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Stephen Charnock (1628-1680) is arguably remembered for his importance,
at the zenith of Puritan or English Reformed scholastic divinity, in terms of the
doctrine of God’s existence and attributes. He also contributed to Reformed orthodox
or Puritan theology through his writings on the knowledge of God, the doctrine of
regeneration, Christology, and the atonement. He wrote all these work in the midst of
the theological turbulence of the later seventeenth century, with the underlying
purpose of defending the inseparability of theological system and piety. His work,
with its eclectic acceptance of medieval scholastic intellectual tradition as a tool,
plays a significant role in the development of an historical phase of trinitarian and
federal theology. However, The Existence and Attributes of God as Charnock’s
magnum opus has been unexplored in terms of its view of the full doctrine of God in
its trinitarian and covenantal dimensions. This is despite the fact that the Puritan
concept of the divine attributes is the very doctrinal area in which the theological loci
are concentrated into “a system” associated with the pursuit of piety in the period of
high orthodoxy. This lack of a comprehensive overview concerning the Reformed
orthodox system has brought about a misunderstanding of his theology. Charnock’s
work has been regarded, even in recent scholarship, as the product of a mere
scholastic rationalism.
William Perkins (1558-1602) is undoubtedly the “father” of the doctrine of
God in the early Puritan or Reformed orthodox period. Although misunderstandings
concerning his scholastic Puritan theology and its trinitarian system and piety have
been successfully rectified by other previous researchers, a confirmation of it through
an investigation of his idea of God’s attributes is necessary in our study. This is in
order to prove the identity of Charnock’s doctrine of God with the Puritan Reformed
orthodox theological system allowing, of course, for the development of the
historical and theological context between these two periods.
In particular, Charnock’s understanding of the theological prolegomena,
Scriptural foundations, and God’s existence and attributes is dealt with in this current
study in comparison with Perkins’ work. Charnock’s work has been viewed in terms
of a continuity between the early and high orthodox doctrine of God within the flow
of English Puritan thought. During this examination, giving particular attention to
Charnock’s treatise The Existence and Attributes of God, we have attempted to
resolve the question of whether the past interpretation of Charnock’s theology or
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doctrine of God as a rigid speculative doctrinal formulation of Protestant
scholasticism beyond Scripture is reasonable or not.
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Chapter One
The Context of the Doctrine of God in Charnock and Perkins
I. Reformed Scholasticism and Stephen Charnock
For several years now, the study of Reformed orthodoxy has been a
controversial area in historical theology, particularly in relation to the question of
how to grasp the identity of the relationship between Protestant scholasticism and
“rationalism”. By definition, Reformed orthodoxy signifies a phase and development
of post-Reformation theology from the later sixteenth to the early eighteenth-century
on the continent and in the British Isles.1 According to the older perspective,
predating the rise of recent scholarship, the theologians of the Reformed orthodox
period were uniformly regarded as representing a “discontinuity” between Calvin
and the later orthodox Reformed theologians, including the English “Puritans”.2 The
1 The term “Protestant orthodoxy” includes the development of both Lutheran and the Reformed
tradition. In our thesis, we will follow Richard Muller’s division of the post-Reformation development
of “Reformed” orthodoxy that accepted Otto Weber’s model as follows: early orthodoxy with a
distinct phase (c. 1565-1618-1640) and high orthodoxy with another distinct phase (c. 1640-1685-
1725). See Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2003), esp. vol. I, pp. 30-2. Hereafter “PRRD”. Cf. Otto Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics,
2 vols, tr. Darell Guder (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981-82), pp. 120-7. Reformed orthodoxy of
course covers both Britain and the continent, but we will frequently use the terminology “orthodoxy”
interchangeably with “Puritanism” or even “Puritan Reformed orthodoxy” in the text, because our
focus is upon the English Puritans Charnock and Perkins in British context. For example, Stephen
Holmes virtually identifies Puritanism with the Reformed orthodox tradition. See Stephen Holmes,
God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2001), pp. 14-5. For the views that see the definition of “orthodoxy” more widely in
relation to the Antinomianism controversy in the seventeenth century context, see T. D. Bozeman, The
Precisianist Strain: Disciplinary Religion and Antinomian Backslash in Puritanism to 1638 (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Michael Winship, Making Heretics: Militant
Protestantism & Free Grace in Massachusetts 1636-41 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2002); David Como, “Puritans, Predestination and the Construction of Orthodoxy in Early
Seventeenth Century England,” in Conformity and Orthodoxy in the English Church, c. 1560-1660, ed.
P. Lake and & M. Questier (New York: Boydell Press, 2000), pp. 64-87.
2
On the “older” perspective, for example, Otto Gründler, “Thomism and Calvinism in the Theology
of Girolamo Zanchi (1516-1590)” (Th.D. Dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1961), pp.
22-3, 122; Brian Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1969), pp. 136-7; Basil Hall, “Calvin against the Calvinists,” in John Calvin, ed. G. E. Duffield
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), pp. 25-30; S. Strehle, Calvinism, Federalism, and Scholasticism: A
Study in the Reformed Doctrine of the Covenant (Bern: Peter Lang, 1988); Alister McGrath,
Reformation Thought: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 123-31; A. C. Clifford,
Atonement and Justification: English Evangelical Theology 1640-1790: An Evaluation (Oxford:
Clarenden Press, 1990), pp. 95-105. For a summary of similar views about Luther and later
Lutheranism, see Robert P. Scharlemann, Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1964), pp. 14-8. With regard to the definition of (English) Puritanism, we do not
deal with Arminian and mystical Dissenters of later seventeenth century. On the ambiguity of the
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English Puritan, moderate Independent, and Reformed orthodox divine, Stephen
Charnock (1628-1680) was, of course, included in this scholarly assessment.3
Who was Stephen Charnock? Charnock was born in the parish of St
Katharine Cree, London.4 He was admitted as a sizar at Emmanuel, the Puritan
college, Cambridge in 1642. He studied under William Sancroft and seems to have
experienced “true” conversion during the Cambridge days. Charnock seems to have
been affected much more by the Puritan milieu of Cambridge than by either
Anglicanism or Platonic philosophy although, it must be said, he had an extensive
knowledge of philosophy in those days. After receiving his B. D. degree, he worked
as a minister at Southwark and London. In 1650, he became a fellow of New College,
Oxford, and was appointed Proctor of the university in 1654. While at Oxford,
Charnock collaborated with Goodwin, Owen and Howe; he was respected as a very
considerable scholar and an eminent divine. He accepted an offer to go to Ireland,
and was appointed as one of the ministers for a weekly Monday lecture at Dublin in
1655 while keeping his fellowship at Oxford by Oliver Cromwell. He preached at
St.Patrick’s and St.Catherine’s, and carried out his pastoral ministry as an
Independent to English troops and civilian administrations with fervency. His
audience regarded Charnock’s preaching as the best except for that of James Ussher,
for his sermons were mostly practical, rational, and persuasive enough for them to
understand it.
Charnock visited the continent several times after the Restoration in 1660. He
boundary of the terms Independency, the puritan separatists and sects, see John Spurr, English
Puritanism 1603-1689 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 12; on the term “Arminian puritans”, see
pp. 168-9. For a succinct explanation of recent and constantly changing aspects of the meaning of
“puritan” and the puritan movement, see Susan Hardman Moore, Pilgrims: New World Settlers & the
Call of Home (London: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 148-9 and the abundant cited literature
therein; see also Joel Beeke, The Quest for Full Assurance: The Legacy of Calvin and His Successors
(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1999), pp. 82-3.
3 There has been a misunderstanding of Charnock’s denominational background that saw him as
Presbyterian because he was a co-pastor with Thomas Watson at Crosby Hall from 1675 to his death
in 1680. However, there is no literary evidence to support this assumption. According to Gribben’s
and Seymour’s account of Irish Puritanism related to Charnock’s ministry in Dublin before the
Restoration, he was arguably an Independent Puritan. See Crawford Gribben, The Irish Puritans:
James Ussher and the Reformation of the Church (Darlington: Evangelical Press, 2003), pp. 110-5; St.
John D. Seymour, The Puritans in Ireland 1647-1661 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921).
4 The following concise account of the biography of Charnock depends upon Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography (2004), Richard Greaves, “Stephen Charnock”; Erasmus Middleton, “Stephen
Charnock, B. D.,” in Biographia Evangelica: or, an historical account of the lives and deaths of the
most eminent and evangelical authors or preachers, … , vol. 3 of 4 in Eighteenth Century Collections
Online (London: 1779-1786), pp. 443-50; James McCosh, “Introduction to Charnock’s Works”, in The
Complete Works of Stephen Charnock vol. I, pp. vii-xxxv; William M. Symington, “Life and Character
of Charnock,” in Stephen Charnock, Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God, 2 vols.
(Robert Carter & Brothers, 1853), pp. 9-18.
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traveled in the Netherlands and France for the study of divinity. After these fifteen
years, he became co-pastor of a nonconformist congregation with Thomas Watson at
Crosby Hall in London. He published only one book in his lifetime, The Sinfulness
and Cure of Thoughts (1676). Charnock left voluminous writings originally given as
lectures from the pulpit over three years on the doctrine of God, especially
concerning the divine essence and attributes: Discourses upon the Existence and the
Attributes of God (1682). This was published as his magnum opus with other works
after his death.5 Although Charnock died on 27 July 1680 before the completion of
the lectures on all the divine attributes and thus the detailed treatment of divine
affections and virtues could not be written, our case in this thesis for the clarifying
“theological matrix” of Charnock’s thought is not affected by this incompleteness
because of his wide-ranging treatment of the doctrine of God throughout this work.
As Charnock’s theology has not been much studied, it has only been possible
to find two recent commentators who relate it to the general characteristics of
seventeenth century Reformed orthodox thought. Tudur R. Jones, who adopts the
negative view that Protestant scholasticism represents a discontinuity with Calvin,
asserted:
Whereas most [Puritan] theologians were content to speak of two covenants,
some posited three. Charnock is an example of one who took this view. He
distinguished a Covenant of Grace and a Covenant of Redemption. … This
elaboration of the theology of the covenants by Charnock exemplifies the
tendency to move beyond the testimony of Scripture into the realm of
scholasticism. It illustrates why some students of the period see the Federal
theology as the intrusion of rationalism into Puritan thought.6
5 Stephen Charnock, Several Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God (London: 1682). It
was also published in two different editions in the nineteenth century: Discourses upon the Existence
and Attributes of God (London: T. Tag, 1840; H. G. Bohn, 1845; J. Blackwood, 1875); Discourses
upon the Existence and Attributes of God (New York: Robert Carter, 1853, 1856). Charnock’s
complete works were first printed in the seventeenth century: The Works of the late learned Divine
Stephen Charnock, B.D., 2 vols. (London: Printed for Ben Griffin, and Tho. Cockeril, 1684, 1699, the
third edition). They were edited and published as part of Nichol’s series of standard Puritan divines
along with Thomas Goodwin, Richard Sibbes, David Clarkson, Thomas Brooks, George Swinnock,
Henry Smith, and Thomas Adams, as The Complete Works of Stephen Charnock, 5 vols. (Edinburgh:
James Nichol, 1864-5; repr. Lightening Source, IN: Sovereign Grace Publishers, 2001). Cf. James
M’Cosh, Introduction to Charnock’s Works in Works I, p. xxv. In this thesis, this nineteenth-century
edition of Charnock’s complete works (Nichol’s edition) will be used unless stated otherwise; its
accuracy and completeness have been verified by detailed comparison with the 1684 and 1699 text.
6 Tudur Jones, “Union with Christ: The Existential Nerve of Puritan Piety,” Tyndale Bulletin 41/2
(1990), pp. 186-208. See esp. pp. 194-5. T. F. Torrance holds a similar viewpoint to Jones by seeing
the development of the idea of the covenant of redemption in later Puritan theology as “becoming
abstractive”: see his The School of Faith: the Catechisms of the Reformed Church (London: James
Clarke, 1959), p. lxxix. However, within the wider context of the development of the later Puritan or
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As we see above, Jones uses both “scholasticism” and “rationalism” without specific
definitions as if there is already a tacit understanding of the two terms between
himself and his readers.7 This statement de facto shows that the difference between
the views of these two terms (that is, between the older view and the newer
perspective) gives rise to a particular understanding of Puritan or Reformed orthodox
federal theology.
We also see a similar perspective in Colin Gunton’s work (1941-2003).8 He
argues that the overall traditional tendency of the treatment of God’s attributes,
including that of the Reformed scholastics before the enlightenment, is the
prolongation of so-called “negative theology” or “rationalism”.9 In other words, he
Reformed orthodox theology, the idea of the covenant of redemption was a necessary device for them
to maintain their orthodox theological system on a scriptural basis as the cognitive foundation of our
knowledge of God. In the case of Owen, this tendency is particularly well shown. Throughout the
upcoming arguments in this thesis, we will examine whether Charnock corresponds to Owen and
other Puritans’ cases. See Steve Griffiths, Redeem the Time: Sin in the Writings of John Owen (Fearn:
Christian Focus Publication, 2001), pp. 26-9; Sinclair Ferguson, John Owen on the Christian Life
(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1987), pp. 25-7; Richard Daniels, The Christology of John Owen (Grand
Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2004), pp. 153-67; Carl Trueman, John Owen: Reformed
Catholic, Renaissance Man (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 80-92.
7 We will investigate the problems of defining these terms later. Almost certainly, this error is due to
the misinterpretation of the Reformed doctrine of predestination combined with both the balance and
dynamics of the eternal and temporal dimensions as a rigid “predestinarian system” derived from —
what is called — Aristotelian scholasticism. However, in fact, this was a “high Augustinian doctrinal
conviction,” which, in fact, our research upon the Puritan doctrine of God’s existence should be based
upon as a general assumption of the arguments following later on. Cf. Muller, “Calvin and the
‘Calvinists’: Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities between the Reformation and Orthodoxy, Part
2,” in After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003), pp. 82-3.
8 Colin E. Gunton, Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes (London: SCM Press,
2002). He refers to Charnock as a representative figure in illustrating the limit of the Reformed
scholastic idea of divine attributes. See esp. pp. 89-93, 113, 117.
9 The tradition of negative theology basically emphasises our unknowability of God. On the definition
and the root of it, see Gunton, Act and Being, pp. 36-55. In the traditions of Christian theology since
the period of early Fathers, the doctrine of Scriptures and the issue of “divine simplicity” were firstly
dealt with among theological loci. However, modern theologians deny the concept of divine simplicity
with its arbitrary “ontological confidence” saying that it is foreign to Christianity. For a critique of this,
see Stephen Holmes, “Something Much Too Plain to Say: Towards a Defence of the Doctrine of
Divine Simplicity,” in Listening to the Past: The Place of Tradition in Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2002), pp. 53-4, 67. It is also worth paying attention to Carl Trueman’s argument that both
the mainstream of medieval theology and the major Reformers’ theology de facto accepted “God’s
trustworthiness” in redemption with “an absolutely unconditional promise of salvation,” though
medieval theology did not highlight it and the medieval catholic church did not approve it within
soteriological context: Carl Trueman, “The God of Unconditional Promise,” in The Trustworthiness of
God: Perspectives on the Nature of Scripture, ed. Paul Helm & Carl R. Trueman (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2002), pp. 175-91, esp. pp. 178-89. Cf. Colin Gunton, “Trinity and Trustworthiness,” in
The Trustworthiness of God, pp. 275-84. On the related outline of the points of contention on the
doctrine of God since Adolf Von Harnack, especially on divine attributes, see Alister E. McGrath,
Christian Theology: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, second edition), pp. 273-80.
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considers that the traditional doctrines of the divine attributes, Charnock’s included,
did not reflect appropriately the trinitarian revelation of God in the history of
salvation. Sharing Jones’ assumption about the intrusion of scholasticism, he also
argues that the (Reformed scholastic) “method” constrains the “content” of theology
in Charnock’s The Existence and Attributes of God.10 According to Gunton’s view,
therefore, the necessity of the close relatedness of trinitarian theology and the
doctrine of God’s attributes (as the core of a theological system or of the doctrine of
God) in Reformed orthodox or Puritan thought — Charnock’s in our case — became
obscured. Of course this is against the view that the Puritan (and Charnock’s)
emphases upon the ad extra dimension, in the account of divine attributes as our
knowledge of God, could be seen as evidence of the following: that the Protestant
scholastic doctrine of divine attributes was neither abstract nor speculative, but
instead reflects faithfulness to the “exegetical tradition” of Scripture and to the piety
associated with this line of thought since the medieval period.11 That is, Jones’s and
Gunton’s assertions allege the existence of a “distorted” image of God in Charnock’s
theology, and it is worthwhile examining whether this view is tenable or not. A closer
study of Charnock’s doctrine of God — especially in The Attributes of God — would
suggest that Jones’ and Gunton’s claims should be reassessed.
In a similar vein to the necessity of new investigation of Charnock’s doctrine
of God, Stephen Holmes asserts that we can demonstrate the “comprehensibleness
and usefulness” of the divine essence and attributes as long as there is no “failure to
listen to the tradition”.12 Carl Trueman also describes the Reformed scholastic
Puritan John Owen’s view on the divine attributes as follows:
10 Gunton, Act and Being, p. 91. For example, Gunton criticises Charnock by saying that Charnock
merely repeats the twofold approach of Wollebius (1586-1629) by dividing divine attributes into two
rather loose groupings - a “negative” group (essence, spirit, eternity) and a more positive group. In
chapters three and four, we will show that Gunton fails to fully consider the federal dimension of
Charnock’s ideas. The point can also be made that in the Attributes of God Charnock, in fact, did not
deal with the complete range of the divine attributes. However, this does not amount to any significant
inconsistency between the “method” and “content” of his theology, as has been alleged.
11
Richard Muller, “Calvin and the ‘Calvinists’: Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities between
the Reformation and Orthodoxy, Part 2,” p. 84. Within a similar context, we see at the same time the
need to revise Perry Miller’s classical understanding of the Puritan doctrine of the attributes of God.
Miller fails to note the importance of both Scripture (the cognitive foundation of the Puritan’s
knowledge of God) and biblical language as key elements in the essence of the “Puritan mind”. See
Perry Miller, The New England Mind: Seventeenth Century (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1954), esp. pp. 10-21. Cf. J. Coffey, Politics, Religion, and the British Revolutions: The Mind of
Samuel Rutherford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 81; contra Miller, see G.
Marsden, “Perry Miller’s Rehabilitation of the Puritans: a Critique,” Church History 39 (1970), p. 93.
12 S. Holmes, “Something Much Too Plain to Say,” p. 51.
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Owen characteristically uses God’s attributes as a means of safeguarding the
personal God of history and salvation, and he is able to do this because of the
important relationship in which God’s attributes stand to the covenant of grace
and thus to God’s saving purposes.13
Although Charnock’s treatises upon the attributes of God along with his
works on regeneration, providence, and atonement have been appraised as major
works, few have researched his whole doctrine of God as a “system” at a scholarly
level. Charnock has been a “forgotten man” in Puritan and Reformed scholarship.14
Some researchers have dealt only with his doctrine of regeneration. James Shields’
work displays weakness in that he only used a topical research method, examining
Charnock in comparison with other Puritan divines, i.e., Perkins, Sibbes, Baxter,
Owen, Goodwin, and Howe.15 E. F. Kevan cited Charnock’s work frequently but
briefly, along with other Puritan works.16 F. K. Drayson dealt with Charnock’s
doctrine of divine sovereignty, but without a scholarly level of analysis.17 A. T. B.
McGowan only touched on Charnock’s doctrine of regeneration.18 Among more
recent scholars, Trueman has spoken highly of Charnock’s literature on the doctrine
of God as a “classic example” of “rhetorical persuasion to belief” in the Reformed
orthodox period.19 Most of all, Richard Muller, in his multi-volume series Post-
13 Carl Trueman, The Claims of Truth: John Owen’s Trinitarian Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster
Publishing, 1998), p. 143.
14 For example, see J. Beeke, A Reader’s Guide to Reformed Literature (Grand Rapids: Reformation
Heritage Books, 1999), pp. 1, 28; Augustus Toplady, “Philosophical Necessity Asserted,” in The
Complete Works of Augustus Toplady (Harrisburg: Sprinkle Publication, 1987), p. 785. William Shedd
(1820-1894) also cites Charnock’s work as much as twenty eight times as a representative writer of
the seventeenth century along with John Owen and Turretin: see W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology,
Third Edition, ed. Alan Gomes (New Jersey: P & R, 2003). We can confirm this point in the
publication history of his writings, especially in the nineteenth century. Stephen Charnock, The
Doctrine of Regeneration (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1800, 1840); idem, A
Treatise of Divine Providence (London: 1680, 1683, 1685; Philadelphia: W. W. Woodward, 1817);
idem, Discourses on Christ Crucified (London: Religious Tract Society, 1800); idem, Discourses on
Christ’s Death, Exaltation, and Intercession (London: Religious Tract Society, 1839). We can also see
the Dutch version of Charnock’s Discourses on Christ Crucified: Godt verzoent de wet: in haaren
tweederleyen eisch verheerlykt en van haren vloek ontwapent, trans. Jan Ross (Amsterdam: Jacobus
Haffman, boekverkoper op het Rusland, 1757).
15 James L. Shields, “The Doctrine of Regeneration in English Puritan Theology: 1604-1689” (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1965).
16 E. F. Kevan, The Grace of Law: A Study in Puritan Theology (London: Carey Kingsgate, 1964).
17 F. K. Drayson, “Divine sovereignty in the Thought of Stephen Charnock,” in Puritan Papers:
volume one (1956-1959), ed. J. I. Packer (New Jersey: P & R, 2000), pp. 213-24.
18 A. T. B. McGowan, The Federal Theology of Thomas Boston (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2002), pp. 92-
109.
19 Carl Trueman, “Calvin and Calvinism,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin, ed. Donald
K. McKim, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 236-7; idem, “Reformers, puritans,
evangelicals,” in The Rise of Laity in Evangelical Protestantism, ed. Deryck W. Lovegrove (London:
Routledge, 2002), p. 34.
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Reformation Reformed Dogmatics (I-IV, 4 vols. 2003), dealt with the full doctrine of
God of the Reformed orthodox comparing this extensively with the views of older
scholarship. 20 Muller’s point of strength lies in the fact that he clarified the
importance of the role of the Reformed doctrine of the “covenant”. This consistently
controls the whole theological system in relation to the other important theological
loci within the context of a doctrine of God including the Trinity and the attributes of
God.
In brief, on the whole, there have been, clearly, two mutually opposite
(negative and affirmative) views concerning the Reformed scholastic doctrine of God,
especially related to the attributes of God.
II. The Historical Background of the Relationship between the Trinity and the
Doctrine of Divine Attributes
At this juncture, we need to discuss the “root” reason of divergent views
about the seventeenth century orthodox doctrine of God in modern scholarship.
Developing the brief comments made earlier, the key issue is how to view the
relationship between trinitarian doctrine and God’s attributes in light of the history of
Christianity. In relation to the pursuit of the historical roots of the seventeenth
century doctrine of God, this also depends upon whether one sees the historical
process of the formation of the doctrine of Trinity since early Christianity as “an
undesirable Hellenization” of the teaching of the original gospel of Christ written in
Scripture or not.21
Let us summarise the general argument on the “negative” side. According to
those who view the Hellenistic tendency critically, the influence of both Greek
philosophy and Augustine’s psychological model of the Trinity dominated the history
of the Western intellectual tradition, and produced a distorted image of God. This
image was of an ontological, static, and metaphysical God as an unknowable
20 Muller clarifies the Reformed orthodox system of the doctrine of God from both theological
prolegomena and the doctrine of Scripture to the doctrine of the existence, essence, and attributes of
God and the Trinity, arguing that this is founded upon and developed from the initial structure of the
medieval scholastic system of theology. Similar arguments are pursued in his After Calvin; Carl
Trueman, The Claims of Truth; Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment, ed. Carl Trueman
and Scott Clark (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999); Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical
Enterprise, ed. Willem Van Asselt and Eef Dekker (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001).
21 See Gerald Bray, “The Trinity: Where Do We Go from Here?” in Always Reforming: Explorations
in Systematic Theology, ed. A. T. B. McGowan (Downers Grove: IVP, 2006), pp. 19-40; idem, “Has
the Christian Doctrine of God Been Corrupted by Greek Philosophy?” in God under Fire, ed. Douglas
Huffman & Eric Johnson (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002), pp. 106-17.
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“essence” or “substance” far from the image of the biblical, dynamic, relational, and
historical God as the three distinct “persons”. The way of explaining God’s attributes
also went astray according to this “impersonal” or “modalistic” understanding of the
doctrine of the Trinity. Such continuous currents in Western theology before the
enlightenment are viewed as a type of “rationalism”, which is named “classical
theism”.22 In addition, medieval scholasticism represented by Thomas Aquinas’
Summa Theologica added to this rationalistic tendency. Though the Reformation
seems to have returned to the Scriptural God transiently, it was soon influenced by
the ‘recurrent’ tendency of Protestant scholasticism towards rationalism.
This view — that Protestant scholasticism tends towards rationalism —
basically stems from the interpretations of the nineteenth century church historians in
Germany on the past history of the orthodox doctrine of God, especially in the work
of Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) and Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930).23 Karl Barth
developed his understanding of Protestant scholastic theology within the boundary of
their influence, and the aforementioned T. F. Torrance, Colin Gunton, and Tudur
Jones are not free from the legacy of Ritschl, Harnack, and Barth related to this point.
At another level, the emergence of growing interest in trinitarian theology over the
last several decades is partly related to the inheritance of Barthian theology.24 The
overall tendency of the modern interest in trinitarianism is distinct from the radical
“social” trinitarian theory that neglects the importance of the immanent Trinity.
However, this is de facto located within the context of the tradition of the systematic
theology of the “New Yale School” or “Yale post-liberalism”, associated with the
thought of Hans Frei and George Lindbeck who are also affected by the method and
framework of Barth’s theology.25
22 For a representative essay based upon this perspective: Colin Gunton, “Augustine, The Trinity and
the Theological Crisis of the West,” in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (New York & London: T
& T Clark, 1997), pp. 30-55. Cf. R. Letham, The Holy Trinity (New Jersey: P & R, 2004), pp. 198-200.
23 Gerald Bray, “Has the Christian Doctrine of God Been Corrupted by Greek Philosophy?” in God
under Fire, ed. Douglas Huffman & Eric Johnson (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002), p. 108.
24 For example, see Colin Gunton, Father, Son & Holy Spirit: Towards a Fully Trinitarian Theology
(New York & London: T & T Clark, 2003); idem, Enlightenment and Alienation: An Essay Towards a
Trinitarian Theology (London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1985); Robert Jenson, The Triune Identity
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982); E. Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s Being is Becoming
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976); Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed.
Christoph Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995); Thomas Weinandy, The Father’s Spirit of
Sonship: Rediscovering the Trinity (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995).
25 For example: Hans Frei, Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, ed. George Hunsinger (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993); George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and
Theology in a Postliberal Age (London: SPCK, 1984); John Thompson, Modern Trinitarian
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). For a detailed account, see Michael Horton,
“Yale Postliberalism: Back to the bible?” in A Confessing Theology for Postmodern Times, ed.
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These theologians seek to integrate the unnecessarily divided dimensions of
both trinitarian theology and the doctrine of divine attributes in terms of “being” (the
ontological dimension) and “act” (the economic dimension) of God. They do this by
way of adopting historical christocentrism (in a Barthian or ecumenical way); along
with increased interest in the person and work of the Holy Spirit, which has been
allegedly overlooked in the Western Augustinian tradition.26 In a similar vein, we
have also seen a growing interest in the Eastern idea of the Trinity that lays emphasis
on the concepts of “person” and the “communion” of the three persons in recent
scholarship, especially in the work of Torrance and Gunton.27 At the same time they
emphasise the aspects of theology or dogmatics as a kind of “narrative” second level
system elicited from the Scripture under the authority of the church or communal
background.28 Of course the influence of postmodern thought is not unrelated to this
trend in the midst of the conflict between “foundationalism” and “anti-
foundationalism” in theological methodology.29
How could perspectives on the history of the Trinitarian doctrine and divine
attributes be so divergent? How should we respond to the “negative” position
concerning the relationship between the Trinity and the divine attributes in classical
theism, particularly regarding the case of the Reformed scholastics? Although some
theologians (e.g., Robert Letham and Stephen Holmes) have recently taken a middle
or eclectic position between these two camps by regarding the importance of the role
of “tradition” in this issue, the fundamental gap still remains.30 Did the seventeenth
century Reformed scholastic doctrine of God fail to deal successfully with the prior
limits of classical theism in Western theology?
Michael Horton (Wheaton: Crossway, 2000), pp. 183-216. Cf. George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace:
Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2000).
26 The increasing interest of recent western researchers of the Trinity in the thought of the modern
eastern theologian John Zizioulas is one of the examples of this trend: John Zizioulas, Being as
Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985).
27 For a brief account of this tendency, see Brian Kay, Trinitarian Spirituality: John Owen and the
Doctrine of God in Western Devotion (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2007), pp. 9, 110.
28 For example, see Trinitarian Soundings in Systematic Theology, ed. Paul Metzger (New York &
London: T & T Clark, 2005).
29 See Albert Mohler, “Reformist Evangelicalism: A Center without a Circumference,” in A
Confessing Theology for Postmodern Times, pp. 131-50; Michael Horton, Covenant and Eschatology:
The Divine Drama (Louisville: Westminster and John Knox Press, 2002), pp. 2-4. Cf. Kevin
Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: a Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), pp. 291-4; Stanley Grenz and John Franke, Beyond
Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context (Louisville: Westminster John Knox
Press, 2001).
30 Stephen Holmes, “The Attributes of God,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed.
John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 54-70;
Robert Letham, The Holy Trinity (New Jersey: P & R, 2004), esp. pp. 408-9, 430-1.
19
As mentioned earlier, Richard Muller’s general argument concerning the
seventeenth century orthodox doctrine of God shows its strength in reminding us of
the importance of the historical context of theology. However, he does not mention or
reflect on the discussion of this doctrinal area (trinitarian theology and the doctrine of
divine attributes) in terms of recent development (regardless of whether they are
against his argument or not) in the field of modern systematic theology. Therefore, in
this thesis, based upon the recognition of the weak point found in Muller’s treatment
of the Reformed orthodox attributes of God as well, we see the need to examine
whether Jones’ and Gunton’s comments on Charnock indicate a lack of proper
understanding of “Christian Aristotelianism” (against the negative nuances of the
agnostic, Hellenized, or hybrid God of Christianity) and its significance in the
Western intellectual tradition from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century.
III. The English Reformed Scholastic Doctrine of God: Charnock and Perkins
Now we need to think about the root of Charnock’s doctrine of God from the
point of view of wider English Reformed theology. Did his ideas appear in a
vacuum? No. To illuminate Charnock’s doctrine of God’s attributes, it is valuable to
focus simultaneously on William Perkins’ (1558-1602) specific treatment of it as “the
father” of English Puritan theology, in order to trace the antecedents of Charnock’s
thought. Perkins was born in 1558 in Bulkington parish, Warkwickshire, and
educated in Christ’s College, Cambridge. After experiencing “true” conversion from
a life of dissipation, he studied theology under Laurence Chaderton (1536-1640), and
had fellowship with other early Puritans in a “spiritual brotherhood” at Cambridge.
He became a fellow at Christ’s College in 1578, and also served as the dean of
Christ’s College (1590-1591). From 1585 until his death in 1602, as rector of St.
Andrews Church, Cambridge, Perkins’ pulpit ministry made him famous throughout
Britain and the Continent for his highly influential, scholastic, Ramistic, and
experimental Calvinistic preaching. After his death, his writings were collected and
edited in the three volumes. Perkins was “a major English codifier” of the Reformed
doctrine of God in early orthodoxy.31 Michael Jinkins describes Perkins’ powerful
influence: “The list of students influenced by Perkins reads like a who’s who of
31 Quotation from Muller, “John Calvin and Later Calvinism,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Reformation Theology, ed. David Bagchi & David Steinmetz (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), p. 138. William Perkins, The Workes of … Mr. William Perkins. 3 vols. (Cambridge: John
Legatt, 1612-1619). This edition will be used in our investigation of Perkins’ idea.
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seventeenth century Calvinism”.32 He was also a highly influential figure in the
“two-way traffic in theology between England and the Continent” which was made
possible through the large translated publication of his works on the continent.33
The case of Perkins evidences not only the initial aspect of the trinitarian
emphasis in the seventeenth century Puritan doctrine of God, but also the balance
between “efficacy” and “reliability” in the Puritan doctrine of God within the
covenantal structure. 34 In addition, although a few theologians have recently
developed the study of Perkins’ doctrine of God from the new perspective of a larger
Trinitarian context, yet there has been less focus on Perkins’ exposition of the
attributes of God.35 There comes a need to investigate Perkins’ thought concerning
trinitarianism in relation to the doctrine of the attributes of God, in comparison with
Charnock’s work. In brief, the investigation of the coherence of the trinitarian system
will be our methodological “key” for understanding the identity of Charnock’s idea
of God’s attributes through the ongoing research. For this purpose, we need to set up
in advance three parameters for our discussion in the later chapters, within the
theological and historical contexts which inform Charnock’s The Attributes of God in
the discussions of the later seventeenth century.
32
Quotation from Michael Jinkins, “William Perkins (1558-1602),” in Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography (2004). For an older but representative research into the general background of Perkins’
theology, see Ian Breward, “The Life and Theology of William Perkins” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of
Manchester, 1963); Mark Shaw, “The Marrow of Practical Divinity: A Study in the Theology of
William Perkins” (Th.D. Dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary, 1981).
33 Ian Breward, “The Significance of William Perkins,” Journal of Religious History 4 (1966), p. 116.
See also Cornelius W. Schoneveld, Intertraffic of the Mind: Studies in Seventeenth-Century Anglo-
Dutch Translation with a Checklist of Books Translated from English into Dutch, 1600-1700 (Leiden:
Brill, 1983).
34 Quotation from Trueman, The Claims of Truth, p. 143. The “absolute and conditional” aspect of
Puritanism is always related to seeking to find a “middle course” between “two fearful errors”:
Antinomianism and Pelagianism. See John Spurr, English Puritanism 1603-1689 (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 157-9.
35 Richard Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from
Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988); idem, “Perkins’ A Golden Chaine:
Predestinarian System or Schematized Ordo Salutis?” Sixteenth Century Journal 9, 1 (1978), pp. 69-
81; Joel Beeke, The Quest for Full Assurance: The Legacy of Calvin and His Successors (Edinburgh:
The Banner of Truth, 1999); P.R. Schaefer, “Protestant ‘Scholasticism’ at Elizabethan Cambridge:
William Perkins and a Reformed Theology of the Heart,” in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in
Reassessment, ed. Carl Trueman and R. Scott Clark (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), pp. 147-64; idem,
“The Spiritual Brotherhood of the Heart: Cambridge Protestants and the Doctrine of Sanctification
from William Perkins to Thomas Shepherd” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994); Paul Helm,
Calvin and the Calvinists (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth, 1982); Mark Dever, Richard Sibbes:
Puritanism and Calvinism in Late Elizabethan and Early Stuart England (Georgia: Mercer University
Press, 2000).
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A. Parameter One: Doctrinal System and Scripture in Reformed Scholasticism
To get a clear picture of the doctrine of God in Perkins and Charnock we, first,
should make several points about the term “Reformed orthodoxy” within the context
of intellectual history.36 Perkins’ work falls roughly into the first half of early
orthodoxy, and Charnock’s, under the first half of high orthodoxy. A definition of the
Reformed orthodoxy should be clearly given again: the “theological content of the
Reformed tradition;” what was taken to be “right and correct teaching” in the
Reformed literature of the seventeenth-century.37 In fact, Reformed orthodoxy left a
diverse genre of literatures — confessions, catechisms, biblical commentaries,
sermons, and treatises.38 To elaborate the theological system that correlates with
orthodoxy (though the preliminary form of prolegomena had been seen in late
medieval theology) the orthodox theologians needed a theological prolegomena
dealing with principia theologiae in the context of their era.39 They saw two ultimate
principles of theology (the knowledge of God) ― the Scripture as the principium
cognoscendi or cognitive foundation and God as the principium essendi or essential
foundation.40 For Reformed orthodoxy, the genus of theology was “science” in the
sense that the knowledge of both God and Scripture as the revealed truth of God
could be attained, and this, at the same time was “wisdom”, that is, the knowledge of
final goals to which such knowledge pointed.
Second, post-Reformation orthodoxy cannot be understood without
considering its relationship to “scholasticism”. Scholasticism in medieval perspective
was a “school theology” in the university with various backgrounds of philosophy.41
36 For a general survey of the terminologies, see Richard Muller, “Scholasticism and Orthodoxy in the
Reformed Tradition: Definition and Method,” in After Calvin, pp. 27-36.
37 Muller, “John Calvin and later Calvinism,” p. 140. Cf. idem, “Scholasticism and Orthodoxy in the
Reformed Tradition,” p. 36.
38 Idem, “Scholasticism and Orthodoxy in the Reformed Tradition,” p. 31.
39 PRRD IV, p. 397. For the details of the history of theological prolegomena since Augustine, see
PRRD I, pp. 88-108.
40 See PRRD I, pp. 108-22. For the doctrinal limitation of medieval scholastic forerunners of the
Reformation on this point, see ibid., pp. 437-40.
41 Carl Trueman defines scholasticism plainly, “Scholasticism was simply the pedagogical method
which was employed in the university context, built around the question and answer framework of so-
called disputed questions.” See Trueman, “Reformers, puritans, evangelicals,” p. 26; idem, “Calvin
and Calvinism,” p. 229; Muller, “Giving Direction to Theology: The Scholastic Dimension,” Journal
of Evangelical Theological Society 26, 3 (Sep. 1983), p. 319; idem, After Calvin, pp. 30ff; M. D.
Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, trans. A. M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry
Regnery, 1964), p. 61. Especially on the distinction between Aristotelianism and scholasticism, see
David C. Steinmetz, “The Theology of Calvin and Calvinism,” in Reformation Europe: A Guide to
Research, ed. Steven Ozment (St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1982), pp. 225-6; idem,
“The Scholastic Calvin,” in Protestant Scholasticism, ed. Trueman and Clark (Carlisle: Paternoster,
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It was also an objective method foreign to its content, as Van Asselt and Dekker
define it, “a scientific method of research and teaching, and [scholasticism] does not
have a doctrinal content, neither does it have reason as its foundation.”42 Muller’s
definition of scholasticism as the “academic and often highly technical method for
the definition and elaboration of this theological orthodoxy” also shows its
relationship to and distinction from Protestant orthodoxy.43 Thus, a basic similarity
can be found between Protestant scholasticism and, for example, the Summa
Theologica of Thomas Aquinas that used disputatio and quaestio in building the
structure of its theological system.44 Like other Puritan theologians, Charnock seems
to have used and cited plentifully scholastic materials of the medieval era, as well as
Reformed material from the continent and Roman Catholic material after the
Reformation, in his works.45
What we need to note in the light of historical development, is that the
medieval scholastic method was transformed into a “locus method”, which was a
logic based on the “topical discussion of doctrine” regarding the interpretation of
important biblical texts; “a Renaissance modification of the scholastic approach” also
influenced the writings of the Reformers; a remodified form of the Reformers’ locus
method appeared in orthodoxy as the “standard pattern of dogmatic exposition”
1999), pp. 16-30; idem, “Calvin and the Absolute Power of God,” in Calvin in Context (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 40-52; Stephen Spencer, “Reformed Scholasticism in Medieval
Perspective: Thomas Aquinas and Francis Turretin on Incarnation” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan
State University, 1988), p. 8; Stephen Holmes, “Calvin against Calvinists?” in Listening to the Past, p.
71; Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch.3; idem, After Calvin, p. 16.
42 Reformation and Scholasticism, p. 39. For example, see Muller’s comparison of Aquinas’
commentary on the Gospel of John with Summa Theologiae, cited in Muller, “Scholasticism and
Orthodoxy in the Reformed Tradition,” p. 27. Cf. Muller, ibid., p. 36.
43 Muller, “John Calvin and later Calvinism,” p. 140. For the four ways of distinction of scholasticism
according to the standard of “looseness” and “strictness” in Voetius’ view, see idem, PRRD I, pp. 197-
8.
44 On the concise explanation of the medieval disputatio and quaestio, S. Spencer, “Reformed
Scholasticism in Medieval Perspective,” pp. 23-30; James Weispiel says: “The master’s exposition
was… an intellectual grappling with real problems examined by the author. Recognition of a problem
meant appreciation of all problems sic et non…. Such questions could arise from the text, conflicting
interpretations, doubtful questions, or new insights; these gave rise to [disputatio],” in New Catholic
Encyclopedia, s. v. “Scholastic method”.
45 The most frequent examples are Aquinas, Bradwardine, Calvin, Beza, Zanchi, Amyraut, Turretin,
Daille, Cocceius, Suarez etc. The extensiveness of Charnock’s library (over 1200 items) was proved
during its auction in October 1680: see Bibliotheca Charnockiana Sive Catalogus Librorum (London,
1680). Richard Greaves reports the wide range of Charnock’s library: “His reading included classical
authors such as Plato, Ovid, Pythagoras, and the stoics; church fathers such as Tertulian; the medieval
philosophers Boethius and Averroes; Catholic writers such as Cajetan, Savonarola, and Suarez;
continental protestants such as Cocceius and Grotius; and English writers as disparate as Cartwright,
Baxter, Preston, Ames, Stillingfleet, Fuller, Lightfoot, Davenant, and John Owen”, quoted from
“Stephen Charnock,” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004).
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which was based upon a firm exegetical foundation.46 Reformed orthodoxy then
used the locus method by the proper combination of an a priori and an a posteriori
approach where necessary. 47 Both of the approaches were significant for the
characteristics of the Reformed orthodox doctrine of God. The locus method relates
to the discussion of theology as a theoretical or practical discipline, that is, as
theology for an academic context or for the churchly piety of orthodoxy.48 Scholastic
orthodoxy can be characterized, therefore, as both a “fundamentally exegetical” and
“profoundly traditional” theological system using the locus method as a bridge-
builder between Scriptural exegesis and the construction of doctrinal articles, with a
balance between revelation and a “rectified” reason, albeit sticking to the principle of
the supremacy of the Scriptures over the “abuse” of philosophy.49
These characteristics form the basic framework of Charnock’s and Perkins’
Reformed scholastic doctrine of God with the kinship between sacra pagina and
sacra doctrina over against the suspicion of seventeenth century orthodoxy in
modern scholarship.50 In other words, both Perkins and Charnock set forth a doctrine
of God that regulates other theological loci within the tradition characteristic of
Reformed orthodoxy, especially with regard to the relationship of Scripture and the
fundamental articles.51 Moreover, as Muller puts it, Charnock’s The Existence and
Attributes of God can be regarded as “an excellent example of the orthodox
Protestant use of Scripture” in the way it moves from the Scriptural text to
theological formulation by focusing on the “scope” of the words in the text and
considers hermeneutical and theological concerns within the context of “a tradition
of interpretation”.52 In sum, this inseparability between exegesis and doctrine in
46 Muller, PRRD IV, p. 398. There he adds, “Specific modification came to the method by way of
Ramist logic [that] belong[s] to the late Renaissance recovery and modification of classical late
medieval logical and rhetorical tools. [This model] carr[ies] over into the ‘scholastic’ methods of the
seventeenth-century Protestants”; idem, “Ad fontes argumentorum: The Sources of Reformed
Theology in the Seventeenth Century,” in After Calvin, pp. 57, 78.
47 On the necessity and the way for such combination arranging topics and materials in seventeenth-
century context, see Muller, “Ad fontes argumentorum,” p. 58.
48 PRRD I, pp. 180-1. See also Crawford Gribben, “Lay Conversion and Calvinist Doctrine during the
English Commonwealth,” in The Rise of Laity in Evangelical Protestantism, pp. 36-7. There Gribben
argues that scholastic treatment of all doctrinal loci are not alien to English Puritan theology, stressing
both conversion and sanctification.
49 PRRD IV, p. 392.
50 PRRD II, pp. 501, 518.
51 In the second chapter of this thesis, especially in case of Charnock, we will focus on A Discourse of
the Knowledge of God and A Discourse of the Knowledge of God in Christ (in Works IV, pp. 3-163)
that show Charnock’s idea of theological prolegomena in relation to the doctrine of the attributes of
God.
52 See PRRD II, pp. 516-8. This point will be dealt with in detail in chapter two. For the meaning of
pre-critical exegesis in this interpretive tradition, see Muller, PRRD IV, p. 405; on the monumental
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Perkins’ and Charnock’s scholasticism will be the continuing ‘prop’ of our ongoing
argument.
B. Parameter Two: Trinitarianism and the Divine Simplicity
Although Perkins does not give a fully extensive account of the doctrine of
the attributes of God in separate books, within his works he nevertheless explains the
entire list of divine attributes.53 Above all, Perkins focuses on the working of the
divine will (voluntas Dei) within a Trinitarian dimension. Perkins combined the
divine decree with Christology through the idea of Christ’s being the mediator, which
means that predestination cannot be discussed extra Christum.54 He wanted to see
the divine decree as “an essential act” belonging equally to the three persons of the
triune God by way of correlating it with the doctrine of the Trinity.55 The system of
Perkins has what appears to be an element of “speculative elaboration” for the
clarification of the “logical ordering” of the decree, but this needs to be understood
within the twofold context of divine will: an essential and causal dimension, and a
temporal, covenantal and economic dimension.56
In other words, according to Muller, Christology in Perkins’ system was
structured in terms of “the economy of the divine will as it enters history” in the “line
of the covenant-promise”.57 Lyle Bierma also, without breaking the tension and
balance in this trinitarian background, showed that predestination in the decree and
the nature of the covenant of grace can go hand in hand without a division of
covenant theology in sixteenth-century Reformed theology into two traditions;58 that
article about the significance of pre-critical exegesis, see David C. Steinmetz, “The Superiority of Pre-
Critical Exegesis,” in Theology Today, 37 (1980), pp. 27-38. For the details of interpretation of
Scripture in post-Reformation theology, see Muller, PRRD II, chapter 7; idem, “Biblical Interpretation
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Dictionary of Major Biblical Interpreters, ed. Donald
McKim (Downers Grove, IVP, 2007), pp. 22-44.
53 E.g., Perkins, A Golden Chaine, in Workes (London, 1617-1631), I, pp. 11-14; idem, An Exposition
of the Creede, ibid., pp. 128-30, 133-9.
54 Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin
to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic. 1988), p. 163.
55 Christ and the Decree, p. 161.
56 Christ and the Decree, pp. 171, 173, 178.
57 Christ and the Decree, p. 172.
58 Lyle D. Bierma, “Federal Theology in the Sixteenth Century: Two Traditions?” in Westminster
Theological Journal 45 (1983), pp. 304-21; idem, “The Role of Covenant Theology in Early
Reformed Orthodoxy,” in Sixteenth Century Journal 21 (1990), pp. 453-62; John Von Rohr, The
Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986). For scholars who argue for
two distinct Reformed traditions deriving from Bullinger and Calvin in covenant theology, see
Leonard Trinterud, “The Origins of Puritanism,” in Church History 20 (1951), pp. 37-57; Jens Møller,
“The Beginnings of Puritan Covenant Theology,” in Journal of Ecclesiastical History 14 (1963), pp.
46-67; Richard Greaves, “The Origins and Early Development of English Covenant Thought,” in The
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is, election and covenant do not exclude each other but are mutually related.59 The
fact that the thought of “Christ the mediator” in this way originated in Calvin and
produced its fruit in Perkins, of course, evidences a similar trinitarian understanding
of the doctrine of God. 60 In fact, Perkins’ supralapsarian tendencies in his
christocentric understanding of election are moderated by his view of the covenant as
“the means of executing the decree” that holds not only because of the blood of
Christ on the cross, but because of the elect’s repentance and faith from the working
of the Holy Spirit. This maintains a due regard for works of “preparation” due to the
action of grace for the beginning of the ordo salutis.61 In short, these arguments of
recent scholarship evidence that Perkins was the forerunner of the Puritan Reformed
scholastic understanding of the attributes of God through an integration of both the
ad intra and ad extra, though he explores the full doctrine of God primarily in light
of the working of the divine will.
After Perkins, in the first period of high orthodoxy, British Puritan divines
also wrote numerous works on the doctrine of God ― especially on the divine 
attributes ― in relation to God’s trinitarian working ad extra.62 Owen, Rutherford,
Historian 21 (1968), pp. 21-35; J. Wayne Baker, Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenant: The Other
Reformed Tradition (Athens, Ohio: University of Ohio Press, 1980).
59 In his book The New England Mind, Perry Miller fails to see this affirmative relationship between
election and covenant. Contra Miller, see John Von Rohr, “Covenant and Assurance in Early English
Puritanism,” Church History 34 (1965), pp. 195-203; William K. B. Stoever, ‘A Fair and Easie Way to
Heaven’: Covenant Theology and Antinomianism in Early Massachusetts (Middletown: Wesleyan
University Press, 1978), pp. 53-4.
60 Muller, Christ and the Decree, p. 106. Joel Beeke also points out the continuity of same tendency
in the mid and the later seventeenth-century by mentioning Owen: “For Owen, Predestination compels
covenant; covenant, perseverance; perseverance, assurance,” quoted from The Quest for Full
Assurance: The Legacy of Calvin and His Successors (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth, 1999), p. 167;
cf. John S. Coolidge, Pauline Renaissance in England: Puritanism and the Bible (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1970), p. 131.
61 Robert Letham, “Faith and assurance in Early English Calvinism: A Model of Continuity and
diversity,” in Later Calvinism: International Perspectives, eds. W. Fred Graham (Kirksville: Sixteenth
Century Journal Publishers, 1994), esp. pp. 379-80. On the close relationship between Christology and
Pneumatology in puritan theology within the Trinitarian context, see G. Nuttall, The Holy Spirit in
Puritan Faith and Experience (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946), pp. 144-6.
62 This tendency is largely influenced by Perkins’ theological method that unfolds most of theological
discussions based upon the doctrine of God, though he also stresses ecclesiology: see his Golden
Chaine. H. C. Porter, Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1958), p. 291; cf. Dewey Wallace, Puritans and Predestination: Grace in English Protestant
Theology 1525-1695 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), p. 58; G. R. Cragg,
Puritanism in the Period of the Great Persecution 1660-1688 (London: Cambridge University Press,
1957), p. 205. Carl Trueman, “Lewis Bayly and Richard Baxter,” in The Pietist Theologians: An
Introduction to Theology in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Carter Lindberg (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2005), pp. 52-67, esp. p. 53. For another discussion on the importance of the attributes of
God in seventeenth century puritan theology within the Anglo-American context, see Janice Knight,
Orthodoxies in Massachusetts: Rereading American Puritanism (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1994), ch. 3.
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and Twisse contributed to the doctrine of God, demonstrating mutual influences from
the Reformed contemporaries on the continent, in a polemic style;63 William Bates
and Ezekiel Hopkins offered expositions of the attributes of God from a more
pietistic standpoint.64 Furthermore, Richard Baxter and Charnock were by far the
most eminent English puritans who extensively dealt with the doctrine of the
attributes of God “on a more technical level but remaining firmly within the genre of
devotional and homiletical theologies”.65 In contrast to Baxter, however, Charnock
united scholasticism and piety without a division between a “more scholastic model”
and a “less scholastic model” from the point of view of literary genre.66 Muller notes
the significance of Charnock’s work:
Also of considerable significance as both a contribution to the English
Reformed theology of the seventeenth century and as a codification of doctrine
evidencing the broad resources and major opponents of the Reformed position
is Charnock’s Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God. … [It]
certainly stands as one of the more elaborate and detailed treatises on the
subject written in the seventeenth century and … partakes of the careful
distinctions and definitions that belong to the scholastic theology of the era. It
also evidences the exegetical and practical character of the Protestant theology
of the era, with consistent references to the texts of Scripture on which its
teaching is based and equally consistent attention to the churchly and pious
“use” of each doctrinal point. Charnock’s work, remarkable for its grasp of the
scholastic materials and for its ability to turn those materials to homiletical use,
also invariably turns toward christological and soteriological issues.67
This statement also shows that Charnock and some high orthodox Puritans felt
obliged to give lectures on the existence and attributes of God in order to provide a
63 John Owen, The Works of John Owen, 16 vols. Johnston & Hunter 1850-1853; repr. (Edinburgh:
The Banner of Truth Trust, 1967). See especially Brief Declaration and Vindication of the Doctrine of
the Trinity, in Works 2, pp. 365-439; idem, The Death of Death in the Death of Christ, in Works 10, pp.
139-479; idem, A Dissertation on Divine Justice, in Works 10, pp. 481-624. For Rutherford and
Twisse’s works, see the full list cited in PRRD III, p. 130.
64 William Bates, The Harmony of the Divine Attributes in the Contrivance and Accomplishment of
Man’s Redemption (London, 1674); ed. Presbyterian Board of Publication (Philadelphia: Presbyterian
Board of Publication, n.d.; repr. Virginia: Sprinkle Publication, 1985); Ezekiel Hopkins, On Glorifying
God in His Attributes, in The Works of Ezekiel Hopkins, successively Bishop of Raphoe and Derry, 3
vols. ed. Charles W. Quick, 1874; (repr. Morgan, Pa.: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1995-1998), vol. 2,
pp. 590-708.
65 PRRD III, p. 116. For the full list of Baxter’s works on this, see the list cited in PRRD III, p. 117.
66 PRRD III, p. 117.
67 PRRD III, p. 132. Muller also deals with Charnock in terms of the relationship between theology
and Scripture within the later seventeenth century context in PRRD II, pp. 507, 516-7, and passim.
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firm foundation for the life and piety of the saints as regenerated “new creature(s)”.68
For instance (and this will be explored in detail in chapter three), the arguments for
God’s existence worked not as a foundational proof for the loci system but rather
through persuasive, rhetorical means.69 That is, the philosophical tools for such
arguments were adopted only within an exegetical framework. For Charnock and
several of the English puritans of high orthodoxy within the later seventeenth century
context, the detailed explanation of the attributes of God offered a basis for the
deeper knowledge of God in view of the doctrine of the Trinity.70 Owen also
considers the doctrine of divine attributes to be the elements of “effective regulating”
in the acts of the Triune God ad extra.71
Therefore, most of all, as Amy Pauw argues, we should also consider the
orthodox Puritan effort to explain consistently both “divine simplicity” and
Trinitarian doctrine within the context of Christian Aristotelianism.72 That is, Pauw’s
general analysis of the Puritan theology will also be verified through our case study
of Charnock. The idea of divine simplicity was extremely important for the
Reformed tradition in that it undergirds every other divine attribute.73 It is also
critically important for the argument that the necessity of divine substance or essence
is the “minimal device” for the ontological or immanent Trinity against Tritheism in
the Western-Augustinian tradition including Perkins and Charnock. At the same time,
such necessity was linked to the emergence of Arminianism, Socinianism, and the
debate about “middle knowledge” especially in relation to the necessity of the
68 Though such subjects were apt to be “abstruse and arcane,” the puritan preachers never delivered
lectures and sermons without considering their comprehensibility for their audience. See Charles
Cohen, God’s Caress: The Psychology of Puritan Religious Experience (New York: Oxford University
Press,1986), pp. 167-8. Cf. U. Milo Kaufmann, The Pilgrim’s Progress and Traditions in Puritan
Meditation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 184-5; P. Benedict, Christ’s Churches
Purely Reformed: A Social History of Calvinism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 326;
Gerald Cragg, Puritanism in the Period of the Great Persecution 1660-1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1957), pp. 196, 205-7.
69 For the differences in style among Aquinas, the Reformers, and the Reformed orthodoxy on the
arguments over the existence of God, see Muller, “Ad fontes argumentorum,” pp. 54-5.
70 Muller points out the reciprocal effect between two areas of doctrine in the Reformed orthodoxy:
“The Reformed orthodox were highly attentive to trinitarian issues in their discussions of divine
essence and attributes, just as they were highly attentive to the issues raised by discussions of essence
and attributes in their analysis of the doctrine of the Trinity,” in PRRD IV, p. 418. See also idem,
PRRD III, pp. 129-32. However, the Puritans avoided using “abstruse trinitarian terms,” and discussed
it in terms of explaining economic trinitarian working and piety. See Amy P. Pauw, The Supreme
Harmony of All: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), pp.
66-7.
71 Trueman, The Claims of Truth, p. 110.
72 Pauw, The Supreme Harmony of All, p. 64.
73 Ibid., p. 62. For Pauw’s excellent summary of the Reformed tradition on divine simplicity, see pp.
59-69.
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incarnation and Christ’s atonement.74 This dimension is also deeply related to the
Puritan Reformed scholastics’ defence of the traditional, orthodox idea of the
knowledge of God as a “system” without inconsistency. This defence, furthermore,
attempted to prevent the reduction or “wrecking” of the contents of the key biblical
doctrines based upon both the divine simplicity and the Trinity.
Accordingly, we need to explore the doctrine of God in the work of Charnock
and Perkins to assess whether their theological formulations were a defence of
“divine simplicity” based upon their orthodox understanding of the Triune God in
providence and the decree, or not.75 For example, even if Charnock and the high
orthodox puritans basically added “rational argumentation” for both “support and
elaboration” and more detailed discussions to “the biblical exposition in the initial
place” written by the Reformers and Perkins, yet they were still aware of the
importance of the work of the divine will as a major attribute, as Perkins indicated in
light of the economy of salvation in time.76 At the same time, because of the
continuous importance of trinitarianism and divine simplicity as the “pivot” of our
discussion, we should make it clear later that Charnock’s discussions of the doctrine
of the attributes of God did not depart from a focus on both the covenant of grace and
Christology within the trinitarian structure ad extra, on which Perkins’ and the early
orthodox Puritans’ theological systems had also been based.77
74 Muller, “Ad fontes argumentorum,” p. 54; idem, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of
Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1993). For a lucid exposition of the Jesuit view of divine
knowledge in Molina and Suarez, see J. Coffey, Politics, Religion, and the British Revolutions: The
Mind of Samuel Rutherford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 123-4 ; W. L. Craig,
The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden: Brill,
1988). Against their opponents, the puritans endeavoured to ward off the danger of both the conflict
between divine will and divine knowledge and the arbitrary attributing of the acts of the whole Triune
God to the act of one person of the Trinity. For a brief explanation of the characteristics of these
controversies, see Muller, PRRD III, pp. 119-21. Muller sees that they had a similar origin and effect.
For Arminians as the root of Socinians, see John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The
Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575-1650 (Leiden: Brill, 1982). For the
medieval distinction between potentia absoluta Dei and potentia ordinata Dei in relation to these
controversies, see Heiko Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1963), pp. 30-8. This theme (the power of God) will be dealt with in chapter six in
detail.
75 According to Trueman’s understanding of Puritan theology from his study of Owen, divine
simplicity basically signifies God as a “fully actualized being, so called ‘pure act’, with no potential to
change”. Trueman also states that this terminology was common to both English Puritans and to
orthodox scholastic theologians in the continent in the seventeenth century. See Trueman, Claims of
Truth, pp. 111-2. For a detailed account of the “Reformed scholastics on divine simplicity,” see PRRD
III, pp. 275-84.
76 The quotations are from PRRD IV, pp. 413, 415.
77 Although Charnock did not write on the Trinity as a separate subject in his system (probably
because he died before the completion of his theology as a body of divinity), we will focus upon his
treatment as it appears within his discussion of the existence, essence and attributes of God.
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C. Parameter Three: Continuity and Development from Perkins to Charnock
We need a brief review of the history of writing about the attributes of God to
place Charnock’s intellectual framework in seventeenth century context in terms of
considering the wider tradition in this area. As mentioned earlier, in the medieval
scholastic traditions represented by the Summa Theologica and Summa Contra
Gentiles of Thomas Aquinas, the discussion of the existence and attributes of God
has a considerable weight.78 In contrast with medieval scholastic systems, the
relative scantness of Luther and Calvin’s discussion of the attributes of God arises
out of a sixteenth century context that primarily deals with the Trinitarian debate. To
some extent it also relates to the Reformers’ antipathy to what they saw as late
medieval scholastics’ overuse of reason and philosophy in the exposition of the
attributes of God.79 Nevertheless there were undeniable traces of interest in the
discussion of the attributes of God among Reformers. Early orthodox theologians
developed similar interests in this against a background of doctrinal debates and
controversies with opponents, despite a developing diversity in the orthodox
constitution of the list of attributes.80 Perkins’ writings on divine attributes also
reflect such a tendency along with the influence of Ramism in its succinct way of
presentation.81
In high orthodoxy, particularly in Britain, as mentioned earlier, we note an
extensive development in homiletical theology and commentary within “the field of
dogmatic theology” in the doctrine of the attributes of God.82 This phenomenon also
78 For example, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. the Fathers of the English Dominican
Province, 5 vols, 1911; repr. (Westminster, MD: Christian classics, 1981), I. ii-xxvi.
79 PRRD I, pp. 99, 360-1.
80 See PRRD III, pp. 85-115.
81 PRRD I, p. 62; Muller, “Calvin and the ‘Calvinists’: Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities
between the Reformation and Orthodoxy, Part 2,” p. 87. Cf. Keith L. Sprunger, “Technometria: a
Prologue to Puritan Theology,” in Journal of the History of Ideas 29 (1968), pp. 115-22; Stephen
Holmes, God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), pp. 13-4. On the relationship of Ramism and Puritan sermons in terms of
pastoral influences on the audiences, see John Morgan, Godly Learning: Puritan Attitudes towards
Reason, Learning, and Education 1560-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.
102-12. For more details, see Walter J. Ong, Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art
of Discourse to the Art of Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958); Wilbur
Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England: 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1956); Donald K. McKim, Ramism in William Perkins’ Theology (New York: Peter Lang, 1987).
82 PRRD III, pp. 116-7. To build a system of theology as a whole, Thomas Watson, James Ussher and
Edward Leigh also explained the doctrine of the existence and attributes of God. Watson, A Body of
Divinity (1692), II. 1-11, repr. (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1983), pp. 39-108; Ussher, A Body
of Divinitie (London, 1670), pp. 27-75; Leigh, Systeme or Body of Divinity (London, 1662), pp. 144-
251. John Owen and Thomas Goodwin also dealt with the attributes of God in relation to other
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correlates with the polemical doctrinal debates with opponents within the mid to late
seventeenth century context conducted by orthodox Reformed theologians.83 Among
several theologians in this category, Charnock has been assessed as the most
outstanding theologian for his stress on “the practical use” of doctrines, especially
the doctrine of God, in terms of seeking a “true religion” that both focuses on the
sovereignty of God and the responsiveness of the covenant.84 If we can identify
Charnock’s theology as the “summit of Puritan practical religion” in the later
seventeenth century, this may help us to clear Charnock of the alleged charge that he
allowed rationalism to condition his thought. The “pietistic” aspect of Charnock’s
Puritanism, therefore, will also be investigated along with the structural, theological,
and polemical developments of Charnock’s doctrine of God in the high orthodox
period.
Specifically, based upon these historical and theological backgrounds, in
creating the third parameter of our study, we can posit some points of both continuity
and difference between the thought of Perkins and Charnock within the larger
context of early and high orthodoxy.
First, both Perkins and Charnock appear to seek to set up the doctrine of God
in their theological systems employing the locus method in a “synthetic” way based
upon exhaustive explication of Scripture in an “analytic” way.85 Philosophy, logic,
and rhetoric are integrated in the work of Perkins and Charnock within the context of
this locus method.86 Both of them hold to a central idea of the relationship of
Scripture and theology, affirming the role of Christ–focused Scripture as the
cognitive foundation of the latter.87 Along with this aspect, dealt with in detail from
the fifth to the seventh chapters concerning divine intellect and will, we will also
need to focus upon the rise of Arminianism related to Molinism in the early orthodox
period and upon the emergence of Socinianism in high orthodoxy. These were
particularly a target for the critique of the Puritan and Reformed scholastic
doctrinal issues, albeit neither of them pursued building of the whole theological system. Owen,
Vindicae Evangelicae in Works, vol. 12, pp. 86-98, 108-40; Thomas Goodwin, The Knowledge of God
the Father, and His Son Jesus Christ, in The Works of Thomas Goodwin, 12 vols. James Nichol. 1861-
1866; repr. Eureka: Tanski Publications, 1996, vol. 4, pp. 380-94.
83 For short explanation of the similarity and difference among those opponents between early and
high orthodoxy, see PRRD I, p. 75.
84 PRRD I, pp. 170-1.
85 For the details, see PRRD I, pp. 110-1.
86 PRRD I, p. 398.
87 These points play an important role in the disputes with the various theological opponents of
Perkins and Charnock in the orthodox period.
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theologians.88 The opponents of orthodoxy seek to deny a “theoretical” aspect of
theology by not acknowledging the elicitation of “the fundamental articles” in
scriptural exegesis and exposition.89
That is, the Reformed scholastic camp in early and high orthodoxy needed
more polemic and disputative tools to fight diversity within Protestantism than they
did to fight with Roman Catholicism in the Reformation era. Thus there comes a
critical point to grasp for our following discussions about Charnock’s and Perkins’
doctrine of God — we need to see the merits of the scholastic method
notwithstanding its demerits in the medieval period.90 Admitting that the contents of
medieval theology, despite varying emphasis, were not accepted totally by
Protestants, we ought to examine not only how the scholastic method was used,
especially in Charnock, as an effective tool for the defence of his orthodox
theological system, but also how it could help him to focus on a biblical exposition
which was far from a “dogmatizing exegesis” and a doctrinal defence with “pre-
critical” exegetical support. This, in addition, was in the context of a pastoral
application that was distinct from the major interests of the medieval scholastics.91
Second, both Perkins and Charnock emphasise the aspect of theologia
regenitorum (regeneration) in the presentation of the doctrine of the existence and
attributes of God. Both of them endeavour to explain the priority of “supernatural
theology” based upon both faith and regeneration through “infusion of gratia” over
“genuine natural theology” that necessarily receives the help of ancillary reason in
the believer. In this respect both the Aristotelian model of faculty psychology and a
range of scholastic terms, e.g. habitus, are widely used in continuity with the use of
this instrument by the medieval scholastic theologians and the Reformers. For
Perkins and Charnock, the stress upon piety despite a “scholastic” doctrine of God
was possible only for the regenerated theologian infused with grace who can
rationally worship God, and study the attributes of God at the level of confirmation
of personal knowledge of God.92 In other words, particularly for Charnock, without
“theology viewed as habitus,” there would be no “theology viewed as doctrinal
88 How to understand divine foreknowledge in relation to divine intellect and will was the key to the
controversy between the Reformed and the Arminians. Chapter five will deal with this in detail. For a
recent brief sketch of Socinus’ idea of Scripture, the role of reason, and the theological “centre” of his
doctrinal system, see Alan Gomes, “Some Observations on the Theological Method of Faustus
Socinus (1539-1604),” Westminster Theological Journal 70/1 (Spring, 2008), pp. 49-71.
89 PRRD I, p. 351.
90 Stephen Spencer, “Reformed Scholasticism in Medieval Perspective,” p. 251.
91 PRRD IV, pp. 405-7.
92 PRRD I, pp. 400-1.
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systems”.93
The prerequisite of supernatural theology makes Perkins and Charnock deal
with the genus of theology by way of stressing both a theologia nostra (our theology)
and the ad extra dimension. While Calvin prefers to discuss divine essence and
attributes within the context of God in relation to the ad extra, Perkins and Charnock
maintain such a tendency within a more complex dialectic between Scotism,
nominalism, and Thomism in the seventeenth century context. To be sure, both of
them mainly prefer the Thomist pattern in the sense that they categorise divine
attributes objectively according to the balance between the scriptural analogy of faith
and arguments from ancillary reason.94 Added to this, we can see the crisis of “the
traditional God-language” in the debate about predication, for example, whether the
distinction of divine attributes in the Godhead ad intra is possible or not.95 It is
undeniable that both Perkins and Charnock endeavoured to defend the orthodox
doctrine of God within the early and high orthodox context respectively. Thus we
should also investigate the controversial points between Perkins and Charnock and
their opponents, especially concerning middle knowledge and divine concurrence in
relation to the problem of predication.96
It is worth observing that such a point demonstrates the two aspects of
continuity between Perkins and Charnock. They both appear to have a “Scotist
overtone” that emphasises the aspect of theologia as both a praxis and “operative
discipline” (totally practical and directed), which is deeply related to the pietistic
dimension or spirituality of Puritan theology. 97 Namely, neither Perkins nor
Charnock has an interest in a purely theoretical dimension in their understanding of
the genus of theology. From Perkins and the English Ramistic puritans Charnock
93 The quotations are from PRRD I, p. 356.
94 For the Scotist and nominalist ideas of setting limitations on both the categorisation of divine
attributes and the arguments for the existence of God by emphasising the concept univocity of being,
see Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. Allan Wolter (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1962), pp.
19-25; F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 9 vols. vol. II: Medieval Philosophy: Augustine to
Scotus (London: Burns Oates & Washburn, 1946-75), esp. ch. 48; E. Gilson, History of Christian
Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), X.2.2.
95 This point also correlates with the debate between Thomistic and late medieval nominalistic views.
See PRRD III, pp. 136-7.
96 For the details, see PRRD III, pp. 107-15. This subject will be dealt with in depth in chapter five
and six, on divine knowledge and power.
97 PRRD I, p. 344. For classic introductory works on puritan spirituality, see Michael McGiffert,
God’s Plot: Puritan Spirituality in Thomas Shepherd’s Cambridge (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1972); Gordon Wakefield, Puritan Devotion: Its Place in the Development of
Christian Piety (London: Epworth Press, 1957); Norman Petitt, Heart Prepared: Grace and
Conversion in Puritan Spiritual Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); J. Beeke, Puritan
Reformed Spirituality (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2004).
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inherited a tendency to de-emphasise discussion of the difference between theologia
archetypa and ectypa.98 Though there were three major tendencies in Reformed
orthodoxy concerning the proper genus of theology,99 both Perkins and Charnock
seem to reflect Scotist thought as well as an Augustinian perspective inherited from a
late medieval trajectory. Yet this does not seem to be a preference for theology as “a
purely practical discipline,” but rather indicates a serious emphasis on “the
regenerated will” in view of a “soteriological voluntarism” that does not exclude the
Thomistic intellectual dimension in the idea of the knowledge of God.100 Thus,
based upon these preliminary assumptions, we should examine and find out exactly
the relationship of Thomism and Scotism in the thought of both figures within the
context of the understanding of the genus of theology among the orthodox.
At another preliminary level, although our study primarily deals with the
investigation of theological or intellectual aspects, the formal or structural continuity,
development, and difference between Perkins and Charnock is to be referred to as
another important point underlying our research. This is necessary because the
method and structure of the investigation of Perkins’ and Charnock’s ideas
concerning the divine attributes in later chapters will be developed according to the
pattern and order of the Puritan Reformed scholastic style of the threefold (exegesis-
doctrine-practice) or fourfold (plus elenctic) division in argument. In particular, the
development of homiletical literature among the orthodox also shows that their
seeking of the knowledge of God was “a theology as a discipline directed toward the
goal of salvation” that should lead to piety.101 As noted above, the homiletical
98 For the details, see PRRD I, pp. 116-7, 157-8. On the significance of the relationship between the
focus on the ectypal theology and the English Puritan doctrine of the essence and the attributes of God,
see pp. 222-3.
99 For the details, see PRRD I, pp. 352-3.
100 The quotations are from PRRD I, p. 354; cf. PRRD IV, p. 359. “Voluntarism” stresses the primacy
of one’s will over one’s intellect, and “Intellectualism” vice versa. However, in recent scholarship,
there has been some disagreement about the definition of these terms. This will be discussed in detail
in chapter six. Of course the fact that even Aquinas had voluntaristic elements in his thought shows
the danger of dichotomy between these two terms: see Stephen Spencer, “Reformed Scholasticism in
Medieval Perspective,” pp. 254, 260. Muller’s critique of Barth is also very suggestive for our study:
“In view of this Protestant orthodox tendency to balance theory and praxis in definitions of theology,
we must reject as a major misinterpretation Barth’s argument that the orthodox chose a Scotist
definition of theology as a scientia practica and tended to emphasize religiosity rather than objectivity
in their view of theology,” PRRD I, p. 344.
101 PRRD III, p. 32. At another level, this point is linked to the relationship of Puritan doctrine and
“the subjective religious experience in their internalization of those truths”, as Peter Lake argues in
Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.
155. Within the same context, David Como also writes that Puritan practical divinity worked as “the
point of intersection” between these two points. See David Como, Blown by the Spirit: Puritanism
and the Emergence of an Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil-War England (California: Stanford
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commentary was in full bloom during the period of “the final codification of
orthodoxy (1640-1685)” that Charnock comes under.102
For the English Puritans’ scholastic sermons in the seventeenth century,
theology as both a “theory” and a “practice” was well balanced by the combination
of doctrine and “use” for application through the use of the locus method.103
According to Muller, this homiletical characteristic also relates to the full fruition of
the perspective of the “Perkinsian” doctrine of God and “practical” theology on the
continent (especially in the Dutch Reformed theology) confirmed through the case of
Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706).104 Both Charnock and Mastricht’s works maintain
not only the fourfold “exegetical, dogmatic, polemical, and practical” concerns along
with a partly Ramistic framework, but also the identical movement in the order of the
discussion, e.g. from scholastic through homiletical to christological and
soteriological dimensions.105 To put it another way, if the international character of
Reformed orthodoxy was acknowledged as Muller argued in the case of Perkins and
Mastricht, we might be able to find traces of Perkins’ doctrine of God in Charnock’s
homiletical writings on the attributes of God, with their “extended scholastic
style”.106
At the same time, despite the presumed fundamental continuity of the
contents of the orthodox doctrine of God between Perkins and Charnock, there may
also be important differences in terms of style, method, and intellectual context.
Perkins appears to show an “architectonic clarity” of Ramism in the period of early
University Press, 2004), p. 117.
102 PRRD II, p. 444.
103 PRRD I, p. 218. On the clear continuity and development of homiletical forms of styles between
Perkins and Charnock representing “the new Reformed method” in the English puritan tradition, see
PRRD II, pp. 505-7; cf. David G. Mullan, Scottish Puritanism 1590-1638 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), pp. 58-9; Paul Seaver, The Puritan Lectureships: The Politics of Religious Dissent 1560-
1662 (California: Stanford University Press, 1970), ch.1; Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan
Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 168-76.
104 For examples of “profound and mutually supportive formulation” between the Reformed
orthodoxy in the Dutch and English Puritanism by the time of Westminster Assembly, see PRRD IV, p.
405 and PRRD III, p. 32; idem, After Calvin, pp. 17-8; cf. K. Sprunger, Dutch Puritanism: A History
of English and Scottish Churches of the Netherlands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982); idem, The Learned Doctor William Ames: Dutch Backgrounds of English
and American Puritanism (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1972); idem, Trumpets from the
Tower: English Printing in the Netherlands 1600-1640 (Leiden: Brill, 1994). For a good summary of
the close relatedness between the English Puritanism and the Continental Reformed orthodoxy with
common characteristics, see Steven Holmes, “Calvin against Calvinists?” in Listening to the Past, pp.
68-85, esp. 78-85.
105 PRRD I, pp. 203-4, 217-9; PRRD III, p. 132. Therefore, in chapters three to seven (concerning
God’s existence and attributes), we will continue to scrutinise Charnock’s work especially according
to this threefold or fourfold framework.
106 Quotation from PRRD II, p. 507.
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orthodoxy; Charnock, however, seems to opt more for “a more broadly developed
and even discursive system” and “technical theological system” in high orthodoxy.107
In our study of Perkins’ and Charnock’s doctrine of the existence and attributes of
God, we will see the change from the Ramistic early orthodox model to the
“synthetic, teleological, and historical” outlook of high orthodoxy. It will be
significant for us to demonstrate through the arguments that the latter was an
approach that focused more on “the covenant as a focal point of system” than early
orthodoxy.108 We will also find a difference of hermeneutical context between early
and high orthodoxy that gives rise to “the difficulty of maintaining churchly
doctrines” in relation to the debate with opponents.109
IV. The Methodology of Our Study
Therefore, based upon these three parameters of research by way of using
both the comparative and “linguistic” approach (in light of both the synchronic and
diachronic dimensions of early and high orthodoxy), we will be able to examine
whether the older scholarship’s negative appraisal of Charnock’s scholastic doctrine
of God’s attributes (which was based upon different assumptions about rationalism)
is coherent or not.110 This is necessary in order to clarify the relationship between
Trinitarianism and divine attributes in Charnock’s doctrine of God and Perkins’
doctrine.111 At this point, therefore, we need to define in advance the four key terms
107 Quotations from PRRD I, p. 71; PRRD II, p. 466; on the relationship between Ramism and biblical
exegesis especially in Perkins, see Donald K. McKim, “William Perkins’ Use of Ramism as an
Exegetical Tool,” in William Perkins, A Commentary on Hebrews 11 (1609 Edition), ed. John
Augustine (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1991), pp. 32-45.
108 Quotations from PRRD I, pp. 78, 170-1.
109 Quotation from PRRD II, p. 523. This polemical dimension will be dealt with frequently in the
later chapters. Such a phenomenon was partly due to the radical change of intellectual milieu in the
later seventeenth century. See John Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England 1558-
1689 (Essex: Longman, 2000), p. 213. For the details of this upheaval, see also Paul Hazard, The
European Mind 1680-1715 (London: Hollies & Carter, 1953); Michael Hunter, Science and the shape
of Orthodoxy: Intellectual Change in Late Seventeenth Century Britain (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1995).
110 Carl Trueman names this new method a “linguistic approach” to Puritan texts that emphasises the
role of the Aristotelian terminology of causality both as the common intellectual legacy of medieval
scholasticism and as “the common linguistic basis of Puritanism and other seventeenth century
theological movements.” For the details, see Carl Trueman, “Puritan Theology as Historical Event,” in
Reformation and Scholasticism, pp. 253-75.
111 As Muller argues, we basically see in our study that the problem of “continuity” and
“discontinuity” depends upon whether there was a “similarity of questions” raised between the two
figures. See PRRD IV, p. 387. See Reformation and Scholasticism, ed. Van Asselt and Dekker, pp. 11-
43; Martin I. Klauber, “Continuity and Discontinuity in Post-Reformation Reformed Theology: An
Evaluation of the Muller Thesis,” Journal of Evangelical Theological Society 33 (1990), pp. 467-75.
For a criterion of judgment on continuity and discontinuity in the study of intellectual history, see
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that will be used frequently in the argument of this thesis (although these terms were
briefly mentioned earlier). We first define “Christian Aristotelianism” as the product
of the intellectual framework of Aristotle combined with the idea of Christian
revelation from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries synthesized by Thomas
Aquinas in particular. This term also implies the coexistence of reason and faith as
well as philosophy and theology in the “hierarchical” system of the quest for human
knowledge of God. In other words, “nature” and “grace” do not contradict each other
on the basis of the priority of grace over nature. Second, the terms “Thomism” or
“Thomistic characteristic” in this thesis indicate a balance of nature and grace,
maintained especially in the medieval scholastic theological system of Aquinas. This
more “optimistic” view of reason (rather than that of Scotism) necessarily
emphasises the “intellectual” or theoretical aspect in the search for truth. Third, the
terms “Scotism” or “Scotistic perspective” denote a stress upon the role of both the
divine transcendence and practical human will, as represented by Duns Scotus, in the
understanding of the knowledge of God or theology. Scotism, of course, is within the
larger boundary of Christian Aristotelianism, which is also the “fruit” of the
historical pursuit of “true” Augustinian theology. Fourth, Ramism is defined and used
as “a method of logical discourse by means of partition or dichotomy which gave to
Reformed theology [which was more prevalent in Perkins’ case in the early
orthodoxy] an extreme clarity and conciseness of approach”.112
In clarifying the identity of Charnock’s theology, we basically build on
Muller’s comprehensive argument concerning the Reformed orthodox doctrine of
God (including his partial analysis of Charnock’s thought). Muller is a pioneer in this
field, despite the weakness of his work due to the absence of detailed reflection on
trinitarian theology rediscovered in modern scholarship.113 Needless to say, the
discussion of the inseparable relationship between the trinitarian system of theology
and piety will necessarily be addressed within the context of supporting our
approach.114 In doing so, we shall seek a fresh understanding of Charnock’s ideas in
their context. That is, although Muller dealt with the Reformed doctrine of God in
Britain and the continent in a broader international and historical context, yet at this
Heiko A. Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), pp.
42-3.
112 PRRD I, p. 62.
113 See p. 19. This means that, for this case study of Charnock along with Perkins, we are indebted in
many ways to the previous research and methodology of Richard Muller.
114 Although this aspect is one of the common subjects we need to note in each chapter, we will
especially deal with it in detail in chapter seven on the holiness of God.
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point we need a more focused study of the Puritan doctrine of God (especially God’s
attributes) after Perkins, employing a “rectified” understanding of the preceding key
terms we mentioned above ― orthodoxy, scholasticism, Aristotelianism, and
rationalism ― through case studies of individual Puritan divines, in this instance 
Charnock.
For these discussions of God’s existence and attributes in our thesis, we will
start to investigate as a preliminary Perkins’ and Charnock’s ideas of theologia and
Scriptura in the second chapter. This is because of the necessity for discussion of
theological prolegomena and the doctrine of the interpretation of Scripture prior to
exploring the ideas of the existence and the attributes of God found within the work
of Perkins and Charnock. This will follow the order of locus of the traditional
scholastic doctrine of God within the Reformed orthodox dogmatic system. In terms
of further exploring the work of Perkins and Charnock, in chapters three and four we
will examine their ideas of God’s existence, essence, and essential attributes. In
chapters five and six, we will focus upon the problem of divine knowledge, wisdom,
power, and sovereignty within their thinking concerning the larger boundary of the
relationship between the divine intellect and will. In chapter seven, we will examine
the implications of their doctrine of God’s holiness and goodness as the outward
manifestation of His will.
The focus of our discussions in the following chapters will thus lie in the
exploration of Charnock’s The Attributes, along with the ideas of Perkins.
Throughout all of the following chapters, as a prototype of the mainstream of Puritan
thought, we will find and analyse Perkins’ account of theology, interpretation of
Scripture, and God’s existence as well as attributes as a ‘foil’ for comparison with
Charnock’s ideas. We will carry out this examination to discover whether the
“negative” interpretations of Charnock’s “scholastic” doctrine of the attributes of
God have correctly assessed the relatedness between Trinitarian theology and piety in
Charnock’s thought, within the context of seventeenth century Reformed orthodoxy.
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Chapter Two
The Knowledge of God: Theologia and Scriptura
In the orthodox understanding, the term “theology” could not be separated
from the goal of establishing a theological system. Broadly speaking, Continental
Reformed theologians were more consistent in this than the English Puritans.
Nevertheless we can find systematic tendencies in the pursuit of soteriological
coherence in theology both as praxis and discipline. This is evident in the Ramistic,
architectonic character of Perkins’ work in early orthodoxy and in the extended
scholastic style of Charnock in the period of high orthodoxy.1 The development of
the role of the “prolegomena” as an important element in the theological systems
which had developed since the medieval scholastic period is reflected in some
particular concepts and forms of Reformed orthodox theology.2 In Perkins’ case, we
see an initial stage of an English Reformed theological prolegomenon in his
definition of theology as the “science of living blessedly forever”, located first in the
order of discussion on “the causes of salvation and damnation”.3 For Charnock, in
the context of his writing “a complete body of divinity” for his congregation, “the
systematic exposition of the divine word” can be discerned even if it does not belong
to the genre of typical systematic divinity in its style in the orthodox era.4 Though
Charnock’s writings are not a full dogmatic system in character, still they show “the
1 Perkins’ system, especially remarkable in his Golden Chaine, can be regarded as a systematic
theology in terms of its genre. However, on account of its strong Ramistic characteristics, it remains
somewhat distinct from the fully developed dogmatic system that was typical of the continental
theologians.
2 “Prolegomena” means a type of preliminary system that sets out principles and presuppositions in
its etymology. For a detailed account of the historical development of theological prolegomena, see
PRRD I, ch.2 (pp. 85-146).
3 PRRD I, p. 113; Perkins, A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 11. For a detailed explanation of Golden
Chaine related to this point: see Muller, “Perkins’ A Golden Chaine: Predestinarian System or
Schematized Ordo Salutis?” Sixteenth Century Journal 9/1 (1978), pp. 69-81.
4 James McCosh, “Introduction to Charnock’s Works,” in The Complete Works of Stephen Charnock,
B.D., 5 vols. (Edinburgh: James Nichols, 1864), vol. I, pp. vii-xlviii. See esp. pp. xxv, xxxi; cf. Joel
Beeke & Randall Pederson, “Stephen Charnock,” in Meet the Puritans: With a Guide to Modern
Reprints (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2006), pp. 142-3. For a short explanation of the
typical threefold literary genres of the Reformed orthodox divinity: see Edward Leigh, A Systeme or
Body of Divinity (London, 1654), I. i, pp. 3-4. As is mentioned earlier in the introduction to the thesis,
Charnock uses not only an analytical method that invariably starts each treatise by deep examination
of the exegesis of scriptural passages related to his doctrinal locus, but also in some ways maintains a
synthetic method characteristic of a succinct systematic divinity like that of Perkins. This issue is
related to the organising principle of the theological system in Charnock, especially as to the use of
the idea of “covenant” between God and man. Cf. Honggyu Park, Grace and Nature in the Theology
of John Gill (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2001), pp. 94-6.
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knowledge of God” as a theological prolegomenon to the full doctrine of God which
virtually regulates all of his works,5 especially The Existence and Attributes of God.
In addition, just as Scripture is the cognitive foundation of theology, the
doctrine of both Scripture and the Word of God is to be found between the
theological prolegomena and the doctrine of God in the Reformed scholastic system.
We therefore need to examine both Perkins’ and Charnock’s views of the relationship
of Christian doctrine and the interpretation of Scripture before approaching their
doctrine of God. We will investigate continuities, developments and, if there are any,
the differences in relation between theological prolegomena and doctrinal exegesis in
the work of Perkins and Charnock within the context of both Reformed scholasticism
and English Puritan theology in the early and high orthodox period. In short, in this
second chapter we would hope to explore the doctrine of the knowledge of God in
Charnock in terms of the relationship of the Triune God to theologia and Scriptura as
a reciprocal foundation necessary to the Reformed orthodox theological system. The
overall continuity of Perkins and Charnock would be confirmed in the fact that the
Triune God and Scripture stand as “the twin foundations” of their theological system.
I. The Nature and Necessity of Theology
According to the early orthodox writers’ general understanding of the term
theologia, teaching about God and the works of God (opera Dei) is conceived along
the lines of the Augustinian and medieval tradition. In this etymology the creatures
who rightly have the knowledge of God are “theologians”. Perkins’ treatment of the
term theology in his A Golden Chaine illustrates this point well:
The principal science is Theologie. Theologie is the science of living blessedly
forever. Blessed life ariseth from the knowledge of God. Ioh. 17.3. This is life
eternal, that they know thee to bee the only very God, and a Sonne thou hast
sent, Christ Jesus. Isa. 53:11. By his knowledge shall my righteous servant (viz.
Christ) justifie many. And therefore it ariseth likewise from the knowledge of
ourselves, because we know God by looking into ourselves.6
Such a stipulation, the so-called Perkinsian definition of theology influenced by Peter
5 Charnock, A Discourse of the Knowledge of God; idem. A Discourse of the Knowledge of God in
Christ, in Works IV, pp. 3-109, 110-63.
6 Perkins, Golden Chaine, p. 11, col. 1, in Workes I.
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Ramus, was popular in England and the continent,7 though the alternative term
“divinity” was preferred to the term theology in English systematic works.8 As we
see in Perkins’ case, the term theologia assumes the concept of “true knowledge of
God” as a premise. In addition, theology as both science and discipline inherently
assumes practical piety as the ultimate goal of this knowledge in — a blessed life.9
In other words, Perkins primarily regards theology as a science that includes teaching
or doctrines, which do not exclude the dimension of theology as an intellectual
discipline. Later Ramistic Puritan theologians, however, generally sought to replace
this with a view that saw theology as a doctrina or disciplina in itself, a view
inherited from some strands of the theology of early orthodoxy.10
This general tendency in the early orthodoxy of English Puritanism to see
theology as a “totally practical and directed” discipline seems to affect Charnock’s
view of the relation of theologia to the theoretical and practical in high orthodoxy.
Charnock arguably inherited the Ramistic understanding of theology that sees
theology both as “the art of living well” and as doctrine leading to “genuine
godliness”.11 Thus, according to Charnock, the phrase “knowledge of God” leading
to eternal life is no less than a definition of the term theologia.12 Following Perkins,
Charnock not only cites John 17:3 (“And this is life eternal, that they know thee the
only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent”) as a key verse for the
explanation of this doctrine, but also gives a general exegesis based upon a doctrinal
background in a trinitarian dimension.13 To explain the characteristics of a saving
knowledge of God that leads to eternal life, he uses the image of pilgrimage in this
life in contrast with “an intuitive knowledge of God” obtained in heaven. For
7 Ramus defines theology as “the doctrine of living well” coram Deo in his Commentariorum de
religione christiana libri quattuor (Frankfurt: andreas Wechel, 1576; repr. Frankfurt, Minerva, 1969).
For the classic article on the relationship between Ramism and Puritan theology, see Keith Sprunger,
“Ames, Ramus, and the Method of Puritan Theology,” Harvard Theological Review 59:2 (April 1966),
pp. 133-51.
8 For example: Thomas Watson, A Body of Divinity (London, 1692); Leigh, A Systeme or Body of
Divinity; James Ussher, A Body of Divinitie (London, 1653), John Downame, The Summe of Sacred
Divinitie (London, 1630); Maccovius, Loci Communes (Franeker, 1650); Van Mastricht, Theoretico-
practica (Amsterdam, 1685).
9 For some overlapping of definition in this respect between the Reformed on the continent and the
English Puritans, see Leigh, Systeme, I.i, pp. 2-3; Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology. 3
vols. trans. G. M. Giger and ed. J. T. Dennison Jr. (Phillisburg: P & R, 1992), vol. I. viii, p. 23.
10 PRRD I, pp. 325-6, 333-4.
11 Cf. PRRD I, pp. 343-5.
12 This point shows the vital continuity between Calvin and the later Reformed tradition. See John
Calvin, Institutes of Christian Religion, 2 vols. trans. F. L. Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), I,
ch. 1-2 (on the knowledge of God).
13 Works IV, pp. 3-15.
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Charnock, this theologia viatorum (as a theologia ectypa distinct from a theologia
archetypa14) being communicated to human beings from God as an infused grace,
also relates to the understanding of both the human psyche and the attributes of God,
though he does not use this scholastic term directly:
This knowledge of God is not only a knowledge of God and Christ in theory,
but is a knowledge which is saving; joined with ardent love to him, cordial trust
in him, … It is not only a knowledge of God in his will, but a knowledge of
God in his nature; both must go together; we must know him in his nature, we
must be obedient to his will. … It must be therefore such a knowledge which
descends from the head to the heart, which is light in the mind and heat in the
affections; such a knowledge of God as includes faith in him.15
The character of theology should be both theoretical and practical in terms of both
the internal and external economy of the Triune God and His divine attributes and
will. The “true and saving” theology must produce faith and trust in God, nothing
less than both “a fiducial knowledge” and “a certain, full, and persuasive assent”
about the unity and the Trinitarian working of God the Father, Son, and the Spirit ad
extra. Our understanding of God in His nature and perfections is not to be separated
from that of Christ the mediator in His person and offices.16
Within a Protestant scholastic background, Charnock then proceeds to a
detailed doctrinal elaboration of theology as the knowledge of God in its “quality”.
He demonstrates his grasp of theologia within the context of typical English
Reformed spirituality. Of course the motive of theology for Charnock is also an
attempt to build the full system of doctrinal exposition based upon Scripture
according to theological loci. First, such a theology is neither a speculative
knowledge that comes from creation or a partial revelation through the Jews in the
14 On the definition theologia archetypa, ectypa, in se, nostra, and viatorum, see Muller, Dictionary
of Latin and Greek Theological Terms (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1985), pp. 299-304. Hereafter
DLGT. For the use of these terms from the Reformation era to the orthodoxy, see PRRD I, pp. 229-38.
On the Lutheran side, see Robert Preus, The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism (Saint Louis:
Concordia Publishing House, 1970), vol. I, pp. 112-4, 168-73. The distinction of Scotus between
theologia in se and theologia nostra as the arguable source of this distinction in the medieval
scholastic distinction is also crucial. See Guy Richard, “Deus Qui Regnat in Excelso: Samuel
Rutherford’s Radical God-exalting Theology and the Grounds for His Systematic Opposition to
Arminianism” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2006), p. 25; Willem Van Asselt, “The
Fundamental Meaning of Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in Seventeenth-Century
Reformed Thought,” Westminster Theological Journal 64:2 (Fall 2002), pp. 319-35. For the clearest
lists and summary of the term ectypal theology by way of Ramistic dichotomy, see Polanus, Syntagma,
Synopsis Libri I, cited (in English translation) in PRRD I, pp. 225-6.
15 Works IV, p. 10.
16 Works IV, pp. 12-5.
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Old Testament nor is it a natural or historical knowledge about the existence of God.
Though natural knowledge of Christ the mediator is impossible for human beings,
speculative theology (despite its insufficiency) is nevertheless useful to both
salvation and piety as “the true end” of theology. 17 This is because no spiritual
understanding or principle can be obtained without the lower foundation. Second,
this knowledge of God is practical in that it brings the rectifying and enlivening
effects to the faculties of the soul (“the whole heart”) by grace.18 Thus it constantly
produces both obedience and “an affectionate practice” that is lacking in a
speculative knowledge of God. Third, Charnock points out that the experimental,
spiritual and mystical dimension of this knowledge comes from the aspect of its
being both an infused faith and grace in contrast with a speculative knowledge as a
mere notional understanding: “Divine truth acted upon the heart, and felt in its
influence, is more plainly known than by discourse and reason.”19 Fourth, theology
gives a salvific interest that is the recovery of the relationship with God in
covenant.20 Charnock emphasises that such a theology is the very knowledge of bliss
of God and Christ our mediator due to its satisfactory effect upon fallen human
nature. Nevertheless, although these four characteristics of knowledge of God are all
necessary, each direction of importance among them differs according to their
soteriological benefit:
The speculative is necessary as a foundation; practical, essentially necessary;
experimental and interested, necessary to the comfort of knowledge. The two
first are necessary to the being of a Christian; the two latter, to the well-being.
The two first together, constitute our happiness; the two latter sweeten our
imperfect happiness in the world. … Speculative, is knowledge received;
practical, knowledge expressed; experimental, the relish of it; and interested,
the foretaste of happiness.21
Through this summary, we can see the basic characteristics of Charnock’s theological
framework through all of his works. At the same time this gives a preliminary idea of
his understanding of the scholastic discussion of whether theology is theoretical or
17 Works IV, p. 16.
18 Works IV, p. 18: “Powerfully directive, conforming the soul, as it did the human nature of Christ, to
the will and mind of God, when the understanding is not forced to comply with the corrupt appetite of
the will, but the will conformed to the true notions of an enlightened understanding.”
19 Works IV, p. 21.
20 Charnock expresses such a usefulness of theology as “covenant mercy”, “covenant graces” and
“covenant blessings”. See Works IV, p. 81.
21 Works IV, p. 22.
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practical.22 To be sure, Charnock does not neglect any of the four elements of
theology but deals with every soteriological point balanced by emphasising both
nature and grace.
Then why does human understanding need theologia as the knowledge of
God? To answer this question, we need to be aware of the Thomistic ordering of
intellectual framework in Charnock’s understanding of the human faculties.
Charnock seems to prefer “knowledge” to “will” in the discussion of the knowledge
of God.23 Of course, in Charnock’s view, such a priority of intellect over the will
invariably entails ordering practical observance according to prior knowledge.
Though he uses the term “religion” instead of “theology”, “religion” is, in fact, the
“wisdom” that assumes the knowledge of God proceeding to the knowledge of the
highest things in the state of blessedness in its character.24 We also find a similar
tendency in his combination of the traditional Augustinian phrase of the enjoyment
of God (frui) with an account of the relationship between knowledge and love.25
Such a goal-oriented understanding of theology as a discipline continues to operate
in his explanation of the object of divine and human knowledge. The attainment of
ultimate happiness in heaven communicated to us by God’s own happiness stemming
from perfect divine knowledge comes to us only from the beginning of theology,
which is the knowledge of God in this world. On the one hand, the stress upon the
relationship of “knowledge” and “action” shows that Charnock considers the crucial
role of theology to be a practical discipline as well as a theoretical one. This again
echoes the Augustinian heritage of dialectics between frui and uti (use).26 On the
other hand, this pattern of explanation is based upon both the Aristotelian faculty
psychology and the following use of the scholastic term habitus:
22 For a similar idea of the knowledge of God in relation to both worship and true religion, see
Turretin, Institutes, vol. I. vii, p. 22.
23 For example, Charnock states in Works IV, p. 24: “God has ordered knowledge to be the first step
to salvation, … The gospel being nothing else but a manifestation of God in Christ, a knowledge of
this precedes the application of salvation.”
24 Works IV, p. 23.
25 Works IV, p. 23: “Knowledge and love fits us for acquaintance with, and enjoyment of, God. We
actually embrace him by love, after we perceive him fit for our embraces by knowledge. Knowledge
imprints the similitude and idea of the object upon the understanding; love draws out the soul to close
with the object so understood. By knowledge, God conveys himself in his glorious perfection to our
view; by love, we give up ourselves to him. By knowledge, we see God; by love, we enjoy him.” For
a brief account of the Augustinian understanding of “use and enjoyment,” see Oliver O’Donovan, The
Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 24-9.
26 Works IV, p. 26: “Without a natural knowledge of God we can never think of him, or have any
natural motions in him; … Natural knowledge is necessary to natural actions, moral knowledge to
moral actions; so supernatural knowledge is necessary to supernatural actions.”
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As the mind is, so the nature is; corruption of nature began in wrong notions
received in the mind, … There must be then other notions in the mind, and
other principles in the heart, before we can be fit for recovery out of natural
misery. … [Supernatural knowledge] must be in us as a rooted habit, a law in
his heart, established as firm in his heart as it was in the sanction. Since,
therefore, all our actions towards God are to be both a reasonable and a spiritual
service, there must be a reasonable and a spiritual knowledge as the foundation,
to raise up action as the building.27
Charnock’s understanding of the nature of theology thus reflects not only the
underlying structure of “faith” and “obedience” in Perkins and the Ramistic English
Puritan theological tradition in relation to both worship and theology, but also the
elements of continuity between himself and “the theologians of the heart,” the
Spiritual Brethren after Perkins. Of course faith needs supernatural grace because
natural theology cannot worship in a proper manner: “Without a knowledge, we
cannot affect him; without a strong knowledge, we cannot love him ardently.”28
Obedience is nothing less than the knowledge of both divine attributes and the law
“digested into will, affections, and practice” and necessarily “quickened with
grace.”29
What we need to note is that Charnock frequently unfolds his arguments on
the necessity of theology as the knowledge of God in terms of the knowledge of the
attributes of God ad extra for both sanctification and the regeneration of the elect.30
Therefore, Charnock extends the discussion of knowledge of God to the
understanding of the term “grace” by using the terms from faculty psychology and
the concept habitus. Grace in relation to the knowledge of God directing toward faith
operates both upon the understanding and the will. It is this that causes the change of
“the principle or habit”.31 In the same regard, he notes the fiducial character of faith
as both an assent in the mind and “a full assurance of understanding” of the
knowledge of God ― if it is to be “a Christian knowledge [theology]”.32 For
27 Works IV, p. 26. We will address the term habitus in the third section of this chapter in detail.
28 Works IV, p. 27. Charnock also summarises the relationship of mind, affection, heart, and love in
the believer in p. 32: “We cannot love God ‘with all our hearts,’ with the affective part, till we first
love him ‘with all our minds,’ with our reason and intelligent part, Mark xii 30.”
29 Works IV, p. 29.
30 For example, Works IV, p. 35: “God abstracted from his perfections, his power, holiness,
faithfulness, love, is not the object about which any grace can be conversant, but God as revealing
himself, clothed with such excellency as suit and answer the creature’s necessities.”
31 See Works IV, p. 35: “There can be no form without the matter, nor any acting of that form but in
the matter; no grace without knowledge, no acting of grace but in knowledge. The frame of grace is
raised upon the infused notion of God.”
32 Works IV, pp. 31-3, 36.
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Charnock, being faithful to the Reformed axiom, the ultimate end (finis ultimus) of
our comfort and happy life as a “theologian” who has the knowledge of God is to
glorify God.33 To put it another way, the discussion of the nature and necessity of
theology presupposes the existence of a Christian theologian who knows this end.
This presupposition lets us deal with the discussion of the properties of theology.
II. The Properties of Theology as Theologia Nostra
As noted earlier, the Reformed scholastic division of theologia in se, unionis,
visionis, revelata (viatorum, nostra) has its theological background in the history of
doctrine, especially in relation to the development of theological prolegomena in the
later Middle Ages.34 The discussion of it is also related to its medieval scholastic
antecedents. Although there is a distinction between the Scotist and Occamist
understanding of theologia in se with difference in understanding of the term
theologia nostra (in contrast to the somewhat Thomistic tendency which emphasises
the importance of the intellectual element of theologia as “knowledge” in Reformed
scholastic theology), both of these influenced the Reformed orthodox view of
theologia nostra and revealed theology as both an ectypal and a pilgrim theology.35
In fact, Perkins does not discuss the division of archetypal and ectypal
theology. Rather he focuses on the aspect of theologia as a “praxis–oriented” interest.
Theology has its significance only when it is dealt with as a revelation from God.36
For Perkins, this theologia revelata is at once an “accommodated human capacity”
which is “communicated to human being(s)”, and is given as “a doctrine sufficient to
live well”.37 Such an English Ramistic, Puritan reluctance with regard to the
distinction of archetypal and ectypal theology seems to continue to affect the later
English Puritan theologians including Charnock (who focuses only on the ectypal
level of theology).38
While contrasting theologia nostra as true theology with other unsaving
knowledges of God, Charnock endeavours to show what level of theology ought to
33 Works IV, pp. 37-8.
34 For details, see PRRD I, pp. 222-5.
35 To be sure, the distinction of potentia absoluta Dei and potentia ordinata Dei affects this discussion.
For the details, see PRRD I, pp. 222-5. On the distinction between the Scotists and Occam on this
point, see idem, pp. 227-8.
36 PRRD I, pp. 232-3. For the historical background of these terms, see pp. 225-38.
37 PRRD I, pp. 255-6; Perkins, Golden Chaine, p.11, col. 1, in Workes I.
38 Muller cites works by John Stoughton (1593-1639), Ames, and Owen that can substantiate this
generalization: PRRD I, p. 233.
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be our aim. First, “our theology” is not an immediate or comprehensive knowledge
of God: the ad extra dimension of the opera Dei is crucial for approaching this
knowledge.39 We can sense that he reflects the traditional phrase finitum non capax
infiniti in respect of the limitation of human capability in theology. 40 Very
meaningfully, at this point, Charnock thus elicits the significance of the attributes of
God in our knowledge of God within the boundary of theological prolegomena: “We
know God to be omnipotent and immense, but we cannot comprehend his power and
immensity. … We should know what kind of God is ― merciful, just, wise, holy, true 
― and how those perfections are manifested in Christ.”41 Although our theology
cannot become perfect in this life, it should be aimed toward the full knowledge of
God, the theologia beatorum in heaven.
Second, according to Charnock, our theology has certain characteristics in
terms of both the “effect” and the “manner” of knowing. With regard to the effects,
this knowledge is to be “the evangelical doctrine” internally and specially revealed to
the heart resulting in conversion.42 In this definition of theology as doctrina, we also
see that Charnock by no means neglected the intellectual element as Perkins does not
in his view of the term theologia.43 At the same time the supernatural operation of
God gradually causes a transformation in the soul’s faculties: “The forming of Christ
in the head, changing the notions in the mind, is in order to a Christ formed in the
heart, changing the inclinations of the will and the temper of the soul.”44 Charnock
also lays stress on theology as an “affective knowledge” which is “full of sense”:
natural knowledge only stays in the head as “a dead knowledge” with neither
affections nor “a flame of love” as its warmth. Certainly his thinking here seems to
reflect the influence of the Spiritual Brethren after Perkins in terms of the
39 Works IV, pp. 38-9: “It is more especially true of our knowledge of God, who is not known
immediately in his nature, so much as by his excellent works of creation, providence, redemption, and
the revelation of invisible mysteries in his word. The invisible things of God are understood, not by
immediate speculations about the nature of them, but by the things that are made, Rom. i. 20. … We
are not able to conceive of God as he is, because our apprehensions take their first rise from sense and
sensible objects.”
40 Cf. Carl Trueman, The Claims of Truth: John Owen’s Trinitarian Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster,
1997), pp. 54-6.
41 Works IV, p. 41. In fact Charnock’s own statement justifies our investigation of his ideas of God’s
attributes in trinitarian, covenantal, and christological dimensions in the later chapters.
42 Works IV, p. 42.
43 Perkins, A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 11.
44 Works IV, p. 43. Cf. ibid.: “When this knowledge is enlightening, it is the image of God in the
mind; when it is enlivening, it is the image of God in the heart, a picture of God and Christ, drawn in
the understanding, which enamours the will, and assimilates the whole soul to God.”
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relationship between constant divine love and our affections:45
We are not changed into his image till we behold his beauty so as to love and
adore him. It is not only a beam of his loveliness, but a ray of his love, that
changeth the temper of the soul. Though the light of the fire attends the heat of
it, yet it is not the light, but the heat, transforms combustible matter into fire. It
was not Christ’s knowledge of us, but love to us, stooped the divine nature to
assume ours; nor our knowledge, but faith and love, that elevates us to the
divine. As Christ is a Sun of righteousness, not only shining, but warming, if we
be like him, there must not only be light in our minds, but warmth in our
affections.46
Nevertheless true theology as a saving knowledge possesses both intellectual and
affective elements.47 Charnock balances the importance of mind and affections while
at the same time stressing the priority of the intellectual faculty because our theology
is to be the form of “knowledge” of God. If so, what would the relationship of
intellect and a will be in the believer if it is to be a genuine, true theology?
Charnock’s view of theology as a directed discipline is well seen in this examination
of the relationship of mind and will in soul’s faculties.48 He never loses the
Perkinsian definition of theology as a whole perspective that leads the way to the
enjoyment of God (fruitio Dei), happiness, and a blessed life.49 The combination of
intellect and will is essential to this goal of giving “the soul a full satisfaction”.50
When Charnock anatomises the faculties of the soul, especially will and
45 See William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism (New York: Harper, 1938), pp. 49-82.
46 Works IV, p. 46.
47 Works IV, p. 45: “Both must go together; knowledge without affections is stupid, and affections
without knowledge are childish. The diviner the light in the mind, the warmer will love be in the soul.
… In knowledge, we are passive in the reception of the divine beams; by affection, we are active, and
give ourselves to God.”
48 Of course we see his detailed understanding of the soul’s faculties in relation to this respect in
Works IV, p. 78: “The mind, the repository of principles, the faculty whereby we should judge of
things honest or dishonest; the understanding, the discursive faculty and the reducer of those
principles into practical dictates, ― that part whereby we reason and collect one thing from another, 
framing conclusions from the principles in the mind; the heart, i. e. the will, conscience, affections,
which were to apply those principles, draw out those reasonings upon the stage of the life, all
corrupted, …”
49 See Muller’s explanation of the common Scotist background of both Perkins, Ames, and
Keckerman in early orthodoxy and Charnock, Baxter, Cocceius, Heidegger in high orthodoxy as to
this respect: PRRD I, pp. 343-4.
50 See Works IV, p. 47: “The end of all the acts of the understanding is to cause a motion in the will
and affections suitable to the apprehension. God hath given us two faculties: understanding, to know
the goodness of a thing, and a will to embrace it. To content one faculty in contemplation, without
contenting the other in embracing what we know, is to give a half satisfaction to the soul; it is to
separate those two faculties of understanding and will, which God hath joined.”
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understanding, as the seat of our theology in terms of its perfection and the
relationship between God and man, he notes: “[Man’s] happiness must be placed in
the exercise of those two about their proper object; the understanding, in knowing
God as the object of happiness, and the will in willing to love him.” Thus we need to
pursue theology “out of love to the perfection of our minds”.51 In this setting we see
both elements of the intellect and the will solidly combined. Although Charnock
shows a somewhat Thomistic tendency to emphasise the intellect (while not
disregarding knowledge from reason and nature), he still affirms the importance of
supernatural revelation as the basis of our theology.52 At the same time Charnock
declares that our theology cannot be other than an “active and expressive
knowledge” that moves one’s will to the fulfillment of it. Such a respect indicates
that the term theologia nostra necessarily connotes one’s piety and sanctification per
se beyond a mere noetic aspect of it. Actually, as the bridge between doctrine and
actions, the Scripture offers a rule for this practice of piety.53
At this juncture, Charnock refers to a critical difference of view on the
property of theology between the Scotists and Aquinas with respect to its practical
dimensions: “The Scotists defined divinity well when they made it practica; better
than Aquinas, who made it speculativa. Every illumination of the mind is not to
speculate, but to work by; every notion of God is a direction to some sphere of
action.”54 As Muller puts it, the problem of whether theology is a speculative or
practical discipline for Reformed orthodoxy certainly reflects the exquisite dialectics
of the medieval background.55 In so far as Charnock deals with the term speculation
somewhat negatively, he seems to follow the Scotist background of Calvin’s thought
in contrast to Vermigli’s Thomistic Reformed tendency.56 In this respect he is totally
51 Works IV, p. 94.
52 Works IV, p. 97: “We have principles of the knowledge of him. We have sense to view the effects of
his goodness, we have reason to draw conclusions from the excellency of creatures, to inform us of
the transcendent excellency of God; and we have revelation, which surmounts the other two principles
of sense and reason.”
53 Works IV, p. 50. Cf. ibid.: “The end of knowledge is to impress a sound image of the goodness of
an object as well as the truth; the truth to be eyed, and the goodness to be imitated.”
54 Works IV, p. 50.
55 Note the important point made by Muller, PRRD IV, p. 395: “The typical identification of theology
by the Reformed [orthodoxy] as either a mixed theoretical-practical but primarily practical or as a
purely practical discipline point toward the Augustinian and the Scotist definitions, respectively, and
away from the Thomist (theoretical-practical but primarily theoretical) form of definition. … This
practical emphasis of the majority, moreover, coincided with the fundamentally voluntarist set of
assumptions held by the Reformed, both concerning the divine will and the problem of human
salvation — pointing again in the doctrine of God to an Augustinian or Scotist background.”
56 Cf. PRRD I, pp. 342-3; F. Copleston, History of Philosophy, 9 vols. Vol. II: Medieval Philosophy:
Augustine to Scotus (London: Burns Oates & Washburn, 1946-75), pp. 494-6.
49
Scotistic. However, we cannot disregard the fact that Charnock quotes from Aquinas
most frequently in his works whether the content of the citation is affirmative or
not,57 although he still asserts the priority of the Scotists over Aquinas in the
definition of theology (divinity).
Though it is somewhat early to draw a conclusion on this point, Charnock’s
Scotism and Thomism appears in the context of Perkinsian or later English Puritan
thought to lead to theology being an “operative discipline” (operatrix disciplina) in
character.58 The influence of the Ramist dichotomy in both Perkins and Charnock is
seen in the multiplied divisions and subdivisions of topic in the structure of their
writings. This also contributes to a methodological ‘bridge-building’ between faith,
doctrine, theory or speculation and obedience, practice, works or piety. What we also
need to note is that the emphasis on both the absolute sovereignty of God and the
human predicament of sin in Reformed soteriology in the Reformation and the
orthodox era can be traced back to late medieval Augustinianism in the sense that the
doctrinal solidity of traditional Augustinianism is safeguarded. On the other hand,
Franciscan and Neoplatonic influence on Puritan piety within the boundary of
Christian Aristotelianism in terms of personal and practical religion connecting
doctrine with experience is another facet of the Augustinian heritage found in Perkins
and Charnock in their idea of the property of theologia. 59 This overlies the
aforementioned dialectics of Thomism and Scotism. We will investigate these
matters in detail in later chapters.
The “operative” dimension of Perkinsian theological prolegomena continues
to operate in the rest of Charnock’s arguments for the knowledge of God. For
instance, Charnock attempts to extend the discussion of the property of theology to
Christ’s knowledge of God in view of the term theologia unionis (theology of union).
As Christ’s knowledge cannot possibly be detached from his redemptive works, both
57 On evidence of the importance of Aquinas in the Reformed scholastics including Owen, see
Sebastian Rehnman, Divine Discourse: The Theological Methodology of John Owen (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2002), pp. 34-5; Carl Trueman, “John Owen’s Dissertation on Divine Justice,”
Calvin Theological Journal 33 (1998), pp. 87-103. As Rehnman puts it, we need to note Aquinas’
predominant Augustinian tendency of justification ‘by grace alone’ in his later period of life. Cf. H.
Oberman, The Dawn of the Reformation (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986), pp. 4-5.
58 Quotation from PRRD I, p. 344.
59 Rehnman, Divine Discourse, pp. 41-4; Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the
Development of Doctrine, 5 vols. Vol. III: The Growth of Medieval Theology 600-1300 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 303-7; vol. IV: Reformation of Church and Dogma 1300-1700
(1984), pp. 36, 43. On the classic outline of background of Puritan piety in this respect, see P. Miller,
The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954),
ch.1-2; J. C. Brauer, “Types of Puritan Piety,” Church History 56 (1987), pp. 39-58.
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our theology and the theology of Christ have “directed” characteristics per se.60 We
here find that a Christological dimension invariably plays an important role in
Charnock’s theological arguments, which are based upon the frequent resorts to
scriptural underpinning. Again, Charnock notes the relationship between the practice
of piety for sanctification and the doctrine of the attributes of God in terms of
theologia as a directed discipline:
The end of knowledge is directive; the proper effect of knowledge is the
observation of the direction, to write after the copy, to work according to the
pattern, to do what is agreeable to the perfections of God, to honour what we
see honourable in God, and to disparage none of those excellencies we profess
to know.61
Accordingly, following the model of the attributes of God as revealed in Christ, a
supernaturally enlightened reason and mind in humanity should result in a practice
and action of obedience as the evidence of its stemming from vera theologia.
Charnock also offers seven elements of theologia nostra ― knowing Christ savingly, 
as a mediator, reconciler, redeemer, prophet, priest, and advocate ― in terms of 
human knowledge of Christ.62 At the same time, although he stresses both the
practical and directive character of theology, he does not lose the balance between
intellect and will in the understanding of theological prolegomena within an
understanding of the knowledge of God. That is, the property of our theology
embracing both noetic and voluntary aspects as the true knowledge comes only from
our union with Christ who is the basis of “direction”.
III. The Term “Habitus” & the Genus of Theology
In Puritan and Reformed scholastics in general, the discussion of the
character of theology in relation to the definition of faith on the basis of faculty
psychology relates to an inseparable relationship between theological prolegomena
and the wider doctrinal system. It is this that guarantees their coherence with each
60 See Works IV, pp. 50-1: “The end of Christ’s knowledge of his Father must be the end of our
knowledge, both of God and himself. He knows his Father’s secrets to reveal them, and he knows his
Father’s will to perform it. … The incarnation of Christ was for action; the divine nature had not
attained its end in the business of our redemption, without union to the human, as necessary to
mediatory acts; nor doth our knowledge of God attain its end without union to the will, as necessary to
all religious operations.”
61 Works IV, p. 51.
62 Works IV, p. 53.
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other.63 For both Perkins and Charnock, faith, theology, and the knowledge of God
are integrated, since the character of faith has the element of an act of the will as ‘the
fiducial apprehension’. That is, our theology should be both “a fiducial knowledge”
of God and “a knowledge of faith”.64 Charnock even contrasts theologia vera with
theologia falsa in relation to whether it has a fiducial characteristic or not. The fact
that Charnock stresses the “affective” aspect in the knowledge of God seems to be
related to an understanding of such a fiducial character in true theology as well as to
a Puritan practical religion that considers the whole change of the human soul as a
“new creation”.65 In fact this dimension leads us not only to the importance of
knowing God in covenant with us but also to the relationship of true theology and the
assurance of salvation. The use of the scholastic key term habitus is placed in the
centre of all the discussions of faith, theology and the knowledge of God in Perkins
and Charnock.
To explore the significant role of habitus and faculty psychology, let us first
turn to the noteworthy fact that Charnock combines the doctrine of faith with the
doctrine of the attributes of God in the present discussion of theological prolegomena.
Just as a clear theology produces stronger faith and confidence, so faith cannot work
in a lively fashion without clear knowledge of the attributes of God.66 Therefore,
according to Charnock, our theology ought to yield spiritual advancement because it
was first “infused into us” as an “active principle”. Our theology proceeds to the
perfection of a psychological faculty in heaven, although it cannot be attained fully
in this life.67 What makes this itinerary possible is the fact that the first infused
habitual grace (habitus gratiae) not only “breaks into the soul” but also “repairs the
faculty,” and is no less than saving knowledge of God:68
63 Muller also notes this point in PRRD I, p. 162: “Theological prolegomena cannot be entirely
vordogmatisch or predogmatic: they stand in dialogue with the system and, in fact, are a system in
miniature, stand at the level of presupposition.”
64 Works IV, p. 57: “Faith is not one simple virtue, but compounded of the two, knowledge and trust.
The common subject is the heart, the special seat of each part is the understanding and will (yet those
two parts cannot be separated but the nature of faith is destroyed), …”; Perkins, A Golden Chaine, in
Workes I, p. 79.
65 In fact the pursuit of the meaning of true theology has its origin in Augustine, various medieval
Augustinians, and the Reformers: for example, see PRRD I, p. 344, especially the comment on the
relationship between Puritans, Keckermann, and the Scotists. In some way, the affections and the will
can be integrated as the inclination of the whole heart in the Puritan tradition.
66 Works IV, p. 59.
67 Works IV, pp. 61-2.
68 For the detailed historical background of the Reformed use of the term habitus: see PRRD I, pp.
355-9.
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Growth in grace is not new graces (for they are all included in the habit of grace
first put into the soul), but in a strength of each particular grace and the actings
of it. … Though grace be not perfect, yet there is an habit of grace, and all the
parts of grace in the soul of a renewed man.69
In other words, being faithful to the general tendency of Puritan Reformed
scholastics including Perkins (which is based upon a Christian Aristotelianism that
had been dominant from the high Middle Ages to the seventeenth century), Charnock
makes good use of the traditional scholastic concept of habitus to explain the
relationship between theology and sanctification. Undoubtedly, for Charnock,
sanctification derives from the increase of knowledge of the attributes of God. The
overall emphasis on the doctrines of both regeneration and perseverance in all of
Charnock’s writings is also confirmed in the theological character and definition of
the term habitus.70 This supernaturally granted “mental disposition” from God
makes it possible for both theology and faith to grow in the believer as habitus
theologiae and credendi. At the same time, this could be the reason why Charnock
argues that our theology is to proceed to the theologia unionis that Christ had with
God after the incarnation. For Charnock, this theology is communicated to all the
faculties of the soul in a believer, in a process similar to the communication to the
faculties present in Christ, e.g. mind, affections, and will. 71 Theology as “a
knowledge in the heart” should bring forth an act of one’s will accompanying love
and affections as well as an act of understanding if it is to be the knowledge of
‘enjoying’ God.72 Thus, without the discussion of theology as a habit, there is no
proper discussion of theologia as a doctrinal system that only such a habitus can
develop. This point again confirms that Charnock is a figure who reflects both a
Christian Aristotelianism and a particular Puritan spirituality, that of the theology of
the Spiritual Brethren including Perkins.
The characteristic of our theology as a theologia revelata, which gives both
69 Works IV, pp. 62-3. This description of grace in Charnock holds true of Muller’s analysis of the
delicate distinction between medieval scholastics and the Protestant idea of gratia: “[The Reformed]
had been to deny that grace is a habit infused into the sinner. Grace is a power of God which never
becomes a property or predicate of human nature. The psychology of the middle ages and of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, depended on the language of habitus as a way of
reckoning with the ability of the mind to know or do certain things. … Rather than to speak directly of
a habitus infusa, the Protestant scholastics tend rather to speak of the divine act of infusing the habit in
regeneration or in calling”: PRRD I, pp. 358-9.
70 Works IV, p. 67: “It is an habit: Heb. v. 14, ‘Who by reason of use;’ by reason of habit, in the Greek.
The faculty is firm, and can never be totally vitiated;”
71 Works IV, pp. 65-6.
72 Works IV, pp. 85-6.
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“full assurance” and a solid apprehension of God and Christ, leads Charnock to
discuss the genus of theology.73 We can in fact trace the origin of the Reformed
discussion of such a classification of theology in relation to human intellectual
dispositions in the medieval scholastic tradition that it inherited from Aristotle.74 It is
undeniable, as we see Perkins’ case in the Reformed systems, that the Thomistic
influence that underscores theology as scientia is considerable. However, the
influences of Scotus and later medieval theology made its character complex, so that
the elements of all the distinct intellectual dispositions other than mere understanding
are amalgamated. 75 Therefore, the perspective on Protestant orthodoxy which
identifies it as a derivation of strict medieval Thomism considering theology as a
sheer “science”,76 results from a lack of grasp of its nature as a complicated genus.
On the contrary, a proper understanding of the genus of theology in Perkins and
Charnock should see it as the product of the history of Christian doctrine within the
context of Augustinianism, as we have seen it in line with Muller’s argument
concerning the tendency of Reformed scholastics on this point.
In Charnock, we see traces of Perkins’ idea of theology influenced by both
the Ramistic definition and a wider Reformed scholastic tendency. This idea lays
emphasis on a balanced consideration of the aspects of theology as a mixed
discipline of scientia, sapientia, prudentia and ars.77 Such a complex characteristic
of theology necessarily leads Charnock to assert that our knowledge of God, which is
infused by grace, has its foundation from “a scriptural light” given as “a special
revelation” superior both to natural knowledge of God and to the one perceived from
the law.78 Charnock even affirms: “ [In our theology], the manner of revealing was
most certain; the manner of knowing must be in some measure suitable to the object
known, and the way of its manifestation: the principles of faith are more certain than
those of any science.”79 Thus, without knowledge of Scripture as the cognitive
foundation (principium cognoscendi) of our theology, there is no growth in piety:
“The knowledge of the word is the entrance of life, the means of begetting is the
73 For an outline of the genus of theology in intellectual history, see PRRD I, pp. 324-40; S. Rehnman,
Divine Discourse, pp. 96-7.
74 PRRD I, pp. 326-7; S. Rehnman, Divine Discourse, pp. 98-104. Aristotle’s five categories of
knowing are as follows: understanding or intelligence (intelligentia), knowledge or science (scientia),
wisdom (sapientia), prudence (prudentia), art or technique (ars). Cf. Aristotle, Aristotle’s Ethics, ed.
and trans. John Warrington (London: Dent, 1963), pp. 119-36.
75 For details, see PRRD I, pp. 324-7.
76 Cf. PRRD I, p. 339.
77 Cf. Rehnman, Divine Discourse, p. 106.
78 Works IV, pp. 79-80.
79 Works IV, p. 65.
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means of nourishing the soul to eternal life.”80 For Charnock, as theology is the
highest science as a “tree of life”, the progress of theology comes only from deeper
efforts toward the knowledge of Scripture:
Let us fetch the increase of this knowledge from the true principle, from the
word. By the Spirit in the word it was first imprinted; by the Spirit in the word it
is further enlarged. The improvement of a man in any science must be fetched
from the principles of that science, not from the principles of another;81
In short, in Charnock’s position, the discussion of the genus of theology cannot stand
without linking itself with the doctrine of Scripture and biblical interpretation. Such a
directive dimension ― in which Charnock suggests principles for the progress of our 
theology ― is particularly characteristic of the (English) Puritan theological system. 
We thus can further confirm the close relationship of theology and practice. For
example, the emphasis on prayer shows the importance of the recognition of the
sovereignty of God in the reception of the knowledge of God, i.e., we definitely need
“an operation of God in us” no less than a divine communication toward us for
obtaining such knowledge of God.82
Charnock also points out the significance of the work of the Holy Spirit in the
formation of our theology. This is clear evidence that his understanding of theologia
is fundamentally trinitarian, especially in view of the operation towards our
faculties.83 For Charnock, continuing purity of the whole heart accompanied by
obedience and practice is essential for the increase of our theology. His interest in the
faculties of the soul is also related to the growth of our knowledge of God gained by
using the method of Christian meditation upon God and Scripture. To know God, the
“senses of the soul” or psychological faculties are to be guided by meditation.
Charnock uses the term “ascent” in the expression of our theology, which shows the
influence of both the Augustinian-Franciscan and Puritan meditative tradition.84 All
80 Works IV, p. 88.
81 Works IV, p. 90.
82 Works IV, p. 104.
83 Works IV, p. 105: “The foundation was laid by Christ, but the consummation of this discovery, and
the last line, was reserved for the Spirit. … The first work of the Spirit is that of knowledge. He
communicates himself to our understanding, before he makes impressions to our wills, … he reflects
it upon the will and affections, that the faculties may regularly follow one another in the order of
working, and the soul, in turning to God, may act, and be acted, as a rational creature;” Cf. idem,
Conviction of Sin, in Works IV, pp. 164-219.
84 Works IV, p. 108: “By meditation we enter within the veil and behold his glory. … The senses of
the soul, which are as real and have as real operations about their proper objects, as the external senses
of sight and taste have about sensible objects, are thus to be exercised; … Without this we cannot
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the means of grace, in Charnock’s schema, should contribute to the substantial
increase of our knowledge of God, as both the soul’s faculties and the whole heart
that yield proper observances as the evidence of both regeneration and sanctification.
In other words, the broadly integrated understanding of the genus of theology with its
directive dimension (as part of the characteristic of English Puritan theological
prolegomena following Perkins) is seen in Charnock, especially in the cogent
arguments regarding ‘the knowledge of God’.
IV. Knowledge of God in Christ: The Limit of Natural Theology and Reason
The dialectic of “nature” and “grace” in our knowledge of God is another
important topic we need to examine in the Puritan Reformed orthodox understanding
of theological prolegomena.85 Both Perkins and Charnock reflect the theological
elaboration of the Reformed tradition since the Reformation in this discussion. In the
case of Charnock, he directly deals with this theme within the wider context of
Christology in his treatise The Knowledge of God in Christ.86 First of all, we need to
take note of the fact that Charnock categorises human knowledge of God into three
groups according to medium: natural, legal, and evangelical. Though Charnock
replaces knowledge in the Scripture with knowledge of the law, in line with the
developing interest in the “salvation-historical approach” of covenant theology in the
later seventeenth century,87 such a threefold model of the knowledge (natural, legal,
come to a knowledge of God. … We use the faculties and senses which are proper for the objects
proposed. … If we would know God, we must employ our minds, they can only be conversant about
him. By this ascent of meditation we may see more of God in a moment than otherwise we can do in
an age, … But let our affections keep an equal pace with our meditations, that the heart may be
inflamed with a divine love.” On the Puritan practice of meditation, see Frank L.Huntley, Bishop
Joseph Hall and Protestant Meditation in Seventeenth-century England: A Study with the texts of The
Art of Divine Meditations (1606) and Occasional Meditations (1633) (Binghamton: Center for
Medieval & Early Renaissance Studies, 1981); Simon Chan, “The Puritan Meditative Tradition, 1559-
1691: A Study of Ascetical Piety” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1986); J. Beeke, “The
Puritan Practice of Meditation,” in Reformed Spirituality: Communion with Our Glorious God, ed.
Joseph Pipa, Jr. and J. Andrew Wortmann (Taylors: Southern Presbyterian Press, 2003).
85 On the clear meaning of both nature and grace in the Reformed tradition, see Thomas Boston,
Human Nature in its Four-fold State (1729); repr. (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1989). In
this book Boston contrasts the state of corrupt “nature” in humanity after Adam’s fall with the state of
“grace” in humanity after regeneration.
86 Works IV, pp. 110-63. On the importance of both the christocentric character and the theologia
Mediatoris in Owen, see Rehnman, Divine Discourse, pp. 70-1.
87 For the details, see PRRD I, pp. 288-93, 296-7. Nevertheless, the model of the duplex cognitio Dei
represented by Calvin (knowledge of God and knowledge of self) was still influential in the sixteenth
and the seventeenth century. See Calvin, Institutes, I. ii; Muller, PRRD I, pp. 299-300; idem, “Duplex
Cognitio Dei in the Theology of Early Reformed Orthodoxy,” Sixteenth Century Journal 10:2 (1979),
pp. 51-61.
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and evangelical) of God primarily reflects both federal thought and the influence of
the idea of the duplex cognitio Dei in the Reformers. To be sure, we can find many
exemplary figures besides Calvin and Charnock who use this concept of the
knowledge of God as creator, which is one part of the duplex cognitio Dei in the
Reformation era and the post-Reformation period. Both Musculus and Vermigli use
the basic structure of Calvin despite additions of their own;88 Perkins uses the same
structure in dealing with the theme of creation, providence, conscience, and the
human faculties in relation to the knowledge of God in his works;89 James Ussher
and Thomas Goodwin also adopt a similar structure to their seventeenth century
contemporaries.90 At the same time, although we can trace back the history of
discussion of natural theology pursuing “a middle path between rationalism and
fideism” since the medieval scholastic period in relation to the dialectics between
Thomism and Scotism, the Reformed orthodox idea of this issue correlates with the
rise of Armininianism and Socinianism in the seventeenth century context.91 Thus,
no matter how natural theology may be set up in its definition and extent,92 the focus
of the Reformed orthodox Puritans like Charnock in this discussion was to reveal
human sinfulness and inability to receive the saving knowledge of God.93 Of course
the maxims of both finitum non capax infiniti and finiti et infiniti nulla proportio are
still important to them related to this aspect.
At the same time, in Charnock’s schema, this threefold knowledge of God is
to be considered in a Christological dimension. Thus the role of Christ as the scope
of all the Scriptures (the cognitive foundation of our theology) is related to the
meaning of the knowledge of God the Father in Christ the mediator. Both immanent
and economic communications of the knowledge of God between the Father and the
Son are also important in understanding theology as at once revealed and
supernatural.94 Christ is the image of God the Father both as “the exemplar of his
beauty and excellency” ad intra and as the person who shows the attributes of the
88 Wolfgang Musculus, Common Places of Christian Religion, trans. John Man (London: 1578), pp.
1068-78 (on the knowledge of God); Peter Martyr Vermigli, The Common Places, ed. and trans.
Anthony Marten (London: 1583), I.ii, pp. 10-7 (on the natural knowledge of God).
89 Perkins, Workes I, pp. 144 (on creation), 154-5, 158-9 (on providence), 517-8 (on conscience);
Workes II, pp. 280-3 (commentary upon Gal. 4:8-11), 458-9.
90 Ussher, Body, pp. 5-8, 27-30; Thomas Goodwin, The Works of Thomas Goodwin, D. D., 12 vols
(Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1861-66), vol. 1, pp. 386-90; vol. 6, pp. 375-7; vol. 10, pp. 140-6.
91 See PRRD I, pp. 271, 279.
92 To be sure, such a characteristic is generally inherited from the major Reformers’ ideas in Bullinger,
Calvin, and Vermigli despite the delicate differences among them. See PRRD I, pp. 278-84.
93 Cf. PRRD I, p. 283.
94 Works IV, pp. 110-1.
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Father ad extra. Thus our theology should reflect “the vision of Christ”, since we
know God through Christ “not immediately and directly, but mediately and
consequently”. Even the knowledge of God obtained by reason and natural light
comes from “the mediation of Christ”. The revelations of Christ consist of revealed
theology given through “an intellectual or spiritual vision”.95 We see in this part that
both natural theology and supernatural theology cannot be discussed without
considering the office and works of Christ as the conferrer of both aspects of the
knowledge of God. In addition, the negative assessment of Charnock’s theological
system as a decretal Aristotelian scholasticism based merely upon the structure of the
covenant of redemption (as Jones argues) becomes untenable in the light of the
underlying Christological and soteriological foci found in Charnock.96
After dealing with such a Christological framework of the knowledge of God,
Charnock proceeds to set the boundary of a “natural” knowledge of God.97 Citing
Rom. 1:19,98 Charnock demonstrates the existence of an “implanted notion” of God
in the human mind as “a law of nature” that arouses the movings of conscience;99
yet such knowledge can have no soteriological effect upon the unregenerate sinner in
such a human predicament due to original sin.100 In addition, Charnock provides
another argument for the evidences of natural knowledge of God by anatomising our
soul’s faculties. Given that the image of God is engraved in every human soul as a
copy of the divine intellect and will, a natural knowledge of God exists in each
human soul as the miniature of God.101 To put it another way, while Charnock
affirms the reality of such a natural theology, he indicates the demerits of a
“corrupted nature” (post-lapsarian state) in the human psyche on the basis of his
Augustinian attitude in anthropology. Nevertheless one finds clear evidences of
95 Works IV, pp. 112-3.
96 Tudur Jones, “Union with Christ: The Existential Nerve of Puritan Piety,” Tyndale Bulletin 41/2
(1990), pp. 194-5.
97 For the general survey of this term in the history of doctrine, see PRRD I, pp. 270-84.
98 Rom. i. 19: “That which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath shewn it unto
them.”
99 Works IV, p. 114: “[It is] a notion within, an excitation of it by objects without, that there is an
internal light which doth manifest him, as well as an external evidence of him by the creatures.” Cf.
Calvin, Institutes, II.viii.1; III.xix.15; Ussher, Body, p. 3; Owen, The Divine Original of Scripture, in
Works 16, pp. 309-10; idem, The Reason of Faith, in Works 4, p. 84; idem, Biblical Theology: The
History of Theology from Adam to Christ, trans. Stephen Westcott (Morgan: Soli Deo Gloria, 1994),
pp. 14-29.
100 The Reformed scholastics regard this knowledge as an “intuitive” knowledge (cognitio insita) that
denies its innateness like the Platonic theory, its being infusedness, and a theory of a tabula rasa. E.g.,
F. Turretin, Institutes, vol. I.iii.2. See also PRRD I, pp. 284-5; Rehnman, Divine Discourse, p. 75. We
will investigate this issue related to the Socinians and later Arminians in detail in chapter three.
101 Works IV, p. 118.
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several divine attributes within creatures, even if some critical attributes are not seen
without understanding the office and the work of Christ.102 Charnock points out both
the benefits and the weaknesses of such knowledge that one perceives from the work
of creation and providence:
Nature, therefore, can never teach men to worship God in images, unless they
were able to frame one in which they could gather and store up the perfections
of all creatures; … All this may be known of God by the creation, and it is a
true (though not a full) discovery of God. It is called truth: Rom i. 18, 25,
‘Change the truth of God into a lie.’ … It is a rational way of arguing, from the
excellency of the effect to the excellency of the cause, and from the perfection
of the creature to the perfection of God. … Yet, because there is an imperfection
in every creature, we must sift the flour of the creature from this bran, when we
would frame any conception of the excellency of God by it.103
In this comment, we see both the importance and the relationship of worship and the
attributes of God in Charnock’s theological framework. This allows humans to
receive the knowledge of God as true theology. Insofar as true worship of God is
impossible without the proper knowledge of the attributes of God, both creation and
providence cannot possibly provide such a level of theology: they lack the crucial
attributes of God that can only be transmitted through the teaching concerning Christ
the mediator. In other words, although natural knowledge of God is necessary as a
foundation for theologia nostra in the sense that it is related to the discussion of the
arguments of the existence of God (which we will deal with in detail in the next
chapter), it cannot provide a full picture of all the perfections of God toward us.104
That is, according to Charnock, we can prove the insufficiency of natural
theology in three respects: first, knowledge obtained by way of induction from the
effects to the cause cannot precisely explain the essence of objects. Second, the work
of the Holy Spirit means that there is another necessary element for our theology
distinct from a natural knowledge of God. Third, natural theology cannot explain
qualis Dei, though it provides us with the recognition of a “supreme being” in this
102 Thus Charnock does not forget anthropological considerations in explaining this knowledge. See
Works IV, p. 115: “Though man hath not the knowledge which Adam had, since the flaw he contracted
upon his understanding, yet there being some scattered relics of this knowledge, he may, by looking
near to the creatures, discern, by his purblind and dim sight, something of the attributes of God, every
creature being a glass which reflects some beams of God upon his mind;” Cf. ibid. p. 121.
103 Works IV, p. 117.
104 Works IV, p. 118: “The world is at best is but a shadow of God, … It discovers something of God,
not so much of him as to give the soul a full complacency; the fruit of it is but a thirst without a
satisfaction.”
59
world. The recognition of such failings could be the reason why Charnock
reiteratively endeavours to show that the doctrine of God’s attributes and the
atonement are connected with each other by way of the two routes of the knowledge
of God: natura and gratia. Without considering Christology, this aspect of theology
leaves no room for its being a supernatural theology explained only by virtue of the
“infusion” of grace.105 Such a combination is dispersed over all of his writings as an
underlying key idea, especially in The Attributes of God.
The discussion of the role of human reason is another theme that we need to
investigate in relation to the limits of natural theology.106 As mentioned previously,
this is linked to the assertion that the essential identity of Protestant scholastic
doctrine of God is an arid rationalism or mere scholasticism.107 Arguably Protestant
orthodoxy, including even the work of Ramistic Puritan theologians like Perkins,
depends on an Aristotelian causal model for its theological logic, though this
affirmative but ancillary use of reason becomes meaningful only within the boundary
of theologia regenitorum.108 Indeed this view of the role of reason in theology can
be traced back to Augustine, the Middle Ages, and the Reformation period.109
Philosophy, logic, and rhetoric, included as instruments in the wider category of
human reason, contribute to the exegetical formulation of theology along with the
locus method within the Reformed orthodox background. Perkins is no exception to
105 See Works IV, pp. 119, 121: “Nature could discover no more than what was imprinted on it by the
God of nature; the world stood in no need of redemption by virtue of its creation, but by virtue of its
transgression and pollution. … The creation was but the first draught of God’s perfections, and came
much short of the full declaration; … There was nothing in all their observation [on nature] that could
discover anything of God in Christ, the union of two natures, the doctrine of the trinity of persons,
which was necessary to the notion of redemption.”
106 For a general account of relationship between reason, philosophy and theology, see PRRD I, ch. 8;
idem, “Vera Philosophia cum sacra Theologia nusquam pugant: Keckerman on Philosophy, Theology,
and the Problem of Double Truth,” in After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological
Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 123-36; Sebastian Rehnman, “Alleged
Rationalism: Francis Turretin on Reason,” Calvin Theological Journal 37 (2002), pp. 255-69; Martin
Klauber, “The Use of Philosophy in the Theology of Johannes Maccovius (1578-1644),” Calvin
Theological Journal 30 (1995), pp. 376-91; G. R. Evans, Problems of Authority in the Reformation
Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. part I. 3; John Morgan, Godly
Learning: Puritan Attitudes towards Reason, Learning, and Education (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986).
107 Cf. Rehnman, Divine Discourse, pp. 113-4.
108 Cf. Rehnman, Divine Discourse, pp. 82-3.
109 See Erik Persson, Sacra Doctrina: Reason and Revelation in Aquinas, trans. Ross Mackenzie
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), pp. 230-3; F. Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of His
Religious Thought, trans. Philip Mairet (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 126-9; Heiko Oberman,
“The ‘Extra’ Dimension in Calvin’s Theology,” in The Dawn of the Reformation (Edinburgh: T & T
Clark, 1986), pp. 251-57; idem, “Initia Calvini,” in Calvinus Sacrae Scripturae Professor:Calvin as
Confessor of Holy Scripture, ed. Wilhelm Neuser (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1994), pp. 113-54; Anthony
Lane, “Calvin’s Use of the Fathers and the Medievals,” Calvin Theological Journal 16 (1981), pp.
149-205.
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this generalisation. He notes the paradoxical condition of human reason after the fall
but before the new birth concerning the knowledge of existence of true God.110
Other English Reformed theologians are also faithful to this boundary.111 In the case
of Charnock, reason without supernatural revelation merely attains “some dark
shadows or notion of God”, since nature can offer neither a “doctrine of (the)
saviour” nor “the necessity of faith”. This knowledge obtained from creation and
providence based upon an unregenerate reason comes neither from a supernatural
and special illumination nor from revelation but from God’s “common
illumination”. 112 The problem of Arminius and the Remonstrants arises from
regarding the concept of natural knowledge of God before regeneration as a
supernatural and prevenient grace of God universal to all humanity irrespective of
the fall. In other words, they destroy the boundary between nature and grace by
adopting a new definition of natural and supernatural revelation.113 Granted that “the
innate ideas” of God and human conscience might, rarely, give some natural
knowledge of God according to the view of “real” rationalists, the necessity of
supernatural revelation coming from both Scripture and the work of the Holy Spirit
cannot possibly be denied.114
In other words, in contrast to the view of these groups, the idea of the
limitation of reason in obtaining the saving knowledge of God leads Charnock to
discuss the absolute necessity of supernatural theology. The external word of God
should be internally revealed to the human faculties, including reason, by the work of
the Spirit of revelation. Even so, an acknowledgement of the fundamental priority of
revelation over reason in the matter of faith does not decrease the importance of
reason for both the comprehension and examination of revelation: grace does not
destroy nature but perfects it.115 Charnock also argues according to the Anselmic
110 Perkins, Mans Naturall Imaginations, in Workes II, pp. 458-9; PRRD I, pp. 398-9.
111 For example, see the excellent account of Owen’s use of reason in true theology in Rehnman,
Divine Discourse, pp. 114-8.
112 Works IV, pp. 154-6. This is the decisive factor of the difference between Aquinas and the
Protestants’ camp in their understanding of a natural knowledge of God. See Rehnman, Divine
Discourse, p. 77; Erik Persson, Sacra Doctrina, pp. 227-41.
113 Muller, God, Creation and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 1993), pp. 243-6; Guy Richard, “Deus Qui Regnat in Excelso,” p. 35.
114 As mentioned earlier, we will examine this point in detail in chapter three in relation to the
seventeenth century context and various rationalisms, including Socinianism. Cf. Rehnman, Divine
Discourse, pp. 119-28.
115 Being faithful to the seventeenth century Reformed scholastic tendency, Charnock frequently uses
this traditional Thomistic axiom in his works. Similarly John Morgan also says that the Puritans
combined faith and reason as long as they “subordinate human reason to the demands of an
enthusiastic faith”: John Morgan, Godly Learning, pp. 301, 309; W. Stoever, ‘A Faire and Easie Way
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tradition of fides quarens intellectum (faith seeking understanding):
We ought therefore to submit our reasonings to God’s declaration. The rational
creature was made to serve God. His reason, then, ought to be held in the rank
of a servant; the light of reason ought to veil to the author of reason, … Reason
ought to follow faith, not precede it. … Reason, indeed, may come in with an
auxiliary force after a revelation is made, for the maintaining the truth of it, and
clearing it up to the minds of others, and may be a servant to revelation now
under Christ, as well as it should have been to any revelation in the state of
innocence.116
Moreover, in Charnock’s schema, the relationship between reason and supernatural
revelation that yields faith cannot be explained without considering both the
Christological and trinitarian dimensions and the acknowledgement of Scripture as
the principle of knowing in our theology. This is the reason that both Scripture and
God are the sole two foundations (cognitive and essential) of theologia. Just as our
theology is communicated to the believer from the theology of union in Christ, so our
reason is to be under the revelation of Christ who is the wisdom of God: “The
knowledge of God in the gospel is more glorious than the knowledge of God by
nature, as much as Scripture revelation is above natural reason.”117 As will be
clearer later in the development of our thesis, an understanding of the immanent
Triune God related to both the eternal decree and the covenant of redemption cannot
be grasped without considering the external works of the Triune God in relation to
creation, providence, redemption, and the personal execution of the covenant of
grace in time. Even so, there is neither the knowledge of the Triune God in Christ nor
a proper grasp of the limitations of natural theology without the existence of
Scripture illuminating both of these points.118 Thus it becomes inevitable that our
knowledge of God is to be a Trinitarian theology reflecting fully the attributes of God
obtained both by reason from nature and by supernatural revelation of grace.119
to Heaven’: Covenant Theology and Antinomianism in Early Massachusetts (Middletown: Wesleyan
University Press, 1978), pp. 4, 6; Louis Bouyer, Orthodox Spirituality and Protestant and Anglican
Spirituality (London: Burns & Oates, 1969), p. 145.
116 Works IV, p. 157.
117 Works IV, p. 162.
118 For example, there are many scriptural proof-texts that Charnock and other Reformed theologians
cite to show the reality of a natural knowledge of God. This means that Scripture functions as the
“duplex foundation” of our theology to know both natural and supernatural theology.
119 Therefore, we see that negative views of the classical theism including those of Colin Gunton
basically fail to grasp the importance of theologia nostra as the theology of the regenerate in the
traditional orthodox doctrine of God, as well as in Reformed scholastic thought.
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V. Supernatural Theology: Christ the Mediator & Trinitarian God
The discussion of “our” theology as a theologia supernatura in theological
prolegomena encompasses various concomitant problems of the understanding of
revelation in the Reformed tradition. In the case of Charnock,120 his account of the
second medium of theology in humanity after God gave the law, known as “legal
knowledge”, stands in the middle of natural and supernatural theology as the
connecting link between them. Although knowledge obtained from Scripture itself
can be included in this second category in terms of its being an objective,
supernatural revelation, Charnock asserts the importance of the subjective dimension
of the supernatural by dividing the Scripture into the law and Gospel in a threefold
distinction. Even if the law reveals some of divine attributes, i.e. sovereignty,
holiness and justice, it cannot grant “justifying grace” leading to Christ in spite of its
sufficiency as a revelation, owing to human depravity since the fall.121 Nevertheless
legal knowledge of God leads human beings to discover the attributes of God “more
clearly than the works of nature” despite its inferiority to the third medium, theologia
evangelica.122
In contrast to the former two kinds of knowledge, evangelical knowledge of
God as the third medium of theologia nostra solves the problem of the qualis Dei to
the fullest extent by introducing Christ to humanity: “The creatures tell us there is a
God, and Christ tells who and what that God is.”123 We come to see “the transactions
between the Father and the son” by Christ who provides the believers in the “gospel
state” with a better theology: the covenant of redemption is revealed through Christ
who accomplished and applied it in history through the covenant of grace by his
works and the power of the Holy Spirit. At the same time the infallibility of
evangelical theology is guaranteed through the integration of Christology, the
doctrine of faith and the attributes of God in Charnock’s theological framework.124
120 In this section we do not deal separately with Perkins’ trinitarianism and federal theology. As
mentioned in the first chapter, we generally adopt Muller’s recent study on Perkins in this area to find
out Perkins’ idea of God’s attributes in order to explore the identity of Charnock’s doctrine of God.
See R. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from
Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1988).
121 Works IV, pp. 123-4.
122 On the use of the term “theologia evangelica” in the early orthodoxy, see Rehnman, Divine
Discourse, p. 84.
123 Works IV, p. 125.
124 Works IV, pp. 127-8: “The whole scope of the doctrine of Christ is to reveal God in his most
illustrious perfections to man, and in the relation of a gracious Father to him. … The knowledge of
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Evangelical theology also makes it possible for the elect to understand the meaning
of both ‘true’ natural theology and the compatible relationship between nature and
grace in the regenerate believer:
Natural and legal knowledge is clarified by the gospel, which is a comment to
explain what was before but darkly understood, and a new revelation to elevate
the soul to a greater understanding; it fortifies the light of nature, and frames in
us more pure and significant conceptions of God.125
Given that corrupted humanity cannot see God by way of natural knowledge of God
(despite its appropriateness in the pre-lapsarian state) evangelical theology becomes
much more necessary to the sinner after the fall. Thus theologia revelata made by
Christ is beneficial to us in the following respects: “By him, we have the illumination
of our minds, as well as the justification of our persons, the sanctification of our
natures, and redemption from our enemies.”126 For Charnock, this point is closely
connected to the meaning of the concept of Christ the mediator. Only Christ who is
the Son of God knows the mysteries of God ― this is related to His own intimacy 
with the Father in trinitarian acts both ad intra and ad extra. Christ the mediator
perpetually works with the Father in all divine acts including both creation and
redemption as the second person of the Triune God through divine counsels and
“eternal transactions”.127 We can also infer the relationship of Scripture and Christ in
terms of the knowledge of God from Charnock’s comment in the following:
As the beautiful image of reason in the mind, breaking out with the discovery of
itself in speech and words, is fittest to express the inward sense, thoughts,
conceptions, nature, and posture of the mind, so the essential Word of God
clothes himself with flesh, comes out from God to manifest the nature of God.
The word in the mind of a man is insensible to others, but published with the
voice is made sensible, and makes the person know whose word it is.128
In short, Christ as “the essential Word of God” is the scope and centre of Scripture as
faith is the most infallible way of knowledge, it being built upon the revelation of the Son of God,
who is the word of God, and the wisdom of God.”
125 Works IV, p. 127.
126 Works IV, p. 130.
127 Therefore, we can affirm that Colin Gunton’s emphasis on the concept of the trinitarian “God in
action” fails to notice the importance of this eternal “act” of the Father and the Son in the dynamics of
trinitarian theology. See C. Gunton, Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes
(London: SCM Press, 2002), esp. pp. 139, 158.
128 Works IV, p. 132.
64
the written Word. By revealing Christ, Scripture exists as the cognitive foundation or
principle of our theology. This indicates that the object of Charnock’s concept of
theologia is the Triune God revealed in both Scripture and Christ. This becomes
clearer when we consider the fact that Christ is both the “revelation” Himself through
the incarnation and the “revealer” irrespective of the incarnation in temporal
history.129 Accordingly, without understanding Christ as our mediator, there is no
saving or revealed theology that makes us sensible of the attributes of God. Moreover,
our knowledge of God should be in the form of a clear trinitarian theology that
integrates the word of God with Christ.130 Evangelical theology also confirms the
doctrine of the Trinity through the revelation of Christ the mediator.131
Of course Scripture introduces the role of Christ as the mediator, directing us
to theologia nostra through the work of the Holy Spirit. As noted above, the theology
of union that is Christ’s operates as the medium of our theology because he imparts
“something of the mind and will of God” to the believer.132 The transmission of this
theology can only be possible through both Christ’s atonement as the cause of our
theology “under the new covenant” and his work of supernatural illumination in the
spiritual faculty of humanity.133 The discussions of theologia and the doctrine of
regeneration are thus connected with each other in the doctrine of Scripture. At the
same time, in Charnock’s schema, such a doctrinally interwoven structure means that
the discussion of theologia and the doctrine of the attributes of God overlap with a
Christological dimension.134 Our theology allows us to see all the attributes of God
glorified since they are “centred together” in Christ. As Christ our mediator
participates in all of the divine acts of the Trinity as mentioned earlier, the
glorification of divine attributes in terms of their richness becomes essential to the
129 Cf. Muller, “Christ ― the Revelation or the Revealer? Brunner and Reformed Orthodoxy on the 
Doctrine of the Word of God,” Journal of Evangelical Theological Society 26:3 (Sep. 1983), pp. 307-
19.
130 Again, losing the aspect of Christ as revealer in relation to the Scriptures (as is found in Gunton)
by employing a Christocentric, Barthian way also, ironically, means one that loses the importance of
trinitarian revelation.
131 Works IV, p. 133.
132 Works IV, p. 133.
133 See the excellent description of illumination on human faculty: Works IV, p. 136: “[Christ] has
given us understanding, is not meant of the natural faculty, which is the gift of God in nature and
creation, and which grace presupposeth, but of an enlightened and purified mind, which is operative
upon the will and heart, and imprints so firmly the glory of God upon the mind, that the will is carried
out to love and fear him which compliance of the will with an illuminated understanding is the formal
act of our regeneration.”
134 Cf. Works IV, pp. 138-54.
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sensibleness of our theology.135 Although these divine attributes in Christ are in a
perfect “harmony of all”, the work of redemption has a special relevance in relation
to our knowledge of God: “When he was set forth as a propitiation, it was not only to
purchase our happiness, but to let into our knowledge the righteous and gracious
nature of God thereby:”136
It is worth observing that Charnock addresses the implications of true
“Christian religion”, in a restated version of the discussion on theologia in terms of
emphasising both the cruciality of the trinitarian dimension and the directive
characteristic of “religion” in this discussion.137 Namely, affirming the three levels
of the knowledge of God (in nature, the law and the gospel) in history, he emphasises
the fact that the history of theologia is no less than the development of a Trinitarian
theology in terms of a revelational dispensation of God which is beyond human
reason.138 To be a “true religion”, therefore, the authentic goal of our theology must
be identified as a knowledge of God that yields consolidation of doctrine or faith and
piety or observance.139 Thus the connection between true religion and worship of
God also becomes an important theme for Charnock.140 In the same way, our
theology is to endeavour towards a “union with God” in Christ because it stands as
an ectypal theology in itself, which is communicated from God. Our theology must
also pursue a piety which moves our will into action through spiritual impressions
upon our affections. Once all of these aspects are considered properly, the necessary
condition of our theology toward “life eternal” can be realised in Christ who has
theologia unionis.141
To summarise, Charnock’s idea of supernatural theology is seen in his
account of the evangelical knowledge of God, which is based upon the saving,
covenantal, and trinitarian revelation of God. That is, the examination above
illustrates that Charnock has already clarified this relationship between divine
attributes and trinitarianism on both christological and federal bases in his account of
135 Works IV, p. 139: “Christ is the stage wherein all the attributes of God act their parts: in creation,
he was a God of goodness and power; in providence, a God of wisdom; in the law, a God of justice; in
Christ, a God of all, and a God of grace, a Father of mercy.”
136 Works IV, p. 142.
137 Works IV, p. 157.
138 Works IV, p. 158.
139 Works IV, p. 158: “Religion respects God; it must have the knowledge of God therefore a
foundation. … All true religion conduceth to the creature’s duty and happiness: our duty and
happiness is to know and love God.”
140 Charnock deals with it in detail in the treatise titled Spiritual Worship as a part of The Attributes, in
Works II, pp. 283-344.
141 Works IV, pp. 161-3.
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theological prolegomena.
VI. The Interpretation of Scripture: Toward “Theological” Interpretation
If Scripture is the one of the two foundations of our theology as the “Word
written” and given in both mediated and accommodated form, it must be rightly
interpreted in order that its genuineness is inwardly testified by the Holy Spirit.142 In
other words, for Puritans and the Reformed scholastic theologians, the problem of
interpretation of Scripture is located at the centre of the identity of our theology
(knowledge of God) which is to be elicited and revealed ultimately as a whole
doctrinal system from the Scripture, the only cognitive foundation in light of the
Christological dimension. To examine Perkins’ and Charnock’s ideas of biblical
interpretation, we need to outline briefly the history of this doctrine. Scriptural
interpretation ought to be incontestably the foundation of theological ideas. This was,
without doubt, acknowledged in the exegetical traditions of both the patristic and the
medieval period represented by the quadriga. Yet the Protestant exegetical tradition
needed other interpretive principles and tools in the course of the struggle with
Roman Catholicism. Thus they defended the idea of sola Scriptura during the
Reformation period, although such an idea was not completely new.143 Against the
two extremes of Roman Catholicism and a radical insistence upon the unlimited
freedom of private interpretation, the Puritans and the seventeenth century orthodox
(as the successors of the Reformers) never ceased to forget the fact that the only two
roots of the authority of Scriptural interpretation are the Word of God itself and the
Holy Spirit who guarantees the veracity of the Word in a “single intention” within the
scope of the text.144 Even the analogia fidei and the analogia Scriptura never
deviated from the Reformed orthodox pursuit of the “genuine” sensus literalis
distinct from the medieval quadriga.145 Thus, the role of creeds and confessions in
the Reformed and the Puritan tradition is also important for the biblical interpretation
142 For a succinct “fourfold” description of the Word of God, see PRRD II, p. 155.
143 See PRRD II, pp. 469-70. On the difference between Tradition I and II as the source of doctrines
and exegesis, see H. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1963), pp. 365-93.
144 Quotation from PRRD II, p. 474. For a detailed analysis of the meaning of both the narrow and the
broader scope of the text, see pp. 488-9, 492-3. Cf. Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, ii, 14 (pp. 149-54).
145 The analogy of faith may be defined as follows: “[The rule] according to the fundamental articles
of faith enunciated in the basic catechetical topics of Creed, Lord’s prayer, and Decalogue operate as
interpretive safeguards upon the interpretation of particularly difficult texts,” in PRRD II, p. 493. For
the general explanation of the two interpretive guidelines above, see PRRD II, pp. 493-7. Cf. Guy
Richard, “Deus Qui Regnat Excelso,” pp. 70-1.
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as norma normata in relation to the analogy of faith. Within the context of early
orthodoxy, Perkins successfully deals with the problem of the interpretation of
Scripture under the same title in chapter four of his The Art of Prophecying.146
The establishment of the relationship of the Word, tradition, church, and
doctrine to Scripture coalesces in the issue of the right method of the interpretation of
Scripture. The relationship between elicitation of true doctrine and the subsequent
right worship of God by the church can only be possible through an appropriate
exegesis, which guarantees the existence of true theological formulation along with
“the continued existence of Scripture”.147 Perkins and Charnock also reflect this
point in general in terms of their continuity with the view of the Reformers. At the
same time they developed the doctrine of the Word of God in a more practical
direction in relation to preaching as the “instrument” of regeneration and
sanctification in the English Puritan tradition. To be sure, this is related not only to
setting the boundaries of the proper interpretation of Scripture as an external
revelation, but also to an understanding of subjective revelation in the believer’s
heart internally used as a “sacramental” means of “invisible” grace by the Holy Spirit.
Most of all, we should focus on the Trinitarian, covenantal, and soteriologically
Christocentric (not in the sense of neo-orthodox teaching on Christ as the dominating
principle of all Christian doctrine)148 dimension of biblical interpretation within the
context of both the eternal decree as the essential act of God and the temporal
manifestation of redemptive and soteriological acts of God ad extra (which is a
characteristic of Reformed orthodoxy in general). Just as we see the characteristics of
the whole theological framework in the theological prolegomena, so the
interpretation of Scripture is no different in this respect.
In the case of Perkins, such a dedication to the word of God with its zeal for
piety, and such a Christ-focused understanding of theological interpretation is
particularly remarkable in terms of his role as the ‘father’ of Puritan theology.
Moreover, we find the Puritan pattern of exegetical pursuit from biblical text to
146 Perkins, The Art of Prophecying, in Workes II, pp. 646-73. See esp. pp. 650-4. Cf. Workes II, pp.
54-60, which deals with the arguments on the truth and authority of Scripture in his Case of
Conscience.
147 Quotation from PRRD II, p. 175.
148 Cf. PRRD II, p. 212. This point arguably reminds us of the reason for Gunton’s emphasis on the
gospel and the incarnation as an historical action of God and his criticism of the orthodox doctrine of
God as one which excludes the temporal and personal dimensions of the Trinity. In Gunton’s view,
based upon a tendency to Barthian Christocentric assumptions, the Puritan emphasis on the ad extra
dimension fails to overcome the limitations of its belonging to the traditional orthodox system of the
doctrine of God. See Gunton, Act and Being, esp. pp. 16-8.
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doctrinal systems in Perkins’ extended theological commentaries along with
polemical, theological pieces.149 For Charnock, the development of the genre of the
homiletical commentary in the whole orthodox period in general is linked with his
viewpoint of the doctrine of Scripture in continuity with Perkins. Both writers’ work
is indisputably in the form of an exposition of Scripture taking the form of doctrinal
sermons, a characteristically Reformed method, especially among the Puritans. It is
therefore also important to understand this trait more clearly. The continuity and
development of the style of biblical exposition between Perkins and Charnock is
based upon the essential frame of the locus method. At the same time there is an
emphasis upon the “use” of the doctrines according to the Puritan tradition of
practical divinity along with the scholastic method.150 Despite diverse patterns and
emphases in their interpretations, what both the early orthodox theologians and high
orthodox Puritans commonly endeavour to resolve is to set the boundary and the
standard of the “literal meaning” of the passages against the abuse of this term in
continuity with the Reformers.
To put it another way, theological systems or doctrines cannot be separated
from right exegetical results; and such exegetical results can never oppose the
fundamental doctrines of our salvation. Perkins, conversely, even points out the
importance of basic doctrinal knowledge in that there would be no right biblical
interpretation without it.151 The use of reason and logic in drawing doctrinal
conclusions invariably moves within the boundary of both the Word and the Spirit
that buttresses faith and regeneration. Certainly we also find a distinction of
hermeneutical context between early and high orthodoxy ― the increased interest in 
textual criticism and original languages ― that presses upon the orthodox Puritans to 
develop more elaborate arguments to defend their own pre-critical exegesis thus
preserving the key doctrines as “the core of the biblical messages” for churchly
discipline and piety.152
149 Perkins, A Commentarie or Exposition upon the Five First Chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians,
in Workes II, pp. 153-432; idem, An Exposition upon Christs Sermon in the Mount, in Workes III (i),
pp. 1-264; idem, A Cloud of Faithfull Witnesses, in Workes III (ii), pp. 1-206; A Reformed Catholike,
in Workes I, pp. 555-624, esp. pp. 580-3 on the relationship between Scripture and tradition for
eliciting right doctrinal points in biblical interpretation.
150 See PRRD II, pp. 506-7, 514-6. While Perkins uses a four-fold approach to a text (reading –
exposition – doctrine – application), Charnock extends such an approach in hermeneutical and
theological directions. Cf. Trueman, Claims of Truth, pp. 89-90.
151 Perkins, The Art of Prophecying, in Workes II, p. 650; idem, A Godly and Learned Exposition …of
Revelation, in Workes III, pp. 213-5; idem, A Godly and Learned Exposition … of Jude, in Workes III,
pp. 497-9. Cf. PRRD II, pp. 466, 476.
152 Quotation from PRRD II, p. 455.
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Let us turn more fully to Charnock’s view on Scriptural interpretation. In
general, Charnock’s twofold understanding of the Word of God as the essential and
written word shows that he takes a position in line with Calvin and early Reformed
orthodoxy. Charnock does not allocate a specific section to the interpretation of
Scripture on a systematic level, but rather he expounds the doctrine of the Word of
God in one of the treatises primarily dealing with the grandiose theme of
“regeneration”.153 In Charnock, we see that the authority of Scripture as the word of
God and its interpretation is directly linked with the Christological dimension of the
Word of God in its content and efficacy. In other words, Charnock especially focuses
on the gospel in Scripture as an instrument of the application of Christ’s redemptive
works in the believer in a temporal dimension. Though he does not use the specific
Greek words endiathetos (the word as the act of divine power) and prophorikos
(Scripture itself) in his distinction of the word of God,154 such a characteristic shows
that Charnock seems to stress the aspect of the word that manifests divine
regenerative power. According to Charnock, the written Word of God is “the Word of
truth” that shows the law and gospel both in the Old and the New Testaments. The
scope of Scripture as the Word of truth is thus Christ, “the essential and uncreated
logos, Word”. The gospel seen in the person and work of Christ the mediator
between God and humanity is declared through preaching this written Word of God.
Only this Word of God can substitute a habit of grace leading to new birth for the old
sinful habit caused by the fall.155 The relationship of Scripture to the Holy Spirit in
terms of the efficacy for both the begetting of the new creature and the quickening of
the believer depends upon the redemptive works of the essential word, Christ.156
Charnock also states:
As God will have the mediation of his son honoured in the whole progress and
perfection of grace as the meritorious cause, the efficacy of the Spirit as the
efficient cause, so he will have the word in every step to heaven honoured as the
instrumental cause; that as Jesus Christ is all in all, as the chief, so the word
may be all in all as the means. As God created the world by the word of his
153 Charnock, The Word, The Instrument of Regeneration, in Works III, pp. 307-35.
154 In what follows, we are indebted to Trueman’s discussion of Owen on this subject. See Trueman,
Claims of Truth, pp. 68-9.
155 Works III, pp. 308-9.
156 Works III, p. 317: “The word has this efficacy from the bleeding wounds and dying groans of
Christ. … By his blood are all the promises of grace confirmed; by his blood they are operative. … the
word shews the way, and the Spirit enables to walk in it.” The classic account of the Holy Spirit and
Word in Puritan tradition is G. Nuttall, The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1946), chapter I, esp. pp. 23, 33.
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power, and by the word of his providence bid the creatures increase and
multiply, so by the word of the gospel he lays the foundation, and rears the
building, of his spiritual house.157
Charnock considers the multi-faceted role of the Word in terms of both the
intratrinitarian act of the eternal decree that appoints Christ as the mediator and the
redeemer and the external works of the Triune God in the history of the creatures.
Although the redemptive work is the most glorious one among the divine works ad
extra, the Scripture nevertheless ought to be appreciated as the only objective
revelation of God that is to be read and preached with soteriological effect.158 The
transforming power of the Word of God in conversion and sanctification links
directly with the reason for the importance of the interpretation of the Scripture.
For Charnock, faithful to the tradition of Puritan theology, only the preaching
of the Word of God accompanied by right exegesis is conducive to works of
regeneration by the Holy Spirit.159 In short, we can see that Charnock’s doctrine of
the Scripture is linked with his endeavour to expound “correctly” the various
significant doctrinal areas in it, i.e., Trinity, Christology, Pneumatology, and
Providence.160 Creation and providence is based upon the Trinitarian working of the
word of God;161 the evangelical ministry of Christ as the Word agraphon is founded
upon the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son ad intra, while at the same
time it uses the means of the Word engraphon, Scripture and the proclaimed word of
the gospel ad extra in time. All the divine acts according to His decree and will are
executed by the word of God in the Trinitarian structure.162 Charnock also explains
the divine economy of the covenantal structure in the progress of redemptive history
written in the Old and New Testaments. Although a series of covenants converge on
the covenant of grace, which reaches its zenith in the person and the work of Christ
after the incarnation in terms of “the horizontal line”, according to Charnock, “the
157 Works III, p. 315.
158 Works III, p. 322.
159 Works III, p. 325: “The instrument of conversion is not barely the letter of the word, but the sense
and meaning of it, rationally impressed upon the understanding, and closely applied to the conscience.
The opening [of] the word is the life of it, and the true means of regeneration.”
160 Cf. Trueman, Claims of Truth, pp. 65, 67.
161 In the operation of the word of God, the Father acts “by the Son through the Holy Spirit”. See
Trueman, Claims of Truth, p. 73. For the details, see Owen, Works 16, pp. 297-300.
162 Trueman points out well through Owen’s case the grounds of argument on the role of the Holy
Spirit in the Trinitarian dimension of opera Dei: “All actions of God toward human beings, including
the personal application of salvation [except the assumption of bodily form by the logos], must be the
direct work of the Holy Spirit, although dual procession guarantees the overall Trinitarian nature of
such actions,” in Claims of Truth, p. 76.
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vertical line” of the divine will to save the elect is based upon His eternal decree of
the covenant of redemption clearly seen in John 17.163 In fact such a tendency
arguably echoes Perkins and previous orthodox Puritans in the relationship between
the Scriptures and Christ.164
What is also prominent in Charnock’s teachings on the word of God is his
detailed analysis of the influence of the Word upon one’s soul in a practical
dimension. He does not lose a balanced consideration of each faculty of the soul in
receiving the word, while at the same time he reminds his readers of the importance
of the discretion of the holy affections incited by the Spirit. Only the threefold work
of the Holy Spirit upon the mind, will and affections in harmony can be the evidence
of the operation of the word of God in individuals as “a genuine flame”165, which can
lead to a right interpretation of Scripture as objective revelation. As Trueman stresses,
“rationality” in the Puritan understanding of human intellect in the believer is to be
distinct from “rationalism” in terms of this balance of the soul’s faculty. 166
Furthermore the interpreter of Scripture ought to have both justifying faith and
“experimental” knowledge of the word “heated with love” and prayer.167 Though
such a Christian piety necessary for the interpreter as “the context of interpretation”
had been stressed before Charnock and the Puritans,168 this point is especially
related to their emphasis on theologia regenitorum in an exegetical dimension ― the 
practice of exegesis cannot make progress without the practice of piety. In a sense,
such characteristics are related to the broader Reformed tradition that emphasised
interpretation as “a spiritual exercise”, which is to be traced back to Augustine.169
Certainly, it is related to an understanding of theology as a practical science or
163 Quotation from Trueman, Claims of Truth, p. 74.
164 For example, Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed
Theology from Calvin to Perkins. See esp. pp. 164-171 (on Perkins); Trueman, Claims of Truth, pp.
74-5 (on Owen).
165 Works III, p. 333.
166 “As in regeneration the Holy Spirit does not oppose human rational powers, but rather restores and
perfects them, … the truths of faith are not irrational but rather supraratural”: Trueman, Claims of
Truth, p. 92. Contra Gunton and Jones, this point is also related to the whole argument of our thesis:
Puritan Reformed scholasticism in Perkins and Charnock’s doctrine of God is not the product of
rationalism, but is elaborated in order to defend the biblically elicited doctrines of both divine
simplicity and trinitarianism.
167 Works III, p. 334.
168 Quotation from PRRD II, p. 482. A representative piece would be William Whitaker, A
Disputation on Holy Scripture, trans. and ed. W. Fitzgerald, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1849; repr. Morgan: Soli Deo Gloria, 2005), esp. IX. 5.
169 PRRD II, p. 503. Cf. Augustine, Teaching Christianity: De Doctrina Christiana; ed. John Rotelle
and trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City Press, 1995); Trueman, Claims of Truth: John Owen’s
Trinitarian Theology, pp. 86-7.
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wisdom.
We may also confirm the characteristic of Charnock’s biblical interpretation
by investigating the organisational style of his writings. Although Muller selects
Charnock’s The Existence and the Attributes of God as an outstanding exemplar of
the Protestant use of Scripture, Muller’s analysis relates it to Charnock’s other
writings within the larger framework of the doctrine of God:
Each discourse sets forth a single doctrinal point belonging to the dogmatic
locus “God” ― with the larger number of discourses focusing on an attribute as 
identified by a text from the bible. … Rather than simply abstract from the text
the [doctrinal] idea … Charnock both examines the text and discusses the view
of various commentators … prior to their application to the doctrinal problem at
hand. … Charnock then proceeds to offer [doctrinal] statements, each with
exposition, … which, he comments, is the “chief scope of the words”: … The
reference to “scope” here is significant. The term indicates not so much a
doctrinal or dogmatic as a hermeneutical concern. Charnock, like the Reformers
and like various early orthodox exegetes, assumed that the fundamental issue to
be addressed in identifying the meaning of a biblical passage was the focus,
center, or “scope” of the passage, … Charnock was working in the context of a
tradition of interpretation ― a tradition that he referenced closely in his effort to 
grasp the meaning of the text … and to move from the text to theological
formulation.170
Therefore, the discussion of the doctrine of God found in Charnock and the orthodox
Puritans, which we will deal with in the following chapters, whatever its specific
literary genre and form, is based upon appropriate and coherent gatherings of biblical
passages. From these they elicit doctrinal formulations without missing either the
scope or the fundamental articles of the whole Scripture.171 Even the relatively
philosophical arguments in relation to the doctrine of the divine essence are
invariably based upon the exegesis of the specific passages as sedes doctrinae, which
is not a mere “proof-texting” utterly apart from the exegetical result.172
At this juncture, we again find the fallacy of Tudur Jones’ assertion (based
upon a negative view of the “classical” doctrine of God) that Charnock moves
170 PRRD II, pp. 516-8. Cf. Guy Richard, “Deus Qui Regnat in Excelso,” pp. 46-7.
171 Muller explains this aspect of Reformed orthodoxy as follows in PRRD II, p. 502: “The exegesis,
the larger framework of interpretation leading toward exposition, and the dogmatic methods
advocated by Reformed orthodoxy were profoundly and organically interrelated. The assumption of
the orthodox, much like that of the Reformers, was that exegesis functioned not as a disciplinary end
in itself but as the ground and foundation for a path ― a methodus ― leading to theological 
formulation on all matters of doctrine and practice. ”
172 PRRD II, p. 510.
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beyond the Scripture into the area of scholasticism, which is “the road not [to be]
taken” in Jones’ view.173 Apart from its form, the problem of scholasticism has
nothing to do with this significant trinitarian structure of the doctrine of revelation ― 
the interpretation of Scripture ― in its content and background.174 On the contrary,
the Arminians and various rationalist groups merely used the scriptural passage
“segmentally” in order to diminish or deny the range of core biblical doctrines,
especially in the doctrine of God. As the area of the doctrine of God was in the midst
of this severe “hermeneutical struggle” in the early modern period, 175 the
understanding of the link between the interpretation of Scripture and the doctrine of
God is critical, especially in Perkins and Charnock who de facto adopt the doctrine of
God as the central field of their theological discussion. Furthermore, both Perkins
and Charnock show clear evidence of the flourishing hermeneutical and methodical
connections between a biblical interpretation that uses the analytical method and a
doctrinal formulation built on a system of theological loci that uses the synthetic or
compositive method. 176 In short, the Puritan Reformed orthodox biblical
interpretation, especially in Charnock within the context of continuity with Perkins,
is based upon the twin foundation of the two objective revelations of God as the
Word of God (Christ and Scripture) and as the subjective Word of God internally
appropriated in the elect through the efficacy of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, to
investigate their doctrine of God (as will be done in the forthcoming chapters), we
need to bear in mind the intrinsic character of Scriptural interpretation in the
Reformed orthodoxy, viz. “theological” interpretation amalgamating exegesis into a
“system”.
Conclusion
We have scrutinised Charnock’s ideas of the nature, necessity, properties, and
genus of theology as well as of natural and supernatural theology in terms of its
Christological and trinitarian dimensions. Then we have also explored Charnock’s
doctrine of the word of God and Scriptural interpretation along with the views of
Perkins. As we have seen, Charnock’s doctrine of the knowledge of God reflected in
173 I borrowed this expression from Thomas Nettles, By His Grace and for His Glory: A Historical,
and Practical Study of the Doctrines of Grace in Baptist Life (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1986),
p. 86.
174 Cf. Trueman, Claims of Truth, pp. 78, 97-8.
175 The quotation is from PRRD II, p. 504.
176 For a detailed account of the distinction of these methods, see PRRD II, pp. 504-5.
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his view of theologia shows the typical dialectic of grace and nature as the medium
of the human knowledge of God. At the same time, in terms of the history of
theology, this indicates that Puritan Reformed scholastic theology had inherited the
dialectic between Thomism and Scotism insofar as they acknowledged the priority of
grace over nature as the root of supernatural theology. The plan of the revelation of
such salvific knowledge of God to the elect is primarily founded upon the
intratrinitarian act of the eternal decree, which then reaches its climax at the time of
Christ’s incarnation and the fulfillment of redemption by the Father and through the
Holy Spirit in time. According to Charnock and the Puritan reformed theologians of
early and high orthodoxy alike, our theology is nothing other than to know the mind
and the will of this Triune God who acts in both the eternal and temporal dimension.
Moreover, in Charnock’s system, the doctrine of the attributes of God is
significant because the works of God ad extra provide humanity with such
knowledge more clearly and sufficiently than the ad intra dimension, especially in
terms of the person and the work of Christ. Charnock endeavours to show that only
the knowledge of God “in Christ” can render a human approach ectypal, saving and
our theology, while at the same time stressing that such knowledge can be provided
only by the word of God given both as the objective and subjective revelation of God
through the work of the Holy Spirit. The role of Scriptural interpretation is critical in
that it connects the written Scripture as the objective revelation of God with the
theological doctrines elicited from it ― ultimately heading toward a theological 
system in a larger framework ― as the subjective and applicatory teaching for our 
regeneration and sanctification.
Such a close relationship between the theme of theology and Scripture seen in
Charnock’s intellectual foundations has much in common with the characteristics of
both Perkins and the whole of Reformed orthodox theology. Though we have only
investigated the area of theological prolegomena and biblical interpretation, it would
be correct to sum up as follows. If Perkins’ theology can be represented as an early
Puritan trinitarianism which does not deviate from Calvin’s own doctrine of the
Trinity, as has been insisted in recent scholarship,177 then Charnock’s emphasis on
the intratrinitarian dimension of God’s covenant is no less than the reaffirmation and
magnification of such a fundamental theological framework for our knowledge of the
trinitarian God within the later seventeenth century context. That is, Charnock never
deviates from the common theological framework of Perkins and the earlier Puritan
177 See p. 20 and the works cited therein.
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theology or the understanding common to the mainstream of the Reformed federal
tradition. His attempts to build a theological system loyal to the previous generation
of Puritan theologians coalesce in the writing of his extended discussion of the theme,
The Attributes of God. At this moment, then, the preparatory road is paved for our
discussion of Charnock’s whole doctrine of God’s existence and attributes.
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Chapter Three
The Existence of God and Divine Spirituality
It is critically important for our discussion of Perkins’ and Charnock’s
doctrine of the existence, essence, and attributes of God in this and later chapters to
keep the following statement in mind as the main argumentative point that we will
demonstrate: both the Reformed scholastic and the English Puritan divines treat this
doctrinal locus not as the area of a pure natural theology, but as that of supernatural
knowledge of God in relation to the work of the Triune God ad intra and ad extra
(the ontological Trinity and the economic Trinity). 1 Accordingly, we will see
whether the criticisms of the Reformed orthodox doctrine of God that see it within
the larger perspective of “classical theism”, which point to a severance between
God’s essence and attributes and the Trinity in the doctrine of God, without
consideration of the context of faith, is a misunderstanding or not.2
Certainly this characteristic in the Puritan Reformed scholastic theology can
be construed as an echo of the Reformers Musculus, Hyperius, and Calvin, in their
arrangement of the order of the doctrine of God as “one doctrine of God
distinguished but not separated.”3 This is to be found throughout the arrangement of
their discussion, regardless of whether they are more systematic or not in their styles
— ranging from the existence of God (An sit Deus) via essence (what and who is
God, Quid et Quis sit Deus) and attributes (what sort of God, Qualis sit Deus) to the
doctrine of Trinity.4 Perkins and Charnock, in fact, both seem to avoid dealing with
detailed discussion of the divine essence (following the style of Zanchi), in contrast
1 To understand the role of the attributes of God in the whole span of the doctrine of God, despite the
delicate differences in nuance in the Reformed tradition, the following distinction of theological terms
is important. We might say there are two kinds of opera Dei interna: personal and essential.
According to the Augustinian tradition, the decree (decretum) is an essential work of the Trinity ad
intra in eternity based upon the equality of the three persons as “free and internal act of divine will”.
In other words, the decree is an act of divine essence as “the work of the entire Godhead”. The divine
decree is general or special: the general decree is the providence of God; the special decree (or special
providence) is predestination. When considering this sequence, the eternal decree is revealed through
the executions of the decree according to the divine will in an ad extra dimension. For the details, see
Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to
Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1988), pp. 149-54, 160-71, which especially deals with Perkins’
doctrine of the decree.
2 Cf. Adriaan Neele, The Art of Living to God: A Study of Method and Piety in the Theoretico-practica
theologia of Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706) (Pretoria: Department of Church History, University of
Pretoria, 2005), pp. 74-5.
3 PRRD III, p. 164.
4 For detailed explanation and related bibliography, see PRRD III, pp. 153-9.
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to other Reformed orthodox theologians who define essentia in detail. 5 The
Reformed orthodox theologians de facto identify essence with the nature of God
along with the consideration of its relationship to the Trinity, as Muller writes: “God
is a most simple, immutable, immense, eternal, most living, wise, just, free, powerful,
and blessed Spirit; and he is the father, Son, & Holy Spirit. … The essence of God is
Deity itself or the divine nature”.6 In some way the Reformed identification of
essentia (essence) with the esse (existence) of God is also significant for piety as it
functions as a source of consolation.7
From chapter three to seven of this thesis, in the case of Perkins especially,
we will be able to establish that in each attribute, as well as in the doctrine of divine
existence, Perkins follows the Ramist architectonic style of partition of the whole
theological system into faith (credenda) and works (facienda). This takes place in
terms of both the theoretical doctrine to believe and the practical doctrine to obey as
an ethic of life based upon the larger framework of uniting each element into “the
science of living blessedly forever” according to the early orthodox model.8 In the
case of Charnock, we will also discover that Charnock develops a twofold analysis of
faith and obedience into a threefold or even fourfold structure of exegetical, doctrinal,
polemical, and practical elements. As mentioned earlier, these feature in his
theological framework in a way similar to Mastricht’s work, within the historical
context of the later seventeenth century.9
In addition, from chapters three to seven, it will become clear that the
understanding of “true religion” as a combination of the knowledge and worship of
God is also essential to Perkins and Charnock. This emphasis united the Perkinsian
or Spiritual Brethren and, for that matter, the wider circle of English Puritans who
emphasised the act of the soul’s faculties (the whole heart).10 At the same time a
5 Cf. PRRD III, p. 228; Neele, The Art of Living to God, p. 76.
6 PRRD III, p. 232, citing in Hottinger, Cursus theologicus, III.ii,iv.
7 PRRD III, p. 237.
8 Perkins, A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 11; PRRD III, p. 159. According to Muller, this
characteristic belongs to the category of theologia ectypa which is imperfect, which is clearly
influenced by Franciscus Junius (1545-1602). For Junius and other styles of approach in the
arrangement of the order of the doctrine of God in early and high orthodoxy, see PRRD III, pp. 159-64.
9 However, the elenctic dimension in Charnock’s overall work seems to be somewhat softened
because of its characteristic as an English Puritan theology that avoids too speculative or abstruse
points of argument for its hearers and readers.
10 Paul Schaefer defines this spiritual brotherhood as follows: “a group of men for whom the
Cambridge of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries became a centre of reforming activity,
teaching, and training that eventually sent many of them throughout the rest of England and even to
the Netherlands and to the New World,” in “The Spiritual Brotherhood of the Habits of the Heart:
Cambridge Protestants and the Doctrine of Sanctification from William Perkins to Thomas Shepard”
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thread of connection will be found running through our investigation of the doctrine
of existence and attributes of God between Perkins and Charnock. Both of them
attach priority to the doctrine of God over other loci in their structures along with the
consideration of both trinitarian and covenantal dimensions of theology.11 In brief,
the continuities, developments, and differences between Perkins and Charnock will
become much clearer according to the development of our investigation. For this
examination, the views and influences of other Puritans and the Continental
Reformed orthodox theologians, if necessary, will also be addressed. This will enable
us to consider both the diachronic and synchronous dimensions of their theological
ideas, and the dialectics between Scotism and Thomism that brought about
modification in Reformed orthodox thinking.12
When it comes to the taxonomy of divine attributes, as mentioned earlier,
both Perkins and Charnock were influenced by the tradition of federal theology that
continued to develop in both early and high orthodoxy. On the one hand, Perkins
classifies the divine attributes into the attributes based upon the divine essence
(simpleness, infiniteness, immutability, spirituality, eternity, and greatness) and the
attributes of the life of God (intellect, will, and the affections).13 We see strong
traces of the faculty psychology in this classification, reflecting the legacy of
Aquinas and Scotus.14 On the other hand, Charnock virtually seems to use a
threefold division of the attributes (without a separate topic on divine essence)
following the scholastic division, as well as reflecting “the strong influence of
federalism”: quid as essential property (spirituality), quantus as greatness (eternity,
immutability, and omnipresence), and qualis as the attributes of life, intellect, will,
and the affections (knowledge, wisdom, power, holiness, goodness, dominion, and
(Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994), pp. ii, 6-7. This indicates that in some way both
ecclesiastical reformation and the reforming of the heart are necessary. Following Schaefer, we also
see that the core of Puritan thought is “the internal matters of the heart,” which will be dealt with
throughout our thesis; cf. William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, trans. and ed. John Eusden
(Durham: Labyrinth Press, 1983), p. 79 (I.ii.1-2).
11 Cf. PRRD III, p. 160.
12 Cf. A. Neele, The Art of Living to God, pp. 90, 92.
13 On the important distinction between Perkins’ and Arminius’ views that appropriates Suarez’s idea
of the life of God in relation to divine simplicity, see R. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the
Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1993), pp. 126-7.
14 For detailed presentation, see PRRD III, pp. 219-20. Muller also asserts a similarity between
Cocceius and the Leiden theologians who use much the same style as Perkins despite Cocceius’ use of
the distinction of incommunicable and communicable attributes. Since Cocceius influenced
Charnock’s theological system, the reason for our comparative study of Perkins and Charnock on the
attributes of God becomes more apparent; cf. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 123.
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patience as divine affection).15
As also mentioned earlier, Charnock’s structure is a basically threefold or
mild fourfold theological enterprise developed and extended from the form and
content of Perkins’ more compact Ramist system. This, however, is joined to a
“hermeneutical principle” and “the use of reason” yielding a doctrinal formulation
categorised as an English Puritan theology as well as a Reformed scholastic system.16
Our investigation following both the order and pattern of this mild fourfold structure
(in the organisation of this thesis) from this chapter to the end will demonstrate the
whole structural convergence of theology and piety at “the macro level” of the
scholastic method in the seventeenth century, moving beyond the definitional and
(typical) quaestio style while at the same time remaining more focused on Charnock.
In this examination the relationship of each section exegetical, doctrinal, elenctic,
and practical is preserved.17
In summary, throughout the following five chapters, we shall meet in
Charnock (and Perkins) a solid combination of the trinitarian knowledge of God and
the doctrine of God’s existence and attributes on the basis of a strong Christology
and federalism, coupled with firm exegetical evidence and a more extended structure.
We will see not only that this characteristic of their theological formulations was
enhanced and developed from Perkins’ work in the early orthodox English Reformed
doctrine of God to Charnock’s high orthodox theological system within the clear
boundary of the tradition of Puritan piety, but also that the core framework or
“matrix” of their system was not altered.
I. The Existence of God & Practical Atheism
On the whole, the Reformed scholastic’s discussion of the knowledge of
God’s existence is related to the problem of natural theology in its soteriological
dimension. The problem of faith and the knowledge of God are closely related with
each other in this context because only a “regenerate mind” can correctly understand
15 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 222-3; Neele, The Art of Living to God, p. 198. As mentioned in chapter one, the
importance of the covenantal aspect is the key to understanding this categorisation of the divine
attributes: contra Colin Gunton, Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes (London:
SCM Press, 2002), pp. 89-90.
16 Quotations from PRRD III, p. 277; cf. Neele, The Art of Living to God, p. 74.
17 On the three levels of scholastic method (micro, meso, and macro), see Neele, The Art of Living to
God, pp. 93, 128. In this respect there he also refers to Van Asselt and Rouwendal eds., Inleiding in de
Gereformeerde Scholastiek, (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1998).
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the Scriptural text that reveals the existence of God not as a Being in the purely
metaphysical sense but as the living God who is the object of theologia nostra.18
Since the return of the discussion of the existence of God in Melanchthon, from
Calvin and the early Reformed theologians to the seventeenth century orthodoxy,19
the Protestant way of dealing with this theme lays emphasis on an evangelical
persuasion aiming at the conversion of the atheist rather than on any speculative
dimension. In other words, this is not the “demonstrative” approach that was a
marked characteristic of medieval theologians, but a rhetorical and homiletical one
aimed toward the congregation and the reader. Nevertheless, the necessary help
offered by metaphysics in those days can be traced in the doctrines of the existence,
essence, and the attributes of God, although their treatment of the divine virtues and
affections and the doctrine of Trinity were based purely upon a soteriological
framework alone.20
In the case of Perkins and Charnock, neither of them uses purely logical and
demonstrative arguments. As Muller argues, in the Reformed orthodox view
especially in the English Puritan context, the question of An sit Deus (whether God
exists or not) was not a problem of proof but a principle of presupposition for the
persuasion of believers. This reflects a preference for Scotistic over Thomistic forms
in the proofs, though the proof itself derives its identity initially from medieval
Thomism. At the same time the Reformed orthodox sensitivity to the relationship
between the knowledge of God’s existence and the problem of sin shows their
continuity with the Reformers in terms of views of the knowledge of God.21 In short,
especially in case of Charnock, the arguments for the existence of God are placed in
the initial part of the doctrine of God as an independent theme related to the problem
of atheism within the boundary of the whole theological system.22 Though Perkins,
in the early orthodox context, deals with this theme to a lesser degree of detail than is
the case in high orthodoxy, the general characteristic of the Reformed orthodoxy as a
18 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 165, 168; William Whitaker, A Disputation on Holy Scripture (1588), trans. and
ed. W. Fitzgerald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1849; repr. Morgan, Pa: Soli Deo Gloria,
2005), question V. ch. IX.
19 For a summary of early Reformers’ and Calvin’s views of the proofs of divine existence, see PRRD
III, pp. 171-7; cf. J.E. Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of
God in Dutch Theology1575-1650 (Leiden: Brill, 1982), pp. 34-46.
20 Cf. PRRD III, p. 169.
21 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 171, 176, 179.
22 Charnock, A Discourse upon the Existence of God; Practical Atheism; A Discourse upon God’s
Being a Spirit; A Discourse upon Spiritual Worship, in Works I, pp. 126-344. See also PRRD III, p.
178; cf. F. Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, pp. 169-77; Leigh, System, II.i. (pp. 144-57); Ussher, A Body of
Divinity, pp. 23-4.
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whole was maintained despite the differences of both the historical and theological
contexts in each period.
A. Perkins on God’s Existence & the Problem of Atheism
Perkins does not treat the doctrine of God’s existence or the problem of
atheism as separate sections in his works. Yet we can find several places where these
issues are discussed within the context of the doctrine of knowledge of God. These
are to be found throughout his whole works as a vital frame for his ideas. To begin
with, Perkins speaks about the evidences for the existence of God in A Golden
Chaine as follows:
That there is a God, it is evident, 1. by the course of nature: 2. by the nature of
the soule of man: 3. by the distinction of things honest and dishonest: 4. by the
terror of consciences: 5. by the regiment of civill societies: 6. the order of all
causes having ever recourse to some former beginning: 7. the determination of
all things to their severall ends: 8. the consent of all men well in their wits.23
We see Perkins places the proof of God’s existence in the initial part of the whole
doctrine of God despite its simplicity and brevity. This arises because of the Ramist
style of early orthodoxy: his comment on the Scripture and theology is followed by a
succinct argument for the existence of God; he also directly goes on to the discussion
of names (“Jehovah Elohim”) in Exod. 3:13-14 and the nature of God after this
proof.24 It is notable that Perkins maintains a balance of arguments between the two
major approaches (“testimony” and “reason”) to proof based upon the medieval
Thomistic style of proof.25 In fact, among Perkins’ lists of proofs, the 2, 3, 4, 8th
correspond to the area of testimony; the 1, 5, 6, 7th come under that of reason. As
mentioned before, although he briefly lists the eight kinds of argument without
detailed explanation, such treatment also reflects Perkins’ ideas concerning argument
23 Perkins, Workes I, p. 11.
24 For the various styles of order, and whether they deal with the respective discussion about the
existence, essence, names of God or not in early orthodox writers, see PRRD III, p. 178. Perkins’
exegetical analysis of such names of God de facto covers the whole doctrine of divine existence and
the essence of God as well as the Trinity. This shows the importance of exegesis based upon the
revealed name of Scripture as the foundation of the doctrine of God in early Reformed orthodoxy; cf.
PRRD III, pp. 257-8.
25 For persuasion of God’s existence, Perkins refers to the Scriptures as the “testimony” and the frame
of the world and a gripping of the conscience as “reason.” See Perkins, The Foundation of Christian
Religion, in Workes I, p. 3. This also shows that Perkins attaches priority to the Scriptures as the
primary testimony of God’s existence despite the importance of the role of conscience in this respect;
for a detailed account of these two ways of testimony and reason, see PRRD III, p. 183.
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for the existence of God as the presupposition for theological discussion. The fact
that Perkins does not refer to the testimony of Scriptures in his arguments tends to
confirm this assessment. We thus note at the outset the dialectics of Thomism and
Scotism in both the form and content of the proof of God’s existence within early
(and high) English Reformed orthodoxy, in the work of Perkins.26
Perkins’ more detailed dealing with the proof of God’s existence in The whole
Treatise of the Cases of Conscience (1606) confirms the points mentioned above: the
knowledge of God’s existence is not a purely noetical matter but includes the
problem of supernatural faith as “a maine ground and principle in all religions” as
well as a “caveat premised” beyond nature and reason:27
For this cause I doe not meane to dispute the question, whether there bee a God
or no; … but rather my purpose is, in shewing that there is a God, to remoove,
or at least to helpe an inward corruption of the soule, that is great and dangerous,
whereby the heart and conscience by nature denieth God and his providence.28
We can also appreciate this point in the fact that Perkins goes on to explain the three-
fold light of revelation (nature, grace, and glory) as the proof of the knowledge of
God’s existence.29 From the light of “nature”, five arguments similar to those of the
eight proofs in A Golden Chaine are elicited: the creation and frame of the world that
had a beginning, the preservation and government of the created world, the soul of
man and conscience, the consent of the human heart concerning divine existence, and
a certain order of causes following naturally the cause of all causes. Perkins also
makes a clear statement about the role of the light of “grace” in a supernatural
dimension in relation to the evidences of Scripture. He writes: “This gives a further
confirmation, then nature doth. For the light of nature in onely a way or preparation
to faith; But this light serves to beget faith, and causeth us to believe there is a
God.”30 Furthermore, from the light of “glory”, we receive a full and perfect vision
26 Throughout this thesis, the “dialectics of Thomism and Scotism” basically indicates (as we
explained in detail in the second chapter) the balance of nature and grace or reason and revelation on
the basis of the priority of grace and revelation over nature and reason in its salvific power.
27 Cf. Perkins, A Commentary upon the 11. Chap. to the Hebr., in Workes III (ii), p. 29.
28 Perkins, The Cases of Conscience, in Workes II, p. 49.
29 The Cases of Conscience, in Workes II, p. 49: “If it bee demanded, in what order God hath reveiled
this light unto man: I answer that the light of nature serveth to give a beginning and preparation to this
knowledge: the light of grace ministers the ground, and gives further proofe and evidence: and the
light of glory yeelds perfection of assurance, making that perfectly and fully knowne, …”; cf. A
Commentary upon the 11. Chap. to the Hebr,, in Workes III (ii), p. 31.
30 The Cases of Conscience, in Workes II, p. 52. At the same time Perkins stresses the limit of the
knowledge of the existence of God from both nature and grace in ibid., p. 53: “Such is our sight and
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of God’s existence that allows us to see God face to face beyond the vision of grace
and nature. In brief, for Perkins, the knowledge of God’s existence is also a concept
that should deepen according to the increase of the knowledge of God in the believer
within the context of faith and sanctification on the “pilgrim’s road” to heaven.
In addition to the characteristics mentioned above, the relationship between
conscience and atheism is also noteworthy in Perkins’ idea of the proof of God’s
existence.31 For Perkins, conscience has the two-fold role of giving testimony and
judgment (Rom.1:15). Conscience also provides three points of knowledge in terms
of testimony: God’s existence, the special providence of God, and God’s goodness
and love to man;32 atheism maintained in the face of the witness of conscience is
common to every sinful man as both a proneness, and the result of “the natural
cogitations”. In Mans Naturall Imaginations (1606), Perkins investigates the reality
of such atheism against conscience seen in the light of a hamartiology of the post-fall
state. Referring to Ps. 10:4 and 14:1 exegetically, like Calvin,33 he states:
Wherby he gives us to understand, that the foole there mentioned, must be
understood of every naturall man. But it will be said, that it is ingrafted in mans
nature to hold & think there is a God, and therefore every man doth not deny
God in his heart. Answ. Wee must know that these two thoughts, There is a God,
& there is no God, may be, and are both in one & the same heart: the same man,
that by the light of nature thinketh there is a God, may by that corruption and
darknes of mind that came by Adams fall, think there is no God: … as light and
darkness in the same house: heate and colde in the same bodie.34
The human paradox of such a double-faced attitude toward the existence of God in
the natural imagination necessarily makes oneself transform the true God into an idol,
otherwise this may result in a denial of providence or the attributes of God despite
vague consent about absolute being. At the same time, according to Perkins, this
atheism can be categorised as both “Atheism in practice” (an outward believer as
hypocrite, Epicurism, and witchcraft) and “Atheism in judgment” (the religion of
comprehension of God, darke and dimme, in that we cannot behold him as he is, but only as he hath
manifested himselfe unto us, in and through the glasse of the Word and Sacraments, and by the
spectacles of his creatures”; cf. Perkins, A Commentary upon the 11. Chap. to the Hebr., in Workes III
(ii), p. 29.
31 Perkins, An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, p. 128.
32 Perkins, A Treatise of Conscience, in Workes I, p. 518.
33 Cf. A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 34. Here Perkins rather presents Eph. 2:12, Mal. 1:2 and 3:14
along with Ps. 14:1 as the necessary exegetical bases; Calvin, Commentary upon the Book of Psalms,
ed. and trans. James Anderson (Edinburgh: 1845-1849), 10:4 and 14:1.
34 Perkins, Mans Naturall Imaginations, in Workes II, p. 459.
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Turks, Jews, and Papists).35 Concerning the “Romanists”, he criticises their doctrinal
error as harmful, targeting them with depth and clarity as the main opponent of
Christianity as true religion. Within a similar context, Perkins seeks to categorise in
detail the practices of atheism: a sheer atheism against conscience, the people who
worship a false God, those who worship the true God but in a false manner, and
“Protestant Atheists” who deny God in their words and deeds.36 Accordingly, for
Perkins, the examination of one’s heart for the mortification of sins is vital for
spiritual health because such an atheistic attitude might emerge anytime, even in the
Protestant believer.37 In fact he does not forget to emphasise the importance of the
use of the means of grace to search the heart, ultimately pointing to the true faith at a
more elaborate level in the existence of God.38
In brief, in Perkins’ schema, the doctrine of conscience, faith, and the
existence of God, and the problem of atheism are inextricably linked with each other.
The practical true religion operates within the dialectic between natural knowledge of
God and supernatural theology as well as that of Thomism and Scotism. The
doctrinal matrix of God’s existence and the problem of atheism in Perkins are placed
within such a context.
B. Charnock’s Exegesis regarding God’s Existence & the Problem of Atheism
Charnock unfolds his arguments on both God’s existence and atheism based
upon Ps. 14:139 just as Calvin and Perkins had chosen it as one of the exegetical
bases of their arguments. He thus attempts to clarify the meaning of this verse in a
manner strongly reflecting Calvin’s exegesis of the same text.40 Charnock first
35 Mans Naturall Imaginations, in Workes II, pp. 460-1; cf. Perkins, A Reformed Catholike, in Workes
I, p. 618. Here Perkins divides atheism into both “open atheism” denying God as well as His word
totally and “coloured atheism” that precisely corresponds to “atheism in judgment”. Again, for Perkins,
these three opponents are no different from the atheists because they deny the fundamental articles of
orthodox Christianity, e.g., Trinity and Christology (especially the Roman Catholics).
36 A Commentary upon the 11. Chap. to the Hebr., in Workes III (ii), pp. 30-1.
37 Perkins mentions three signs of such an evil atheism in the individual: a disordered life, not calling
on the names of God by prayer, and condemning of trust in God, Mans Naturall Imaginations in
Workes II, p. 462; cf. The Combate of the Flesh and Spirit, in Workes I, p. 472. Here he emphasises
the same point in terms of the growth of godliness.
38 A Commentary upon the 11. Chap. to the Hebr., in Workes III (ii), p. 31: “Let us therefore goe to
God by earnest prayer, to give us his Spirit to worke true faith in our hearts, and to make us of a true
beliefe. … Let us all look narrowly to our selves, and join with our profession, conscience and
obedience: for else the more we know God, the worse we are. … Wee want that true faith, which must
professe God, not in judgement alone, but in practice.”
39 “The fool has said in his heart, there is no God; they have done abominable works; there is none
that doth good”; cf. Perkins, Mans Naturall Imaginations, in Workes II, p. 459.
40 PRRD III, p. 180; cf. Calvin, Commentary upon the Book of Psalms, 14:1.
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maintains that Adam’s fall caused the corruption of the human soul’s faculties in the
heart that results in the denial of God’s existence. Yet this corruption inherited from
original sin does not preclude the function of human rational faculties but takes away
“grace” in the faculties for the proper use of it against atheism.41 Citing Cocceius,
Charnock then classifies this atheism into three groups exhibiting such deficiency in
the faculties of the soul: quoad existentiam (those who are absolute atheists), quoad
providentiam (those who deny divine providence), and quoad naturam (those who
deny divine attributes).42 At another level, along with the background knowledge of
etymology and classical philosophy of both Diagoras and Protagoras, Charnock
verifies that “God” as the object of atheism in the Ps. 14:1 does not indicate
“Jehovah” as the supreme being, but rather “Elohim” as providential God.43
Such exegetical observation shows that Charnock seeks to focus primarily on
clarifying the identity of “practical atheism”, which is in the second and third cases
of atheism according to his taxonomy, within both anthropological and soteriological
backgrounds. In summary, while Perkins observes the paradox of the human state
after the fall concerning the knowledge of God’s existence by pointing out the role of
conscience, Charnock finds the same problem of practical atheism but bases his
discussion upon richer exegetical, linguistic, and literary sources than Perkins in this
section of exegesis.
C. Charnock’s Doctrine of God’s Existence & the Problem of Atheism:
Merely Scholastic “Rationalism?”
As the arguments for the existence of God are used originally for the
refutation of atheism in Charnock’s schema, we see that the discussion of the proofs
and atheism frequently rotate and overlap with each other in this section within the
41 Charnock analyses the word “fool” etymologically in Hebrew affirming that the atheist is not the
person lacking in reason but one who abuses it. Such an inconsistency between “head” and “heart”
concerning the existence of God becomes an important feature of practical atheism for Charnock; cf.
PRRD III, p. 180; on the detailed accounts of the different state in human knowledge of God between
the ante-fall and the post-fall, see John Owen, Biblical Theology: The History of Theology from Adam
to Christ, trans. Stephen Westcott (Morgan: Soli Deo Gloria, 1994).
42 Works I, p. 127. This shows that Charnock arguably has the Romanists, Socinians, and Arminians
in his mind as the objects of his anti-atheism within the context of the metaphysical relationship
between God and creatures. On Cocceius’ view of the arguments for the existence of God and the
problem of atheism, see Willem Van Asselt, The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius (Leiden:
Brill, 2001), pp. 145-55.
43 Works I, pp. 126-7. This point also indicates that the Reformed orthodoxy used the various names
of God in the Scriptures as doctrinal and polemical bases of the existence, essence, and attributes of
God against theological opponents in their arguments. We have already seen the same tendency in
Perkins earlier. For more general explanation of the names of God in the wider Reformed tradition,
see PRRD III, pp. 246-70.
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context of the knowledge of God. Though it is distinct from a strictly logical form
like that of Aquinas, Charnock at the outset affirms the value of proofs of the
existence of God in three dimensions without losing the exegetical basis, especially
against the various practical atheists:44 first, knowledge of God obtained from
neither nature nor reason can be denied; second, there is no “principium” of religion
without the existence of God; third, the knowledge obtained by these demonstrations
is useful for the growth of effectual belief and piety in a practical aspect:45
There is a natural as well as a revealed knowledge, and the book of creatures is
legible in declaring the being of God, as well as the Scriptures are in declaring
the nature of a God; there are outward objects in the world, and common
principles in the conscience; whence it may be inferred. … God, in regard of his
existence, is not only the discovery of faith, but of reason. … Faith supposeth
natural knowledge, as grace supposeth nature. Faith indeed is properly of things
above reason, purely depending upon revelation. What can be demonstrated by
natural light is not so properly the object of faith, though in regard of the
addition of a certainty by revelation it is so.46
Adding Scriptural testimony in Rom. 1:19-20 and Heb. 11:6 to the demonstration of
natural revelation (as “a minimal sensus divinitatis”) in human existence as the
evidences for the existence of God,47 Charnock seeks to explain both the tension and
harmony between nature and grace in the knowledge of God. In fact the relationship
of faith and reason as well as grace and nature in this understanding of the existence
of God seems essentially Thomistic in its epistemology. He refers directly to Aquinas
in his argument. Charnock’s comment on the compatible relation between philosophy
and divinity also confirms this presumption.48 In addition, he even maintains that the
Scripture supports the reality of natural theology by referring to Rom. 1:19, Act.
14:15-6, 17:27-29, and Job 38-40: the evidence of scriptural revelation must
44 This fact can be also regarded as the double continuity and discontinuity of Charnock from both
Aquinas and Calvin in the form and intention of proofs of the existence of God in terms of the use of
scholastic tools for arguments. For the detail, see PRRD III, pp. 173-4.
45 Works I, pp. 129-30. At this practical point, Charlock again shows the influence of Cocceius in the
Continent by referring to his Summa.
46 Works I, p. 130.
47 Quotation form PRRD III, p. 182.
48 Works I, p. 131: “It is but one truth in philosophy and divinity, that what is false in one cannot be
true in another. Truth, in what appearance soever, doth never contradict itself. And this is so
convincing an argument of the existence of God, …” However, he points out the limit of both human
nature and the human predicament in their noetic dimension after the fall according to the anti-
Pelagian tradition in soteriological view. See also p. 130: “Men, under the conscience of sin, … cannot
act toward him [God] as an object of faith. … Nature does not shew any way to a sinner how to
reconcile God’s provoked justice with his tenderness.”
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presuppose the existence of a revealer who is God. This is consistent, of course, with
the Reformed scholastic critique of the Socinians who denied any natural knowledge
of God outside the revelation of the Scripture based upon a radical Biblicism.49
Apparently the “critical” adoption of both a medieval and Suarezian metaphysical
framework was also necessary in Charnock’s discussions of the natural revelation of
God.50 In short, as is the case with the overall tendency of Reformed orthodoxy,
Charnock’s proof of God’s existence also takes on the role of a foundational
assumption along with the discussion of theological prolegomena and the doctrine of
Scripture. This is in order to accommodate the doctrine of God’s attributes and His
trinitarian acts both ad intra and ad extra within the covenantal structure of his
whole theological system.
Given the above, in Charnock’s schema, the proof of the existence of God
moves forward in four directions: evidences of universal consent in history,
arguments from Scripture as well as from human natural reason, anthropological
analysis of human nature, and extraordinary events in the world beyond the
understanding of human reason.51 According to the two major categories of proof
mentioned earlier in the case of Perkins, Charnock’s first and third proofs (universal
consent, human nature) are more rhetorical, and based upon “testimony”; the second
and fourth (natural reason, miracles) are proofs from “reason”, though the second
proof shows his view of the priority of scriptural testimony over reason by beginning
the argument from scriptural evidences prior to that from reason.52 To be sure these
four directions of proof do not belong to an a priori category but to that of “faith and
doctrine” inferred from a posteriori results.53
Let us proceed to the details of the proof. In the first proof, the existence of
“the natural sentiment of a God” is illustrated by the fact that there has been no
question about “the existence of a Supreme Being” as “a first cause”, but rather about
what it is: “It is impossible that nature can naturally and universally lie; … A general
49 PRRD III, p. 182; Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, pp. 6, 311-4.
50 The influence of the Spanish Jesuit thinker Francis Suarez (1548-1617) on later Reformed orthodox
theology was very wide, in terms of his seeing divine attributes as divine “actions” in the created
world: e.g., in the work of Charnock and Owen. For a detailed account, see Carl Trueman, John
Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissane Man (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 19, 38, 43-4, 46. In this
respect, Colin Gunton’s failure to make a distinction between the traditional idea of God’s attributes in
the category of negative theology and the Puritan attributes of God emphasising the ad extra
dimension becomes clearer again.
51 We need to investigate in detail the former three of them here related to the arguments of our thesis.
52 Cf. PRRD III, p. 183.
53 PRRD III, pp. 170-1.
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consent of all nations is to be esteemed as a law of nature.”54 Charnock also deals
with the problem of whether innate human knowledge of God exists or not in the
same context:55
It is so natural that every man is born with a restless instinct to be of some kind
of religion or other, which implies some object of religion. The impression of a
deity is as common as reason, and of the same age with reason. It is a relic of
knowledge after the fall of Adam, like fire under ashes, which sparkles as soon
as ever the heap of ashes is open, a notion sealed up in the soul of every man.56
At the same time it is noteworthy that Charnock shows a somewhat flexible attitude
in his understanding of this “post-fall knowledge” of God, because it adds to the
persuasiveness of his argument concerning God’s existence by reflecting some aspect
of natural theology (which does not reach the salvific level);57 namely he appears to
integrate the various ideas of post-fall knowledge of God. He acknowledges pre-
existent notions in the fallen human heart but these are not “innate”, i.e. they do not
precede all the ideas formed in the natural mind post factum, but are present as an
“implanted inward principle”.58 In short, Charnock proves God’s existence through a
combination of metaphysical argument with an understanding of the relationship
between Creator and creatures and the undeniable evidences of ‘the seed of religion’
within human life in its post-fall state.59
In the second proof, after a brief examination of the perspicuity of the
scriptural evidences (Rom. 1:19-20; Gen. 1:24; Ps. 8:1, 104:2, 19:1-2; Job 31:25, 27),
Charnock goes on to deal with the argument from natural reason concerning the
existence of God.60 As Muller argues, within the overall tendency of the Reformed
54 Works I, pp. 133-5. He refers to a French philosopher and scientist Gassendi (1592-1655) and
Cicero (106 BC- 43 BC) in this argument, which shows that Charnock was conversant with
philosophy, natural science, and classics as the inheritor of the intellectual milieu of the Rennaissance
in both content and rhetoric.
55 For the summary of the views of Aquinas, late medieval nominalists, Armnius, Suarez, and Vorstius
on this point, see Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, pp. 90-1.
56 Works I, p. 137.
57 Works I, p. 137: “So that the notion of a God seems to be twisted with the nature of man, and is the
first natural branch of common reason, or upon either the first inspection of a man into himself and his
own state and constitution, or upon the first sight of any external visible object. Nature within man,
and nature without man, agree upon the first meeting together to form this sentiment, that there is a
God. … If this be not born with us, yet the exercise of reason, essential to man, settles it as a certain
maxim;”
58 Works I, p. 138.
59 Cf. Calvin, Institutes, I, ch. 3-5.
60 In this argument we again note the influence of continental theologians (especially French and
Dutch) on Charnock; seen in the reference of Jean Daille (1594-1670), Dionysous Petavius (1583-
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orthodox proofs of God’s existence from “reason”, Charnock’s emphasis upon
rhetorical persuasion is consistent, even if he exhibits an a posteriori style not strictly
based upon Aquinas’ five ways.61 He focuses, above all, on drawing conclusions
about God as “the first cause” on the basis of the traditional metaphysics of medieval
scholasticism. The beginning of the world and its creatures ought to be explained by
the structures of “cause” and “effect” as a chain of acts; there must be a “first way”
in which matter is formed, without any relationship to other being. Needless to say,
the creatures can neither make themselves and the world nor create any other
creature without matter, which means that they are neither eternal nor perfect because
“nothing can act before it be”.62 In addition, the post-fall state of depravity in human
soul also demonstrates the falsity of the atheist who claims the spontaneous existence
of it.
Therefore, according to Charnock, we need to postulate an “uncreated being”
as “the cause of the matter.” The “eternally existent” is to be the first cause as well as
the “cause of itself”. Such an “infinite, eternal, independent being” is called God who
has “some nature above all those, of inconceivable perfection”.63 Even so, Charnock
does not forget to refer to the fundamental significance of the aforementioned
scriptural evidences that support a conclusion concerning God as the first cause. The
theorem of the existence of God according to reason does not conflict with this.64
Moreover, the harmony and constant order of the created world in production and
preservation reflects the existence of both the infinite wisdom and power of the
Creator. He appoints them to move toward “some end” they do not know: “If nature
be restrained by another, it hath a superior; if not, it is a free agent: it is an
understanding being that directs them.”65
In the third proof, Charnock seeks to illustrate the evidences of God’s
existence in the human body and the psychological faculties.66 The argument from
the analysis of the nature of the soul, i.e., “understanding, will, judgment, memory,
imagination” as the light of the reflection of the image of God, is especially
1652), and Cocceius.
61 PRRD III, p. 187. For a concise account of Aquinas’ proofs, see B. Davies, The Thought of Thomas
Aquinas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 25-33; cf. Muller, “The Dogmatic Function of
St. Thomas’ Proofs: a Protestant Appreciation,” in Fides et Historia, XXIV (1992), pp. 15-29.
62 Works I, p. 146.
63 Works I, pp. 149-50.
64 See Works I, pp. 147, 151.
65 Works I, p. 160.
66 Cf. PRRD III, p. 181. For a similar argument representative of seventeenth century sources, see
also Baxter, Divine Life (London, 1664), I.ii, pp. 14-17. I am indebted to Muller for the reference to
Baxter.
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important for Charnock. The fact that he recounts in detail the relationship between
the reflections of human conscience and the existence of God in terms of the
knowledge of the law of nature in the post-fall state is also worth noting. For the
overall Reformed position, including Perkins and Charnock, the knowledge of God
obtained by the mind (as a faculty of the soul) and objective “natural light” affirms
the same knowledge as is obtained by conscience.67 The conscience builds a bridge
between the human heart and the saving knowledge of God: “Conscience is the
foundation of all religion; and the two pillars upon which it is built, are the being of
God, and the bounty of God to those that diligently seek him, Heb. xi. 6.”68
Charnock even argues not only that the operation of conscience confirms the
characteristics of various divine attributes,69 but that human beings cannot limit or
control the acting of it by their own will because of its God-given authority.
In brief, Reformed orthodox and Puritan arguments for the existence of God
do not arise from the type of rationalism characteristic of the eighteenth century. This
rationalism attempted to replace “grace” and supernatural theology as the foundation
of theology with that of “nature” and natural theology as “a necessary prolegomenon
to revealed theology.” Instead, the Reformed approach which Charnock and others
adopt is a homiletical, exhortative, and rhetorical means of evangelical persuasion for
the believer who uses the resources of “nature” on the basis of “grace”. 70
Seventeenth century scholasticism was, then, not a mediate way towards a pure
natural theology based upon rationalism.
We can confirm this thesis by exploring Charnock’s second treatise on the
exegetical basis of Ps. 14:1, titled Practical Atheism. In this work, he primarily seeks
to expand the doctrine of divine existence in relation to both hamartiology and the
doctrines of regeneration and sanctification.71 Charnock deals especially with the
practical dimension of the doctrine by calling attention to the sinfulness of the human
heart, which is the result of the corruption of the faculties of the soul. At the
beginning, like Perkins, he points out that the human being, after Adam’s fall, stands
paradoxically in an in-between state of “practical atheism”. This corresponds to both
67 PRRD III, pp. 171, 186; Leigh, Treatise, II.i , pp. 1-2.
68 Works I, p. 169.
69 Works I, p. 169: “The accusations of conscience evidence the omniscience and the holiness of God;
the terrors of conscience, the justice of God; the approbations of conscience, the goodness of God. All
the order in the world owes itself, next to the providence of God, to conscience”; cf. PRRD III, pp.
186-7; Leigh, Treatise, II.i (p. 6); Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, pp. 173-4; Calvin, Institutes, I.iii.2 (pp.
44-5).
70 See also PRRD I, p. 306; PRRD III, pp. 192-3.
71 Cf. PRRD III, p. 179.
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the second and third position according to his taxonomy. This in-between state
neither corroborates the inexistence of God nor naturally maintains “reverence of
God” in the heart with the idea of God in the head.72 With regard to this practical
atheism, Charnock goes on to examine the relationship in the unregenerate between
sin, conscience, the law, and a secret atheism that neglects both the law and
revelation as “the mind and will of God”. He makes it clear that, for the person in
such a state of natural corruption, the “deep conviction” followed by the “quickening
(of) their affections” penetrating the heart is totally impossible without the work of
the Holy Spirit that ultimately ends the dominance of the carnal heart.73 For
Charnock, there is no substantial cessation of the dominance of practical atheism in
human life without regeneration. Within such a context Charnock’s contrast between
justifying faith and the reality of atheism represented by the “contempt of God” and
the law represents his attempt to relate the doctrine of the existence and the attributes
of God to the problem of practical atheism:
Those graces [should be] in the heart, which most exalt God, debase man, and
bring men to the lowest subjection to their Creator. Such is the doctrine and
grace of justifying faith. … In the slight of his precepts, his essential perfections
are slighted. In disowning his will as a rule, we disown all those attributes
which flow from his will, as goodness, righteousness, and truth. … Every law,
though it proceeds from the will of the lawgiver, and doth formally consist in an
act of the will, yet it doth presuppose an act of the understanding.74
In other words, only the grace of justifying faith can make an unregenerate discard
contempt for God as well as gaining insight into the “spiritual sense” of the law. As
shown above, Charnock verifies the significance of the law in a logical sense. The
law acts upon the human heart in relation to the role of conscience regardless of
whether one is in the state of regeneration or not, despite the different dynamics
between them. Based upon the background of the idea of covenant of works in
relation to the role of the law that shows the mercy of God in a soteriological
dimension, Charnock also maintains that the original purpose of giving the law in a
historical and relational sense was for communication between God as rule-giver and
72 For detailed discussion on practical atheists since the early Reformation and Renaissance, see
Lucien Febre, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century, trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); cf. PRRD III, p. 171.
73 Works I, pp. 194, 195.
74 Works I, pp. 198-9.
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humanity as obedient moral beings.75 On the one hand, (in a natural sense for the
unregenerate), conscience sets up and evokes the boundary of natural law, which is
the inexcusable evidence of the existence of God, in both our mind and in consequent
actions.76 On the other hand, an evangelical sense of divine law is infused as a
habitus into the heart of the regenerate, which means that the soul’s faculties are reset
for the renewed self in order to live according to the spiritually ingrafted moral law
by the grace of God.77 In brief, Charnock sets up an integral understanding of the
law and gospel as the one necessary pivot for the believer. They point to the life of
sanctification that mortifies the remnants of practical atheism after the new birth as
well as producing regeneration according to the order of salvation.
Nevertheless, at this point, we find that Charnock designates the deviant act
of “self-love” as the root of such practical atheism, which is contrary to true
godliness and self-denial. It is thus worth addressing here his analysis of “a threefold
self-love” to draw out the sin inseparable from atheism, which he understands on the
basis of natural, carnal, and a gracious self-love.78 “Natural” self-love comes from
the law of nature planted in humanity. This is necessary, as well as neutral, because
we cannot love others without this essential love. “Carnal” self-love results from
original sin causing all the descendants of Adam to “love himself above God” —
focusing only on their own self-interest without considering the divine honour (this
concept is similar to the Augustinian idea of uti — love of “use”). A “gracious” self-
love arises from the divine grace of regeneration that makes human beings react to
God’s original purpose of creation by giving priority to the honour of God over the
self. Among them, of course, Charnock’s interest lies in providing both an exegetical
as well as a doctrinal explanation about carnal, inordinate, and universal self-love in
the post-fall situation, which exists de facto as “self-idolatry” and leads to practical
atheism. In other words, in Charnock’s view, sin, self, and atheism are one in the
hamartiological context.79
At the same time, in the light of a rather pessimistic anthropology, he lists
75 For example, Works I, p. 202: “Never did any law of God meet with so much opposition as
Christianity, which was the design of God from the first promise to the exhibiting [of] the Redeemer,
and from thence to the end of the world.”
76 Works I, p. 212.
77 Works I, p. 215.
78 Works I, p. 224.
79 Works I, p. 224: “No sin is committed as sin, but as it pretends a self-satisfaction. Sin indeed may
well be termed a man’s self, because it is, since the loss of original righteousness, the form that
overspreads every part of souls. … Sin and self are one. What is called a ‘living to sin’ in one place,
Rom. vi., is called a living to self in another: 2 Cor. v. 15, ‘That they that live should not live unto
themselves.’”
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numerous, practical, atheistic misdeeds of believers based upon self-love. These
operate mostly by way of changing the order of priority between God and the
creature.80 According to Charnock, this tendency (not entirely free from practical
atheism) in the believer, despite new birth, can only be overcome by the faithful
practice of religious duties through the means of grace. This is another necessary
practice to mortify the inner remnants of practical atheism, to be balanced by a
fervent hope for the renewal of “spiritual communications” with God.81 This, of
course, could also be construed as the necessity of human participation on a
covenantal basis, though not in a synergistic way, in the God-decreed causal chains
of being. These operate within the boundary of the metaphysical structure between
the infinite Creator and finite rational creatures. As mentioned in the exegetical
section, this also seems to indicate traces of both Thomism and a late medieval
Scotism reflected here in the Reformed view.82 The contrast, however, between self-
love as the representation of “the great Anti-Christ” and Christ’s self-denial in the
work of redemption also shows Charnock’s Christ-centered understanding of the
problem of practical atheism even though he uses both an ontological and noetical
framework in doctrinal argument.83
In brief, Charnock shows that the true knowledge of the existence of God
comes only through the incessant subjugation of the practically atheistic attitude.
This does not completely disappear even in the believer who is embarked upon a
theologia viatorum in this world. In this doctrinal section, we can preliminarily
conclude that Charnock deals with God’s existence and the problem of atheism in a
single context on the basis of soteriological, hamartiological, covenantal, trinitarian,
and christological elements from the whole range of theological loci.
D. Charnock’s Praxis of God’s Existence & the Problem of Atheism:
Rhetoric in the Context of Faith
In the practical part of Charnock’s arguments concerning God’s existence, it
is notable that he asserts the perniciousness of atheism by various rhetorical
80 For detailed discussion, see Works I, pp. 217-23, 229-46.
81 Works I, p. 237: “If there be no delight in the means that lead to God, there is no delight in God
himself, because love is appetitus unionis, a desire of union; and where the object is desirable, the
means that brings us to it would be delightful too.”
82 For example, Works I, p. 216: “The honour of every rational creature consists in the service of the
First Cause of his being; as the welfare of every creature consists in the orders and proportionable
motion of its members, according to the law of its creation.”
83 See Works I, pp. 211-2.
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enunciations in continuity with the doctrinal part. For instance, we see this feature
especially at the outset from the comparison between the atheist and the heathen:
Are not such worse than heathens? They worshipped many gods, these none;
they preserved a notion of God in the world under a disguise of images, these
would banish him both from earth and heaven, and demolish the statues of him
in their own consciences; they degraded him, these would destroy him; they
coupled creatures with him—Rom. i. 25, … And these would make him worse
than a creature, a mere nothing. … Atheism is a persuasion, which finds no
footing anywhere else.84
As mentioned earlier, such rhetorical and persuasive expressions apparently show
Charnock’s fundamental purpose for using the proof of God’s existence: i.e., one
should accept the existence, providence, and attributes of God (the three elements)
properly based upon the “evangelical” proofs of the existence of God in order to be
better than heathen. In so doing, to combat an unreasonable atheism “in a debauched
and sceptic age”, Charnock stresses firm knowledge of the existence of God in its
practical dimension. In fact true worship of God is impossible without this
knowledge because it is the basis of “the whole frame of religion” leading to proper
acts of piety.85 Furthermore, the knowledge of God’s existence is essential in that it
is directly linked to the meaning of Scriptures as the noetic foundation of our
theology.86
At this juncture, Charnock reiteratively emphasises the necessity of obtaining
knowledge of God through the creatures that provide the material for natural
argument. The reason for this repetition seems to have come from his stress upon
both the harmony of nature and grace in the knowledge of God’s existence and the
priority of grace over nature practically. He identifies the relationship of nature and
grace with that of “the book of creation” and “the book of redemption”: the latter
element (grace and the book of redemption) of each relationship does not reject the
former.87 According to Charnock, Scripture itself confirms this datum, e.g.: “That
84 Works I, p. 176.
85 Works I, p. 179.
86 Works I, p. 180: “The belief of a God must necessarily precede the belief of any revelation; the
latter cannot take place without the former as the foundation.”
87 Works I, p. 181: “Had he not shewn himself in his creatures, he could never have shewn in his
Christ. The order of things required it. God must be read wherever he is legible. … Though the
appearance of God in the one be clearer than in the other, yet neither is to be neglected”; cf. Muller,
PRRD III, pp. 180-1; Baxter, Divine Life, I.ii, pp. 14-7.
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whole psalm is a lecture of creation and providence”.88 Accordingly, the relationship
between Scripture and nature is also to be viewed affirmatively in revelation.
Scripture leads us to the knowledge of God’s attributes by “beholding the glory of
God with praise” in nature, as well as to the saving knowledge of God. While
criticising “essential” atheism (denying the first element among the above mentioned
three) concerning the denial of the existence of God, Charnock also argues that true
religion, accompanied by both knowledge and the act of worship, is by no means
contradictory to “reason”.89 In summary, Charnock explained our natural knowledge
of God based upon the Thomistic understanding of the relationship between God and
the rational creature — despite its absolute dependence upon God’s varied revelation
as a noetic foundation of Puritan practical divinity focusing on the emphasis of
spiritual worship in a supernatural dimension.
Nevertheless, as mentioned in the doctrinal section on practical atheism, such
undeniable evidence of the existence of God in the human heart cannot dispense with
the necessity of regeneration and sanctification. The indwelling of an atheistical
nature in human life, within flesh not yet finally redeemed is also incontestable:
Charnock seeks to give an expanded answer in the practical section. In fact, such an
indwelling of atheism is the reason why both conversion and mortification are quite
difficult. To release the faculties of the soul from ‘chains of darkness’ which holds
the soul in a state of practical atheism before regeneration (this corresponds to the
second and third positions – i.e. denying divine providence and the attributes of God),
the infusion of “a supernatural principle” is necessary, i.e., the restoration of “the
sanctifying Spirit” that enables us to live “a supernatural life” before God.
Of course Charnock stresses the sovereignty of God in each stage of the ordo
salutis: for the human being living under the dominance of the practically atheistic
nature, there is no justification before God without a monergistic operation of divine
grace along with “the best and strongest works of nature”.90 At another level,
practical atheism also confirms the doctrine of perseverance in the sense that
apostasy occurs in an outward believer who is not of the elect but is, instead, a
practical atheist. In many ways, the following summarises Charnock’s argument
well:
88 Works I, p. 181.
89 See Works I, p. 182: “He were not reasonable if he were not religious; because by neglecting
religion, he neglects the chiefest dictate of reason.”
90 Works I, pp. 247-50.
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Man by nature would annihilate God and deity himself; the gospel glorifies God
and annihilates man. … The gospel shews ourselves to be an object of
humiliation, and God to be a glorious object for our imitation. The light of
nature tells us there is a God; the gospel gives us a more magnificent report of
him. The light of nature condemns gross atheism, and that of the gospel
condemns and conquers spiritual atheism in the hearts of men.91
To put it another way, Charnock examines the relationship between practical atheism
and “spiritual” atheism quoted above. He places them within the context of the
relationship between the state of nature and the state of grace. Such a spiritual atheist
was nothing less than the “protestant atheist” Perkins criticises. Our humiliation is
necessary for the termination of the prevalent dominance of practical atheism; our
imitation of the Triune God as His image is vital for sanctification since it mortifies
the sins of spiritual atheism. If the regenerate infused by “grace” still has the traces
of practical atheism, according to Charnock, “who is not so [a practical atheist] by
nature?”92 As stated in the previous doctrinal section, he also presents the answers to
the question as to the way of mortifying spiritual atheism through various means of
grace God gives to us.93 This consists chiefly of the study of Scripture as the means
both to know the divine will and mind in the revelation of God and to conform
ourselves to it.94 Again, we see that this could be regarded as the substantial purpose
of Charnock’s entire teachings on the existence of God and atheism practically
applied in the sanctified life.
In summary, Charnock de facto has sought to explore the problem of practical
atheism in relation to the arguments for the existence of God with that of
mortification of sins in a more practically focused dimension within the boundary of
the discussions of the knowledge of God. At the same time Charnock’s treatment of
this theme has nothing to do with a rationalism like the Wolffian or Cartesian form of
proof that depends on an innate idea of God.95 Charnock’s work here operates as the
initial, rhetorical, and persuasive foundation for the arguments for the doctrine of the
91 Works I, p. 251. The italics are mine.
92 Works I, p. 251. The italics are mine; cf. Works I, p. 254: “But what plea can man have for his
practical atheism, who lives by his power, is sustained by his bounty, and solicited by his Spirit?”
93 Works I, p. 255: “Watch against this atheism, and be daily employed in the mortification of it. …
Without some degree of the mortification of these, we cannot make profitable and comfortable
approaches to God.”
94 Works I, p. 256: “We can have no delight in meditation on him unless we know him, and we cannot
know him but by the means of his revelation. … Let, therefore, the subtleties of reason veil to the
doctrine of faith, and the humour of the will to the command of the word.”
95 For a detailed explanation of eighteenth century rationalism in this respect, see PRRD III, pp. 182,
192-5.
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essence and attributes of God that we will investigate in later discussions.
II. Divine Spirituality & Spiritual Worship
Before moving on to the discussion of the doctrine of God’s spirituality, we
need to see the preparatory definitions by the Puritan and Reformed orthodox
theologians of divine essence, perfections, properties, and attributes in relation to the
way of “predication” in theological language. They endeavoured to avoid tension
between revelation and metaphysics in speaking of God at the highest level. At the
same time they kept in mind the axiom finitum non capax infiniti.96 Thus the divine
attributes can be defined as “the perfections according to which God manifests
himself to us and overcomes ‘the defect of our capacity, who are not able to
understand that which is known of God under one name or act of understanding’”.97
Regarding the nuances of these terms, an “attribute” indicates a performance of a
logical task regardless of one’s actual properties; “perfection” indicates that such
predication corresponds to the very actual properties of it. While secular philosophy,
focusing on “Being”, mainly assumes simple subjectivity and a logical dimension to
this problem, Reformed orthodoxy sees no inconsistency between logical predication
and real attributes by assuming “an intrinsic quality or property” in God.98
In other words, the assumption of a subject “materially the same” which has a
“formal” difference in its predications (not in a merely tautological sense) was
necessary for the Reformed orthodox discussions of the attributes of God.99 The
purpose of this struggle in examining the attributes of God, despite a recognition of
the imperfections of theological language, marked the growth of a deep piety: the
“praxis” element of each attribute in their system was crucial in this respect.100 We
thus need to perceive the simultaneous consideration of both “the transcendence and
96 PRRD I, p. 196. Muller paraphrases this axiom excellently as the “foundational distinction between
the essential or necessary existence of God and the contingent, caused, and composite nature of
creatures,” in ibid., p. 193.
97 PRRD I, p. 195, citing from Edward Leigh, A System or Body of Divinity (London, 1662), II. i. p.
160. Thus, the problem of divine accommodation becomes an issue to be dealt with in all the
discussions of the doctrine of divine attributes because of this disproportionality between God and
humanity.
98 For the difference between Suarez based upon the Roman Catholic understanding of metaphysical
order of “being” and the Reformed in this respect, see PRRD III, p. 201; cf. J. P Donnelly, “Calvinist
Thomism,” Viator 7 (1976), pp. 452-5; idem, “Italian Influences on Calvinist Scholasticism,”
Sixteenth Century Journal 7/1 (1976), pp. 90-1, 96-7.
99 PRRD III, pp. 197-8.
100 PRRD III, p. 205.
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the relationality of God” in the discussion of divine attributes.101 This stress on the
pietistic dimension in dealing with the attributes of God continued despite the
diversity in enumeration of the attributes from the Reformers through early
orthodoxy in Ramist form to high orthodoxy itself.102
The importance of the spirituality of God lies in the fact that it is usually
located as the first attribute in the light of God’s essence as both an incorporeal and
invisible spirit. Although Perkins sees all other essential attributes of God derived
from the arguments for the simplicity of God, many other English reformed
theologians, including Charnock, deemed spirituality as the primary attribute for
discussion.103 Nevertheless, as the relationship of divine simplicity, spirituality, and
other essential attributes overlap in some way based upon the essential unity of God,
the order of discussion in each individual theologian’s system is not so significant.
Rather, what was more important than order is, arguably, the flexible adaptation of
notions derived from divine aseity to a more practically and Scotistically focused
treatment in “the working of God ad extra, in his self-revelation.”104 We will see that
this was achieved without losing the balance of the knowledge of the Trinity ad intra
and trinitarian theology ad extra. We will also examine the relationship of spirituality
and worship in Perkins and Charnock as the hallmark of true religion. This
relationship organically connects doctrine with praxis, although there are delicate
distinctions in the respective arguments because of the change of both historical and
theological circumstances between early and high orthodoxy.
A. Perkins on the Spirituality of God & Spiritual Worship
In his A Golden Chaine, to begin with, Perkins explains the essence,
perfection, and the nature of God before dealing with all the attributes of God
respectively: the nature of God is “most perfect essence”; such perfection of His
nature thus also signifies that divine nature is “simple”. This simplicity is depicted as
follows: “Hee is voide of all logicall relation in arguments. … Whatsoever is in God,
101 Quotation from PRRD III, p. 212.
102 For the detail, see PRRD III, pp. 205-16.
103 PRRD III, p. 271; cf. Westminster Confession, I. i; Thomas Watson, A Body of Divinity, repr.
(Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth, 1983), pp. 45-50; Thomas Ridgley, Body of Divinity, revised with
notes by John Wilson, 1855; repr. (Edmonton: Still Waters Revival Books, 1993), p. 81. Cf. Gunton,
Act and Being, p. 90.
104 Quotation from Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 130; cf. PRRD III, pp. 273-5.
Nevertheless, we cannot totally disregard the Thomistic understanding, in Reformed orthodox thought,
of an ad extra dimension that sees it as “the emanation of [divine] esse” in terms of the
interrelatedness of creator and creatures. See also God, Creation, and Providence, p. 125.
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is his essence, and all that he is, he is by essence.”105 Then Perkins defines the
spirituality of God concisely as being “incorporal, and therefore invisible” (John 4:24,
2 Cor. 3:17, 1 Tim. 1:17, Col. 1:15) after referring to the contrast between God’s
simplicity and human inconsistency of essence and nature citing Augustine’s De
Trinitate (book 6th, ch.4).106 Next he goes on to present “what God is” further in
terms of an essence, spirituality and simplicity:
Againe, I say he is an essence spirituall, because he is not any kinde of body,
neither hath the parts of the bodies of men or other creatures, but is in nature a
spirit invisible, not subject to any mans senses. I adde also, that he is a simple
essence, because his nature admits no manner of composition of matter or
forme of parts. … he is the same by one & the same singular & indivisible
essence.107
For Perkins, in some way, God’s being as a Spirit and the invisibility consequent
upon this is also a theme dealt with in the context of faith. An example is to be found
in his exegetical commentary on Heb.11 (especially on verse 27).108 To put it
another way, the Being Moses saw the back part of, and talked with (Exod. 33) was
not the substance of God but the result of a divine accommodation. God revealed
Himself in a manner familiar to human perception in terms of faith. Against
Romanism, Perkins thus makes it clear that any form or image in our minds about the
invisible trinitarian God as a Spirit is “idolatrous presumption”. The explanation of
the relationship between divine simplicity and the Trinity can be read as an extension
105 Perkins, Workes I, p. 11; cf. An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, p. 128: “God is an essence
that he is a thing absolutely subsisting in himselfe, and by himselfe, not receiving his being from any
other.” Perkins also defines God as “a most absolute perfect substance and essence” in An Exposition
upon the 1.Chap. of the Revelation, in Workes I, p. 218; PRRD III, pp. 266-7. For detail on the
seventeenth century background to the importance of divine simplicity in relation to the doctrine of
the Trinity, see PRRD III, pp. 275-84. Divine simplicity can also be defined in terms of Godhead as
“the absence of real distinction or composition from the Godhead”: PRRD III, p. 286. For a detailed
explanation of the various understanding of the meaning of “distinction” among divine attributes in
relation to the essence in both the scholastic tradition and the Reformed orthodoxy, see PRRD III, pp.
284-98. Despite the delicate nuances which are derived from the dialectic of the various influences of
Thomism, Scotism, Occamism, and nominalism, the Puritan and Reformed orthodox view clearly
emphasises the role of an ad extra dimension. Only then do we know God’s properties in spite of the
infinite gap between God and humanity. At the same time their views needs to be understood in
contrast with that of Arminius on the created world ad extra in this respect. See Muller, God, Creation,
and Providence, pp. 113-4.
106 Cf. Perkins, An Exposition upon the 1.Chap. of the Revelation, in Workes I, p. 218: “The
communication of the divine substance cannot be without the divine nature: but Gods substance is
indivisible, and incommunicable to the creature.”
107 Perkins, An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, p. 128. The italics are mine.
108 A Commentarie upon the 11. Chap. To the Heb, in Workes III (ii), pp. 149-51.
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of Perkins’ interest in the knowledge of essence and the nature of God in a trinitarian
context: “The divine nature is the Godhead it selfe, simply and absolutely
considered; & a person is that which subsisteth in that Godhead, as the Father, the
Sonne, and the holy Ghost.”109 Our knowledge of the Triune God as a spirit should
engender personal devotional growth in us as spiritual men through regeneration and
sanctification on the basis of the ‘golden chain’ in the order of salvation. Perkins
notes that this is especially true in the case of ministers. Their responsibility as
“spirituall phisitians” is crucial to the background of Perkins’ ideas on the spirituality
of God.110
The proper understanding of “spiritual worship” linked with the spirituality of
God is another important theme to Perkins in terms of Puritan piety. In other words,
the focus of the spiritual worship of God lies not in outward speech or actions but in
an inward dimension of it:
Inward is the worship of the mind, the heart, the conscience, will, and
affections: … [The inward worship] is the spiritual worship of the inward man,
and the very ground and foundation of all true worship of God: for God is a
Spirit, and therefore must bee worshipped in spirit, that is, in the minde,
conscience, will, and affections. … For God is a Spirit, and therefore the true
worship that is done unto him must bee performed in spirit and truth, John
4:24.111
Perkins’ emphasis upon the inner working of the soul’s faculties in true worship can
be considered as an integration of the doctrine of God and anthropology, or in other
words, a soteriological dimension within a modified Aristotelian framework of
faculty psychology.112 At the same time the spiritual worship of God is necessarily
based upon the Trinitarian theology of the believer, to prevent replacing God with an
idol.113 Especially in Of Divine or Religious Worship (1601), we can verify these
elements by noting Perkins’ consolidated view of the knowledge of both God and
109 An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, p. 130; cf. Sixe Principles of Christian Religion, in
Workes I, p. 3.
110 A Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, pp. 326, 349, 394.
111 Cases of Conscience, in Workes II, pp. 62-3; cf. ibid., pp. 84-6.
112 For example, see A Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, p. 312: “The
inward motions of the spirit, are of themselves the worship of God, whereas our words and deedes are
not simply, but so farreforth as they are founded in the renewed motions of the heart.”
113 A Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, p. 162: “God is to be
acknowledged and worshipped in the Father, in Christ, & in the Holy Spirit”; Cases of Conscience, in
ibid., p. 61.
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ourselves.114 This is the foundation of both the spiritual, as well as the true worship
of God. On the one hand, concerning the knowledge of God, we first need to know
God as a simple essence who is “the unitie of the Godhead in the Trinitie of persons,
with the properties and workes thereof”. Second, the knowledge of God as the God,
our God (theologia nostra) who extends mercy and providence over us is necessary.
Third, Perkins stresses this knowledge as an “experimental” knowledge of our sense
of the favour and goodness of God.
On the other hand, concerning the knowledge of ourselves, the knowledge of
original sin, Scriptures, and the covenant of grace is necessary for spiritual worship.
This foundation is engraved into the soul’s faculties (mind, conscience, and the
affections of the heart) because they are “the first and principal seate of divine and
spiritual worship” that move the body.115 Thus the relationship of regeneration
(based upon these two dimensions of the knowledge of God) and spiritual worship is
inseparable in Perkins’ schema: the divineness and spirituality of worship is to be
examined necessarily in terms of regeneration in order to judge whether it is from the
true religion or not.
It is also notable that Perkins especially requires an unequivocal knowledge
of the role of Christ as mediator of spiritual worship. Such recognition of the
significance of the Christological dimension also leads Perkins to see the role of the
worship of God as a process of sanctification within the context of the imitation of
Christ.116 The unremitting endeavour to be “renewed in the spirit of our minds,” and
to present “the worship of our spirits” unto God is the key to the “spiritual service of
God” which is as good as “the new creation in a pure heart, good conscience, and
faith unfained”.117 Similarly, mainly in relation to the “Romanists” and in line with
the Reformers and the Puritan tradition, Perkins also stresses the role of a special
word for spiritual worship from the ministry of proclamation as an ordinance of God.
The hearing of the word can make us “give credence to the whole word of God”
through the work of the Holy Spirit. In addition, our faith, springing from the
“Apostolical doctrine” of salvation and the word of God proclaimed in the sermon, is
the foundation of our spiritual communion with God by grace.118 At the same time,
114 Cf. Calvin, Institutes, I.i. pp. 35-9.
115 Perkins, Of Divine or Religious Worship, in Workes I, pp. 698, 700.
116 Of Divine or Religious Worship, in Workes I, p. 703: “The principal worship of God, is a worke of
God in us, whereby wee are made conformable to him in holinesse and goodness: and whereby his
image is renewed or restored to us.”
117 Of Divine or Religious Worship, in Workes I, p. 706.
118 Of Divine or Religious Worship, in Workes I, pp. 707-10.
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the emphasis on the practice of the means of grace (e.g. reading of and meditation on
scriptures and prayer) for devotional life as an act of personal spiritual worship is
closely related to the responsibility to present consistently our faith as the true
religion to God who reveals His covenant to the elect.119
In summary, Perkins concentrates all of the doctrinal loci, e.g. soteriology,
Trinity, Christology, the doctrine of faith, grace, and the Word of God on the
relationship between the spirituality of God and true worship as the foundational
section of the whole doctrine of the attributes of God in terms of true religion.120 He
achieves this by maintaining exegetical, doctrinal, and practical bases for his
arguments regardless of the specific genre of his writing, as well as developing the
Ramist style characteristic of early orthodoxy.
B. Charnock’s Exegesis of the Spirituality of God & Spiritual Worship
Charnock bases his teachings about the spirituality of God on John 4:24,121
which follows the typical style of the wider Reformed tradition as well as Perkins.122
From an overall viewpoint, similar to Perkins, Charnock mainly sees the spirituality
of God as the principal nature of God in the sense that it leads a believer to the life of
piety as well as worship of God. In the exegetical part, Charnock primarily analyses
the meaning of the Greek text of “God is a Spirit” and “in spirit and truth”. He first
defines the phrase “God is a Spirit” as follows by referring to Melanchthon: “That is,
he hath nothing corporeal, no mixture of matter; not a visible substance, a bodily
form.” Then Charnock adds some definition, “He is a Spirit, not a bare spiritual
substance, but an understanding, willing Spirit; holy, wise, good, and just.”123 This
definition shows the reason that Charnock sets great importance on the attributes of
God — he includes the divine will relating it to the worship of God as spirit.124 For
Charnock, “evangelical” worship, different from that of “Judaic carnal” worship, can
only be guaranteed if God is spirit possessing His own attributes. At the same time,
119 Of Divine or Religious Worship, in Workes I, pp. 715-6; cf. An Exposition of Christs Sermon in the
Mount, in Workes III (i), p. 114.
120 Cf. G. R. Cragg, Puritanism in the Period of the Great Persecution 1660-1688 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 194-5.
121 “God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.”
122 For a detailed explanation of various use of this verse for eliciting the attributes of God, see A.
Neele, The Art of Living to God, pp. 201-6; cf. PRRD III, p. 299.
123 This also shows that Charnock does not merely use the way of negation based upon the classical
theistic tradition since Pseudo-Dionysius (as Gunton argues), rather, he focuses upon describing His
substance through the abundant ad extra dimension which ought to be the basis of our knowability of
God. See Gunton, Act and Being, p. 90.
124 Works I, p. 260.
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he expounds Christ’ words, arguing that only the Triune God as the divine essence
who commonly has the nature of spirituality in three persons can be the object of true
worship. Of course this point also shows that Charnock’s primary interest concerning
the attributes of God lies in Trinitarian theology.
In the exposition of “in spirit and truth”, Charnock makes the point that
evangelical worship of God happens through the motion of the human faculties and
the working of the Holy Spirit.125 In fact this motion of the human heart and
conscience by the “operation of a supernatural grace” does not exclude the working
of “true reason”. 126 In doing so, Charnock balances the initiative of the
administration of the Spirit as “the true sanctifier and quickener of the soul” and the
human response as an element in worship. In short, Charnock expounds the text of
John 4:24 literally by eliciting the significance of the spirituality of God in relation to
other attributes and the Trinitarian knowledge of God. He also infers from the
spirituality of God the idea of true worship in terms of regeneration and the operation
of grace. Thus, as we have seen, the theological points Charnock argues in the
exegetical section do not deviate from Perkins’ points of argument.
C. Charnock’s Doctrine of the Spirituality of God & Spiritual Worship:
The Act of the Faculties of the Soul
In this section, Charnock attempts to clarify the way the spirituality of God is
elicited as a doctrinal formulation on the basis of exegetical results. Charnock adds
scriptural evidence to his arguments and quotes Johann Gerhard (1582-1637) on the
two ways of knowing God by affirmation or negation. Charnock parallels God’s
spirituality with invisibility in terms of the other essential attributes of God that
guarantee His infiniteness. 127 In the same regard, infinity, immensity, and
immutability are also negative attributes.128 Thus, according to Charnock, “Scripture
125 Works I, p. 261: “ Render a worship chiefly consisting in the affectionate motions of the heart. …
[It] meant such a worship as is kindled in the heart by the breath of the Holy Ghost.”
126 As mentioned earlier in the doctrine of God’s existence and atheism, Charnock repeatedly
emphasises the relationship of reason and revelation while at the same time considering the
disproportionality between the finite and the infinite.
127 Works I, pp. 267-8: “If God be infinite, then he can have no parts in him; if he had, they must be
finite, or infinite: finite parts can never make up an infinite being. … Infinite parts they cannot be,
because then every part would be equal to the whole, as infinite as the whole, which is contradictory.
… If God were not a pure Spirit, he could not be omnipresent. … If God were not a spirit, he could
not be the most perfect being.” Italics are mine.
128 Works I, p. 263. Charnock quotes Cocceius’ Sum. Theol.(cap. 8) on this point. In these two kinds
of doctrinal argument, he also quotes intellectual sources of the sixteenth and seventeenth century
plentifully, for example, Episcopius, Institutes, I, iv, c.8; Suarez, De Deo, vol. I, p. 9, col. 2; Amyraut,
Loci.
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and reason meet together to assert the spirituality of God”. At the same time God
must be a “pure, entire, unmixed Spirit” without a body if He is to be “an
independent being” as well as “the first being”. Most of all, divine simplicity
necessarily requires God to be spiritual, otherwise God cannot be immutable:
His immutability depends upon his simplicity. He is unchangeable in his
essence, because he is a pure and unmixed spiritual being. … God is immutable
by nature as well as will; … He is as unchangeable in his essence, as in his
veracity and faithfulness. They are perfections belonging to his nature; but if he
were not a pure spirit, he could not be immutable by nature. … [He is to be] an
infinite sublimity, a pure act, to which nothing can be added, from which
nothing can be taken.129
Charnock also deals with the problem of divine accommodation in relation to the
spirituality of God in scriptural phrases describing God as the “member” of the body
(Ps. 34:15, Isa. 51:9). Citing Zanchi, he asserts that what is important to the
interpreter is to understand “the true intent” of the expressions of divine
accommodation as “condescension to our weakness (loquitur lex secundum linguam
filiorum hominum)” just as we see God through the incarnation of Christ.130 That is,
God should not be understood as a visible or corporeal deity but one who both acts
according to His will and also communicates that will. Within the context of the
relationship between creator and rational creatures God takes human limitation into
account.
For Charnock, as with Perkins, the doctrine of the spirituality of God should
lead us to spiritual worship with a practical dimension. In the second section of his
exposition of the spirituality of God based upon John 4:24 titled On Spiritual
Worship, he explicates the relationship between the inward operations of the human
faculties of the soul and true spiritual worship. Citing William Ames, according to
Charnock, all God’s attributes presuppose a spiritual nature in God and provide the
motive of right worship of Him as the object of love and honour.131 The essence of
true religion lies in “the work of the soul”,132 which is no other than the act of one’s
spiritual faculties towards the spiritual God. The law of nature cannot provide more
129 Works I, p. 268. The italics are mine.
130 Works I, pp. 269-70; Zanchi, De Natura Dei (Heidelberg: Jacob Mylius, 1577), lib.i. cap.4, thes. 9.
131 Works I, pp. 284-5; cf. Ames, The Marrow of Theology, II. iv. 20 (p. 238): “Religion is related to
God through that divine excellency which shines forth in his sufficiency and efficiency. This is not
one attribute, but a perfection arising from all attributes.”
132 Works I, p. 287.
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clear knowledge regarding this point than the consequent knowledge of God. This
point leads Charnock to deal with another special dimension of the duplex cognitio
Dei:
He must know his faculties were given him to act, and to act for the glory of
that God who gave him his soul and the faculties of it. … We cannot think of
him but with our minds, nor love him but with our will; and we cannot worship
him without the acts of thinking and loving, and therefore cannot worship him
without the exercise of our inward faculties. … The excellency of God’s nature,
and the excellent constitution of human faculties, concur naturally to support
this [relationship].133
Consequently, God requires spiritual worship based upon another dimension of the
twofold knowledge of God: God who has “excellency” in all of His natures demands
true worship from the believer according to the extent of the “excellency” of his own
faculties of the soul. In other words, spiritual worship should accompany “gracious
habits and affections working” in the soul pointing to the fact that “faith works by
love”. Only this “sincere act of mind and will” can be the evidence of “true piety”
and “true purity”.134 For Charnock, this distinguishes the Reformed understanding of
worship, especially remarkable in the Puritan tradition, from the outward ceremonies
of the Jews and the opus operatum of the papacy.135
In brief, in the doctrine of God’s spirituality and spiritual worship, Charnock
wanted to make it clear that it strengthens our knowledge of God as the object of true
worship. This is increased only by the act of our soul’s faculties. We have seen that
Charnock sought to provide philosophical, historical or bibliographical, and doctrinal
backgrounds for this argument.
D. Charnock’s Praxis of the Spirituality of God & Spiritual Worship:
“Reasonable Service” in Trinitarian Theology
In the practical section, Charnock elicits the importance of the human
faculties of the soul as the subject of the restoration of the image of God in
regeneration from the fact that God is a pure spiritual being. God stamped His image
133 Works I, pp. 287-8.
134 Charnock adds to this idea according to the concept of a chain reaction within the psychological
faculties: “Such a worship wherein the mind thinks of God, feels a sense of God, has the spirit
consecrated to God, the heart glowing with affections to God,” in Works I, p. 289.
135 Charnock does not deny the necessity of bodily forms of worship because man consists of physical
body and soul. For his detailed critique on the Spiritualists at that time about this point, see Works I,
pp. 296-8.
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on the spiritual faculties of the human soul rather than in the body.136 Consequently,
although the worship of corporeal images of God is unreasonable, the practical error
of such idolatry in worship occurs principally because of the depravity of human
nature. Although there is no proportion between the most spiritual God and human
beings, we nevertheless should seek after “a true notion” of God despite our
weakness. In other words, Charnock puts an application of the spirituality of God to
practical use within the context of the Reformed maxim finitum non capax infiniti, at
the same time as maintaining a place for the anthropological predicament of
humanity.137 For Charnock, again, the proper understanding of the usefulness of
divine accommodation (Deus figuratus) in the Scripture is critical in a practical
dimension because it can avoid polluted worship of God. As the representations of
God in the Scripture are “accommodated to our weakness” as well as “the inward
sense” of the soul’s faculties, we need to be careful in reflecting this accommodation
in our understanding of God:138
God accommodates himself to our contracted and tethered capacities, and uses
such expressions of God as are suited to us, in this state of flesh wherein we are;
and therefore, because we cannot apprehend God in the simplicity of his own
being and his undivided essence, he draws the representations of himself from
several creatures, and several actions of those creatures: … They are helps to
our meditations, but ought not to be formal conceptions of him.139
The theme of divine accommodation also makes Charnock consider seriously the
problem of an individual struggle for piety. This can be based upon our capacities as
well as on the limitations of communion with the spiritual God. For Charnock, a
proper understanding of our anthropological status justifies such an endeavour
towards purification and refinement in the soul’s faculties that makes higher
communion with God possible to the fullest extent.140 On the harmartiological level,
our resemblance to God in terms of the spiritual nature of the soul (imago Dei) is
136 Works I, p. 271.
137 Works I, p. 273: “It is impossible to fashion any image of God. … No one knows him but himself,
none can describe him but himself. … No corporeal thing can represent a spiritual substance; there is
no proportion in nature between them; God is a simple, infinite, immense, eternal, invisible,
incorruptible being.” In this argument, Charnock cites Cocceius, Summa, cap. 9, p. 47, sec. 35 and
Amyraut, Moral., tom. I. p. 289.
138 Cf. PRRD III, p. 305. Certainly, Charnock’s repetitive interest in explaining divine accommodation
is related to his emphasis upon the ad extra within the context of “our theology” that can draw us into
appropriate worship.
139 Works I, p. 278.
140 Works I, pp. 278-81.
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also a double-edged sword, for “spiritual sins divest us of the image of God for the
image of Satan”.141 In short, for Charnock, we can have a firm basis for the growth
of piety only when we have knowledge of the dilemmas and paradoxes of
communion in the worship of God as a spirit arising from the faculties of the soul of
the regenerate as the image of God.
Charnock even names such doctrinal foundations of spiritual worship “a
reasonable service”. Spiritual worship as communion with God in Spirit through
Christ the Son should be the service that is “evangelical” as well as “reasonable”.142
If it is true religious worship, an exercise of “the whole spirit”, then that will include
an act of understanding and will based upon the knowledge of the attributes of God
in terms of creator and the Redeemer.143 At the same time, Charnock points out the
importance of christological and pneumatological elements in the concept of spiritual
worship itself.144 He goes on to expound the comprehensive doctrinal background of
spiritual worship in practice. For Charnock, spiritual worship is also linked with the
“habits” of the whole human heart. He analyses in a very scholastic way the reason
why the spiritual habits in one’s heart should act through the exercise of grace in
spiritual worship:
A Christian endowed with grace must act suitable to that nature, and exercise
his grace in his acting. … Reason is not the principle, for then all rational
creatures would be Christians. They ought therefore to be acts of a higher
principle, exercises of that grace whereby Christians are what they are; …
Grace doth not exclude reason, but ennobles it, and calls it up to another form;
… All worship must have the same spring, and be the exercise of that principle,
otherwise we can have no communion with God.145
According to Charnock, “supernatural principle” and “reason” are necessary in
spiritual worship on the one hand; on the other hand, “nature” cannot prevent the
Christian’s heart from becoming carnal if there is no proper exercise of “graces”.
Thus Charnock gives a clear reason for one’s pursuit of holiness — in the struggle
141 Works I, p. 282; cf. PRRD III, p. 306.
142 Works I, p. 295; cf. Rom. 12:1.
143 Works I, p. 298.
144 Works I, pp. 299-300: “As God counts not any soul living but in Christ, so he counts not any a
spiritual worshipper but in Christ. … Our worship is then spiritual, when the fire that kindles our
affections comes from heaven, as that fire upon the altar wherewith the sacrifices were consumed.
God tastes a sweetness in no service, but as it is dressed up by the hand of the Mediator, and hath the
air of his own Spirit in it. … We cannot mortify a lust without the Spirit, Rom, viii. 13, nor quicken a
service without the Spirit.”
145 Works I, p. 304.
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graces are exercised.146 The “whole set of graces” must be in operation in all our
faculties for the performance of spiritual worship: he even calls this process “the
spiritual harmony” of worship: first, grace is to be exercised on our “faith” in
worship as an evangelical confidence in God. 147 As faith in itself cannot be
considered without the relationship with Christ whose name is necessary as our
pacifying intercessor, the exercise of faith spiritualises the act of worshipping God.
Second, “love” is to be the object of the exercise of grace. Charnock also compares
love with faith in terms of appetitus unionis (desire for union with God) through
Christ the mediator.148 The heavenly affections are thus indispensable to spiritual
worship because the word “love” encompasses all the pietistic devotions from us to
be united to God. The delight, reverence, humility and holiness in our spirit towards
God as “a sprout of habitual grace” become our duty in spiritual worship within this
context.149 In brief, the theological virtues in the regenerate can grow only by the
continuously infused habit of grace necessary for spiritual worship.
After the arguments for the necessity of the exercise of grace in spiritual
worship, Charnock explores the fundamental reason for offering spiritual worship to
God. On the one hand, according to the order of creation and providence in nature
including human’s rational faculties, God as the most excellent being is to be served
with the best of all that creatures have. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the
similarity between God and humanity in the nature of spiritual faculties provides the
basis of true religion in need of spiritual worship. In other words, only the human
nature of the psychological faculties makes spiritual worship possible through
knowledge and acknowledgement of the attributes of God.150 Charnock names such
an engagement of the human spirit as “the concurrence of the powers of the soul” or
“the exercise of the soul” in the act of religious services.151 To put it another way, for
Charnock, the analysis of the human faculties of the soul in terms of the dialectic
between sin and grace continues to be necessary in the advancement of the
146 Works I, p. 304: “Though we may have the spiritual graces which compose in us a resemblance to
God, yet for want of acting those suitable dispositions, we render ourselves unfit for his converse, and
make the worship, which is fundamentally spiritual, to become actually carnal. As the will cannot
naturally act to any object but by the exercise of its affections, so the heart cannot spiritually act
towards God but by the exercise of graces.”
147 Works I, p. 305: “Without the habit of faith, our persons are out of Christ; and without the exercise
of faith, the duties are out of Christ.”
148 Works I, pp. 306, 309.
149 See Works I, pp. 308-15.
150 Works I, p. 318.
151 Works I, p. 319. Charnock sometimes expresses it as “the acts of the soul” or “the internal speech,
whereby we must speak with God”. See Works I, p. 333.
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knowledge of the attributes of God. The concept of spiritual worship in this context
operates as a positive motive towards a full anthropological recovery of the image of
God in a trinitarian dimension, as he writes: “To have a spiritual worship is God’s
end in the restoration of the creature, both in the redemption by his son, and
sanctification by his Spirit.”152
As much as spiritual worship contributes to one’s growth in piety in this
world, there exist obstacles that cause spiritual distraction. For Charnock, as is also
the case with Perkins, the Puritanistic focus on the “spiritual war” seen in the strong
resistance to these obstacles seems to dominate his thinking regarding this respect:153
There is natural corruption in us. … This corruption being seated in all the
faculties, and a constant domestic in them, has the greater opportunity to trouble
us, since it is by those faculties that we spiritually transact with God; … As the
Spirit brings good thoughts and divine promises to mind, to quicken our
worship, so the devil brings evil things to mind, and endeavours to fasten them
in our souls to disturb us. … There is something of flesh that lusts against the
spirit, so there is something of spirit in worship which lusts against the flesh.154
While Charnock emphasises the importance of such spiritual vigilance, he never
deviates from the Christ-centeredness of the doctrine of sanctification.155 Rather,
what is crucial for Charnock is to know the principle of one’s “inward frame” for
spiritual worship. This is given through the grace of regeneration, “animating and
quickening” the religious acts of worship in practice for the glory of God as the
ultimate end of all the opera Dei.156 Within the same context, he contrasts the
repercussions of sin with that of grace in terms of spiritual worship by using the term
habitus once again.157 In addition, spiritual worship is essential in that false worship
without “the activity of our noblest [soul] faculties” is invariably against all the
attributes of God as the archetype of our psychological faculties in the image of
152 Works I, p. 320.
153 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 306-7; Leigh, Treatise, II. iii, pp. 25-6. For recent secondary literature on this
subject, see Bryan Zacharias, The Embattled Christian: William Gurnall and the Puritan View of
Spiritual Warfare (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth, 1995).
154 Works I, pp. 328-9, 332.
155 See Works I, p. 332: “Let us not be discomforted; for as the greatness of our sins upon our turning
to God is no hindrance to our justification, because it doth not depend upon our conversion as the
meritorious cause, but upon the infinite value of our Saviour’s satisfaction, which reaches the greatest
sins as well as the least, so the multitude of our bewailed distractions in worship are not a hindrance to
our acceptation, because of the uncontrollable power of Christ’s intercession.”
156 Works I, pp. 332-3.
157 Works I, p. 341: “As frequent sinful acts strengthen habits of sin, so frequent religious acts
strengthen habits of grace.”
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God.158 What is also notable is the fact that Charnock emphasises the exercise of our
“love” as a holy inward affection in spiritual worship to God according to the
tradition of Spiritual Brethren.159 Therefore, the usual conduct of duty in the act of
worship as the means of grace should be daily examined in practice in terms of
whether the blood and death of Christ is applied properly through the proper acts of
the soul based upon this love.
In brief, Charnock opened a preliminary road for consequent discussions of
all the other attributes of God by his insistence that there is no genuine knowledge of
the doctrine of God’s attributes without the elements of spiritual worship in its
practical outworking focusing on the act of the human faculties of the soul that make
it possible. This particularly displays the Puritan pietistic background of Charnock’s
trinitarian theology towards true religion in continuity with Perkins.
Conclusion
We have investigated the doctrine of God’s existence and spirituality in the
work of Perkins and Charnock. The problem of atheism was examined in close
relation to the doctrine of the existence of God; the theme of spiritual worship was
also dealt with within the framework of the doctrine of God’s spirituality. The
function of these two areas of theological loci was foundational for the later
discussion of the doctrine of God’s attributes, which is relevant to the doctrinal
(Trinitarian, soteriological, covenantal, and christological) concerns developed and
expanded in their system. This is especially true for Charnock. This remains true
despite the differences in the historical and theological context affecting the form and
content of the two writers’ work.160
In addition, Charnock seems to have inherited the emphasis upon the role of
conscience from Perkins, while at the same time extending the account of it to the
discussion of the relationship of both the soul’s faculties and the attributes of God to
conscience. The fact that Charnock elucidates the relationship of human nature
(psychological faculties) and divine nature (attributes of God) in terms of both
158 Quotation from Works I, p. 335.
159 Works I, pp. 341-2: “Love is a commanding affection, a uniting grace; it draws all the faculties of
the soul to the centre. … The happiness of heaven consists in a full attraction of the soul to God, by
his glorious influence upon it.”
160 For example, Charnock’s detailed argument on the human being’s implanted knowledge of God’s
existence in the natural state, which is not innate, is absent in Perkins’ writings. This indicates the
difference of context in each period in relation to the emergence of Socinianism.
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sanctification and spiritual worship shows a fundamental framework in our ongoing
investigation. Arguably Charnock’s idea of God’s existence and His spirituality
developed from a primary schema of William Perkins’ as the “theologian of the
heart”.
Charnock’s continuation of the Puritan inheritance of Perkins’ emphasis upon
the reforming of the heart (soul’s faculties) by supernatural grace was significant.
Even his use of a modified scholasticism on the basis of the regenerate’s reason was
influenced by it. Thus the continuity of form and content with the wider Reformed
tradition from Perkins to Charnock is apparent. Their treatment of the doctrine of
God’s existence and spirituality was totally practical as well as theoretical in that
they geared the ideas of the true knowledge of God towards the circulation of both
faith and obedience which arises through the mutual operation of the act of the
faculties of the soul and the use of the means of grace. To put it another way, both
emphasised the systematic coherence of doctrinal loci and the growth of piety,
identifying it as true religion within the context of the theology of grace as a
supernatural habitus. In other words, we might even be able to say that here the
Thomistic basis of the form of argument was in harmony with a Scotistic interest in
practical piety.
In conclusion, a fundamental point can be made which will be confirmed
successively in the following chapters. The complexity of the threefold or fourfold
structure in Charnock is not simply the product of a rationalism that collides with the
Ramist and relatively more systematic structure of Perkins. Neither is it a breakaway
from Calvin. Rather, the integrity of exegetical, doctrinal, and practical argument is
maintained as well as developed. Above all, the significant theological bond between
the doctrine of God’s attributes and trinitarian knowledge of God is the most obvious
evidence of continuity between Perkins and Charnock. We will continue to unfold
the validity of these points in the later discussions of other attributes of God.
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Chapter Four
The Essential Attributes of God
Perkins and Charnock elicit three essential attributes of God based upon their
discussion of the doctrine of God’s existence and spirituality. As they see it, the
primary attributes of God are: eternity, immutability, and omnipresence. They both
derive eternity in terms of time and omnipresence in terms of space from God’s
infinity as do many Puritan and other Reformed scholastics.1 Charnock interposes
immutability between the two infinite attributes of God in order to emphasise the
deductive relationship of eternity and immutability. As a matter of fact, for Perkins
and Charnock, the double dimension (eternal and temporal) of the doctrine of the life,
knowledge, and will of God can be properly represented only when the seeming
inconsistencies of these essential attributes of God ad intra/extra are explained
coherently. At the same time we will find traces of a dialectic between a Scotism that
sees “infinity” as the ground of all divine attributes and a Thomism that prioritises
“aseity” for the same reason. These are based upon the Puritan and Reformed
scholastic’s pursuit of both dynamics and stability in their theological system,
especially in the doctrine of the attributes of God Who is Triune.2
I. The Eternity of God
For the Puritan and Reformed scholastics, the proper understanding of God’s
eternity not as an absolute attribute of timelessness but as “a successionless duration”
related to the created orders in temporal dimension was critically important. Only
then both the transcendence and the immanency of God ad intra/extra could be
explained, maintaining both the sovereignty of God and human responsibility.3 To
put it another way, God’s eternal duration is to be grasped not as a concept “without
or outside” of time but as a “beyond time”.4 The Socinians and Vorstius had denied
1 For example, see William Ames, Marrow of Theology, ed. and trans. John Eusden (Durham,
Labyrinth Press, 1983), I, iv, 41, 43-4, 47-8 (p. 86); Leigh, Systeme, II, iv, pp. 170-8, 179-82 (on
immutability); Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii, 8 (p. 194).
2 Cf. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 1993), pp. 132-3.
3 The quotation is from PRRD III, p. 350. Instead the Socinians and Conrad Vorstius (1569-1622)
asserted God’s experience of temporal succession despite His aseity.
4 PRRD III, p. 355.
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the concept of divine eternity and had affirmed only an everlastingness based upon
their own arbitrary distinction of each concept. Against this, the Reformed orthodox
divines sought to prove the consistent existence of God in eternity in terms of both
His essential or intrinsic “Being” and His operational or extrinsic “Act”. Like other
Reformed scholastics, both Perkins and Charnock sought to elaborate such a
formulation through a significant dialectic between eternal and temporal dimensions
even in the doctrine of God’s “eternity,” and in spite of the change of historical
context between early and high orthodoxy.
A. Perkins on God’s Eternity
Perkins deals with divine eternity relatively briefly in comparison with other
essential attributes. There had been relatively less debate or theological controversy,
it seems, with opponents regarding the doctrine of God’s eternity in early orthodoxy.
At the same time this also shows that the Boethian concept of the identity of time
which regarded it as a “quality” rather than some kind of “substance” (like the
rationalists would do afterward) already existed. 5 Thus, according to Perkins,
eternity is one of the two-fold aspects of the infinity of God alongside omnipresence
as “exceeding greatness,” as he writes: “that by which he is without beginning and
ending (Ps.90:2, Rev.1:8)”.6 In fact God’s absolute eternity is distinct from other
spiritual beings like angels because they are eternal merely “by participation” based
upon a beginning of existence from God.7 Such an observation also indicates
Perkins’ familiarity with the distinction concerning God’s eternity in both its
ontological dimension ad intra and its relational and temporal aspect ad extra with
creatures. In addition, Perkins’ deduction of eternity from infinity shows a Scotistic
understanding of the doctrine of God’s eternity.8
In brief, in Perkins, we trace the “beginnings” of the distinctive understanding
of God’s eternity as both internal (essential) and external (operational) in its aspects,
not as a merely transcendent or abstract attribute of God. We will find a development
of the form and content of Perkins’ basic recognition of the dynamic balance in
God’s eternity in the following examination of Charnock’s thought.
5 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 351, 360-1; Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 134; Boethius, The
Consolation of Philosophy, trans. and noted by P.G. Walsh (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), pp. 110-4.
6 Perkins, A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 11.
7 Perkins, An Exposition upon the 1.chap. of the Revel., in Workes III (ii), p. 218.
8 By contrast, Aquinas elicits eternity from God’s immutability. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica,
trans. the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 5 vols (1911); repr. (Westminster, MD:
Christian classics, 1981), Ia. 9.2.
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B. Charnock’s Exegesis & Doctrine concerning the Eternity of God:
The Eternal Decree and Covenant
Although the Reformed orthodox theologians used various scriptural texts as
the exegetical basis of their arguments concerning God’s eternity,9 Charnock chose
Ps. 90:2 as the main text, like Perkins. He argues that Ps. 90:2, as an excerpt from
Moses’ prayer, represents the eternity of God by observing both God’s redemptive
history on earth and His everlastingness that transcends the history of creatures.10
This certainly shows that he is aware of the distinction (derived from Perkins)
between the concept of everlastingness on the basis of an ad extra dimension and the
concept of the eternity of God ad intra without considering God’s relatedness to
creatures in a temporal dimension. He also contrasts creatures in their limited state
arising from nothingness (which is extraneous to eternity) with God who exists in the
unlimited extension of duration and possesses creating power.
From these two fundamental exegetical results, Charnock first attempts to
derive the stability of God’s covenant with His people. Here, the eternity of God
functions as the foundation of the covenant in terms of its essence and its “federal
providence”.11 Second, the assumption of the existence of the eternal “wisdom” of
God ad intra/extra is founded, of course, on the existence of the eternal “essence” of
God possessing “the nature of eternity in an infinite immutable duration”. 12
Nevertheless, citing Augustine’s Confessions, Charnock acknowledges the difficulty
of presenting this attribute of God via eminentiae (in a positive way related to the
creatures). This, in turn, demonstrates that the approach of Reformed orthodoxy on
this point varies despite the common Augustinian basis of their understanding of
eternity and time.13 In short, Charnock substantially inherited the exegetical and
9 For examples, see PRRD III, pp. 348-53.
10 “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even
from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.”
11 Works I, p. 348. Calvin also mentions the same aspect in his The Commentary upon the Book of
Psalms, ed. and trans. James Anderson (Edinburgh: 1845-1849), Ps. 90:2; cf. PRRD III, p. 352.
12 Works I, pp. 348. He refers to the French Reformed thinker Pierre Du Moulin (1568-1658) for this
argument; cf. Du Moulin, Cor. i., Ser 2, p. 52.
13 According to Muller, while Cocceius, Turretin, and many other Reformed theologians respond
positively to this way of explaining the ad extra dimension, some other (Dutch) Reformed like
Wilhelmus à Brakel (1635-1711) prefer a negative approach. In our view, Charnock seems to be
located in the middle of these two positions. See PRRD III, p. 346. Accordingly, this point also
evidences the unsuitableness of Gunton’s critique of Charnock as an example of negative theology
without considering the eclectic aspect of his idea of God’s attributes: see Colin Gunton, Act and
Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes (London: SCM Press, 2002), p. 90. For a brief
115
hermeneutical traditions of the past but brought his own formulations to bear on the
eternity of God, within a seventeenth century orthodox context.
In the doctrinal section, Charnock first seeks to explain how God is eternal by
combining both exegetical and theological arguments. He presents the definition of
eternity as one of negative attribution in comparison with the immensity of God.14
Charnock also refers to Abraham’s calling upon the name of the “everlasting God” in
Gen. 21:33 in order to build an argument for the eternity of God, who is without
beginning, in terms of the gospel based upon Christ and the eternal decree:
The gospel is not preached by the command of a new and temporary God, but
of that God that was before all ages. Though the manifestation of it be in time,
yet the purpose and resolve of it was from eternity. If there were decrees before
the foundation of the world, there was a decreer before the foundation of the
world. Before the foundation of the world he loved Christ as a mediator, John
xvii. 24; a foreordination of him was before the foundation of the world, Eph. i.
4. A choice of men, and therefore a chooser before the foundation of the world;
a ‘grace given in Christ before the world began,’ 2 Tim. i. 9, and therefore a
donor of that grace.15
For Charnock, the eternity of the trinitarian God in terms of His immanency and
economy is explicit. We can also sense that he seems to assume the intratrinitarian
covenant of redemption as the basis of his argument for the eternity of God. In
addition, God, who precedes the foundation of the world, can have no beginning in
time because there is no proportion between creator and creatures in terms of cause
and effect. In other words, God’s entire work ad extra — of creation, providence,
and redemption — indicates that God is an eternal being without beginning.16
At the same time, the eternal God must be without end in both infinite
simplicity and unchangeableness.17 The essence of God as “pure act” with no
potentiality leads to three detailed characteristics of eternity in God: in the divine
account of Augustine’s understanding of this point, see Simo Knuuttila, “Time and Creation in
Augustine,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 103-15.
14 Works I, p. 349: “As immensity is the diffusion of his essence, so eternity is the duration of his
essence. … His immensity surmounts all places, so his eternity comprehends all times, all durations,
and infinitely excels them.”
15 Works I, p. 350.
16 Cf. PRRD III, p. 357.
17 Works I, pp. 351-3: “Nothing first or last, [Eternity] notes rather the perfection of a being in regard
of its essence. … God hath his whole being in one and the same point or moment of eternity. … God
possesses a firm and absolute being, always constant to himself; … God possesses his being in one
and indivisible point, having neither beginning, end, nor middle.”
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mind, God sees and knows all things and their order by Himself. Charnock makes it
clear that God’s eternity guarantees His omniscience without succession despite the
differentiation of actual existence by the act of divine knowledge in time.18 In
addition, he vindicates the coherence of the eternity of the decrees of God. These
never collide with the omniscience of God in eternity. In other words, the divine
knowledge and divine will are invariably consistent with each other in essence in the
light of eternity. Charnock thus argues:
[God] doth not decree this now which he decreed not before, for as his works
were known from the beginning of the world; so his works were decreed from
the beginning of the world; as they are known at once, so they are decreed at
once; there is a succession in the execution of them, first grace, then glory; but
the purpose of God for the bestowing of both was in one and the same moment
of eternity. … The redemption of the world is after the creation of the world,
but the decree whereby the world was created, and whereby it was redeemed,
was from eternity.19
Such a consistency between the divine will and knowledge comes from the divine
essence that is eternal. The divine essence as “existentia durans” (enduring
existence) without “prius et posterius” (predecessor and posterity) is not accidental
but always and necessarily in existence. In the same way, according to Charnock, all
the other perfections of God must also be eternal if divine essence is eternal by
nature.
Second, Charnock discusses the reason for the necessity of God’s eternity in
detail derived from a background of both the scholastic tradition and a firm
exegetical basis.20 (Though mentioned earlier, we note that he never touches upon
these points without presenting a corresponding exegesis.) To begin with, God’s
eternity is proved by both the name of God (Jehovah, I am that I am) and the life of
God in Himself as “a pure act, nothing but vigour and act” by His essence.21
18 Charnock refers to Acts 15:18: “Known unto God are all things from the beginning of the world.”
He also illustrates it by the example of Christ’s redemptive works: “The death of Christ as to precede
his resurrection in order of time; there is a succession in this; both at once are known by God, yet the
act of his knowledge is not exercised about Christ as dying and rising at the same time, so that there is
succession in things when there is no succession in God’s knowledge of them”, in Works I, p. 353.
19 Works I, p. 353.
20 For detailed discussion through a scholastic example, see William of Ockham, Predestination,
God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, trans. with introductory notes by M. McCord Adams
and N. Kretzmann (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).
21 Cf. Exod. 3:14; John 5:26. Along with these two arguments, Charnock stresses that “chance”
cannot explain the basis of the existence of both God and the world. See Works I, pp. 355-6.
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Referring to Calvin, Charnock also argues that God’s immutability, infinite
perfection, and omnipotence are only applicable in the context of a prerequisite
eternity.22 Finally, we see the Thomistic proof of God as first cause in the light of the
doctrine of eternity intensifies the coherence of Charnock’s reasonings:
If there be any existence of things, it is necessary that that which was the first
cause should exist from eternity. Whatsoever was the immediate cause of the
world, yet the first and chief cause, wherein we must rest, must have nothing
before it; if it had anything before it, it were not the first. He therefore that is the
first cause must be without beginning, nothing must be before him.23
Such eternity is incommunicable to creatures. Thus Charnock’s argument on the
necessary disproportionality of duration between God as the first cause and creatures
as the effect in a Scotistic sense is noteworthy.24 To put it another way, despite his
clear acknowledgement of the relationship between God’s non-successive duration
and the temporal dimension as evidenced by the external work ad extra, yet the
tension between the inifinite and the finite is always maintained in Charnock’s
schema.
In summary, Charnock demonstrates the doctrine of God’s eternity on the
basis of the essential, intratrinitarian, and external works of God by drawing on
exegetical results, theological formulations and the abundant resources of tradition.
This includes arguments from reason within the boundary of revelation. These are
based upon the dialectic between Scotism and Thomism stemming from the
intellectual legacy of medieval scholastic theology within seventeenth century
theological context. Charnock’s method of expounding God’s eternity within the
balance of ad intra and extra is remarkable, especially in his underlying defence of
divine simplicity (as the foundation of the whole doctrine of divine attributes)
through the idea of the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son in his answer
to the question of the problem of the eternity of the divine decree.
22 Works I, p 357: “God argues [in Mal. iii. 6 and Job xxxvii. 23] here, saith Calvin, from his
unchangeable nature as Jehovah, to his immutability in his purpose. … A finite duration is inconsistent
with infinite perfection. … He could not be properly almighty, that were not always mighty.”
23 Works I, p. 358. Charnock seems to depend upon Cocceius’ Summa Thelogiae and Petavius’
Theol.Dogmat. for this argument.
24 See Works I, p. 360: “No effect of an intellectual free agent, can be equal in duration to its cause. …
A free act of the will is necessary to precede in order of time, as the cause of such effects as are purely
voluntary.”
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C. Charnock’s Praxis on the Eternity of God: The Trinitarian Basis of Piety
Charnock now further extends his doctrinal formulation on God’s eternity to
christological, covenantal, trinitarian, and soteriological discussions at a more
practical level. He first takes a christological turn in relation to eternity by
elaborating the argument concerning the divinity of Christ. Having provided several
exegetical evidences of Christ’s eternity as the Son of God in the New Testament,25
Charnock explores Christ’s own words in John 16:28 that suggest strongly His own
eternity:
He speaks of a glory that he ‘had with the father before the world was’, when
there is no creature inbeing; this is an actual glory, and not only in decree. …
Christ speaks of something peculiar to him, a glory in actual possession before
the world was. … There are two goings forth of Christ described, one from the
Bethlehem in the days of his incarnation, and another from eternity. … If this
going out from everlasting were only in the purpose of God, it might be said of
David and of every creature.26
Thus, according to Charnock, the going out of Christ from the Father in an eternal
dimension on the basis of the intratrinitarian structure necessarily implies the eternity
of Christ the Son who possesses divinity. To put it another way, the glory Christ
possesses is not entirely related to the glory in God’s specific decree which will be
fulfilled in time in the work of incarnation. Rather, this is the intrinsic glory that the
Father and the Son have in common in the Trinity because of their co-eternity.27 For
Charnock, the reason for the importance of this comes from the fact that the
authenticity of the Christian religion can stand only on the assumption of the eternity
of both God and Christ who provides the basis of the efficiency of redemptive works.
Moreover, such appreciation of the importance of the atonement in terms of Christ’s
eternity leads Charnock on to consider the consistency of divine knowledge in the
light of eternity. The divine eternity guarantees omniscience without an alteration of
the quantity of His knowledge since God knows all things “in his eternity in one
simple knowledge”. As will be discussed later, Charnock hints that he objects to the
concept of “middle knowledge” or an Arminian understanding of divine knowledge
that would separate divine knowledge from the divine will.28
25 For example, Col. 1:16-7; Heb. 7:3, 13:8; Rev. 1:18.
26 Works I, pp. 360-1.
27 Works I, p. 361: “[In Isa.9:6, Christ] is particularly called the Everlasting, or eternal Father; not the
Father in the Trinity, but a father to us; yet eternal, the Father of eternity.”
28 Works I, p. 361.
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Charnock also discusses the issue of the covenant and the divine will in the
light of the eternity of God: the covenantal God guarantees the eternity of the gospel
in believers, based upon His eternal decree.29 The believers’ happiness and status in
relation to “our God in covenant” is also eternal because only the eternal God has the
power to fulfill His will regarding the promise in our trust. For this reason, citing Isa.
26:4, Charnock argues that divine eternity provides the basis for the consistency of
all the attributes in the decree that evidences the trueness of His word:
‘Trust in the Lord for ever, for in the Lord Jehovah is everlasting strength’, …
His name is doubled, that name Jah and Jehovah, which was always the
strength of his people, … not a failing, but an eternal truth and power; … His
wisdom, will, truth, have always been, and will to eternity be, the same. … As
his word is the bottom of our trust, and his truth is the assurance of his sincerity,
so his eternity is the assurance, of his ability to perform.30
At this juncture, Charnock meaningfully considers the trinitarian dimension of the
eternity of God. That is, he emphasises especially the role of the Holy Spirit in terms
of the application of redemption as the “post-eternity of God”.31 For Charnock, the
eternity of God should be explained in relation to the three persons of the Trinity. To
apply the knowledge and theological virtues of the eternity of God in our growth in
piety, the two dimensions of God’s eternity (“ante-eternity” and “post-eternity”) ad
intra and ad extra should be explicated with a consistent understanding which is in
harmony with all the attributes and the works of the Triune God.32
In addition, we need to note Charnock’s enormous stress upon the practice of
meditation on the eternity of God, which contributes to the increase of our
29 Works I, p. 363: “The immutability of his counsel follows the immutability of his nature.
Immutability and eternity go hand in hand together. The promise of eternal life is as ancient as God
himself in regard of the purpose of the promise, or in regard of the promise made to Christ for us: …
Therefore the gospel, which is the new covenant published, is termed ‘the everlasting gospel’, Rev.
xiv. 6, …”
30 Works I, p. 366.
31 See Works I, p. 367: “Because [the Holy Ghost] is the strongest foundation of our faith and hope,
which respects chiefly that which is future, and not that which is past, yet, indeed, no assurance of his
after-eternity can be had if his ante-eternity be not certain. … But since all the resolves of God are as
himself is, eternal, and all the promises of God are the fruits of his counsel, therefore they cannot be
changed.”
32 It is notable that Charnock used covenantal expressions applying to the mediate work of the Holy
Spirit in this argument. This makes it possible for us to understand his idea of the covenant of
redemption in its more developed or elaborated form by consolidating the trinitarian basis of the
redemptive works ad extra. Carl Trueman points to a similar line of argument in Owen’s work The
Death of Death in the Death of Christ (1647). See Trueman, John Owen: Reformed Catholic,
Renaissance Man (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 86-7.
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devotion.33 He even asserts that the eternity, holiness, and power of God are the
“fundamental articles of all religion” upon which all the other doctrines are based:
our praise is worth giving to God when we meditate fully on “converting grace” in
the light of the eternity of God in a soteriological dimension.34 The emphasis upon
the refining of the faculties of the soul through this meditation shows clearly
Charnock’s pietistic characteristics as a successor of the Spiritual Brethren.35
In summary, all of Charnock’s practical arguments on divine eternity aim
ultimately at the growth of piety by the increase of the believer’s faith, comfort, and
assurance and the practice of meditation on doctrine in the light of those major
theological loci necessary to explain the life of grace. For Charnock, the theological
‘lever’ for this practical application was still the covenant, Trinity, and Christology.
II. The Immutability of God
The concept of divine immutability is situated as one of the key essential
attributes in relation to both the divine aseity or necessity and divine simplicity.
These are primary divine attributes in the Thomistic perspective. 36 How to
understand the concept of God as the first cause, as the “unmoved mover” in the
scholastic tradition, brings about a significant difference between Barthian views
which see it as “inactivity” and the traditional one viewing it as a mere
“immovability” from potency to actuality. In fact Barth’s assertion that the Reformed
orthodox deviated from both the Reformers and the scriptures towards both
scholasticism and rationalism originates to a large extent in this datum.37 In our case,
as mentioned earlier, Gunton’s and Jones’ critique of Charnock’s thought are deeply
related to this Barthian “reverberation”.
However, according to our viewpoint, and contra Barth, immutability has to
33 Cf. PRRD III, p. 362.
34 Works I, p. 372.
35 Works I, pp. 372-3: “Let us therefore meditate upon [the eternity of God], but not in a bare
speculation, without engaging our affections, and making every notion of the divine eternity end in a
suitable impression upon our hearts. … If God is eternal, hoe worthy is he of our choicest affections,
and strongest desires of communion with him!”
36 Cf. PRRD III, p. 324; Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 132.
37 According to Muller, Barth derived this result chiefly from his investigation of Amandus Polanus
(1561-1610) as a representative Reformed orthodox theologian. See PRRD III, pp. 309-10. See also
Antonie Vos, “Always on Time: The Immutability of God,” in Understanding the Attributes of God,
eds. G. Van den Brink and Marcel Sarot (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), pp. 53-73; cf. Karl Barth,
Church Dogmatics, 4 vols, ed. and trans. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T & T Clark,
1936-1975), II/1, pp. 492-4.
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be distinct from the concept of “impassibility”, from a “Stoic notion of apatheia”
because God continues to have a relationship with creatures ad extra. This obtains
even if God effects actual change in them, though without losing His
unchangeableness.38 Therefore, in this subchapter, we find the root cause of the
misunderstanding of the Puritan and Reformed scholastics’ doctrine of God’s
attributes through an examination of Perkins’ and Charnock’s idea of the divine
immutability. The idea of divine immutability had been inherited from Augustine and
passed via the medieval scholastics and the Reformers to the Reformed orthodox
without radical change. 39 That is, the alleged charge of the Hellenistic or
monotheistic character of the “classical” doctrine of God since Augustine is also
deeply related to this. The persuasive strength of the evidence against Barth increases,
especially since Perkins and Charnock put such stress on showing the contrast
between the immutable God and the changeable created orders ad extra, closely
related to their discussion of “piety”.
A. Perkins on God’s Immutability
For Perkins, divine immutability is one of the two essential attributes (after
spirituality) based upon the simplicity of God. This standard of classification
indicates Perkins’ modified Thomistic style.40 He describes God’s immutability in
both essential and economic respects: first, it is “that by which he is voide of all
composition, division, and change” (James 1:17, Mal. 3:6); second, scriptural
expressions about the repentance of God (e.g. Gen. 6:6) do not mean a mutation in
God’s will or nature literally but the change of divine actions “of mercy and love into
effects of anger after the manner of men”.
Perkins also seeks to deal with the relationship between God’s external works
and the immutability of His eternal decree in order to expound its apparent
inconsistency from the point of view of human understanding. In fact the change of
the Law and the abolition of ceremonies of the Old Testament has nothing to do with
an unchangeable decree of God: “God can decree to change this or that, without
change”.41 Such immutability also guarantees the firmness of perseverance of the
elect who not only are known to God (and Christ) but also love Him (1 Cor. 8:3). In
38 PRRD III, pp. 309-11.
39 PRRD III, pp. 308, 311-2.
40 For Aquinas, immutability is critically significant in that this attribute is the basis of divine aseity
and eternity. See Summa Theologica, Ia, q.9, art.1.
41 A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 11; A Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes
II, p. 246.
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its practical dimension, for Perkins, our zeal for the growth of theological virtues
(faith, hope, and love) in terms of both the process of sanctification and “the
maintenance of true religion” should thus also be unchangeable as a reflection of the
immutability of God in our mind and attitude “semper idem”.42
In summary, Perkins investigates divine immutability explicitly in its
exegetical, doctrinal, and practical aspects despite his narrower Ramist style of
discussion, and achieves this while taking into account the disputable theological
points of early orthodox English Puritanism. To be sure, we see that this still operates
by focusing on the defence of the doctrine of divine simplicity, which is the
foundational perfection of His nature, denying any “logical relation” with other
beings regarding His existence.
B. Charnock’s Exegesis of Divine Immutability
Charnock bases his arguments of the immutability of God on an exegesis of
Ps. 102:26-27 as did Zanchi.43 After noting that there are two possible ways of
exegeting these verses in terms of both the historical “kingdom of the Messiah” and
christological redemption, he broaches the importance of the refinement of mutable
creatures pointing toward the restoration of goodness which was the original purpose
of the immutable God, especially from verse 26. Then Charnock focuses on exegesis
of verse 27 arguing that “Thou art the same” asserts God’s immutability in the eternal
duration of God: “The same God, the same in essence and nature, the same in will
and purpose” is “immutable in every respect”; His wisdom, power, knowledge and
will are unexceptionally the same in this regard.44 According to this exegetical
elaboration, Charnock thus derives the summary of the text both by contrasting
God’s immutability with the creatures’ finitude and changeableness and by
comparing it with the eternity of God at the same time:
Indeed true eternity is true immutability, whence eternity is defined the
possession of an immutable life. Yet immutability differs from eternity in our
conception. Immutability respects the essence or existence of a thing, eternity
respects the duration of a being in that state; or rather, immutability is the state
itself, eternity is the measure of that state. … A thing is said to be changed,
when it is otherwise now in regard of nature, state, will, or any quality than it
42 Perkins, A Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, p. 247.
43 “They shall Perish, but thou shalt endure; yea, all of them shall wax old as a garment: as a vesture
shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy years shall have no
end.”
44 Works I, pp. 379-80.
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was before.45
As we have seen in the order of Charnock’s discussions of God’s attributes (eternity-
immutability-omnipresence), he deduces divine immutability from eternity within the
Reformed orthodox tradition. This, in turn, is influenced by a Scotistic pattern which
sees the priority of God’s infinity as the ground of all the attributes.46 In the same
regard, we can also see Charnock giving priority to exegetical arguments over
rational or theological argument (emerging from the necessity for coherence in
exegetical evidences) based upon the relationship between the creator and the
creatures in that he places the latter two (rational, theological) arguments at the very
end.47 In short, we find that Charnock sought to clarify the fact that the concept of
contingency can be applied only to those things possessing the potency of
actualisation effected by God’s work ad extra, and not to God who immanently acts
in the Godhead (ad intra). The Scotistic tendency of emphasising the infinite gap
between creator and the creatures is especially notable, while at the same time being
faithful to the tradition of exegesis.
C. Charnock’s Doctrine and Polemic on the Immutability of God:
The Defence of Divine Simplicity
In the doctrinal section Charnock seeks to investigate the specifics of this,
like other Reformed orthodox theologians who had analysed divine immutability,48
by listing four aspects: essence, knowledge, will, and place. First, God’s
unchangeableness in “essence” is related to His being as “an absolutely simple
Spirit”, who is “truly unum”, possessing no “particle of composition”.49 Neither
perfect blessedness nor full rejoicing in Himself is possible if a change of essence
occurs: the change in a thing indicates its being finitude which has some kind of
medium. For this argument Charnock stresses once again the disproportionality
45 Works I, p. 380.
46 For the accounts of such a tendency in Scotus, see F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 9 vols,
vol. II: Medieval Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus (London: Burns Oates & Washburn, 1946-75), pp.
524-7.
47 Works I, pp. 381-2; cf. PRRD III, pp. 316-7.
48 In some way this could be regarded as the expanded version of Zanchi who sees a twofold
immutability of God (in essence or nature as well as will, decree, and counsels) according to his work
De Natura Dei (Heidelberg: Jacob Mylius, 1577). See PRRD III, pp. 313-4; cf. Benedict Pictet,
Christian Theology, trans. F. Reyroux, (London: R. B. Seeley and W. Burnside, 1834), II.xii.3;
Thomas Ridgley, Body of Divinity, revised with notes by John Wilson (1855, repr. Edmonton: Still
Waters Revival Books, 1993), I, pp. 88-90.
49 Works I, pp. 382, 384.
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between the infinite and the finite, as he writes: “There is no medium between finite
and infinite. … For finite and infinite are extremes so distant, that they can never
pass into one another.”50 God’s immutability in essence also evidences His “aseity”,
for He is from no other but from Himself. Thus, according to Charnock, God exists
as both “first cause and chief good” as well as “efficient cause and last end”.51
Second, the immutability in God’s “knowledge” is another compelling
subject for Charnock, though further detailed discussion concerning God’s intellect
will be dealt with in our next chapter. Citing two scriptural references (Heb. 4:13, 1
Tim. 1:17), Charnock argues that there cannot possibly be any temporal ignorance in
God who is wise, omniscient, and trustworthy. At the same time Charnock attempts
to expound the relationship between divine essence and divine knowledge, which is
the fundamental reason for the immutability of God’s knowledge. In the same regard,
the radical difference in the way of obtaining knowledge between God and human
can only be explained by consideration of the divine essence:
[God] doth not know as we do, by habits, qualities, species, whereby we may be
mistaken at one time and rectified at another. He hath not an understanding
distinct from his essence, as we have; but being the most simple being, his
understanding is his essence; and as from the infiniteness of his essence we
conclude the infiniteness of his understanding, so from the unchangeableness of
his essence we may justly conclude the unchangeableness of his knowledge. …
If his understanding and his essence were not one and the same, he were not
simple, but compounded.52
According to Charnock, such a simple divine knowledge in His essence is given
through “one single act of intuition” that covers “the infinite spaces of past and
future” (Ps. 147:5). In addition, he also contends reiteratively that divine knowledge
is immutable as long as it is eternal because God sees “all knowable truth” just “by
one glance”.53 Subsequently, such a virtual identifying of divine essence and divine
knowledge also prompts Charnock to proceed to identify divine knowledge and
divine will as the cause of succession in creatures. Following the late medieval
Augustinian tradition,54 he demonstrates that divine knowledge and the divine will
50 Works I, p. 383.
51 Works I, p. 384.
52 Works I, p. 385.
53 Works I, pp. 385-6; citing Suarez, Opera (1630), vol. I, p. 137.
54 Charnock supports his point with marginal quotations from Augustine and Bradwardine. See Works
I, p. 386.
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cannot work independently of each other since God “could not do anything
ignorantly”. God does not have a lack of capacity between temporal events due to the
inconsistency of knowledge that human knowledge has (Act. 15:18).55 At the same
time, Charnock directly draws a conclusion from Aquinas to evidence the
immutability of God’s knowledge, as he writes: “All things were all in their
circumstances of past, present, and to come, seen by his understanding as they were
determined by his will”.56
Third, Charnock deals with the immutability of God’s will, purpose and the
decree. Above all, divine wisdom and absolute power as the ground of this
immutability guarantee the solidity of the fulfilment of the decretal will. The
characteristic of divine simplicity also allows Charnock to construct an argument in a
similar pattern on divine will in relation to the divine knowledge:
The will of God is the same with his essence. If God had a will distinct from his
essence, he would not be the most simple being. God hath not a faculty of will
distinct from himself. As his understanding is nothing else but Deus intelligens,
God understanding, so his will is nothing else but Deus volens, God willing; …
There is a concurrence of God’s will and understanding in everything. As his
knowledge is eternal, so is his purpose.57
Therefore, according to the nature of divine essence, as God knows everything “by
one simple vision of his understanding”, so He wills everything “by one act of
volition”. In other words, the unchangeableness of the divine will is confirmed by the
immutability of His counsel (Heb. 6:17) because the will is conceived from eternity
by His counsel as the “one will” (Eph. 1:11). Moreover, “the disorder of faculties”,
i.e. in the case of will over against knowledge or wisdom, cannot possibly be
expected of God when we consider the simplicity of God. Nevertheless the economy
of the divine will in time produces an apparent change of dispensations in terms of
the effect, albeit such a change is also based upon the eternal decree of God. With
regard to this point, it is worth noting that Charnock endeavours to explain this
distinction of the relationship between the decreer, the decree, and the decreed for
clear understanding. As he once argued, concerning the treatment of divine eternity,
55 See Works I, p. 386: “[God] made them after he knew them, and did not know them after he made
them. His knowledge of them made a change in them; their existence made no change in his
knowledge. … God did not receive his knowledge from their existence, but his knowledge and will
acted upon them to bring them into being.”
56 Works I, p. 386; citing Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia. 9.
57 Works I, pp. 387-8.
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only the created order is variable while God and His decrees are unalterable.58 We
also find his consideration of the problem of divine freedom in this immutability of
divine will. According to Charnock, divine freedom should be considered not
according to the state of the objects of the divine will, but to “the necessity of
continuing His purpose” based upon divine wisdom.59
Fourth, Charnock touches briefly upon the problem of the eternal ubiquity of
God in relation to His immutability, irrespective of the existence of created space.
Though this will be discussed in detail in the doctrine of divine omnipresence in the
next subchapter, the problem of immutability related to space emerges as a refutation
of the Socinians and Vorstius who asserted the special finitude of divine essence.60
Accordingly, for Charnock, the interpretation of “God’s drawing near to us” (James
4:8) shows well his point of argument emphasising both invisible spiritual power and
the working of grace in our faculties of the soul, as he states: “[It] is not so much his
coming to us, but his drawing us to him.” To put it another way, Charnock asserts
that God’s presence in the Scriptures is to be understood both theoretically and
practically as a spiritual movement that quickens our zeal in drawing near to God “by
a change of mind, will, and affections”.61
After dealing with the four aspects of divine immutability as the specific
contents of it, Charnock proceeds to argue several proofs demonstrating that the
attribute is incommunicable to creatures. 62 Moreover, we see Charnock’s rich
intellectual resources inherited from the past in these proofs. To be sure, as
mentioned earlier in the exegetical section, he again shows the priority of biblical
evidence (Dan.6:26) in this proof along with the testimony of the classics from
heathen sources, i.e., Plato and Pythagoras. In the proof from the name “Jehovah”
based upon the essence of God as immutable and eternal in the “counsels and
promises”, Charnock extensively quotes other Reformed scholastic writers: e.g. John
Trapp (1601-1669), Amyraut (1596-1664), Spanheim (1600-1649), and Petavius.63
Citing Augustine along with other exegetical evidences (Gen. 2:17, Rom.
58 Works I, pp. 389-90: “As a decree from eternity doth not make the thing decreed to be eternal, so
neither doth the immutability of the decree render the thing so decreed to be immutable. … The
person decreeing, viz., God, is in himself immutable, and the decree is immutable, but the thing
decreed may be mutable.”
59 Works I, p. 390.
60 Cf. PRRD III, p. 318.
61 Works I, p. 391.
62 Works I, pp. 395-7.
63 Works I, p. 391; citing John Trapp, A Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (On Exodus),
(London: Robert White, 1662); Amyraut, De Mysterio Trinitatis (Saumur: Isaac Desbordes, 1661), p.
433; Spanheim, Syntagma, part i, p. 39; Petavius, Theol. Dogmat. Tom. i. cap. 6, sect. 6, 7, 8.
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6:11, Ps. 145:3), he also contends with a somewhat Thomistic nuance that God must
be immutable if He is to be eternal, infinite, and almighty. At the same time God is
the being who exists as the highest principle among other principles in both the order
and government of creatures. On the one hand, the proof from the fact that God is
“the most perfect being” is somewhat complex but worth noting. Charnock shows the
illogicality of the assumptions of God’s either changing Himself to “a great
perfection (mutatio perfectiva)” or “a less perfection (mutatio amissiva)” or being
changed voluntarily or necessarily.64 On the other hand, Charnock proves divine
immutability from the nature of divine simplicity, deriving this mainly from the ideas
of Aquinas. Mutability cannot be consistent with God as “the most simple being”
who does not have composition in His essence: the divine essence cannot possibly
depend upon part of Himself that changes or is changed if such essence is divine.65
In the polemical section (as the extension of the doctrinal treatment of divine
immutability), Charnock examines several controversial points in relation to
immutability. The key point Charnock argues in these polemics is as follows (and it
is somewhat reiterative): there is no mutation in God, although God’s works of
creation, redemption, and providence ad extra are executed in time according to His
decretive will regarding creatures. In fact these elenctic propositions reflect the result
of theological debates in the seventeenth century. First, Charnock argues that there is
no alteration in God by the act of creation. Of course, as is certainly the case with the
other part of the discussion, he proceeds to his arguments along with providing
proper exegetical evidences (Eph. 1:4, 1:9, 1:11, Act. 2:23, Rev. 4:8). Charnock
primarily follows Aquinas again in his understanding of the nature of creation in
order to show the point of his argument:
Creation is considered as active or passive; active creation is the will and power
of God to create; this is from eternity, because God willed from eternity to
create in time. This never had beginning, for God never began in time to
understand anything, to will anything, or to be able to do anything; but he alway
understood, and alway willed, those things which he determined from eternity
to produce in time. The decree of God may be taken for the act decreeing, that
is eternal and the same; or for the object decreed, that is in time;66
Accordingly, there was neither a new will, nor a new power, nor a new relationship
64 Works I, pp. 392-5.
65 Works I, pp. 393-4.
66 Works I, p. 397; cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia. 9.
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that came into existence in God by the creation of the world. The change is to be
attributed only to the creatures that are the objects of the act of creation. The eternity
of the divine decree never fails to secure the immutability of God who created the
world by the execution of His will and His power.67
Secondly, Charnock proceeds to a christological defense against the
misunderstanding of the incarnation in relation to the immutability of divine nature
in the Son of God. He generally seems to consult Zanchi’s De Natura Dei (1577) and
Aquinas’s Summa Theologica in this argument. According to Charnock, on the one
hand, hypostatical union as the union of the two natures nevertheless preserves each
property with the communicatio idiomatum between the two natures (Phil. 2:7).68 On
the other hand, “the glory of the divinity” in Christ should be necessarily maintained
insofar as we consider Christ’s role as a mediator (John 17:5). That is, the work of
redemption along with the incarnation has nothing to do with mutability in the
trinitarian God.69 Thirdly, Charnock deals with the immutability of God in terms of
the providential economy.70 As is the case with other essential attributes of God
previously dealt with, Charnock lucidly explains the meaning of God’s repentance in
the scriptures in view of the act of “divine accommodation”. At the same time he still
maintains a firm emphasis upon the divine “infallible foresight and immutable will”:
Grief is not in God, but his repentance is a willing a thing should not be as it
was, which will was fixed from eternity; for, God foreseeing man would fall,
and decreeing to permit it, he could not be said to repent in time of what he did
not repent from eternity; and, therefore, if there were no repentance in God
from eternity, there could be none in time; … As men when they repent alter the
course of their actions, so God alters things extra se, or without himself, but
changes nothing of his own purpose within himself;71
According to Charnock, within the boundary of a dispensational economy (which
does not deviate from “the rule of providence” which is immutable), both the non-
67 Works I, pp. 398-9; cf. PRRD III, pp. 317-8; cf. Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii, 8-10 (p. 206); Leigh,
Treatise, II.v, pp. 46-8.
68 See Works I, p. 400: “[Christ] assumed our nature without laying aside his own. When the soul is
united to the body, doth it lose any of those perfections that are proper to its nature? Is there any
change either in the substance or qualities of it? No.”
69 See Works I, p. 405: “[Christ] came not to change his will, but to execute his will: ‘Lo I come to do
thy will, O God,’ Heb. x. 7. And the grace of God in Christ was not a new grace, but an old grace in a
new appearance; ‘the grace of God hath appeared,’ Titus ii. 11.”
70 Overall, this conforms to the second major area of discussion that Perkins dealt with, as mentioned
in our previous investigation.
71 Works I, pp. 401-2.
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fulfilment of some prophecies in the scriptures (e.g. 2 Kings 20:1, 5; Isa. 38:1, 5;
Jonah 3:4, 10) and the outward change of divine attitude towards creatures need to be
interpreted in light of the economy of God’s profound attributes which are
“immutable”: e.g. justice, goodness, and holiness. As Charnock had mentioned in his
discussion of the doctrine of divine eternity, the abrogation of the ceremonial law is
also to be considered within the same context.72
In summary, in this doctrinal and polemical section, Charnock consistently
holds to the Reformed orthodox understanding of God’s immutability. He invariably
seeks to defend divine simplicity on the basis of a solid trinitarian and christological
foundation of immanency (ad intra) and economy (ad extra) extending through all
God’s decrees, and the acts of creation, providence, and redemption. In other words,
he does so by applying all the sub-loci of the full doctrine of God to this defence on
the basis of both the dialectical and paradoxical relationship between the infinite God
and His finite creatures.
D. Charnock’s Praxis on the Immutability of God:
Human Responsibility in the Federal Relationship
In the practical section of his work, Charnock presents several “lessons for
faith” from God’s immutability as “a foundation for piety”.73 Despite being already
treated in the doctrinal part, Charnock’s key interest in the application of this
doctrine lies in the vindication of immutability in the divinity of Christ incarnate
against the Socinians. While adding exegetical evidences (Ps. 45:6-7) that confirm
Christ’s divinity in terms of both His mediatorial role and oneness with God the
Father as creator and governor, he points out the contradiction in the exegesis of the
Socinians who claim the loss of divinity in Christ in the incarnation.74 To be sure
this shows that, for Charnock, the divinity of Christ is the basis of the link between
trinitarian knowledge of God and the piety necessary for salvation.
In addition, interestingly, Charnock argues the groundlessness of the seeming
conflict between the idea of prayer (as the practice of piety) aiming to change God’s
previous will and the divine immutability. The divine will according to His decree
72 Works I, pp. 402-6; cf. PRRD III, pp. 314-5; Perkins, Workes I, p. 11; idem, Workes II, p. 246.
73 The quotations are from PRRD III, p. 319, citing Mastricht, Theoretico-practica theol., II.vii.9-14;
cf. Leigh, Treatise, II.v, pp. 47-8.
74 Works I, p. 406: “The Socinians say it is spoken of God, and that God shall destroy the heavens by
Christ; if so, Christ is not a mere creature, not created when he was incarnate; for the same person that
shall change the world, did create the world. … The person who is to change the heavens is said to be
the same, or unchangeable, in the creation as well as the dissolution of the world.”
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includes prayer as the means of expressing the grace of God in its execution.75 It is
thus worth observing Charnock’s definition of prayer. In a sense, our proper
knowledge of divine immutability can assist us in pursuing the right practice of
biblical prayer:
Prayer is an acknowledgement of our dependence upon God, which dependence
could have no firm foundation without unchangeableness. Prayer doth not
desire any change in God, but is offered to God that he would confer those
things which he hath immutably willed to communicate; but he willed them not
without prayer as the means of bestowing them.76
Charnock’s interest in immutability in terms of devotional practice then
moves to an anthropological discussion within the context of the finitum non capax
infiniti towards federal thought and soteriology. Charnock contrasts the changeability
of humans with the immutability of God: viz., Adam’s fall caused fatal wounds to the
mind, will and affections of his posterity. Even the regenerated believer cannot
maintain constancy in knowledge of truth, will, affections, and religious practice, and
is rather inclined to “levity of spirit”.77 Nevertheless, according to Charnock, it is
our comfort that such a changeable and finite believer can find an “anchor” in the
immutable God, in His unchangeable rule of the covenant of grace.78 Within the
context of the understanding of such a covenant, Charnock integrates the discussions
on election, sanctification, and perseverance into the doctrine of the immutability of
God as the ground of practical consolation to the believer.79 Thus, on the covenant of
grace, Charnock states: “The covenant of grace doth not run, ‘I will be your God, if
you will be my people;’ but ‘I will be their God, and they shall be my people.’”80
At the same time, for Charnock, such a fundamental acknowledgement of the
75 See Works I, p. 408: “If we ask according to his revealed will, the unchangeableness of his nature
will assure us of the grant; … God hath decreed to give this or that to man, but conditionally, and by
the means of inquiring after him, and asking for it: Ezek. xxxvi. 37, Matt. vii. 7, … We must depend
upon his immutability for the thing, and submit to his wisdom for the time.”
76 Works I, p. 408.
77 Works I, pp. 408-11.
78 Charnock also mentions the substantial influence of the covenant of works as well as the human
condition of the covenant of grace in light of the immutability of God. See Works I, pp. 411-2:
“Though the covenant of works was changeable by the crime of man violating it, yet it was
unchangeable in regard of God’s justice vindicating it, which is inflexible in the punishment of the
breaches of his law. … His will in the second covenant is as unchangeable as that in the first, only
repentance is settled as the condition of the second, … and without repentance the sinner must
irrevocably perish, or God must change his nature.”
79 See Works I, pp. 413-4. Charnock derives the content of his discussion on federal theology partly
from Turretin and Cocceius in this argument.
80 Works I, p. 413.
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sovereignty of “immutable” God in the covenant does not exclude the role of human
participation in the execution of the “immutable” decree of election, as he states:
“His everlasting purpose is to write his laws in the hearts of the elect. He puts a
condition to his covenant of grace, the condition of faith, and he resolves to work that
condition in the hearts of the elect;”81 Therefore, as we see, Charnock regards both
election and the covenant of grace as the “two immutable pillars” supporting the
believer’s life of faith. The firmness of election and the covenant thus makes it
possible for the believer to be the object of both “the seal of sanctification” and of
perseverance by means of effectual calling (Eph. 1:13).
In the same way, knowledge of the immutability of God demands a proper
obedience from the believer. Charnock seems to emphasise the role of the human
response within seventeenth century context against the Antinomians.82 He does this,
however, without losing sight of the sovereignty of God, while at the same time
avoiding the radical Pelagian assertion of the free choice of the human will that
would undermine the perfection of God.83 In other words, obedience as a response
of faith is impossible until God infuses “an unchangeable disposition” or
supernatural habitus.84
As a result, according to Charnock, we should be patient, believing in God’s
providential decree upon the promise based upon His immutable will, wisdom, and
goodness (Eccl. 6:10, Heb. 10:36). At the same time, the divine immutability in both
nature and will should be the foundation of our struggle to reach both “a steadfast
obedience” (1 Cor. 15:58) on earth and “the beatific vision” in heaven, as those who
know and love God.85 Even so, Charnock offsets the paradox of finitum non capax
infiniti in our theology by affirming the solidity of the trinitarian structure that links
the divine immutability with our unchangeableness as promised, within the “already-
but not yet” context. By way of conclusion, Charnock thus remarks as follows:
81 Works I, p. 413. In some way this can also be interpreted as a comment on the covenant of
redemption as the ontological basis of the firmness of the covenant of grace through the eternal decree
of “election” in the trinitarian God; cf. John Owen, The Doctrine of the Saints Perseverance, in The
Works of John Owen, 16 vols. Johnston & Hunter, 1850-1853, repr. (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth,
1967), vol. 11.
82 We will speak about Antinomianism in more detail in chapter seven in relation to God’s holiness.
83 On the views of the Socinians, the Jesuits, and the Remonstrants in relation to this respect, see
PRRD III, p. 323.
84 Quotation from Works I, p. 418.
85 Works I, pp. 416-7, 419: “Therefore we should not only acquiesce in what he works, but have a
complacency in it; and by having our wills thus knitting themselves with the immutable will of God,
we attain some degree of likeness to him in his own unchangeableness. … the nearer we come to him,
the more stability we shall have in ourselves; the further from him, the more liable to change.”
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The righteousness of Christ, that shall never wear out; and the graces of the
Spirit, that shall never burn out. By this means, what God is infinitely by nature,
we shall come to be finitely, immutable by grace, as much as the capacity of a
creature can obtain.86
In summary, in this practical section on the immutability of God, Charnock
makes an effort to let his readers know the error of both radical antinomian or
deterministic views (seeing immutability as inactivity) and Arminian or Pelagian
ways of reducing the predicament of human finiteness. The defence of the full
doctrine of God as a system for the salvation of the elect is remarkable, especially in
terms of its christological and federal dimensions.
III. The Omnipresence of God
The doctrine of omnipresence as a spatial aspect of divine infinity has been
discussed from the patristic period onwards via medieval scholastics to the
Reformers and the Reformed orthodox, without substantial change to its content. As
we will see in this sub-chapter, in the case of the Reformed scholastics or Puritan
theologians like Perkins and Charnock, the combination of “ontological” support
with a “firm” biblical foundation was especially characteristic of a type of discussion
in relation to doctrinal opponents in the seventeenth century. In other words, as is the
case with divine eternity, the theological key point of omnipresence lies in how this
“essential” attribute of God ad intra can be coherently explained in harmony with
God’s works of creation, providence, and redemption ad extra. Therefore, in this
doctrine of God’s omnipresence, we shall find out that orthodox theology and Puritan
piety are invariably and exquisitely intertwined in Perkins’ and Charnock’s system.
A. Perkins on the Omnipresence of God
With a categorisation similar to many other Reformed theologians,87 Perkins
defines omnipresence (exceeding greatness) as the latter of the two-fold natures of
infiniteness of God: “that by which his incomprehensible nature is everywhere
present, both within & without the world (Ps. 145:3, 1 King 8:27, Jer. 23:24)”. We
86 Works I, p. 419; cf. R. Baxter, Divine Life (London, 1664), I.vi. pp. 49-50.
87 PRRD III, pp. 327-8, citing Amyraut, De mysterio Trinitatis, II, pp. 38-40; Polanus, Syntagma,
Synopsis libri III; Synopsis purioris, VI.xxvii; Mastricht, Theoretico-practica theol., II.ix-xi.
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see thus the concepts of both the infinitas Dei and the magnitudo Dei are used
virtually interchangeably despite the delicate nuances in Perkins’ understanding of
them as a negative or positive attribute.88 Perkins then explains the characteristics of
this attribute in two respects: first, God is the only existence indivisible as well as
infinite in His nature (Eph. 4:5, Deut. 4:35, 1 Cor. 8:4); second, this attribute is, in
some way, the local basis of God’s omniscience of the human heart (1 King 8:39, Ps.
139:1-2).89 The infinite greatness of God is “in regard of his essence and Godhead”,
which thus confirms that we are in God (Act. 18:27) because His essence is
everywhere, along with His providential and decreeing power. At the same time the
immensity of God is the “ground of true obedience in all estates” in trusting God’s
will and pleasure. This clearly demonstrates Perkins’ understanding of omnipresence
both ad intra and ad extra as including all the aspects of God’s essence, nature,
works, and authority.90
Accordingly, for Perkins, God’s omnipresence is also a confutation of the
falseness of “Popish” pilgrimages to specific places for the worship of God. He
points out, moreover that the personal persuasion of such a divine presence is certain
to contribute to our growth in piety. 91 In addition Perkins deals with the
christological dimension in this understanding of divine omnipresence. In relation to
our striving for piety and true religion he argues against the error of the idea of both
ubiquity and the real or essential presence of the body of Christ in the sacrament of
the Lord’s Supper. He does so by explaining the signficance of the Ascension and
Christ’s intercession at the right hand of the Father.92
In short, though it is also the case with other English Puritan works, we see
particularly in Perkins’ treatment of the divine omnipresence the prototype of
Charnock’s fourfold (exegetical, doctrinal, elenctic, and practical) structure. The
vindication of the doctrine of divine simplicity and the Trinitarian nature of God is
still the underlying purpose for his argument in its pietistic dimensions.
B. Charnock’s Exegesis & Doctrine on the Omnipresence of God:
The True Meaning of the “Being” and “Act” of God
After an extensive investigation of the exegetical traditions concerning Jer.
88 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 332, 338. With the same pattern, immensity and omnipresence can also be
differentiated according to the same criterion of via negativa or via eminentiae.
89 Perkins, A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, pp. 11-2.
90 Cf. PRRD III, p. 332.
91 Perkins, An Exposition of Christs Sermon in the Mount, in Workes III (i), pp. 78-9.
92 An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, pp. 251-5.
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23:24,93 Charnock assumes that the omnipresence of God in this verse refers not
only to divine knowledge, authority, or power but also to the essence of God filling
heaven and earth. For the right exegesis of the word “filling” in light of the divine
presence, he explains the divine accommodation declared in this verse, and shows it
to be affirmed in exegetical tradition by the medieval scholastic view.94 To be sure
Charnock seems to keep the misunderstandings of the Socinians, Vorstius, Lutherans,
and Cartesians on the essential presence of God in his mind.95 For Charnock,
without the firm ground of essential presence, there is no proper understanding of the
divine presence by power and knowledge inferred from the former: 96 God’s
omnipresence should be understood comprehensively in terms of His power,
knowledge, and essence. According to the exegetical results he has derived,
Charnock focuses on the vindication of the doctrine of divine omnipresence on the
ground of divine simplicity. He develops this by treating the question of how the
various aspects of divine presence are based upon the essential omnipresence of God
at the same time. In doing so, against the assertions of theological opponents (the
above mentioned Socinians, Vorstius, Lutherans, and Cartesians) who deny such an
omnipresence of God, Charnock seeks to defend the traditional orthodox view of it
within the later seventeenth century context.
To start with, he calls attention to the fact that only God, who is neither
circumscriptively nor definitively present like a human being or angel is, can be the
subject of “repletive” presence “above limitation by any place”.97 This immensity
indicates a boundlessness in terms of place as well as an “influential omnipresence”
with creatures by His authority, power, and knowledge ad extra. Charnock then
endeavours to make a distinction in detail using these two dimensions of
omnipresence, the “essential” and the “influential”. On the one hand, he explains
93 “Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord: do not I fill heaven
and earth? saith the Lord.” For this examination, Charnock refers to Sebastian Muster (1488-1552),
Franciscus Vatablus (1485-1547), Sebastien Castalio (1515-1563), and Johannes Oecolampadius
(1482-1531) in Works I, p. 421; cf. Zanchi, De Natura Dei, II.vi.3; Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii, 9 (p.
197).
94 Works I, p. 422: “The Holy Ghost here accommodates himself to the capacity of men, because we
know that a man sees and knows that which is done where he is corporally present; so he proves that
God knows all things that are done in the most secret caverns of the heart, because he is everywhere in
heaven and earth, as light is everywhere in the air, and air everywhere in the world. Hence the schools
use the term repletive for the presence of God. …”
95 The Socinians and Vorstius asserted that God’s essence inhabits the heaven and can be omnipresent
only by the extension of His power; cf. PRRD III, pp. 329-30, 338-42. This will be addressed in detail
later.
96 Works I, p. 423.
97 Works I, pp. 423-4.
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essential presence “in all places” and “with all creatures” by referring to Maimonides
(1135-1204), Hornbeck (1617-1666), and Amyraut along with the Scriptural
evidences (Ps. 139:7-9; Exod. 33:20, 23; Isa. 40:12; Acts 17:27) by saying: “God is
totally everywhere by his own simple substance”.98 On the other hand, the first
category of influential omnipresence is universal as the “virtual presence of God” to
all the creatures through God’s “virtue” (power) of creation and preservation (Ps.
36:6, Heb. 1:3). Charnock explains it as follows:
There is a virtue sustaining every creature, that it may not fall back into that
nothing from whence it was elevated by the power of God. All those natural
virtues we call the principles of operation, are fountains spring from his
goodness and power, all things are acted and managed by him, as well as
preserved by him; and in this sense God is present with all creatures, for
whatsoever acts another is present with that which it acts, by sending forth some
virtue and influence whereby it acts. If free agents do not only ‘live,’ but ‘move
in him,’ and by him, Acts xvii. 28, much more are the motions of other natural
agents, by a virtue communicated to them, and upheld in them in the time of
their acting.99
Nevertheless, quoting Zanchi, Charnock asserts that God Himself and the
indivisible divine essence exist at a distance from the creatures by the analogy of the
relationship of soul and body.100 Charnock also explains another four kinds of
presence as a second category of the “influential omnipresence” that makes the
subject “be capacitated” for such a presence: a “special providential” presence to
execute divine counsel (e.g. Nebuchanezzar, Judas), an “effective” presence to all the
creatures, an “objective” presence with rational creatures, and the presence of a
“gracious efficacy” by uniting the elect with Christ.101 That is, influential presence is
known to our “senses” by God’s works ad extra; essential presence is known to our
“reason” by His nature and essence ad intra.102 Let us see again the relationship of
each presence in Charnock’s summary:
His essence is not straitened in the limits of any created work, he is not
contained in the heavens, i.e. in the manner that he is there; but he is there in his
essence, and therefore cannot be contained there in his essence. If it should be
98 Works I, pp. 427, 428, 431.
99 Italics are mine. Works I, p. 425.
100 Works I, p. 426.
101 For the details, see Works I, p. 426.
102 See Works I, pp. 427-9.
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meant only of his power and providence, it would conclude also for his essence;
if his power and providence were infinite, his essence must be so too, for the
infiniteness of his essence is the ground of the infiniteness of his power. … God
is essentially in every part of the world, and essentially above ours without the
world: Isa. lxvi. 1, …103
It is not possible, of course, to communicate such immensity to Christ, even
in His human nature, despite the hypostatical union. Emphatic on this point,
Charnock also insists on the coherence of the theory of the extra Calvinisticum
against the view of the Lutherans.104 As a matter of fact we can still sense that
Charnock’s main opponents are the Socinians and Cartesians who affirm God’s
presence as only a material extension, which inevitably denies the various kinds of
the immaterial omnipresence of God.105
As the acknowledgement of God’s essential presence was important to
Charnock within the seventeenth century context, he proceeds to consider the five
reasons (God’s infiniteness, the continual operation of God in the world, supreme
perfection, immutability, and omnipotency) that prove the appropriateness of it.
Particularly the first and second arguments are worth expounding here. First, the
“greatness and excellency” (Ps. 145:3) of God indicates His infiniteness in both
perfections and essence because there is no distinction between the two in God.106 In
other words, the assumption of the relationship of the divine essence as the subject to
the attributes as “faculties and qualities” is absurd because there exists a principle of
“no proportion between finite and infinite”.107
Second, according to Charnock, we cannot deny that God is in all creatures
living, moving, and existing by giving “the impression of a seal” to them. We see that
Charnock holds to the principles of both divine simplicity and divine concurrence in
order to prove this argument by expanding his explanation of the essential presence
103 Works I, p. 432.
104 Works I, p. 433: “Some indeed argue that Christ, in regard of his human nature, is everywhere,
because he sits at the right hand of God, and the right hand of God is everywhere.” For a brief account
of the historical background of the term Extra Calvinisticum from the period of the fathers to
seventeenth century, see Muller, “extra calvinisticum,” in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological
Terms (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1985), p. 111.
105 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 341-2.
106 Works I, p. 435: “Where God works by his power, he is present in his essence, because his power
and his essence cannot be separated, and therefore his power, wisdom, goodness, cannot be anywhere
where his essence is not. … For the power of God is nothing but God acting, and the wisdom of God
nothing but God knowing. As the power of God is always, so is his essence; as the power of God is
everywhere, so his essence. Whatsoever God is, he is alway, and everywhere.” Italics are mine.
107 The quotations are from Works I, pp. 434, 436.
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previously stated. Such an essential presence continues in both the works of creation
and preservation with no distinction;108 the understanding of the “virtue” (power)
necessary for sustaining all the creatures based upon the idea of divine simplicity
also leads us to accept the further argument concerning the essential presence of
God.109 At the same time God’s own acts in using these creatures as second causes
does not conflict with the Potentia Absoluta Dei, but stands in harmony with the
Potentia Ordinata Dei.110 Charnock thus neatly sums up all the dynamics of the
essential presence without losing sight of the doctrine of divine simplicity:
And when he works by means, he acts with those means, in those means,
sustains their faculties and virtues in them, concurs with them by his power, so
that God’s acting by means doth rather strengthen his essential presence than
weaken it, since there is a necessary dependence of the creatures upon the
Creator in their being and acting; and what they are, they are by the power of
God; what they act, they act in the power of God concurring with them. …
Where the power of God is, his essence is, because they are inseparable; and so
this omnipresence ariseth from the simplicity of the nature of God.111
Obviously, other expressions in Scriptures that speak about God’s dwelling in heaven
or the Temple and coming to or departing from us do not impair the doctrine of the
divine essential presence. Rather, they confirm it by representing the varied attributes
of God.112 At this juncture, Charnock sees the need to touch upon the problem of
pantheism (we recall here Spinoza who asserts “the radical concursus of God with all
things”) with regard to the proper understanding of the omnipresence of God.113
Given the above, God’s essential presence everywhere cannot be regarded as either
the identification of God with everything or His existing in materially actual
108 Works I, p. 436.
109 Works I, p. 436: “If his substance cannot be disjoined from his preserving power, his power and
wisdom cannot be separated from his essence; where there are the marks of the one, there is the
presence of the other; for it is by his essence that he is powerful and wise; no man can distinguish the
one from the other in a simple being. … This virtue is therefore God himself, the infinite power and
wisdom of God; and therefore wheresoever the effects of these are seen in the world, God is
essentially present.”
110 Works I, p. 437. Cf. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 1985), pp. 231-2 (on the definition of these two terms in Protestant scholastic
theology). We will expound these terms in chapter six especially in relation to the power and
sovereignty of God.
111 Works I, p. 437.
112 See Works I, pp. 439-41.
113 The quotation is from PRRD III, pp. 342-3. For the general thought of Spinoza concerning this
point, see Baruch Spinoza, Earlier Philosophical Writings: The Cartesian Principles and Thoughts on
Metaphysics, trans. F. A. Hayes & introduced D. Bidney (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).
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relationship with the creatures. Rather, it should reflect cause and effect, as Charnock
argues: “God is not in us as a part of us, but as an efficient and preserving cause. It is
not by his essential presence, but his efficacious presence, that he brings any person
into a likeness to his own nature.”114
In summary, we note that Charnock’s awareness of this distinction (essential
and influential omnipresence) leads him to clarify the relationship of God, divine
essence, and creatures on the basis of the axiom finitum non capax infiniti along with
firm exegetical evidence.115 Nevertheless Charnock emphasises the participation of
rational creatures in the divine presence as secondary causes according to God’s will.
This is a revealed attribute ad extra related to the finite, for the glory of God who is
both infinite and essentially omnipresent. Charnock’s use of the abundant intellectual
heritage of the scholastic tradition in the medieval and Reformation era and his own
period are conspicuous. However, even philosophical arguments were only deployed
within the boundary of the defence of divine simplicity to avoid inconsistencies or
gaps between God’s essence and act.
C. Charnock’s Praxis on the Omnipresence of God:
The Basis of Communion with God in Nature and Grace
As mentioned in the discussion of other essential attributes, Charnock also
applies the doctrine of divine omnipresence to Christological, trinitarian, and
covenantal levels in his practical thought. The divinity of Christ necessarily ensures
His omnipresence anytime and everywhere in heaven and earth, regardless of both
the incarnation, the hypostatical union and the Ascension after the resurrection (John
1:10, 3:13).116 What is especially notable is that Charnock stresses the trinitarian
significance of Christ’s promise of presence to the church after the Ascension (Matt.
18:20, 28:20; John 10:30). That is, for Charnock, this promise ought to be interpreted
not just as the sending of the Holy Spirit, but also as the persevering power of the
Father and the Son regarding the elect in terms of the trinitarian consistency between
divine essence and presence, as he notes: “Where there is a unity of essence there is a
unity of presence”.117 The immensity of the Triune God cannot but confirm the
114 Works I, p. 442.
115 See Works I, p. 442: “God is so in his essence with things as to be distinct from them, as a cause
from the effect, as a Creator different from the creature, preserving their nature, not communicating
his own. His essence touches all, is in conjunction with none. Finite and infinite cannot be joined. He
is not far from us, therefore near to us; so near, that we ‘live and move in him,’Acts xvii. 28.”
116 Works I, p. 445.
117 Works I, p. 446.
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doctrine of spirituality, providential government, and omniscience. The relationship
between providence, the omnipresence of all divine attributes and essence shows
well the dynamics of all the divine acts and the divine presence as Charnock states:
“[God] is not everywhere without acting everywhere. Wherever his essence is, there
is a power and virtue worthy of God everywhere dispensed. He governs by his
presence what he made by his power, and is present as an agent with all his
works.”118
At the same time Charnock refers to the incomprehensibility of God in His
omnipresence by contrasting the hidden God and the revealed God. This is
characterised by a paradoxical relationship in the divine attributes as the source of
our knowledge of God, for at the same time our minds are inevitably limited in fully
understanding Him.119 Charnock then proceeds to deal fully with the meaning of a
“presence of grace” in the covenantal context. His view of the relationship of nature
and grace is directly applied to the case of essential presence and the presence of
federal grace. The acknowledgement of essential omnipresence is important in this
respect, since there is no presence of covenantal grace without a natural
foundation.120 Such a presence of federal grace to the elect also exists as the
foundation of our acts of piety and worship because God promises His “dwelling in
them by grace” and “walking in them by exciting their graces” in a supernatural
dimension.
In addition, the doctrine of divine omnipresence should be both “a shield
against all temptations” and a stimulus to our sanctification on the basis of keeping
constantly in mind “the gracious presence of God” peculiar only to the believer.121 In
other words, what is critically important for Charnock is the believer’s wholehearted
knowledge of the relationship between the divine essence and all the attributes of
God centering around His presence. This knowledge is oriented to the practical life
of “communion with God” leading to a truly and fully restored image of Him.122 We
can fully sense this by noting the fact that Charnock ends his discourse upon
omnipresence by saying:
118 Works I, p. 446.
119 Works I, pp. 447-448: “Nothing is more present than God, yet nothing more hid; he is light, and
yet obscurity; his perfections are visible, yet unsearchable; we know there is an infinite God, but it
surpasseth the compass of our minds. … He is known by faith, enjoyed by love, but comprehended by
no mind. God is not contained in that one syllable, God; by it we apprehend an excellent and
unlimited nature.”
120 Works I, p. 451.
121 Works I, pp. 453-6.
122 Works I, pp. 453, 455.
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Let it be therefore our desire, that as he fills heaven and earth by his essence, he
may fill our understanding and wills by his grace; that we may have another
kind of presence with us than animals have in their brutish state, or devils in
their chains; his essential presence maintains our beings, but his gracious
presence confers and continues a happiness.123
In summary, Charnock sought to show how we should understand the divine
(omni) presence for the growth of piety against the backgrounds of the ad intra and
extra within the context of trinitarian, federal, and christological perspectives. Both
nature and grace operate as the bases of our knowledge of God’s presence on the
assumption of the priority of the “federal” or supernatural presence (in terms of
practical piety) over the immanent or essential presence.
Conclusion
As a result of this investigation of both Perkins’ and Charnock’s doctrine of
the essential attributes of God, we can make an appraisal as follows. The problem of
how to vindicate God’s transcendence and immanence at the same time (without
damaging the divine simplicity as a foundational doctrine) was a matter of great
account to Perkins and Charnock concerning the ideas of God’s essential attributes
against various theological opponents in the early and high orthodox period. At a
more specific level, especially in the case of scholastic Puritans like Perkins and
Charnock, the Reformed orthodox doctrine of the “essential” attribute is not to be
understood as a one-sided “static” concept depriving it of the dynamics of the eternal
and temporal dimensions. That is, such a partial understanding (e.g. Barth, Gunton,
and Jones etc.) can express only one dimension of “Being” ad intra, which is a
serious fault in that it cannot reflect the organic relationship and balance between
ontological and economic trinitarianism in the Puritan and Reformed scholastic
understanding of the attributes of God.
Certainly, such trinitarian thought stands on the firm basis of covenant
theology developed in continuity from Perkins to Charnock, despite the emergence
of the concept of the covenant of redemption in mid seventeenth century Reformed
orthodox theology. In fact, the overall trinitarian structure of Charnock’s theological
system is virtually the same as that of Perkins, the founder of it in the English Puritan
123 Works I, p. 456.
141
theology. Although Perkins based his federal theology more on a “logical” dimension
rather than on a “historical” or dispensational dimension in God’s economy, it was de
facto a fundamental framework of reference for Charnock in his understanding of
divine eternity, immutability, and omnipresence.124
Nevertheless, in Charnock, the elaborate theological linkage between God’s
external works (creation, redemption, and providence) in history and the eternal basis
of them is clearly seen in his treatment of the essential attributes of God given
through the expanded threefold or fourfold structures. In addition, the Puritan
emphasis on the pursuit of piety and true religion especially found in the practical
section increases the necessity for a revision of the views of previous scholarship
concerning Charnock’s thought: no longer should it be seen as the by-product of
speculative, philosophical Aristotelian scholasticism in relation to mere “negative”
theology. We will find out more about the nature of Charnock’s theology, along with
Perkins’, in more detail in the next chapter through the investigation of the doctrine
of the divine intellect.
124 We have commented upon this point in chapter one by seeing the tendency of high orthodox
federal theology as more teleological than that of early orthodox. Cf. Timothy Young-Jae Song,
System and Piety in the Federal Theology of William Perkins and John Preston (Ph.D. Dissertation,
Westminster Theological Seminary, 1998).
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Chapter Five
The Doctrine of the Divine Intellect
As is well known, the Puritan and Reformed scholastics of the early and high
orthodox period endeavoured to explain the relationship of the divine intellect and
will in the doctrine of the divine attributes by using the Aristotelian model of faculty
psychology. 1 In this, of course Perkins and Charnock were unexceptional. In
addition, this subject was basically “scholastic” for it had been handed down to the
late sixteenth and seventeenth century from the thirteenth century development of
modified Aristotelianism in Christianity based upon this faculty psychology.2
Though there were variant formulations in the categories of the divine
intellectual attributes in the Reformed position, they are basically divided according
to whether “knowledge” is discussed within the same category as “wisdom” or not.3
The Reformers generally tended not only to define divine omniscience in terms of
“direct understanding of all things”, but also to define divine wisdom in terms of
providential counsel. The Reformed scholastics cautiously emphasised the point of
distinction between knowledge and wisdom in terms of “causality” ― first or final, 
while at the same time retaining the features of the Reformers’ distinction.4
In this chapter, on the basis of this general background, we will examine
Perkins’ and Charnock’s discussions of God’s intellect; ranging from its manner,
objects, degree, and distinction, to both the problem of divine foreknowledge and the
scientia media (middle knowledge) within the early and high orthodox context.5 In
other words, we will see how Perkins and Charnock responded to the rationale of
their theological opponents to vindicate the orthodox understanding of divine
omniscience in pursuit of the defence of both divine simplicity and the trinitarian
1 We will also discuss the doctrine of the will of God (voluntas Dei) in detail in relation to the divine
intellect in chapter six.
2 R. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids: Baker
Book, 1993), p. 143.
3 The distinction between scientia and sapientia in the divine intellect is also related to medieval
scholastic discussion of whether theology is science or wisdom. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. i.
vi; F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 9 vols (London: Burns & Oates, 1946-75): vol. I (Greece
and Rome), pp. 287-8, 343-44; vol. II (Medieval Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus), pp. 494-5.
4 PRRD III, pp. 384-6. In our case, Perkins chooses not to make a distinction between divine
knowledge and wisdom; Charnock deals with each intellectual attribute separately in depth in two
distinct discourses (on knowledge and wisdom).
5 Though the Reformers seldom discussed the issue of divine omniscience in detail, both the early and
high Reformed orthodox theologians endeavoured to defend it from the concept of middle knowledge
and against the consequent limitation of divine knowledge.
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knowledge of God.6 During this investigation, we will also discover that the
dialectic of Thomism, Scotism and Augustinianism are arguably intertwined in both
Perkins’ and Charnock’s elaborations of the doctrine of the divine intellect, leading
towards a monergistic soteriology and doctrine of providence on the basis of the
causal structure of ontology and action between God and creatures. Of course this
examination will verify more clearly the identity of Charnock’s “scholastic” doctrine
of God.
I. Perkins on the Divine Intellect
Perkins categorises the scientia Dei as one of the three attributes ― wisdom 
or knowledge, will, and omnipotence ― in the life of God (Vita Dei) as “a living
God”.7 Perkins’ understanding of the intellectus Dei has elements of both ad intra
and extra because he de facto identifies divine knowledge with the wisdom of God
operating in the works of creation, providence and redemption.8 At the same time
such a categorisation of the life of God is another indication of the “practical”
characteristic in Perkins’ view of divine knowledge that emphasises the ad extra
dimension.9
For Perkins, the wisdom and knowledge of God also should be proved, as is
the case in the general tendency among the Reformed scholastics, from biblical
evidence within the boundary of the Ramistic framework. Though the Reformed
orthodox found affirmative, negative, and figurative proofs in the Scripture, 10
Perkins simply uses one affirmative verse (Ps. 147:5) and two negative arguments
6 As outlined in chapter one, on the one hand, the opponents of Perkins in early orthodoxy were
Arminius and Molinism; on the other hand, Charnock as a Puritan in the period of high orthodoxy
mainly attacked the Socinian view along with a critique of former synergistic positions. We will deal
with both of them in detail later on.
7 Perkins, Golden Chain, in Workes, p. 12.
8 This classification of divine knowledge among the operations of God seems to follow the pattern of
the Thomist tradition. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. iii-xxvi. Ames, Leigh, Ussher and even
Arminius also follow this style. See Ames, Marrow, I. iv, p. 87; Leigh, Systeme, II. ii, pp. 160-2;
Ussher, A Body of Divinitie, pp. 30-75. However, though Arminius uses a structure identical to
Perkins’ in his understanding of the vita Dei, he is distinct from Perkins in that Arminius shows a
significant inconsistency among the elements (intellectus, voluntas, potentia) of the life of God in
relation to the works of creation, providence and the application of redemption. See Muller, God,
Creation, and Providence, p. 144.
9 See Muller’s definition of it in God, Creation, and Providence, p. 151: “Sapientia is typically
defined by the scholastics in the Aristotelian sense of knowledge ordered toward a goal — that is,
practical knowledge.”
10 PRRD III, p. 393.
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(Matt. 11:27, Heb. 4:13) without referring to metaphorical proofs in his argument.11
Perkins defines the scientia or sapientia Dei as follows:
The wisdom or knowledge of God, is that by the which God doth, not by
certaine motions abstracted from the things themselves, but by his owne
essence: nor successively and by discourse of reason, but by one eternall and
immutable act of understanding, distinctly and perfectly know himselfe, and all
other things, though infinite, whether they have been or not.12
First, this definition indicates that divine knowing is different from human knowing
in terms of eternity, immutability, and infinite spirituality within the boundary of
divine essence. Thus, the three distinctions of human knowing ― intellectus, scientia,
and cognitio ― are meaningless in the act of divine knowing.13 Second, according to
Perkins’ Ramistic categorisation, such divine knowledge consists of the two elements
of “foreknowledge” and “counsel”. As he defines it:
The foreknowledge of God, is that by which he most assuredly foreseeth all
things that are to come. … This is not properly spoken of God, but by reason of
men to whom things are past or to come. …The counsell of God, is that by the
which he doth most rightly perceive the best reason of all things that are done.14
By excluding the possibility of the application of temporal knowing to God, Perkins
leaves no room for a concept of divine foreknowledge (as the first element of divine
knowledge) of future contingents. He reiteratively emphasises the radical difference
between divine foreknowledge and human knowing in that the latter is necessarily
related both to a temporal limitation and to fallibility along with ignorance. Equally,
according to Perkins, what God foresees by all means eventuates in reality without
error.15 The counsel of God (the second element of the divine knowledge) applies
11 Perkins does not even try to prove the scientia Dei by using rational argument viz., the via
negationis, via causalitatis, and via eminentiae. This recourse to Scripture alone for the proof of the
divine knowledge appears to be echoing the Reformers’ sola scriptura. For a detailed account of these
three ways, see PRRD III, p. 395
12 Golden Chain, in Works I, p. 12.
13 As an example of a similar case in the English Reformed scholastics, see Leigh, Treatise of Divinity
(London, 1646), II. Vii (p. 60, margin), cited in PRRD III, p. 397.
14 Golden Chain, in Works I, p. 12.
15 In the explanation of divine counsel in his An Exposition of the Creede, Perkins’ viewpoint is
virtually identical: “The counsel of God is his eternal and unchangeable decree, whereby hee hath
ordained all things either past, present, or to come, for his owne glory. … God’s counsel hath two
parts: his foreknowledge, whereby he did foresee all things which were to come. His will, whereby in
general manner he wils and ordaines whatsoever is to come to passe: and therefore such things as God
altogether nilleth, cannot come to passe. Now these two parts of the counsel of God must be joined
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mainly not to the divine knowledge but rather to the providential wisdom of God in
terms of God as a “final causality” who immutably has a purpose in his works.16
In summary, under the larger category of divine knowledge that does not
differentiate between scientia and sapientia according to the Thomistic pattern, we
can perceive that Perkins simply defines divine knowledge, foreknowledge, and
counsel without explaining other derivative terms of divine knowledge within the
boundary of the early orthodox context. Although this is a consistently focused point
in our investigation of the Puritan and Reformed scholastic attributes of God, we
again see that Perkins tends towards a modified Thomistic tendency in his
understanding of divine knowledge by stressing the importance of the divine will in
terms of the ad extra dimension of God’s works that is a voluntaristic characteristic
of Scotism.17 Of course, all of his arguments de facto converge on the vindication of
divine simplicity.
II. Charnock’s Exegesis & Doctrine of God’s Intellect
While making a distinction between scientia and sapientia in his view of the
divine intellect, Charnock first draws several doctrinal propositions from his exegesis
of Ps. 147:5.18 He writes: “God hath an infinite knowledge and understanding; all
knowledge. … Omniscience respects his understanding, according to our manner of
conception.”19 Admittedly the practical implication of Charnock’s understanding of
this doctrine lies in the fact that the notion of scientia Dei was not obliterated in the
human mind by the fall of man: viz., conscience and “universal notions of God” are
none other than a “natural implantation” of God for the human knowing of scientia
together, and not severed. Will without knowledge is impotent, and foreknowledge without will is
idle”, in Workes I, p. 140.
16 Cf. Leigh, Treatise of Divinity, II. vii (p. 64), cited in PRRD III, p. 386. Perkins also points out the
soteriological aspect of this by referring to God’s “perpetual, unchangeable, and special” knowledge
of the elect in terms of both eternal and executive dimensions for their salvation. See Perkins, A
Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, p. 283; idem, A Treatise of
Predestination, in Works II, p. 607; An Exposition of Christ’s Sermon in the Mount, in Workes III (i), p.
250. At the same time, we find that the stress upon the pietistic aspect applied from the doctrine of
God’s omniscience itself is also maintained in his schema. E.g., A Commentary upon the Epistle to the
Galatians, in Workes II, p. 384; An Exposition of Christ’s Sermon in the Mount, in Workes III (i), p.
109; An Exposition upon the 2, chap. of the Revelation, in Workes III (ii), pp. 283, 292.
17 Cf. J. P. Donnelly, Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli’s Doctrine of Man and Grace (Leiden:
Brill, 1975); idem, “Calvinist Thomism,” Viator 7 (1976), pp. 441-5; idem, “Italian Influences in the
Development of Calvinistic Scholasticism,” Sixteenth Century Journal 7/1, pp. 81-101.
18 “Great is our Lord, and of great power: his understanding is infinite.”
19 Works I, p. 459.
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Dei.20
According to Charnock, the variant categories of distinction concerning the
divine intellect can be presented as follows:
In respect of present things, it is called knowledge or sight; in respect of things
past, remembrance; in respect of things future, or to come, it is called
foreknowledge, or prescience (1 Pet. i. 2); in regard of the universality of the
objects, it is called omniscience; in regard of the simple understanding of things,
it is called knowledge; in regard of acting and modelling the ways of acting, it is
called wisdom and prudence (Eph. I. 8).21
This shows that, under the larger category of the divine intellect, Charnock defines
wisdom, knowledge, and foreknowledge according to their relations with creatures.
That is, we see that he notes the importance of the divine will inasmuch as it
constantly operates according to divine knowledge and wisdom. Thus he presents
various scholastic divisions of the theological terms concerning divine knowledge
reflecting the significance of the extrinsic or operative aspect of God’s work.
A. The Distinctions of the Scientia Dei: The Dialectics of Thomism and Scotism
Charnock offers three distinctions in the divine knowing in terms of its
“objects”. First, there is a distinction between the knowledge of “simple” intelligence
(scientia simplicis intelligentiae) and the knowledge of “vision” (scientia visionis). A
knowledge of simple understanding or intelligence is, as Charnock defines: “The
object of this [knowledge] is not things that are in being, or that shall by any decree
of God ever be existent in the world, but such things as are possible to be wrought by
the power of God, though they shall never in the least peep up into being, …”22 Thus
this is the knowledge that exists in God as the total of “the entire realm of
possibility” outside the act of the divine will towards His goals. At the same time
Charnock identifies this knowledge with “necessary knowledge” of God (scientia
necessaria), viz., it is a necessary knowledge to be allowed to God insofar as the
power of God can work and produce more creatures than those that ever or shall be
in reality.23 Charnock continues to explain the concept of “vision knowledge”. He
20 Thus we sense that Charnock seeks to prove the divine omniscience both from the evidence of
Scripture and from natural argument (despite its ancillary role). Such a tendency reflects the difference
of intellectual atmosphere between early and high orthodoxy.
21 Works I, p. 461. Cf. Polanus, Syntagma, Synopsis Libri II, cited in PRRD III, p. 384.
22 Works I, pp. 461-2, citing Suarez, De Deo, lib, iii. cap. iv. p. 230.
23 Works I, p. 462.
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remarks: “God knows himself and all things that really were, are, or shall be in time;
all those things which he hath decreed to be, though they are not yet actually sprung
up in the world, but lie couchant in their causes.”24
The point we should note is that, as was also the case among the Reformed
orthodox theologians, the divine will and the divine knowledge are conjoined in
Charnock’s idea of “vision knowledge”. At the same time this indicates that
Charnock’s first categorisation of divine knowledge shows a preference for the
tradition of Thomistic intellectualism.25 Yet we see at the outset that he explains this
first distinction in a voluntaristic manner emphasising both the divine will and
decree.26
Secondly, according to Charnock’s distinction, there is a divine speculative
(scientia speculativa) and practical knowledge (scientia practica). This distinction is
no other than the subdivision of “vision knowledge”. Divine speculative knowledge
is based upon both God’s “love of Himself” and “delight in Himself” that are
necessary and natural. In other words, this knowledge is a scientia visionis that
depends on “the eternal divine willing of actuality”; God possesses such knowledge
as a result of the decree.27 Thus, even if God wills actuals, this knowledge exists
immutably as a both “noncausal” and “possible” knowledge concerning God Himself
and things. It is also “theoretical or contemplative” (theoretica sive contemplative) in
light of its characteristic.28 Yet again Charnock moves on to define the divine
practical knowledge:
24 Works I, p. 461.
25 PRRD III, p. 407; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. xiv. 9; In the English Reformed position, see
Leigh, System, II. vii, pp. 191-3. For a general explanation of the use of such a medieval scholastic
distinction of a duplex divine knowledge in the Reformed orthodoxy, see Heinrich Heppe, Reformed
Dogmatics: Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources, trans. G. T. Thompson (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1950), pp. 72-5. The thought of Suarez in this respect is also applied to the modified Thomism.
The equivalence of this distinction in the voluntaristic Scotist’s approach is the distinction between the
necessary or natural knowledge (scientia necessaria sive naturalis) of God and the free or voluntary
knowledge (scientia libera sive voluntaria) of God. Though Charnock refers to the scientia necessaria
in a somewhat intellectualistic tone, the term free or voluntary knowledge appears to be left
unmentioned due to the intellectualistic character of his scholasticism.
26 In light of this point, Charnock virtually indicates the corollary of a distinction between Potentia
Absoluta Dei and Potentia Ordinata Dei in his distinction of divine knowledge. See Works I, p. 483:
“His knowledge of possible things must run parallel with his power, and his knowledge of future
things run parallel with his will.” For a similar style of argument in Owen, see Vindicae Evangelicae,
in Works 12, p. 128.
27 PRRD III, p. 408.
28 This term is related to the Augustinian term: love of “enjoyment” (frui). See Augustine, Teaching
Christianity: De Doctrina Christiana, trans. Edmind Hill and ed. John Rotelle (New York: New City
Press, 1995), I.4.4; also see David Steinmetz, Misercordia Dei: The Theology of Johannes Von
Staupitz in its Late Medieval Setting (Leiden: Brill, 1968), p. 35; Muller, God, Creation, and
Providence, p. 63.
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A practical knowledge, which tends to operation and practice, and is the
principle of working about things that are known, as the knowledge an artificer
hath in an art or mystery. … The knowledge he hath of the things he hath
decreed, is such a kind of knowledge, for it terminates in the act of creation, …
but wholly free. … This is called discretion. … Practical knowledge is his
knowledge of his creatures and things governable.29
This definition shows that Charnock appears to relate the scientia practica to the
doctrine of creation and providence in terms of divine governance ad extra. As the
scientia practica is, in the Aristotelian scholastic tradition, knowledge in pursuit of
its goal,30 it seems virtually identical with the sapientia Dei, His discretion.31 Third,
Charnock distinguishes “vision knowledge” again into both knowledge of
approbation (scientia approbationis) and of apprehension (scientia apprehensionis).
This distinction hinges upon whether divine love and affection exists or not toward
the object of His vision knowledge. If God loves the object of knowledge, He then
naturally approves it with “complacency and pleasure of the will”.32 By way of
example, citing Mat.25:12 ( “I know you not”) and 7:23 (“I never knew you”), he
notes the characteristic of scientia apprehensionis as a knowledge of reprobation
(scientia reprobationis):
[The knowledge of apprehension] is not an ignorance of understanding, but an
ignorance of will; … So he knows them, and doth not know them, in a different
29 Works I, pp. 462-3.
30 Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 151.
31 As is the case with Charnock, though the relation of the scientia Dei to practical knowledge is an
overall characteristic of the Puritan and Reformed orthodox, Arminius also comments on this point.
See Arminius, Disp. Pub. IV. xli, cited in God, Creation and Providence, p. 150: “[The divine]
practical knowledge is that by which things are considered in terms of (sub ratione) the good, and as
objects of the will and power.” The importance of ‘the good’ of the creatures in Arminius’ explanation
is also present in Charnock. He states: “This is a knowledge whereby he knows the essence, qualities,
and properties of what he creates, and governs in order to his own glory, and the common good of the
world over which he [p]resides.” We can suggest that, even if Charnock stands in the Reformed
scholastic position, the influence of Arminius and Suarez (perhaps an eclectic characteristic of
Reformed scholastic theology in its high orthodox period) appears to be seen in his doctrine of the
scientia Dei within the intellectual context of the seventeenth century. However, we should not forget
that Charnock cites both of them mainly from a critical perspective. John Coffey notes the same point,
particularly in the case of the citation of Suarez in the writings of Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661).
See his Politics, Religion, and the British Revolutions: The Mind of Samuel Rutherford (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 73: “Rutherford’s quotations from Suarez were numerous, but
most of the time he was pointing out why Suarez was wrong. However, the large number of references
to Suarez suggests that Rutherford was framing his own ideas in conscious opposition to the thought
of the Spanish Jesuit, and reveals the importance of his influence, albeit a negative one.”
32 Quotation from Works I, p. 463.
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manner; he knows them so as to understand them, but he doth not know them so
as to love them.33
This division is particularly significant to Charnock and the Reformed scholastics in
relation to their efforts to defend the doctrine of divine simplicity by way of
reflecting the dialectics between Thomism and Scotism in the seventeenth century
context. Indeed Aquinas uses the term scientia approbationis to define the
knowledge placed between “simple knowledge” and “vision knowledge” in order to
synthesize the determination of the divine will in terms of causality.34 Scotus also
shows an affinity with the Thomistic categorisation of divine knowledge while at the
same time being faithful to his own idea of “three instants” in the divine
knowledge.35 However, the difference of view between the Thomists and Scotus and
the Nominalists about the “pre-existent ideas” of God in the actual events makes the
focus different in each. Aquinas considers it as the divine idea close to the divine
simple knowledge; Scotus and the Nominalists ― as the area of the divine vision 
knowledge.36 The Scotistic priority of the divine will over the divine knowledge
within a boundary of the Thomistic intellectualism can be grasped in this
explanation.37 What we need to observe is that Charnock seems to follow the
Scotistic tendency in this distinction of divine knowledge in that he virtually regards
scientia approbationis as a type of vision knowledge. Therefore, by way of using the
Thomistic concept scientia approbationis in terms of the Scotistic understanding,
Charnock permits no room for the conflict between divine will and divine knowledge.
In other words, just as the two categories of scientia Dei ― simple knowledge and 
vision knowledge ― can cover all the aspects of the divine knowing in Charnock’s 
schema, so there is no possibility of the existence of another category in the divine
knowing: viz., the scientia media.38
33 Works I, p. 463.
34 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, xiv, 8.
35 For the details, see W. Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from
Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden: Brill, 1988), ch. 5, esp. pp. 136-7.
36 Whether “God the pure act” and “potentiality” in God can coexist or not is significant in this
difference between Aquinas and Scotus and the Nominalists. For the details, see Hong-Gyu Park,
“Grace and Nature in the Theology of John Gill (1697-1771)” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Aberdeen,
2001), p. 199.
37 F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. II: Medieval Philosophy, pp. 379-83, 535-44; B. M.
Bonansea, “Duns Scotus’ Voluntarism,” in John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965, ed. Bonansea and J. K.
Ryan (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1965), pp. 83-121. See esp. pp. 117-20.
38 Muller defines the scientia media as “a term used to describe a category in the divine knowing
according to which God has a conditioned or consequent, rather than an absolute and antecedent,
foreknowledge of future contingents”, in R. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1985), p. 276. Hereafter DLGT in this chapter.
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B. The Problem of Middle Knowledge and Divine Foreknowledge
At this point, we also need to examine how the Puritan and Reformed
scholastics, including Charnock, coped with the rise of the concept of middle
knowledge from the early seventeenth century.39 Though Charnock does not directly
explain this term in detail, we can be aware that he is thoroughly acquainted with the
controversy about middle knowledge. Charnock’s comment shows similarities to
Richard Baxter’s doubts about the above-mentioned dichotomous distinction ― 
natural or simple knowledge vs. free or visionary knowledge ― in God’s 
knowledge.40 Apart from free or voluntary knowledge based upon the decree of God,
Baxter adds the concept of “knowledge of all things as Congruous, eligible and
Volenda, fit to be willed” out of the “wisdom” of God to the two above-mentioned
areas of divine knowledge.41 For Baxter, such divine knowledge can be placed
between simple knowledge and vision knowledge in order to enrich the explanation
of “possible” knowledge. Nevertheless Baxter’s contrivance of this concept was not
for the approval of the scientia media but for the preclusion of “improper discussion
of the way in which God knows”.42 Within the context of similar purport with
Baxter ― against the idea of the scientia media ― Charnock supposes an “order” of
God’s decree that assumes the operation of divine wisdom:
The knowledge of vision follows the act of God’s will, and supposeth an act of
God’s will before, decreeing thing to be. (If we could suppose any first or
second in God’s decree, we might say God knew them as possible before he
decreed them; he knew them as future because he decreed them.)43
39 We will continue to deal with this term in this chapter. On the general discussion of the middle
knowledge and foreknowledge according to the Reformed scholastic viewpoint, see H. Heppe,
Reformed Dogmatics, pp. 75-81; Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, pp. 212-28. For the intellectual origin of
the concept of the scientia media in the sixteenth and seventeenth century in relation to the
Remonstrants and Socinians, see PRRD III, pp. 417-20; Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, esp.
pp. 154-66.
40 For the detail of Baxter’s idea, see PRRD III, pp. 414-7.
41 Baxter, Catholike Theologie, I.iv. pp. 41-3, cited in PRRD III, p. 415.
42 Quotation from PRRD III, p. 416. Cf. Muller’s summary of Baxter’s ideas on this issue shows
clearly the viewpoint of the Reformed position. Muller insists: “To speak of a thing as possible or as
future ‘is to say that now it is nothing.’ It is, therefore, an error and a confusion of meaning to claim
that ‘God knoweth things to be future, because they are future; as he knoweth existents, because they
exist.’ ‘Futurity,’ Baxter counters, ‘is Nothing; and Nothing hath no Cause’ or causal significance: God
cannot be said to foreknew things ‘because they will be; but only that he foreknoweth that they will
be’ ― given that God’s knowledge of things is not because of things, that is, not caused by the things 
as if they were prior to God. There can be, Baxter adds, ‘no effects in God.’ Of course, Baxter has
already indicated that all things that were, are, or will be are known by God as volita, things willed by
him: things are not, in themselves, the cause of God’s knowledge of things”: PRRD III, pp. 415-6. All
the words in the quotation marks are Muller’s citations from Baxter.
43 Works I, p. 462.
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Apparently Charnock also note the importance of the wisdom of God closely related
to the order of the decree that makes “possible” knowledge become “vision”
knowledge through the intervention of divine will. In other words, in Charnock’s
view, the possibility of the existence of the scientia media in God is precluded
through the emphasis on the characteristic of the knowledge of vision that it spans
from all the past to all the future in time. This shows that Charnock, following the
general tendency of the Reformed orthodox defending the divine simplicity, did not
want to allow room for “a quasi actuality upon the [area of pure] possibility” by way
of using the concept of middle knowledge.44
Charnock moves on to the detailed discussion of the “objects” and the
“range” of divine knowing. The basic objects of divine knowing are God Himself
and all other things. Thus such knowledge of Himself accompanying His will is “the
[very] cause of all other things that can fall under His cognizance.” As He is “a
simple being” that does not need to operate His faculty for this knowing, God knows
Himself perfectly and comprehensively by His own essence from eternity.45 For
Charnock, all other things other than God necessarily ought to belong to the one area
among the possible, past, present and future. This divine omniscience of “possible”
things is related to His power, omnipotence, as he comments: “Possibles are infinite,
that is, there is no end of what God can do, and therefore no end of what God doth
know, otherwise his power would be more infinite than his knowledge.”46 At the
same time, this omnipotence is distinguished from the potentia ordinata Dei that
causes the operation of the divine will towards reality.47 God knows all things
“past”; they are the “perpetual presence” before God since nothing is past to the
divine omniscience in eternity.48 God also knows things “present”; He knows human
actions, thoughts and all motions of the human mind and will that even lead to sin
and evil in His own supporting act to the working of their faculty without infection.
Charnock then explores the problems of divine foreknowledge. Like other
seventeenth century Reformed dogmaticians, he pointedly defends the traditional
44 The quotation is from PRRD III, p. 429.
45 Works I, pp. 464-6.
46 Works I, p. 467.
47 See Works I, p. 469: “This knowledge is of another kind than his knowledge of things that are or
shall be. He sees possible things as possible, not as things that ever are or shall be. … He knows them
in his own power, not in his will; he understands them as able to produce them, not as willing to effect
them. Things possible he knows only in his power, things future he knows both in his power and will.”
Italics are mine.
48 Works I, p. 469.
152
understanding against the Socinian view concerning divine future knowledge. We
can see Charnock’s idea of the basic relationship between foreknowledge and the
divine will particularly in terms of the work of creation:
Certainly, if he knows all things possible, which he will not do, he must know
all things future, which he is not only able, but resolved to do, or resolved to
permit. God’s perfect knowledge of himself, that is, of his own infinite power
and concluding will, necessarily includes a foreknowledge of what he is able to
do, and what he will do. … [Creatures], therefore, must be known before they
were made, and not known because they were made; he knew them to make
them, and he did not make them to know them.49
The whole creation is both the object of futural knowledge to God and of present
knowledge in terms of the eternity of God.50 Yet these duplex aspects ought not to
be used for the insistence on the conjectural characteristic of divine knowledge.51
The Socinians insist that God knows the future things in terms of its “causes”
exclusive of “effects”. Conversely, according to Charnock, the decree and the divine
will that bring about both effects and permission in relation to the future cannot
admit room for such knowing in itself.
C. Concursus Dei, Future Contingency, and Divine Causality
The divine providential willing also assumes divine foreknowledge.
Charnock’s argument is performed through using the concept of the concursus Dei
(divine concurrence).52 He describes: “As he decreed life to this or that things, so he
decreed motion as the effect of life, and decreed to exert his power in concurring
with them, for producing effects natural for such causes.”53 Apparently, the event of
divine concurrence is also not an area outside the will of God. We thus can discern
that the foreknowledge is virtually identical with divine free knowledge in relation to
the voluntas Dei. Whether the creature’s reaction or choice as a second cause to the
49 Works I, p. 479.
50 Charnock cites the fifth book of Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy (Lib. V. prof. 6) on this. See
Works I, p. 484: “God sees all things in one instant, scientia nunquam deficientis instantiae.” Muller
notes that the reference to Boethius in the discussion over the absoluteness of divine foreknowledge
was a common characteristic of Reformed scholastics. See PRRD III, p. 403.
51 Works I, p. 481: “If the conjecture of future things savours of ignorance, and God knows them only
by conjecture, there is then no such thing in being as a perfect intelligent being, and so no God.”
52 Muller defines concursus Dei in the following: “[Divine concurrence means] the continuing divine
support of the operation of all secondary causes (whether free, contingent, or necessary). For any
contingent being to act in a free, a contingent, or a necessary manner, the divine will which supports
all contingent being must concur in its act.” Muller, DLGT, p. 76.
53 Works I, p. 481.
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providential willing of God the “first cause” is “necessary, contingent or free”, it is
“fully compatible with the divine knowing” without exception.54
In other words, both human freedom and the divine giving of direction based
upon His immutability and infallibility towards second causes can be understood
within the sense of the identity between His divine foreknowledge and His free will
in creation and providence. At the same time we notice that the proper understanding
of “causality” plays a key point in the appropriate understanding of the problem of
foreknowledge: the causality of “existence” does not come from foreknowledge, but
from the will of God. Charnock even writes as follows citing the late medieval
Augustinian, Thomas Bradwardine (1290-1349): “The reason of the will of God that
they shall be, was equally eternal with him [God].”55 Yet he rejects providing an
answer for the manner of such perfect knowing of God for it is both unknowable and
mysterious: we thus note that Charnock holds fast to the Puritan and Reformed
orthodox watchward: finitum non capax infiniti.56
For Charnock, the discussion of future contingencies appears as an extension
of the understanding of foreknowledge. 57 According to his basic assumption,
whether a contingent is accidental, purely contingent or mixed contingent partly
depending upon the will of a free agent, it is fixed in the knowledge of God because
“God does foreknow the free and voluntary acts of man”.58 The difference of
understanding of future contingencies between the Jesuits, Arminians, and the
Socinians and the Reformed depends on whether the concept of middle knowledge
(as what Muller calls a “divine foreknowledge of future contingent or conditional
acts or events lying outside of or prior to the divine willing”) is acknowledged or
not.59 Against the Arminian way of understanding, Charnock argues that divine
54 The quotations are from PRRD III, p. 402.
55 Works I, p. 484.
56 For example, see Works I, p. 485: “As our power is not the measure of the power of God, so neither
is our knowledge the judge of the knowledge of God, no better, nor so well, as an irrational creature
can be the judge of our reason. … Do we perfectly know the manner how we know? Shall we
therefore deny that we know anything? … We know we have such a faculty which we call
understanding, but doth any man certainly know what it is?”
57 For a survey of ancient, medieval, Molina’s and Suarez’s view on future contingencies, see William
Lane Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez
(Leiden: Brill, 1988); Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, trans. with an introduction and
notes Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988). On the historical origin
of the ‘contingency model’ upon which the Reformed scholasticism is based, see Antonie Vos,
“Scholasticism and Reformation,” in Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise, ed.
Willem Van Asselt and Eef Dekker (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), pp. 99-119.
58 Works I, p. 488.
59 Quotation from PRRD III, p. 418. However, we also see the distinctions of the view among them
with regard to the understanding of the scientia media in relation to the doctrine of predestination
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knowledge can hardly be lessened or increased by the motion of rational creatures as
the second cause.60 The Socinians appear again as the object of his critique by way
of abundant biblical references against their denial of divine knowledge of
contingency.61
What his opponents want to gain is what Muller calls “freedom at the expense
of divine causality”.62 In contrast to both Arminians and the Socinians, Charnock
asserts that both “necessity of [divine] immutability” as to future contingencies and
human freedom are compatible with each other since the nature of such necessity is
no less ‘compulsive’. Human voluntary actions (inclusive of sins in relation to
providence, the divine decree and predestination) are only from one’s own free will
excepting any necessity outside oneself.63 At this point, Charnock reaffirms the
priority of divine will over the foreknowledge of contingency in causality:
Nothing is because God knows it, but because God wills it, either positively or
permissively. God knows all things possible; yet because God knows them, they
are not brought into actual existence, but remain still only as things possible.
Knowledge only apprehends a thing, but acts nothing; it is the rule of acting, but
not the cause of acting; the will is the immediate principle, and the power the
immediate cause. To know a thing is not to do a thing;64
As adumbrated earlier, Charnock’s understanding of both the divine will and divine
knowledge also reflects the development of the theological prolegomena from
medieval scholastic traditions to the Reformed orthodox, particularly in terms of the
trajectory of both the Thomistic and the Scotistic late medieval background. To put it
another way, from the statement above, we get the impression that Charnock
emphasises more the soteriological, voluntaristic and practical aspects in relation to
against the Reformed and the Dominicans. See Muller, God, Creation and Providence, pp. 161-5.
60 See Works I, p. 487: “… they [Arminians] must say that God is at uncertainty, and suspends his
opinion without determining it any way; then he cannot know free acts till they are done, he would
then depend upon the creature for his information, his knowledge would be every instant increased, as
things he knew not before came into act; … there would be every minute an accession of new
knowledge to God, which had not before;”
61 For example, see Works I, p. 492: “If Abraham had been a Socinian, to deny God’s knowledge of
free acts of man, had he not had a fine excuse for unbelief?”
62 The quotation is from PRRD III, p. 425.
63 Works I, p. 493. See also p. 495: “The knowledge of God takes not away the nature of things.
Though God knows possible things, yet they remain in the nature of possibility; and though God
knows contingent things, yet they remain in the nature of contingencies; and though God knows free
agents, yet they remain in the nature of liberty. God did not foreknow the action of man necessary, but
as free; so that liberty is rather established by this foreknowledge than removed.” The italics are mine.
64 Works I, p. 493.
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Scotism than the theoretical ones derived from the Thomistic and intellectualistic
viewpoint in the genus of theology.65 At the same time such a theology as an
“operative” and “directed” discipline should entail human voluntary action towards
piety in a practical dimension if one’s knowledge of God in theory is genuine.66
D. The Manner of Divine Knowing and the Significance of the Ad Extra oriented
Arguments
In Charnock’s treatment of the “manner” of divine knowing, based upon the
result of biblical exegesis, he again makes it clear that the divine understanding is not
a psychological faculty in God as if human beings possess it, but is identical with His
essential nature: i.e., divine simplicity. He remarks: “Since he knows by his essence,
he always knows, because his essence never ceaseth, but is pure act.”67 Such a
knowing, so-called “intuitive knowledge” in the medieval scholastic tradition, comes
from His own “one act of intuition” without reasonings.68 For Charnock, this
intuition exists in God both as “habit” and as “act” without an inconsistency between
them (which is not the case for human beings). Without a discourse or succession,69
this divine knowing covers all things with both independency and distinctness. At the
same time God knows all the means and effects conducing to the end of his will, as
there is no “blind providence” in the world.70 This aspect is also directly connected
to the relationship between the divine will and knowledge. Consequently, God
“knows” all things infallibly and immutably within the context of the divine “will”:
Since God knows all things with a knowledge of vision, because he wills them,
his knowledge must be infallible as his purpose; … God’s knowledge admits no
more of increase or decrease than his essence doth. Since God knows by his
essence, and the essence of God is God himself, his knowledge must be void of
any change. … He knows what he can do, and he knows what he will do, and
both these things immutable, his knowledge must consequently be so too. …
Therefore it was not necessary that God should know this or that creature with a
knowledge of vision; but after the will of God had determined the existence of
65 For a general characteristic of the two camps, see F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. II:
Medieval Philosophy, pp. 495-6.
66 In this respect we see that Charnock also shows the English Puritan tendency that focuses on the
discussion of theologia ectypa.
67 Works I, p. 504.
68 Works I, p. 498.
69 Against Suarez’s view, Charnock denies the possibility of a so-called “virtual discourse in God”
that insists on the divine knowledge coming from several distinct acts in God. However, for Charnock,
divine knowing is the “one simple act” of knowing. See Works I, p. 499.
70 Works I, p. 503.
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this or that creature, his knowledge being then determined to this or that object,
did necessarily continue unchangeable.71
The total amount of divine knowledge (though it is incalculable) is perpetually
invariable irrespective of whether the knowledge is visionary or not. In other words,
our God is, on the one hand, “perpetually in the act of knowing”; on the other hand,
He has both essential and habitual knowledge with unchangeableness. This pursuit of
the defence of the divine simplicity is de facto the representation of the consistency
of the intrinsic or ad intra dimension with the extrinsic or ad extra dimension in the
Triune but “simple” and “one” God.
What we also need to note is the way of Charnock’s treatment of the rational
argumentation of the doctrine of the scientia Dei. To be sure this part shows that he
adheres to a principle of the ancillary role of reason that merely confirms the result of
scriptural exegesis. As mentioned earlier, there are three general patterns of
organisation of such arguments in Reformed orthodoxy: the via negationis, via
causalitatis, and via eminentiae.72 Charnock offers five rational proofs based upon
this general pattern despite the omission of the via negationis type; perhaps because
that he wanted to minimize the use of purely philosophical argument.73 First, God as
wisdom must be omniscient for sustaining the basis of His wisdom. Second, we
should acknowledge that all knowledge in creatures is from God by allowing the
perfection of God in view of knowledge. In these via eminentiae arguments,
Charnock emphasises the practical dimension of the divine knowledge in close
relationship with the divine wisdom that produces “actions” towards the objectives:
“To act by knowledge is the most excellent manner of acting; God has therefore not
only knowledge, but the most excellent manner of knowledge.” 74 Third, the
“accusations of conscience” in humanity evidences divine omniscience of their
actions and thoughts. Charnock also adds another two arguments in terms of via
causalitatis: first, God the first cause as “a voluntary agent”, who wills everything,
should be “an intelligent agent” who has a perfect knowledge.75 Secondly, the divine
71 Works I, pp. 503-4.
72 For the details, see PRRD III, p. 395.
73 This point is also evidence of Gunton’s critique of Charnock as a mere successor of ‘negative
theology’. Charnock was aware of the limit of human language in expressing divine attributes, but did
not abuse the via negationis. Contra Colin Gunton, Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine
Attributes (London: SCM Press, 2002), pp. 89-93.
74 Works I, pp. 505-6.
75 See Works I, p. 507: “The knowledge of God is to be supposed in a free determination of himself;
and that knowledge must be perfect both of the object, act, and all circumstances of it. How can his
will freely produce anything that was not first known in his understanding?”
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omniscience should operate as the basis of divine providence that is the government
of creatures. It is also worth observing that he stresses the importance of the
theoretical aspect of divine knowledge while at the same time focusing on the
practical dimension:
Knowledge is the basis of providence; to know things is before the government
of things; a practical knowledge cannot be without a theoretical knowledge.
Nothing could be directed to its proper end without the knowledge of the nature
of it, and its suitableness to answer that end for which it is intended.76
This statement again reminds us of the discussion of the genus of theology: the
nature of theology as a “directive” knowledge in Charnock. Yet another, even if
Charnock does not deal with the theologia archetypa directly, is the explanation of
divine knowledge in light of a theologia ectypa which has a soteriological
importance for humanity. This point shows his balance of theory and practice with
more stress upon practical dimension. Charnock argues that a theoretical knowledge
of God is essential in terms of its being a basis of faith to the believer, albeit the
theoretical knowledge is meaningless without becoming a practical knowledge of
God heading towards its purpose. That is, the balance of intellectualism and
voluntarism seems to be maintained in Charnock’s schema, albeit he does not lose
his focus on theologia praxis with a Scotist tint. In addition, we encounter evidence
that the doctrinal dialogue between the doctrine of God and other theological loci is
consistent even in Charnock’s rational argumentation of the doctrine of scientia Dei.
E. Sapientia Dei: The Christological and Trinitarian Emphases in the Opera Dei
With regard to God’s wisdom (sapientia), Charnock explains it as an
extension of the doctrine of the scientia Dei, albeit both terms are distinguished in his
idea.77 As indicated earlier, many Puritan and Reformed dogmaticians, including
Perkins, do not make a distinction between divine knowledge and wisdom in their
use of vocabulary as to the divine intellect in following the Thomistic Pattern.78 In
contrast to them, Charnock compares the wisdom of God with the divine knowledge:
76 Works I, p. 507.
77 See Works II, p. 10: “That wisdom is a transcendent excellency of the divine nature. We have
before spoken of the knowledge of God, and the infiniteness of it. The next attribute is the wisdom of
God. Most confound the knowledge and wisdom of God together; but there is a manifest distinction
between them in our conception.”
78 See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. xvi.
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Knowledge hath its seat in the speculative understanding, wisdom in the
practical. … Knowledge is an understanding of general rules, and wisdom is a
drawing conclusions from those rules in order to particular cases. … The
knowledge of God is his understanding of all things; his wisdom is the skillful
resolving and acting of all things; … Men may have knowledge without
wisdom, but not wisdom without knowledge; … All practical knowledge is
founded in speculation, either secundum rem, as in men; or secundum rationem,
as in God. … Knowledge is the apprehension of a thing, and wisdom is the
appointing and ordering of all things. Wisdom is the splendour and lustre of
knowledge shining forth in operations, and is an act both of understanding and
will; understanding in counselling and contriving, will in resolving and
executing. Counsel and will are linked together, …79
He stresses the relationship of the divine wisdom and will as was emphasised in the
case of knowledge and will. To put it another way, the ad extra operations of God in
time connect the divine knowledge in eternity to the divine wisdom as God’s
practical knowledge. In this statement, as was the case with his treatment of divine
knowledge, we can also find Charnock’s voluntaristic stress upon the practical
dimension of the divine intellect: Charnock does not simply follow Thomistic
intellectualism but shows his strong Scotistic interest in the will and decree of God in
close relation to the divine wisdom within the basic Thomistic structure.80 At
another level, when considering the “experiential” emphasis of Puritan spirituality
within the seventeenth century background, we can estimate that such a combination
of Thomism and Scotism seems to have been an inevitable eclectic elaboration for
Charnock, particularly in the doctrine of the divine intellect and will.
Among the general doctrinal propositions about the wisdom of God, we need
to note Charnock’s consideration of the two aspects of the wisdom of God including
the christological: the “essential wisdom” of God no less than the divine essence and
Christ as “a personal wisdom of God”. 81 Of course this also evidences well
Charnock’s understanding of the characteristic of God’s attributes (particularly the
intellectual attribute) as both an ontological “control tower” and a temporal
“revelation” pointing towards a clear “signal post” in history. According to Charnock,
all the operations of God come from this essential wisdom based upon “one simple
essence.” This essential wisdom belongs to God alone originally; it also operates in
79 Works II, p. 12.
80 Edward Leigh (1602-1671) typically shows a similar tendency to Charnock in this point. See his
Systeme or Body of Divinity (London, 1662), II. vii, pp. 194-200.
81 Works II, pp. 12-3.
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harmony with His will and power. Charnock denies reiteratively the existence of
inconsistency between the wisdom and the will of God based upon the doctrine of
divine simplicity.82 By way of example, the divine sovereign election also evidences
God’s infinite and infallible wisdom. Along with an attempt to prove divine wisdom
based upon the priority of scriptural evidence and the ancillary role of rational
arguments, Charnock affirms not only that wisdom is the greatest divine attribute of
all, but also that God is “super-sapientem”, above all wisdom.83
Let us examine Charnock’s demonstration of the doctrine of the divine
wisdom from the external works of God: creation, government and redemption.84
We find that he seeks to expound the apparently “paradoxical” aspect of the whole ad
extra dimension with his awareness of its importance as the source of our knowledge
of divine wisdom. First, the wisdom of God is apparent in “creation”, particularly in
the creation of man with the faculty of the soul. At the same time Charnock insists
that the relationship of grace and nature in this discussion (of the “particulars” of
divine wisdom) is to be rightly set up as follows: “As grace doth not destroy nature,
but elevate it, neither should the fresher and fuller discoveries of divine wisdom in
redemption, deface our thoughts of his wisdom in creation.”85 Second, the wisdom
of God appears in the divine works of “government” of creatures. We see Charnock
attempts to connect the doctrine of divine wisdom in these works of government with
both Christology and the doctrine of providence. The problem of sin is also
especially remarkable in this respect.86 He also applies the certain role of sin to the
dimension of personal piety that can positively yield spiritual growth in grace
through mortification and sanctification.87 Charnock notes the reason for such a
contradictory result by saying: “Though God is not the author of sin, because of his
holiness, yet he is the administrator of sin by his wisdom, and accomplisheth his own
purposes by the iniquities of his enemies, and the lapses and infirmities of his
82 For example, see Works II, pp. 14-5: “All his decrees are drawn out of the infinite treasury of
wisdom in himself. … His understanding and will are infinite; what is therefore the act of his will is
the result of his understanding, and therefore rational; his understanding and will join hands; there is
no contest in God, will against mind, and mind against will; they are one in God, one in his resolves,
and one in all his works.”
83 Works II, p. 18.
84 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 388-91. In Reformed scholastics in general, this is called the “particulars” of the
divine wisdom.
85 Works II, p. 27.
86 See Works II, p. 35: “God willed sin, that is, he willed to permit it, that he might communicate
himself to the creature in the most excellent manner. He willed the permission of sin, as an occasion to
bring forth the mystery of the incarnation and passion of our Saviour.”
87 Works II, pp. 38-43. We will deal with these concepts in detail in chapter six in relation to the
holiness of God.
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friends.” 88 For a similar reason, based upon his understanding of the faculty
psychology, Charnock can argue that the wisdom of God continues to work on the
conversion of a sinner without destroying the faculty of the person but that it
“changes the principle” in the human faculty.89 Third, the work of “redemption” also
reveals the wisdom of God. By way of the orthodox Trinitarian perspective,
Charnock shows that the “medium” of redemption combines divine justice and
mercy through the incarnation and the work of Christ. The meaning of the union of
two natures in Christ for redemption is also illustrated in terms of the doctrine of
God’s wisdom.90 For the application of redemption that is established as “the
condition” by the wisdom of God, one needs “faith” in both the mind and the will as
the faculty of the soul.91
F. Summary of Charnock’s Exegesis and the Doctrine of God’s Intellect
In these exegetical and doctrinal sections on the divine knowledge and
wisdom, we have seen that Charnock sought to vindicate the Trinitarian God’s
“simplicity” in His essence and works by demonstrating the consistency in the divine
intellect and will through christological, federal, and providential arguments based on
a firm scriptural foundation. The Socinian and Arminian idea of middle knowledge
was a major target of Charnock’s critique, in order to guard the stability of the
doctrine of God as a “system”, by way of connecting this system with the discussion
of “piety”, without which the true knowledge of God cannot exist.
III. Charnock’s Praxis of the Divine Intellect:
Our “Trinitarian” Knowledge of the “Triune” God
In the practical section of the divine knowledge and wisdom, Charnock’s
focus on the Trinitarian dimension in the doctrine of the divine knowledge is notable:
i.e., the perfect knowledge of God identically belongs to the three persons of the
Triune God.92 Of course, while seeing again the necessity of the intratrinitarian act
88 Works II, p. 43.
89 Works II, p. 46.
90 See Works II, pp. 56-61.
91 Works II, p. 69: “Faith is an act both of the understanding and will too, and principally of the will,
which doth presuppose an act of the understanding, for there cannot be a persuasion in the will
without a proposition from the understanding.”
92 Charnock particularly attempts to prove the divine omniscience in terms of Christology by
depending on Scriptural evidence along with theological reasoning. See Works I, p. 509: “Finite is
uncapable of being made infinite, and therefore incapable of comprehending infinite, so that Christ
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as a foundation for explaining this tight relatedness among doctrines, he also
emphasises the absoluteness of a divine decree that is thoroughly controlled by
infinite power and wisdom. Charnock also makes it clear that both revelation and
grace have priority over reason and nature as the “way” to our knowledge of God,
but the former do not exclude the latter. Therefore, for Charnock, the Socinian error
is fatal in that it does not recognise the priority of revelation over a human reason
which is merely ancillary.93 Likewise, the divine wisdom revealed ad extra in
“nature” should be meditated upon and contemplated for the growth of piety in
“grace”.94 He also points out the role of Scripture between grace and nature: such
piety cannot be produced without the study of the wisdom of God in the written
revelation.95 In brief, Charnock touches upon the reciprocal intertwinement of the
whole related loci of the full doctrine of God towards the advance of “our theology”
in various dimensions, in his clear grasp of the trinitarian characteristic of divine
intellect, which is the “centre” of his discussion in this section.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the dialectic between Thomism and Scotism that is present
in the background of the intellectual framework of Perkins and Charnock evidences
most clearly the continuity of the doctrine of the divine intellect between the two. By
combining Aristotelian faculty psychology with the Augustinian content of theology,
they sought the integrated understanding of God’s intellect in three subjects: God
cannot be deus factus, made of a creature a god, to comprehend God, for then of finite he would
become infinite, which is a contradiction.” In addition, interestingly, Charnock also applies such a
doctrine to the pietistic dimension by a direct use of scholastic terms elicited from the doctrine of
God’s intellect. See Works I, p.520: “We pray because God knows, for though he knows our wants
with a knowledge of vision, yet he will not know them with a knowledge of supply, till he be sought
into, …”. Italic is mine. Such a use of scholastic terms also evidences the close relationship between
Reformed scholasticism and Puritan practical divinity in the thought of Charnock.
93 See Works II, p. 84: “Hence it was that the philosophers in the primitive times were the greatest
enemies to the gospel; and the contempt of divine wisdom, in making reason the supreme judge of
divine revelation, was the fruitful mother of the heresies in all ages springing up in the church, and
especially of that Socinianism that daily insinuates itself into the minds of men.” Italic is mine.
94 See Charnock’s excellent account of both this relationship of grace and nature and the significance
of the ad extra dimension for our knowledge of God: “Though God is principally to be praised in and
for Christ, yet as grace doth not raze out the law of nature, so the operations of grace put not the
dictates of nature to silence, nor suspend the homage upon our inspection of his works. … We cannot
behold the wisdom of God in his own essence and eternal ideas, but by the reflection of it in the
creatures, as we cannot steadily behold the sun with our eye, but either through a glass, or by
reflection of the image of it in the water. … The contemplation of the reason of God in his works is a
noble and suitable employment for a rational creature. We have not only sense to perceive them, but
souls to mind them,” in Works II, pp. 88-9. Italics are mine.
95 See Works II, pp. 91-8. Cf. PRRD III, pp. 391-2.
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Himself, the elect, and the trinitarian theology as a whole system. Thus the identity
of the divine knowledge in relation to the divine will had to be properly grasped.
Both Perkins and Charnock wanted to protect the idea of divine simplicity and
human freedom in disputes over the problems of foreknowledge, future
contingencies and middle knowledge. At the same time such knowledge of God was
to be the practical, operative, and directed knowledge that necessarily accompanied
theoretical knowledge without which the foundation of practice could not exist. In
other words, we see that Thomism and Scotism were idealistically conjoined in the
notion of theology as a directed discipline in both Perkins’ and Charnock’s
understanding of the divine intellect.
Of course the locus method (of organising each sub-locus of the full doctrine
of God in order to elicit appropriate statements) played an important part in bridging
frequent recourses to exegesis and doctrinal elicitation as to the doctrine of the divine
intellect both in Perkins’ Ramistic structure and in Charnock’s discursive, scholastic,
and extended homiletical commentary. Charnock developed the discussion of the
divine knowledge through a detailed explanation that employed scholastic
vocabularies based upon medieval scholastic theology. In some ways Perkins did not
do so because of the architectonic brevity of his Ramism and the tacit influence on
him (as an early orthodox Puritan divine) of the Reformer’s principle of sola
Scriptura. There is arguably a tendency that the conceptual distinction of the divine
knowledge and wisdom also makes it possible for Charnock to deal with the more
extended discussion of the ad extra dimension of the divine intellect. The doctrinal
control and dialogue between the divine intellect and christological, providential and
soteriological dimensions were prominent in Charnock reflecting a characteristic of a
more broadly developed high orthodox system.
In short, Charnock and Perkins’ pursuit of a “monergistic” theological system
combined with a piety that accompanies operative and practical characteristics
resulted in the development of various theological arguments in the doctrine of the
divine knowledge and wisdom in early modern period. That is, these theological
elaborations towards the defence of both orthodox trinitarianism and the divine




The Power and Dominion of God
We have investigated Perkins and Charnock’s doctrine of the divine intellect
in the previous chapter. According to faculty psychology, the voluntas Dei is next in
line to be addressed on the basis of the traditional system of the doctrine of God.1 In
addition, the Puritans and the Reformed scholastics also dealt with the outward
manifestation of the voluntas Dei in the doctrinal area of various sub-categorical
attributes of the divine will. Divine omnipotence and sovereignty, especially, were
the important themes for Charnock in terms of rightly understanding the voluntas Dei
(which had been principally revealed in the history of redemption) since these
covered the whole theological areas of creation, providence, and predestination. Of
course, as was the case with the previous chapter that dealt with the scientia Dei, the
relation of the divine will and intellect is undoubtedly a further important
consideration even in grasping the identity of the two attributes of omnipotence and
sovereignty.
At the risk of being repetitive, it is necessary, initially, to say that the
identification of both the divine will and power in God on the basis of the divine
essence and simplicity is a fundamental premise of our discussion. This is, in fact, a
general theological axiom from the medieval era to the Puritan and the Reformed
orthodox period, despite fluctuations according to historical context.2 That is to say,
despite the fact that the merely ad intra dimension of the will of God belongs within
the limits of the willing of Himself according to His nature,3 yet we find another
formal distinction of the two in that the divine will is the source of “all actuality”,
whereas the divine power is that of “all possibility” and is wider in its metaphysical
1 In the Protestant scholastic tradition, the voluntas Dei may be defined as “the attribute of God
according to which God may be said to have a potency or, more precisely, an appetitive potency
(potentia appetitiva) ad extra that operates to bring about the good known to and desired by God as
the highest end or greatest good (summum bonum, q.v.) of all things,” in Muller, Dictionary of Latin
and Greek Theological Terms (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1985), p. 331. In some way, this definition
itself denotes the relation between God’s will, power, and intellect that needs to be the primary subject
of our discussion in this chapter.
2 Cf. H. Oberman, “Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism: with Attention to its Relation to the
Renaissance,” Harvard Theological Review 53 (1960), pp. 60-1; cf. Perry Miller, The New England
Mind: Seventeenth Century (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 13.
3 See PRRD III, pp. 453-6. We will explain this again later in relation to the scope of the exercise of
the divine power.
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scope.4 These dual aspects of divine omnipotence serve to substantiate our argument
concerning the intertwinement between omnipotence and sovereignty, as well as
between so-called absolute and ordained power in this chapter.5 Both Perkins and
Charnock also engaged in deeper investigation of the omnipotence of God within the
context of early and high orthodoxy. This, of course, was based upon the intellectual
heritage of late medieval and Reformation thought, yet at the same time both writers
avoided the overtly speculative or logical discussion of this subject often seen in
Occamistic late medieval theology.
From another angle, we discover that they were investigating how to defend
God’s freedom, transcendence, and sovereignty without losing the idea of an
adherence to the “appropriate” allowance of contingency in the created orders and
the “whole covenantal” basis of God’s own restriction, decree, or ordination. This
was, on the whole, the common pressing interest of all the theologians from the
medieval period via the Reformation to the Puritan and the Reformed orthodox era.6
We will explore how this covenantal structure was developed as the underlying
framework of Perkins’ and Charnock’s doctrine of God’s omnipotence and dominion
within the context of both early and high orthodoxy. At the same time, we will also
examine whether this covenantal identity — the trajectory of the medieval discussion
4 The quotations are from PRRD III, p. 526. At another level, this distinction is related to the fact that
the concept of omnipotence is divided into the two terms according to its etymological roots: potentia
as power or potency and potestas as authority, rule, dominion, or sovereignty in relation to divine will.
By reason of this, the order of our investigation in this chapter will also follow the direction of this
distinction; cf. William J. Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” in The Pursuit of
Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. C. Trinkhaus and H. Oberman (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1974), pp. 26-59, esp. pp. 39-43. In addition, we basically see that this distinction (possibility vs.
actuality) consists with Scotus’ understanding of God’s absolute and ordained power that is distinct
from each other but not separate reciprocally: see Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), p. 59. Though it is somewhat early to say this, this could be construed as the
convergent tendency of the concept of God’s “capacity and volition” in an “operationalising” direction
especially in the understanding of absolute power since Duns Scotus in the early fourteenth century.
We shall continue to struggle with this troublesome notion in this chapter: see F. Oakley, “The
Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century Theology,” Journal of
History of Ideas, vol. 59, No. 3. (Jul., 1998), pp. 437-61.
5 Namely, this indicates a virtual affinity between the Scotistic or nominalistic distinction of power
that we will address later and the systematic structure of treating the doctrine of omnipotence and
dominion in Perkins’ and Charnock’s works within the background of the Reformed orthodox
tradition. Cf. Guy Richard, “Deus Qui Regnat in Excelso: Samuel Rutherford’s Radical God-exalting
Theology and the Grounds for His Systematic Opposition to Arminianism” (Ph.D. Thesis, University
of Edinburgh, 2006), pp. 103-4; H. Oberman, “Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism,” pp. 56-
61.
6 Cf. D. Steinmetz, Calvin in Context (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 43-5; Guy
Richard, “Deus Qui Regnat in Excelso,” p. 101. On the well summarised critique of the views of the
Barthians concerning the Reformed orthodox doctrine of the divine will based upon their distinct
understanding of both the relation of the will and freedom and that of the ad intra and ad extra, see
PRRD III, pp. 432-4.
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of the distinction between the absolute and the ordained power of God — was
maintained or not. As was the case in the preceding chapters, the dialectics between
Thomism, Scotism, and nominalism in the formulation of their ideas will also be
addressed in connection with this subject.
I. Perkins on the Power & Dominion of God
In Perkins’ schema, omnipotence is the third category of the “life” of God,
which is one of the operative attributes ad extra along with the intellect and will (the
first and second category).7 Indeed, he also maintains that the will of God consists of
two elements i.e. His eternal counsel and decree.8 In A Golden Chaine, citing Mat.
19:26,9 Perkins defines omnipotence as “that by which hee is most able to performe
every worke”. Of course we can infer the meaning of “every work” in this definition
through the typical scholastic idea of omnipotence. This sees it as “the freedom of
God in His works ad extra” in the area of both supernatural (soteriological and
redemptive) and natural (e.g. creation and providence) theology.10 Yet, for Perkins,
God is omnipotent in spite of a “possible” (imaginable but nonsensical) impotence
which is against His nature or in contradictory things.11 In fact this reflects Perkins’
7 On a similar pattern in other Reformed orthodox theologians, e.g. Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii. 21,
p. 244; Leigh, Systeme (London, 1662), II, xiv, p. 236. Such a point of categorisation has to do with, to
some extent, how to understand the character of the will of God. Some of the Reformed orthodox like
Mastricht saw the divine will as a “propensity” or “active principle” of God. Yet Perkins and others
regarded it as “a single, eternal, and immutable act” of God in relation to divine decree. See PRRD III,
pp. 445-6; Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from
Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1988), pp. 160-2; Perkins, Workes I, p. 12. In fact
the Puritan and the Reformed orthodox treated the doctrine of the omnipotence of God within the
boundary of this larger discussion of the divine will on the basis of the scholastic tradition. Such an
angle necessarily covers the whole area of God’s external works of creation, providence, and
predestination in relation to the execution of the divine decree; on a concise summary of the difference
of view about the numbers of divine will between Perkins (a single will) and Arminius (several wills)
in relation to this point, see Christ and the Decree, p. 169. In addition, although Charnock’s work is
not a typically systematic writing like theirs, it comes under the same category in respect of the divine
will in that he deals with the omnipotence of God as an underlying attribute along with the divine
intellect, affection, and virtues in terms of its operative dimension.
8 Perkins seems to argue the priority of His decretive will over counsel in a very Scotistic way. See Of
God’s Grace and Man’s Free Will, in Workes I, p. 723: “Yet it is not counsel a rule to his will. For
there is nothing higher than his will, and his counsel also is according to his will which is goodnesse
itself.” This tendency hints at his attitude to the doctrine of God’s sovereignty that we will deal with
later in this chapter; cf. Perry Miller, The New England Mind (Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1954), pp. 39, 101.
9 “With men this is impossible, with God all things are possible.”
10 Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 1993), p. 202, citing M. Chossat, “Dieu. Sa nature selon les scolatiques,” in Dictionnaire
de theologie catholique, vol. 4/1, cols. 1152-1243.
11 Perkins, Workes I, p. 13; cf. PRRD III, p. 530; Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 204.
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combined postulation of both absolute and actual phases of divine power.12
Contrarily, Perkins also makes a distinction of this omnipotence into both an
“absolute” and an “actual” one. Absolute power is defined as “that by which he can
do more, than he either doth or will do”; and actual power as “that by which he
causeth all things to be, which he freely willeth”.13 In fact, as mentioned above, the
trace of the Scotistic or nominalistic late medieval distinction of potentia absoluta
and ordinata can be seen here.14 For instance, Perkins illustrates how the Catholic
misunderstanding of the distinction between the two powers could result in a harmful
doctrine of the Eucharist in A Reformed Catholike.15 Since Calvin also seems to
have critically used the idea of God’s absolute power without an outright rejection of
it,16 this also needs to be investigated in terms of the continuity between Calvin and
12 Muller agrees on this by saying that Perkins’ view is “a more subtle assumption of an absolute
power that transcends and is capable of abridging the order of things,” in God, Creation, and
Providence, p. 205. At the same time, this could be regarded as the sign of the extended development
in the understanding of the term “absolute power” from a radically speculative dimension to an actual
dimension (but God does it extraordinarily); cf. H. Oberman, “Via Antiqua and Via Moderna: Late
Medieval Prolegomena to Early Reformation Thought,” Journal of History of Ideas 48 (1987), pp. 38-
9; W. Ames, Marrow of Theology, trans. and ed. John Eusden (Durham: Labyrinth Press, 1983), I.vi.
16-20, p. 93.
13 Perkins, Workes I, p. 13; cf. Mat. 3:9, Phil. 3:21, and Ps. 135:6.
14 See p. 165. We will continue to examine how potentia absoluta and ordinata were reappropriated
with subtly distinct changes in Puritan and Reformed orthodoxy in this chapter. For a detailed account
of developments from the eleventh to the fourteen century, see H. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval
Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 30-56; idem, The Dawn of the
Reformation (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986), pp. 25-9; F. Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, and
Order: An Excursion in the History of Ideas from Abelard to Leibniz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1984), pp. 77-84; Steinmetz, Calvin in Context, pp. 42-3; Muller, God, Creation, and
Providence, p. 203; cf. Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Validity of the Term: ‘Nominalism’,” in The
Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. C. Trinkhaus and H. Oberman
(Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp. 65-6; Lawrence Moonan, Divine Power: The Medieval Power Distinction up
to its Adoption by Albert, Bonaventure, and Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994). On the Reformed and
Puritan position especially, e.g. H. Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, trans. G. T. Thompson (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1950), pp. 99-104, esp. see pp. 103-4; Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii. 21, p.
245; Ames, Marrow of Theology, I, ch. 6 (The Efficiency of God), pp. 18-20, ch. 9 (Providence); John
Norton, Orthodox Evangelist (London, 1654), pp. 19, 101-28, esp. pp. 103-4; Increase Mather, The
Doctrine of Divine Providence Opened and Applied (Boston, 1684), pp. 45-7. David Hall points out
the importance of the concept of potentia ordinata Dei in that it made it possible for Puritans to
explain human participation through reaction and will as a “second cause subject to divine
sovereignty” in the ordo salutis. See David Hall, The Faithful Shepherd: A History of the New
England Ministry in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1972), p. 58.
15 Perkins, Workes I, p. 591: “[The Papist] therefore that hold the body of Christ to bee in many places
at once, doe make it no body at all; but rather a Spirit, and that infinite. They alleged that God is
almightie: that is true indeed, but in this and like matters we must not dispute what God can doe, but
what he will doe. …” Italics are mine.
16 Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii. 21.5, p. 245; Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (Clarendon: Oxford
University Press, 2004), ch. 11, esp. pp. 328-9. Contra Helm’s position (which is similar to the view
Turretin expressed earlier), see Steinmetz, Calvin in Context, pp. 41, 49-50. Here Steinmetz argues
that Calvin has regarded the distinction between the potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata as the
distinction between “disordered” power (potentia inordinata) and “ordered” power necessarily
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the later Calvinists. In any case, Perkins asserts that these two kinds of power are not
distinguished in God Himself on the basis of divine simplicity:
That God is not onely powerfull, but even power it selfe in regard of his nature
as he is goodnesse and wisedome, … That power and will in God are one and
the same: for our better conceiving of them, they may be distinguished, but in
themselves they differ not, God’s willing of a thing is the effecting and doing of
it. It is not so in us, for we will many things which we cannot doe: but
whatsoever God willeth that He doeth, and that which he cannot doe, he cannot
will.17
In fact this has to do with the fact that Perkins gives priority to God’s intellect over
His will, based upon the order of faculty psychology. At the same time he emphasises
the absoluteness of His will in terms of an operative dimension that necessarily
implies His power.18 We also see the trinitarian basis of omnipotence within the
boundary of the doctrine of divine simplicity in Perkins in that he stresses
omnipotence as the common property that God the Father communicates to the Son
and the Holy Spirit. As was the case with his discussion of other attributes, Perkins
elicits various doctrinal points of application from God’s omnipotence in pietistic,
soteriological, and covenantal dimensions. For instance, a christological basis
including the doctrine of incarnation is necessary for Perkins to explain the
foundation of the execution of the divine decree by His power.19 Most of all, God’s
omnipotence should be considered as the essential foundation of our belief in the
fulfillment of all biblical revelation.20
In addition, we find Perkins’ discussion of God’s sovereignty overlaps with
his treatment of the doctrine of providence which covers the whole area of God’s
external works, according to his theological system.21 Perkins also points out various
combined with His justice. Yet it seems to be also the case that both views on Calvin’s attitude do not
seem to be substantially different when we consider the underlying pietistic aspect in Calvin’s
thought; Rijssen, Summa theol., III.xxxvi, cited in PRRD III, p. 534; cf. F. Oakley, “The Absolute and
Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century Theology,” pp. 457-9.
17 Perkins, An Exposition of Christ’s Sermon in the Mount, in Workes III (i), p. 151.
18 For example, see Of God’s Free Grace and Man’s Free will, in Workes I, p. 724: “Indeed there is in
God, a knowledge of things that possibly may be, though they never be: and this knowledge goes
before God’s decree. Yet the divine knowledge of things that certainly shall be, follows the will and
determination of God. … In that God willeth the being of all things, he makes them to be: for his will
is operative, not severed from his power, but distinguished; & his willing of anything is his doing of
it.”
19 For detailed contents, see Workes I, pp. 137-9; Muller, Christ and the Decree, pp. 165-9
20 Perkins, Workes I, p. 139. cf. A Treatise of Predestination, in Workes II, p. 630 on the power of God
known to Gentiles at a distinct level in both creation and redemption respectively.
21 Cf. P. Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University
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aspects of our duties, and the consolation we derive from this providential dominion
of God in its practical dimension, just as he has done in the preceding case of
omnipotence.22 According to Perkins’ definition, providence is “a most free and
powerfull action of God, whereby he hath care” over all creatures.23 This necessarily
means that, in Perkins’ schema, the dominion of God is mainly manifested in the
execution of the “divine will” according to His decree of creation, providence, and
predestination. In fact he sees the dominion, rule, or government of God as the
second part (after dealing with the knowledge as the first part) of providence,
“whereby he ordereth all things and directeth them to good ends”. Both good and evil
are the objects of His government in diverse ways; God uses both an “operative
permission” and a refraining from evil apart from the administration of actually good
things.24 The distinction between general and special providence can be directly
applied to the categorisation of God’s dominion into the executive part of such a
concept of providence:
[General Providence] is that which extends it selfe to the whole world and all
things indifferently, even to the devils themselves. By this providence God
continues and maintains the order which he set in nature in the creation, and he
preserves the life, substance, and the being of all and every creature in his kind.
The special providence is that, which God sheweth & exerciseth towards his
Church & chosen people, ingathering and guiding them and in preserving them
by his mighty power against the gates of hell. And therefore God’s Church here
upon the earth is called the kingdom of grace, in which he showes … the
speciall operation of his Spirit in bowing and bending the hearts of men to his
will.25
We thus see that the sovereignty of God for Perkins is revealed in the execution of
Press, 1954), p. 14.
22 Perkins, An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, pp. 157-9.
23 An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, p. 155.
24 An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, p. 155. For detailed arguments in relation to providential
government, see A Treatise of Predestination, in Workes II, pp. 617-21; and on the distinction of God’s
special will and general will within a similar context, see p. 613; and An Exposition upon the 2. chap.
of the Revel., in Workes III (ii), p. 298. Perkins even categorises the divine will into three actions:
positive willing, nilling, and the middle position between the two (e. g. permission of the evil etc.):
see pp. 615-6.
25 An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, p. 157; cf. Six Principles of Christian Religion, in Workes
I, p. 3; An exposition upon the Lords Supper, in Workes I, p. 340; Cases of Conscience, Workes II, pp.
50-1; An Exposition of Christs Sermon in the Mount, in Workes III (i), pp. 78-80, 98-9, 171, 181; A
Resolution to the Countrey-man, in Workes III (ii), pp. 654-7; An Exposition upon the 2. Chap. Of the
Revelation, in Workes III (ii), pp. 288-9; An Exposition upon the Epistle of Jude, in Workes III (ii), p.
494; A Commentary upon the II. Cap. to the Hebr., in Workes III (ii), pp. 13, 46, 120-1, 148, 159, 179;
ibid., A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 31.
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the decree by His actual (ordained) power. Nonetheless Perkins de facto identifies
this actual power (revealing His sovereignty) with God’s absolute power in the light
of the doctrine of the divine will, as he writes: “In God’s will there is a sovereignty,
that is, an absolute power, whereby he is Lord of all the actions that he willeth,
willing of himself without dependance fro any, without impediment or controlement,
what he will, when he will, & how he will.”26 Since Perkins also accepts the division
of God’s absolute will (of His good pleasure) in His eternal counsel and His revealed
or signified will in the law and the gospel,27 this comment shows Perkins’ emphasis
upon the “absoluteness” or sovereignty of the revealed will at another level.28 At any
rate, the dominion known through God’s external works is not based upon a
speculative determinism or mere causal structure but rather upon the manifestation of
the “gracious will of the transcendent God”.29 Here, clearly, Perkins expounds both
christological and trinitarian aspects of the dominion of God in relation to His power
as follows: “Divine government is the absolute power of God, whereby he maketh
lawes to binde the conscience, and that under paine of life and death eternall. This is
the power of all the Trinitie; but the administration of it is given to the Sonne”.30
In sum, the strong point of Perkins’ treatment of both divine power and
dominion lies in the fact that he successfully combined the eternal and temporal
aspects of God’s will and its exercise on a soteriological basis. Remaining within the
Reformed tradition, he does this by integrating the underlying consolidated aspects
of the traditional division of God’s power.31
26 Perkins, Of God’s Free Grace and Man’s Free Will, in Workes I, p. 723. Italics are mine. Again, this
respect evidences the integrative tendency in seeing the divine will and power in the later Reformed
tradition that reflected the development of the idea of power division since the late medieval period,
while at the same time attaching serious importance to the doctrine of God’s sovereignty as their
theological axiom.
27 Perkins, An Exposition of Christ’s Sermon in the Mount, in Workes III (i), p. 131. On the general
Puritan tendency about this point in relation to piety, see Miller, The New England Mind, pp. 20-1.
28 According to Oakley, the tendency towards “full conflation” between the potentia
absoluta/ordinata and the voluntas Dei beneplaciti (secret or hidden will)/ voluntas Dei signi
(revealed will) by using the term voluntas absoluta in the created orders especially in relation to the
redemptive works was already in Luther. See F. Oakley, “The Absolute and Ordained Power of God in
Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century Theology,” pp. 454-5. This also generally speaks for the sixteenth
and seventeenth century’s attitude toward omnipotence including Perkins and Charnock.
29 The quotation is from Muller, Christ and the Decree, p. 168; cf. Of God’s Free Grace and Man’s
Free will, pp. 723-4: “The will of God is the beginning or first cause of all things without exception,
and of all their motions and actions. … That all things in particular have their being from the will of
God, as from the first efficient cause, …”; cf. P. Miller, The New England Mind, pp. 14-5, 19.
30 Perkins, An Exposition upon the Epistle of Jude, in Workes III (ii), pp. 535-6.
31 For example, see Muller, Christ and the Decree, p. 167: “Perkins clearly hopes to maintain the
freedom of secondary causes while asserting the complete sovereignty of God in the work of
salvation; and this sovereignty will appear a priori, beginning with the intra-trinitarian determination
of the pattern of salvation and proceeding to the execution of the decree rather than as an a a
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II. Charnock’s Exegesis & Doctrine of the Power of God
Charnock shows an “explicit and detailed balance” in linking his exegetical
groundwork with logical or doctrinal concerns. This is especially prominent in his
treatment of the power of God.32 He draws two doctrinal implications from the
exegesis of Job 26:14 by contrasting Job’s idea of God’s omnipotence with Bildad’s
rather inferior perspective:33 first, God’s power is infinite and incomprehensible in
terms of both essence and nature; second, divine power appears in His works of
creation, providence, and redemption. 34 As Muller has argued, against the
misunderstanding of the identity of high orthodoxy, the relationship between the
biblical text and dogmatic formulation in Charnock’s treatment is a characteristic
example of the later seventeenth-century Puritan or Reformed orthodox homiletical
lecture that typified the whole theological genre of those days.35
A. Potentia Absoluta Dei and Potentia Ordinata Dei
Then he goes onto expound the characteristics of divine power regarding the
first point (in two directions). First, Charnock makes it clear that God’s power is
distinct from authority and dominion in that it signifies real “strength to act”
according to the etymological basis of the scriptural text. Of course this definitional
problem is related to the term potentia itself.36 The appropriate understanding of the
posteriori rationalization.”
32 See PRRD III, p. 527. Here Muller again ascribes the reason for such characteristics in Charnock to
“systematic exposition of the attributes belong[ing] to a series of technical sermons”.
33 “Lo, these are parts of his ways: but how little a portion is heard of him? But the thunder of his
power who can understand?”; cf. PRRD III, p. 528.
34 We find a similar analysis of the four ways of distinction of biblical presentation of the
omnipotence of God in Leigh: essential power as “affirmative”, external power as “effective”, difficult
or impossible power against His nature as “negative,” and metaphorical power as “symbolic”. For the
details, see PRRD III, p. 527, citing Leigh, Treatise of Divinity, II, xiv, p.107; and Charnock, Works II,
pp. 102-3.
35 See Muller’ excellent comment on Charnock about this point, PRRD III, p. 528: “The chapter [Job
26], therefore, in its own internal argument and in its distinctions, provides Charnock with the ideal
locus doctrinae for his discussion of divine power. This is hardly a case of ‘proof-texting’ — rather it
is a case of movement from exegesis to contemporary theological formulation on the grounds of the
accepted hermeneutic of the day. … The exegetical grounding of the doctrine is reflected in the
systematic exposition, evidencing in the larger systems a fundamental interrelationship of the
questions raised by the biblical text and various dogmatic questions.” For similar treatments, see
Leigh, Treatise, II.xiv, p.106 and Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii. 21. 3, cited therein.
36 Muller also points out this problem in relation to the wider Reformed scholastic context, PRRD III,
p. 529: “God is usually understood to be pure actus, fully actualized, having in him no potentia:
strictly speaking, there is in God no passive potency (potentia passiva) or possibility. … God must be
said to have power distinct from its exercise. … This is, moreover, an active power (potentia activa)
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relationship of divine essence and power based upon the doctrine of divine simplicity
is of significance here. We find Charnock regarding divine power as both “the
unconceivable excellency and activity of His essence” and “the divine essence
efficacious ad extra”: the identity of divine substance is, in essence, the most simple
being who, at the same time, emanates power in external operations in relation to the
creatures.37 Only God as the greatest simple being of a pure spiritual nature,
Charnock argues, can possess both the greatest unity in all perfections and the
greatest power.38 The Reformed orthodox theologians also generally agree on the
understanding of this two-sided aspect of divine power. As Muller comments about
this:
The divine omnipotence is not to be viewed in the rather restricted sense of
“power” as a force exerted upon a thing but in the larger and more inclusive
sense of an absolute and all-encompassing potency. … But if there is no
potency in God for God to become, there is a potency in God for creatures to
become, for creatures to be drawn from pure potentiality into actual existence.
God’s potentia is, then, a potency or potential for the being of creatures exerted
ad extra in view of the range of genuine possibility.39
Accordingly, the fact that Charnock also directly uses the term ad extra in his
definition of it is significant for the following discussions — this may be another
clear evidence of Charnock’s lack of speculative interest in the doctrine of the
attributes of God. This also shows that we need to grasp the appropriate meaning of
infinity with regard to the power of God in its objects and external activity.40 These
virtually “restrictive” elements of external power, extraneous to His omnipotency, are
necessary for a right understanding of the power of God in relation to the voluntas
Dei.41 In addition, Charnock mentions that this omnipotence does not even exclude
the ceding of power to creatures, despite the infinite distance from God the first
as distinct from a passive potency (potentia passiva).” Thus, the internal acts of the Godhead based
upon the personal relationship of the Trinity are not a subject of the divine power. See Muller, God,
Creation, and Providence, p. 202.
37 Works II, p. 110.
38 Works II, pp. 123-4.
39 PRRD III, p. 529.
40 For the detail, see PRRD III, p. 531.
41 Muller also explains it in a similar perspective on the wider trend of Reformed scholasticism: “But,
despite this primacy and all-inclusive extension of divine will even to unactualized possibilities, there
is a sense in which the divine will must be described as having limits: … The identification of God as
omnipotent never was taken to mean that God can, literally do anything. Since God can perform only
possible acts and the omnipotentia extends only to possibles, even ‘miracles are possibles,’ not
impossibles,” in PRRD III, p. 532, quoting Stapfer, Inst. Theol., I.iii, §396.
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cause to the creatures as second causes.42 At the same time such power is clearly
shown in God’s “immediate creation” from nothing, which is contrasted with a
mediate one using matter. “All natural and rational agents” produce the latter.43
Second, Charnock explores the concept of both the absolute and the ordinate
power of God in depth, because for him this division of theological terms is critical
for an understanding of divine power. Charnock defines them as follows:
Absolute, is that power whereby God is able to do that which he will not do, but
is possible to be done; ordinate, is that power whereby God doth that which he
hath decreed to do, that is, which he hath ordained or appointed to be exercised;
which are not distinct powers, but one and the same power: his ordinate power
is a part of his absolute; for if he had not a power to do everything that he could
will, he might not have a power to do everything that he doth will.44
The important reason for this distinction lies in the proper understanding of God’s
decree that causes His will to act: the divine decree interlinks absolute power with
ordinate power on the basis of the divine wisdom and will. Although there is no gap
between the ability to bring about an act and the act itself in God, yet His absolute
power as “the principle of the action” greater than the ordained power actually
exists.45 God’s absolute power (to do everything that He could will) exists as no
other than the divine essence, which is wider than actual willing in its scope. Yet all
of His decretal will involves other attributes including wisdom. Accordingly, the
identity of God’s power should be grasped in light of the relationship of the intellect
and will of God as in the case of faculty psychology.46
Such an attitude also reflects Charnock’s affirmative appropriation of the late
medieval idea of potentia absoluta in a Scotistic direction: in pursuing the defence of
both God’s “absolute” freedom from the created order and the “absoluteness” of the
eternal decree. He does not, however, lose a proper balance with Thomistic elements
42 Works II, pp. 110, 116; cf. pp. 121-3. This also reflects Charnock’s acceptance of Thomistic
theology to a certain degree in that he sees God as the foundation of all power of creatures because of
His being the first cause; cf. PRRD III, p. 525.
43 The quotations are from Works II, pp. 128, 129. Charnock explains such creative power in detail in
pp. 125-32.
44 Works II, p. 105.
45 Works II, pp. 106-7. He also names absolute power “the essence of His power” and ordinate power
“the exercise of His power”, in Works II, p. 116.
46 See Works II, p. 107: “In us there are three orders, of understanding, will, power; and accordingly
three acts, counsel, resolution, execution; which, though they are distinct in us, are not really distinct
in God.” On the Reformed orthodox’s overall Thomistic tendency in understanding the relation
between the intellect and will in their orders in God as the Supreme being, see PRRD III, pp. 444-5; cf.
PRRD III, p. 448.
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in considering the basis of divine power by saying: “His wisdom is the director of his
action. His will orders, his wisdom guides, and his power effects. … The will of God
is the root of all, the wisdom of God is the copy of all, and the power of God is the
framer of all”.47 This point brings out a similar answer to the problem of absolute
power in the discussion of the term potentia, previously mentioned in both its
intrinsic or essential and externally operative dimensions. At the same time we see
Charnock, in his schema, maintains firmly the rule of disallowing any inconsistency
in the area between divine knowledge and will. (We have seen that this was a key
argument in his treatment of the divine intellect in the preceding chapter.) According
to Charnock and the Reformed orthodox (despite the seeming discrepancies in the
logical or literal dimensions of the statement itself), the proper understanding of
“freedom” in divine omnipotence can stand only on the basis of the “eternal decree”
— in a consideration of His relationship to the created world — irrespective of
whether there is an acknowledgment of radical divine freedom in the late medieval
sense or not: the extrinsic gap between divine power and knowledge de facto does
not exist!48 Here we see that the importance of the doctrine of divine simplicity is
once again manifest. The emphasis on the ad extra dimension in dealing with the
doctrine of the attributes of God in Puritan theology seems, in fact, to encourage such
a tendency.49
Given the above, what would be the specific historical or theological factors
in the re-emergence of the controversy over the term potentia absoluta in the
Reformed camp of the seventeenth-century? According to Muller’s analysis of
Mastricht’s comment on this matter, there were three erroneous ideas current among
the various schools: the Socinians, who asserted the incapacity of God’s doing
contradictory things because of the limitation of His essence; the Weigelian fanatics,
who thought of God’s absolute power as quite literal (including contradictories); and
the Cartesians, who imagined an extremely radical freedom of God (even beyond the
Occamistic level) in this power — on the basis of the “eternal indifference of God”
47 Works II, pp. 107-8; cf. Leigh, Treatise of Divinity (London, 1646), II. xiv, pp. 106-7. Muller
similarly deals with this point in a wider Reformed orthodox context: PRRD III, pp. 532-3.
48 Cf. PRRD III. pp. 533-4. Especially see this comment therein: “The object of His potency is the
realm of the possible even as the object of his omniscience is the realm of the knowable.” Italics are
mine; Leigh, Treatise, II. xiv, p. 108, also cited in PRRD III, pp. 534-5.
49 This does not mean that the medieval scholastic understanding of this distinction lacks in
consideration of the ad extra dimension. Again, we see the danger of the simple categorisation of
“negative theology”. Also for a summary of the medieval intellectual history since the beginning of
this distinction in Hugh of St. Victor, see Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 203; Oberman,
“Some Notes on Nominalism: with Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance,” p. 56.
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to the previously created orders.50 The Cartesian view, especially, concerning God’s
“impossibility” (not considering any nuances from God’s part or the creature’s) was a
key target of attack for the Reformed because of its subtlety. We see that the
Cartesian view seems to be subject to criticism in the following argument of
Charnock:
The object of His absolute power is all things possible; such things that imply
not a contradiction, such that are not repugnant in their own nature to be done,
and such as are not contrary to the nature and perfections of God to be done. …
God could have chose whether he would create the world, and after it is created
he hath power to dissolve it; but after it was created, and when it is dissolved, it
will be eternally true that the world was created, and that it was dissolved; for it
is impossible that that which was once true should ever be false. If it be true that
the world was created, it will for ever be true that God hath decreed, it is
impossible in its own nature to be true that God hath not decreed.51
Yet the meaning of the “possibility” of all things in this area of the definition of
absolute power by no means reaches the extent at which the doctrine of divine
simplicity could be impaired. The act of God in the temporal dimension is invariably
to be considered in terms of the created world as the object of potency (against divine
immutability) only on the basis of the eternal decree of God as pure act or simple
being.52 In other words, the Puritan and the Reformed scholastics endeavoured to
defend the absoluteness of divine omnipotence, not by its mere arbitrariness, but
rather by His wisdom, will, and righteousness. Only then the meaning of divine
freedom could be appropriately vindicated in the light of the harmony of all the
divine attributes.
B. The Ordained Power in Providence, Creation, and Redemption
Therefore, thirdly, we need to explore Charnock’s account of the potentia
ordinata Dei against the background of the previous discussions on absolute power.
For Charnock, ordinate power means a divine omnipotence that is in relation to His
creatures as the possible or factibile objects of the act of divine will ad extra.53 This
approach resolves the problem of sin and evil, and the infiniteness of power from
50 For detailed explanation, see PRRD III, p. 535.
51 Works II, p. 105; cf. Leigh, Treatise, II. xiv, pp. 108-9, cited in PRRD III, p. 536; Turretin, Institutes,
vol. I, iii. 21. 8-9, pp. 245-6.
52 Cf. PRRD III, p. 536.
53 Works II, p. 109.
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God as “most free agent” at the same time.54 Both providential and moral aspects are
also implicated in the distinction between absolute and ordinate power.55
At this point we especially need to note, then, the second direction of
Charnock’s argument — concerning the power of God seen in the works of
providence and redemption based upon the eternal decree that sets the scope of His
ordination. For the Reformed orthodox and the Puritans, the term potentia ordinata is
originally based upon a covenantal (including and also beyond the salvific level)
understanding, derived from the Scriptural relation between God and all the created
orders.56 To be sure, as has been mentioned before, this background in covenantal
theory is not totally free from the trajectory of its late medieval treatment.57
Charnock also discusses this power in a providential and redemptive context within
the boundary of the covenantal idea.58
With regard to providence, Charnock first affirms again that all government
of the created world is God’s “act of the understanding, will, and power”. Although
he does not give priority either to the divine intellect or to the divine power in
providential works,59 this subordination of power is to the will rather than to the
intellect. This is because ordained power is, practically, “the constant efficacy of
54 Van Asselt’s summary on the relation between sin and divine will in Cocceius’ view helps us to
understand this point: “Cocceius Speaks of a divine decree to allow sin, yet it cannot be said of sin
itself that God wills or commands it. Therefore one must distinguish between God’s positive will and
his permissive will, or his decree of permission. ‘Willing’ means approving, concurring in something,
and ordaining as a means or an end. But by no means can this be said of sin”, in The Federal Theology
of Johannes Cocceius (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 169, citing Cocceius, Summa Theologiae, cap. 10 §43.
55 See Works II, p. 116: “Although his absolute power could have made every creature better, yet his
ordinate power, which in every step was regulated by his wisdom, made everything best for his
designed intention;” and see also the detailed discussions of God’s impossibility because of both
divine ordination and immutability in pp. 117-21.
56 PRRD III, p. 537, citing Thomas Manton, Sermons upon Mark 10:17-27, in Works 14, p. 86; cf. Ps.
119:91.
57 The recent interpretation and revision of the ideas about late medieval Scotism and nominalism
also confirms this point. For a good summary of the difference between the original interpretation and
the revisionists, see Steinmetz, Calvin in context, p. 43. The problem of how to understand such
covenantal basis in Scotus like Occamist yielded a difference in the views. Although Richard Cross
states that there is no direct reference to the covenant (“the idea of pact between God and creatures”)
in Scotus, Oberman and Steinmetz argue that Occamistic background of the view of the covenant
includes a Scotistic aspect especially in relation to Scotus’ idea of the covenant in its soteriological
dimension, e.g. habit, infusion of grace, and merit etc. See R. Cross, Duns Scotus, pp. 175-6; Oberman,
The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 166ff; idem, “‘Iustitia Christi’ and ‘Iustitia Dei’: Luther and
the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification”, Harvard Theological Review 59 (1966), pp. 1-26, esp. see p.
4; and David Steinmetz, Misercordia Dei: The Theology of Johannes Von Staupitz in its Late Medieval
Setting (Leiden: Brill, 1968), pp. 52-3.
58 We have, in preceding discussion, already identified a similar tendency in Perkins.
59 Works II, pp. 132-3: “It is a hard matter to determine which is most necessary. Wisdom stands in as
much need of power to perfect, as power doth of wisdom, to model and draw out a scheme; though
wisdom directs, power must effect.”
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omnipotent will”.60 Such a relative priority of the will over the intellect in the
doctrine of providence is justifiable in Charnock’s schema because providence is
naturally intertwined with God’s dominion. Along with the results of our
investigations in previous chapters, this points inevitably to Charnock’s inheritance
of voluntaristic tendencies from Scotus or the nominalists at this juncture. Charnock
then goes on to expound the appearance of ordinate power in providence. In dealing
with “natural” government,61 especially, he touches upon the operation of divine
power both as “sustaining power” in preservation and as “co-working power” in the
motion of all creatures. He states:
[Preservation] is one and the same action invariably continued, and obtaining its
force every moment. The same action whereby he created them of nothing, and
which every moment hath a virtue to produce a thing out of nothing, if it were
not yet extant in the world, it remains the same without any diminution
throughout the whole time wherein anything doth remain in the world. …
Whatsoever nature works, God works in nature; nature is the instrument, God is
the supporter, director, mover of nature; … They are our works subjectively,
efficiently, as second causes; God’s works originally, concurrently.62
As we have seen, God’s preservative power is named “a continual creation”. The
influence of God the first cause upon creatures as second causes in their motions is
called divine “powerful concurrence”.63 Yet both the causal schema and natural law
in the created world are maintained along with this operation of ordinary divine
power (potentia ordinaria), except in the case of the occurrence of extraordinary
divine power (potentia extraordinaria) despite the fact that the latter is within the
realm of the potentia ordinata.64 To be sure we can sense that Charnock also
60 Works II, p. 107. We even find a very Scotistic characteristic in the following statement in ibid.:
“His will is the supreme cause of everything that stands up in time, and all things receive a being as he
wills them.”
61 Charnock divides providential works into three dimensions: natural providence, moral government
of human heart and actions, gracious government upon the church. See Works II, p. 133. This also
similarly corresponds to Perkins’ division of providence into both general and special the latter which
includes a soteriological aspect.
62 Works II, pp. 135, 137.
63 Works II, pp. 135, 137. This doctrine of God’s causal priority in relation to the action of second
causes is differently called depending upon whether one is Thomist (praemotio physica) or nominalist
(the concursus Dei). The choice of the word also seems to reflect the Reformed orthodox and Puritan,
including Charnock, general preference of Scotism over Thomism in this idea, despite the diversity of
respective theologians. Cf. Steinmetz, Misercordia Dei, pp. 45-6.
64 Muller also notes this point in the wider Reformed literature. See PRRD III, p. 537. Interestingly,
Charnock nevertheless asserts that we should remember that the ordinary power of God is in some
way no less wondrous than His extraordinary power: “Miracles indeed affect more, because they
testify the immediate operation of God without the concurrence of second causes; not that there is
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displays a tendency to conflate traditional power distinctions with this division of
ordinary and extraordinary power — especially in relation to providential works.65
In short, what Charnock and the Reformed orthodox Puritans wanted to emphasise in
this argument is the fact that only a consideration of ordained power in creation and
providence on the basis of the sovereignty of God’s will can yield an appropriate
understanding of His absolute power,66 despite the existence of both causal schema
and concurrence.
In contrast to the Reformed camp, Arminius regarded the work of creation as
rendering God’s summum bonum on the basis of His intellect. In this, he is leaning
towards a Thomistic position, which necessarily denies the existence of absolute
power and accepts only the concept of ordained power. Thus we see Charnock and
the Puritan or Reformed scholastic understanding of creation and providence shows a
characteristically affirmative attitude (against the Arminian position) towards
Scotistic or late medieval voluntarism despite the use of a Thomistic infrastructure as
the foundation of its theological formulation.67 This difference, furthermore, has
arguably much more to do with the disagreement over the concept of divine freedom
between the Reformed and the Arminians: a difference derived from how each school
grasped the identity of the psychological faculties and the dialectics between the
intellect (which is wider in its scope than the will) and the will.68 Charnock and the
Reformed orthodox, namely, argued that the divine freedom and sovereignty are
certainly the foundation of contingency in the created order, which is evidence of the
influence of the ideas of Scotus or late medieval Augustinian thought.69
For Charnock, the redemptive works also need God’s ordained but infinite
power, supported by His infinite wisdom. The trinitarian and pietistic emphases are
more of the power of God shining in them than in the other,” in Works II, p. 139.
65 Such a tendency was widespread in the sixteenth and seventeenth century in both the Protestant and
the Catholic camp. According to Francis Oakley, the Suarezian view of divine omnipotence was also
related to this tendency within the common scholastic background. For details, see F. Oakley, “The
Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century Theology,” pp. 452-5.
66 For example, on the errors of Arminius and the Arminians with respect to this point, see Muller,
God, Creation, Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius, pp. 228-9; idem, “God, Predestination,
and the Integrity of the Created Order: A Note on Patterns in Arminius’ Theology,” in Later Calvinism,
ed. W. F. Graham (Kirksville: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1994), pp. 431-46.
67 For example, Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii. 14-16, pp. 218-31; Leigh, Systeme, II. vii, pp. 197-9;
John Owen, A Display of Arminianism, in The Works of John Owen, 16 vols. Johnston & Hunter 1850-
1853; repr. (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth, 1967), vol. 10, ch. 5; H. Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics,
pp. 83-92. See esp. pp. 83-4.
68 The Reformed orthodox position saw freedom as the faculties of the soul to do what one wants,
whereas the Arminians regarded it as the ability to choose autonomously to do or not to do what one
should do. For detail, see PRRD III, pp. 447-8.
69 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 449-50; and see the literature cited therein for details.
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quite remarkable here, especially in Charnock’s treatment of the redemptive aspects,
which he sustains on the basis of wide exegesis. Let us briefly explore his arguments
on this side. In the christological dimension, we particularly need to note Charnock’s
exploration of the divine power revealed in the person of Christ. Although the
incarnation was a mediate creation distinct from creation ex nihilo, yet the manner of
conceiving was supernatural through the operation of the Holy Spirit. The third
person of the Triune God secures the holiness of Christ’s humanity by making it
“supernaturalised and elevated” in spite of His assumption of our sinful nature by
way of imputation. Divine power is also shown in the union of the divine and human
natures in Christ by the “indwelling of the Deity in the humanity”.70 Nevertheless
this union does not deviate from the axiom finitum non capax infiniti.71 At this point
Charnock attempts to deal with the doctrine of redemption comprehensively in terms
of the power of God. Above all, the reception of this doctrine of a crucified mediator
is evidence for the operation of divine omnipotence on the believer’s heart, despite
its paradoxical nature.72
In addition, the application of redemption in time most clearly evidences the
appearance of divine power. Here Charnock seeks to expound the whole process of
the infusion of grace in the believer’s life through “the power of God to salvation
(Rom 1:16)”. The combination of the gospel as instrument and the divine
omnipotence as efficient cause for conversion is conspicuous because it is “the power
above nature” as well as prevailing against corrupt habits in the human heart.73 It is
also notable that Charnock puts emphasis upon the uniqueness of the divine power in
the manner of conversion: the efficacy of divine power in salvation and the
autonomy of the soul faculties in the reception of it do not conflict with each other.74
The powerfulness and “sweetness” of this divine power in the infusion of grace
coexist without conflict despite its “irresistibleness”. In fact the divine power of
preserving grace in the believer after “the first infusion” is critical. Only such an
operation of grace can assist in our struggle to approach “a perfectly sanctified
nature” through the life of piety. In other words, in Charnock’s schema, this power is
70 Works II, pp. 147-8.
71 Works II, p. 150: “Finite can never by any mixture be changed into infinite, nor infinite into finite.”
72 Works II, p. 154.
73 Works II, pp. 159-60. Here in some way Charnock names this operation “the divine conquest”.
74 For example, see Works II, pp. 161-2: “The almighty virtue displays itself invincibly, yet without
constraint, compelling the will without offering violence to it, and making it cease to be will: …
making it will where before it nilled; removing the corrupt nature of the will without invading the
created nature and rights of the faculty; not working in us against the physical nature of the will, but
‘working to will,’ Phil. ii. 13.”
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necessary for the every stage of “a continued regeneration” in the believer. At the
same time we see that the believers’ spiritual warfare in the midst of the dialectic
between indwelling sin and continuously infused grace is utterly impossible without
the continuing exertion of this divine power.75
C. Summary of Charnock’s Exegesis and Doctrine of the Power of God
As we have seen in this section, Charnock’s idea of God’s omnipotence, with
its critical reception of the traditional scholastic distinctions regarding that power,
reflects a successfully combined formulation of “Reformed” scholasticism and
Puritan piety in the historical and theological context of high orthodoxy. That is, the
problem of how to understand the “almightiness” of God can only be resolved by the
vindication of the doctrine of divine simplicity coupled with a trinitarian theological
system particularly related to the ad extra dimension.
III. Charnock’s Exegesis & Doctrine of the Dominion of God:
The Meaning of “Absoluteness” in the Decree of the Triune God & the Pactum
Salutis
Within a similar context of the exercise of the divine will, the Puritans and
Reformed scholastics investigated the aspect of God’s omnipotence as potestas (rule
or authority). Here we discover again that the traditional concepts of potentia
absoluta/ordinata Dei are amalgamated within the underlying framework of divine
sovereignty. Based upon the exegesis of Ps. 103:19,76 Charnock derives the doctrine
of God’s sovereignty as a threefold dominion over the whole created world: “natural”
dominion over whole creatures as creator, “gracious” dominion over the elect as
redeemer, founded upon the covenant of grace, and “glorious” dominion over both
the elect and the damned on the basis of final judgment.77 As in the case of our
discussion concerning divine omnipotence, the foundation of this dominion lies in all
the aspects of covenantal relationship (of both nature and grace) between God and
the created world. That is, the sovereignty of God is not a metaphysical or
speculative doctrine operating in a vacuum but is substantial in that it reveals the will
of God through His temporal works that are the basis of it. At the same time the
75 Works II, p. 163.
76 “The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heavens; and his kingdom ruleth over all.”
77 Works II, pp. 406-7.
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Puritans and Reformed orthodox sought to avoid treating this covenantal aspect in
the dominion of God in a synergistic or semi-pelagian way. This is what the
Arminians had done in using the concept of scientia media or in abusing the idea of
divine concurrence.78 On the one hand, according to Charnock’s division, at a
“gracious” level of dominion God’s sovereignty can be defined as an ordained
dominion, which is a combined rule of the law and the Gospel revealed through the
Scriptures. On the other hand, at a “glorious” level of dominion, God’s sovereignty
may be defined as absolute, decreeing both election and reprobation.79
Let us examine Charnock’s detailed account of this doctrine of dominion
(sovereignty). He first contrasts dominion as God’s “moral power” with omnipotence
as “physical” in the execution of decrees: i.e., sovereignty is the comprehensive
authority of God to which ‘lawfulness’ is attributed. The whole aspect of God’s
essence and nature, the results of divine external works, and the existence of humans
as rational beings evidence the existence of this sovereignty.80 Both the excellency
of His nature and the benefits given from creation, providence, and redemption as
well as the divine acts themselves are the pillars that this doctrine is founded upon.
The reason for this is that sovereignty is, ironically, a relative attribute that ought to
be reflected through the relationship with creatures that God has made in His external
works.81
At the same time, in Charnock’s view, the characteristics of this sovereignty,
focusing on its absoluteness, also require to be expounded, to make clear the concept
of potentia absoluta Dei underlying it. God’s dominion is absolute in terms of
freedom, law, supremacy, and irresistibleness.82 According to Charnock, although
the ordained decretal will is the only cause of each event, there can be countless
possible hypothetical alternatives in the dispensation of God because of the absolute
aspect of this sovereignty. Yet this absoluteness is regulated according to His decree
by other divine attributes. In other words, the concept of the potentia ordinata Dei is
to be based upon the exercise of this dominion. The sovereign will, in harmony with
the rule of wisdom, righteousness, and goodness, extends over the existence and
operation of all visible and invisible creatures.83 Charnock points out that the
78 See PRRD III, p. 538; cf. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, ch. 12, esp. pp. 253-68.
79 Cf. PRRD III, p. 539, citing Rijssen, Summa theol., III. xlvii.
80 Works II, pp. 407-10.
81 Works II, pp. 410-4.
82 Works II, pp. 414-8.
83 See Works II, pp. 418-24. Especially the problem of whether the result of God’s absolute
sovereignty is invariably and absolutely righteous or not has also been a source of debate in relation to
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creation of human beings as free agents does not conflict with the genuineness of
divine sovereignty. He argues this persuasively in relation to the human faculties of
the soul:
God only can infuse habits into the soul, to capacitate it to act nobly and
generously. His sovereignty is seen in regard of the inclinations of men’s wills.
No creature can immediately work upon the will, to guide it to what point he
pleaseth, though mediately it may, by proposing reasons which may master the
understanding, and thereby determine the will; but God bows the hearts of men
by the efficacy of his dominion to what centre he pleaseth. … The second cause
in every motion depends upon the first, and that will being a second cause, may
be furthered or hindered in its inclinations or executions by God;84
This also shows that Charnock endeavours to defend thoroughly God’s “absolute”
dominion while maintaining a balance with its character as “ordained”. That is, even
the absoluteness of sovereignty is revealed to us, paradoxically, through each
revelation of decretal ordination — along with the acts of second causes including
the Scriptures. Only then we can approach the mind and will of God. Within the
boundary of such a Thomistic causal scheme, the working of the human heart is no
exception — both human autonomy and divine control are maintained regardless of
one’s being a believer or a reprobate.85
After dealing with the dialectic of the absolute and relative dimensions in the
sovereignty of God, Charnock goes on to investigate fully how the dominion of God
is manifested in specific areas of divine acts. Following the account of the sovereign
economy of God in respect of laws as both legislator and judge,86 he touches upon
the doctrine of predestination in relation to the dominion of God as the proprietor of
“spiritual” (as opposed to material) resources.87 From an exegesis of Rom 9:13-20,
he argues that election and reprobation are the act of an absolute decretive will of
predestination that belongs to God’s dominion. To illustrate the absolute sovereignty
of God, Charnock continues to emphasise the priority of the decree of election over
other decretal contrivances, especially over the christological dimension, in the
Luther and Calvin as well. For detailed discussion, see Susan Schreiner, “Exegesis and Double Justice
in Calvin’s Sermons on Job,” Church History 58/3 (1989), pp. 322-38.
84 Works II, pp. 425-6. Here he illustrates abundant exegetical evidences for this argument.
85 Charnock stresses this respect reiteratively, Works I, p. 451: “[God] puts what inclinations he
pleaseth into the will, stores it with what habits he please, whether natural or supernatural, … The will
of man is a finite principle, and therefore subject to him who hath an infinite sovereignty over all
things.”
86 See Works II, pp. 427-33.
87 Cf. PRRD III, p. 538; Leigh, Treatise of Divinity, II. vi, pp. 52-5.
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logical order of salvation.88 This coincides with his criticism of the Roman Catholic
view of the mass, which is founded on a different understanding of the causal
mechanism of election in relation to both the merit and the work of Christ.89 At the
same time, for Charnock, this discussion covers the relationship of foreknowledge,
faith, grace, and works. It also clearly shows his critique of Arminian soteriology
especially in the understanding of justification and sanctification.90 Consequently,
we see that the appropriate establishment of the relationship among these mutual
doctrines reinforces his argument for the absolute dominion of God as the single and
“original foundation” of the acts of both election and reprobation. Equally, the
necessity of growth in grace in the “pilgrim’s progress” towards holiness does not
conflict with divine sovereignty, despite the fact that there is a necessary distinction
of the extent of disposing sanctifying grace in the individual believer according to the
providential governance of God.91
Charnock’s investigation of the redemptive aspects of the dominion of God in
terms of its trinitarian perspective is also remarkable. He emphasises the priority of
God the Father over the Son in both the decretal foundation of redemption and the
designation of Christ as the mediator.92 Yet this does not impair the divinity of Christ
but rather evidences the trinitarian order of both the decree and the economy in the
works of redemption that manifest His sovereignty.93 Charnock affirms the existence
of the covenant of redemption as a transaction between the Father and the Son in
eternity in relation to Christ’s role as both mediator and redeemer:
88 E.g., Works II, p. 434: “The decree of sending Christ did not precede, but followed in order of
nature, the determination of choosing some. When men were chosen as the subjects for glory, Christ
was chosen as the means for the bringing them to glory.”
89 Works II, p. 434: “If the decree of election falls not under the merit of Christ’s passion, as the
procuring cause, it cannot fall under the merit of any part of the corrupted mass. … The choice was
not merely in Christ as the moving cause, — that the apostle asserts to be the good pleasure of his will,
— but in Christ, as the means of conveying to the chosen ones the fruits of their election.”
90 Works II, p. 435-6: “Nor could it be any foresight of works to be done in time by them, or of faith,
that might determine God to choose them. … God foresaw no rational act in man before the act of his
will to give him reason, nor foresees faith in any, before the act of his will determining to give him
faith: Eph. ii. 8, ‘Faith is the gift of God.’ … If faith be the fruit of election, the prescience of faith
doth not influence the electing act of God:”
91 Works II, p. 435: “His choice of them was to a holiness, not for a holiness preceding his
determination, Eph. i. 4. He hath chosen us, ‘that we might be holy’ before him; he ordained us ‘to
good works,’ not for them, Eph. ii. 10. … Good works suppose grace, and a good and right habit in the
person, as rational acts suppose reason”; see also ibid., p. 440.
92 See Works II, p. 457: “In redemption a sovereignty is exercised over the Son, the second person in
the Trinity, one equal with the Father in essence and works, … The whole gospel is nothing else but a
declaration of his sovereign pleasure concerning Christ, and concerning us in him; … God [the Father]
is superior to Christ, and of a more eminent dignity; in regard of the constituting him mediator, Christ
is subject to God, as the body to the head.”
93 Works II, p. 458.
183
It is not so clearly manifested when this command was given, whether after the
incarnation of Christ, or at the point of his constitution as mediator, upon the
transaction between the Father and the Son concerning the affair of redemption:
‘The promise was given before the world began,’ Titus i. 2. Might not the
precepts be given before the world began, to Christ, as considered in the quality
of mediator and redeemer? Precepts and promises usually attend one another;
every covenant is made up of both. Christ, considered here as the Son of God in
the divine nature, was not capable of a command or promise, but considered in
the relation of mediator between God and man, he was capable of both.94
Such a view of the eternal pactum salutis, which was not widely prevalent in Perkins’
times, clearly demonstrates Charnock’s balanced understanding of both the
immanent Trinity ad intra and economic Trinity ad extra on the basis of the
covenantal and christological integrity that converge in the doctrine of God’s
sovereignty. For Charnock, through theological inference from this, Christ’s kingly
office is derived naturally after His office as priest because He is the redeemer
possessing “sovereign dignity” Himself as the second person of the Triune God.95
In summary, although the dominion of God is manifested in the whole area of
nature, grace, and glory, we have seen that Charnock particularly concentrates upon
the “gracious” (redemptive and supernatural) dimension that stands on christological,
covenantal, and trinitarian foundations, in order to emphasise the “absolute”
character of this sovereignty reflecting both His power and wisdom. Consequently,
the doctrines of predestination and sanctification coexist without paradox on the
basis of the “dual” soteriological schema in the Puritan and Reformed orthodox
tradition. Against the synergistic schools, the role of the covenant of redemption in
consolidating the trinitarian foundation of a monergistic doctrine of God can only be
grasped through the “perception” of the “biblical” God who both exists and acts in
both eternal and historical dimensions.
IV. Charnock’s Praxis concerning the Power & Dominion of God:
Covenantal Faith and Obedience to the Triune God
Through investigation in the practical part, we discover that the whole
discussion of divine power and sovereignty in Charnock take place in the light of the
94 Works II, p. 460.
95 Works II, p. 460.
184
theme of our knowledge of God (theologia nostra and ectypa) as the unity of
“doctrine” and “piety”. This is given only through revelation based upon His
ordained power. He makes it clear that Christ as the second person of the Triune God
is the subject of this omnipotence. All the works of God the Father ad extra (creation,
providence, and redemption) are done with the Son who possesses “natural and
essential power” in the same manner as the Father. Within the seventeenth century
context, for Charnock, although Christ is certainly our mediator, His status as the
creator and governor of the world who is possessed of an efficacious will was
particularly important.96 Charnock’s emphasis upon the trinitarian aspect of divine
power continues in the explanation of the deity of the Holy Spirit, who is another
subject or person of this power in the Trinity. Along with providing abundant
exegetical evidences of the omnipotence of the third person of the Triune God in all
divine works ad extra, especially prominent in the peculiar act of “changing the heart,
and sanctifying a polluted nature”, he sums up by declaring: “The Father, Son, Spirit,
are one principle in creation, resurrection, and all the works of omnipotence.”97
Charnock also deals with various pietistic aspects of the doctrine of God’s
power. He points out that, as omnipotence is one of the ‘two pillars’ along with
goodness in religion and worship, we still need to strive to avoid neglecting the
practice of the means of grace established by divine ordination — if we truly respect
His omnipotence. 98 The actuality of divine power mutually assisted by other
attributes confirms our assurance of the solidity of both the covenant and
perseverance based upon the unerring fulfillment of all His promises.99 Charnock
also maintains that the doctrine of divine omnipotence is to be a “concurrent
foundation” upon which our trust is placed, along with the Word of truth itself. At the
same time the consciousness of such power as the basis of “the fear of God”
contributes to the growth of the life of sanctification.100 That is, the true knowledge
of God the almighty needs our faith and obedience.
In a similar pattern (of the above-mentioned faith and obedience), Charnock
endeavours to elicit various doctrinal points of piety in the practical section
concerning God’s dominion. He deals with the problem of sin as nothing less than
96 For detailed background and the related argument, see Works II, pp. 164-8; cf. PRRD III, p. 539.
97 Works II, p. 169.
98 Works II, pp. 171, 177-8; cf. PRRD III, p. 539.
99 For example: see Works II, p. 179: “This power in God is always awakened by goodness and
conducted by wisdom; it is never exercised by self-will and passion, but according to the immutable
rule of his own nature, which is righteousness.”
100 Works II, pp. 184-7.
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injury to the dominion of God. With regard to this, he excoriates the Roman
Catholics, Arminians, and Socinians for their fatal errors regarding the core biblical
doctrines of grace.101 For Charnock, as the acknowledgement of divine sovereignty
is the initial phase of practicing all the duties of creatures, the arbitrariness of
religious practices which do not consider whether they are in line with the Scriptures
becomes the object of his severe criticism.102 Contrary to these “sins”, in a way, the
very sovereignty of God allows the federal relationship between Him and the elect at
the same time, which is the basis of divine love and “grace”. Thus he particularly
stresses comprehensive meditation on this doctrine to promote the growth of the
theological virtues during life lived in covenantal union with the sovereign God.103
Because of this federal relationship with the Sovereign God, Charnock
summarises the glory we need to ascribe to Him through exegetical analysis of Rom.
11:36 (based upon the Aristotelian theory of cause) as follows: “‘For of him, and
through him, and to him, are all things, to whom be glory for ever:’ of him, as the
efficient cause; through him, as the preserving cause; to him, as the final cause.”104
Thus the obedience of the believer is naturally demanded along with patience
because of this glorious dominion of God.105 Furthermore, all the faculties of the
soul should be dedicated to the sovereign God if the operation of them is to be a
sincere, inward, and joyful obedience, as Charnock writes: “Our understanding must
take pleasure in knowing him, our wills delightfully embrace him, and our actions be
cheerfully squared to him.”106
In summary, in this practical section, Charnock has shown that the doctrine of
the absoluteness of power and sovereignty in the Triune God does not exclude human
participation towards the growth of piety through a Scripture-based means of grace.
In addition, during this process, knowledge of God as true religion should invariably
101 See Works II, p. 464: “Why are the decrees of election and preterition denied? Because men will
not acknowledge God the sovereign disposer of his creature. Why is effectual calling and efficacious
grace denied? Because they will not allow God the proprietor and distributor of his own goods. Why
is the satisfaction of Christ denied? Because they will not allow God a power to vindicate his own law
in what way he pleaseth. Most of the errors of men may be resolved into a denial of God’s
sovereignty.” cf. ibid., p. 475 on ‘merit’.
102 For example, Works II, p. 466: “To impose laws upon the conscience, which Christ hath not
imposed, hath deservedly been thought the very spirit of antichrist; it may be called also the spirit of
anti-God. …” In fact this seems to reflect the later seventeenth century English context that Charnock
experienced: the period of Great persecution (1660-1688).
103 See Works II, pp. 484-7.
104 Works II, p. 490.
105 Charnock points out that the conscience of rational creatures (especially in the case of the
regenerate) links the doctrine of sovereignty with obedience. See Works II, p. 492.
106 Works II, p. 497.
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exhibit the movement or act of all the faculties of the soul to the glory of almighty
God who is sovereign.
Conclusion
We need, first, to summarise again the trajectory of medieval scholastic ideas
which lay behind the ideas of Charnock and Perkins concerning God’s power and
sovereignty, in order to elicit some concluding remarks within the larger context of
Puritan and Reformed orthodoxy. Duns Scotus acknowledged a distinction between
absolute and ordained power without emphasising the further concept of “covenant”
while at the same time denying the existence of a special, separate, or “literally”
absolute power.107 Occamists accepted the concept of absolute power at a radical
level beyond divine ordination, but at the same time they endeavoured to limit its
arbitrariness by devising the idea of God’s own established covenant with the created
orders. The end result of each of these positions does not seem, de facto, to be
significantly different: both positions pointed to the understanding of divine
omnipotence as “operationalising”, unifying, and single.
On the whole, the Reformed orthodox theologians seem to have taken up a
position eclectically between the two (Scotist and Occammist). Undoubtedly they
stressed divine sovereignty and freedom as well as human responsibility by using the
Thomistic causal scheme along with the idea of contingency and concurrence as the
underlying framework of these voluntaristic theological formulations.108 This shows
their unbiased view of a voluntaristic approach without losing the corresponding
intellectual priority in God. In other words, Charnock and Perkins as Puritan and
Reformed orthodox theologians accepted neither the radical detachment of the
relation of the transcendent God and the created orders nor the inevitable relatedness
between the two to the extent of limiting divine freedom. They invariably wanted to
perceive God’s hidden will within the boundary of the revealed will given only by
the ad extra exercises.109
107 Alexander Broadie has argued that Scotus’ Scotism should be viewed not as a pure voluntarism
but rather as one located between intellectualism and voluntarism. Even if his analysis is correct, the
eclectic characteristic of seventeenth century Reformed thought remains the same. See A. Broadie,
The Shadow of Scotus: Philosophy and Faith in Pre-Reformation Scotland (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1995).
108 Cf. R. Cross, Duns Scotus, pp. 59, 177-8; Perry Miller, The New England Mind, pp. 207-35, see
esp. p. 224.
109 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 462-3; Miller, The New England Mind, pp. 157-62, 165, 168.
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At the same time our appraisal above in terms of the distinctions of power
also confirms the underlying continuity of the core intellectual heritage of the
doctrine of the divine will. This continuity is based on the “scholastic” framework of
the medieval era coming via the Reformers (i.e. Calvin and even Luther) and
inherited by the Puritan and Reformed orthodox. Especially in the English context of
our cases, this continuity has flowed from Perkins in early orthodoxy to Charnock in
the era of high orthodoxy.110 We basically need to consider the fact that this
continuity in the doctrine of divine omnipotence and sovereignty stems from their
effort to protect the fundamental postulation of the orthodox doctrine of God on an
exegetical basis: God’s will is unchangeably “single” because His essence cannot be
other than a simple one. The doctrine of the divine will along with a particular
emphasis on soteriological concerns maintained a proper balance and tension in the
dual aspects of the divine will in both its eternal and temporal dimensions.111
Furthermore, Charnock’s structural difference or complexity in comparison
with Perkins on omnipotence and dominion was due to the additional emergence of
various opponents (the Arminians and the Roman Catholics, plus the Socinians and
Cartesians) in the high orthodox period. Overall, however, both had a similar content
to their theology, as we have noted. Both Perkins and Charnock dealt with God’s
creation, providence, and predestination ad extra in order to explain divine power
and sovereignty. Suarezian influences on Charnock, in which he relates the concept
of power especially to God’s dispensation of the law and Gospel might be presumed.
This influence, however, is not full or decisive in explaining reasons for the
“coalescing” tendency of the idea of omnipotence.112 Most of all, we have seen that
Charnock accepted the idea of the covenant of redemption within a high orthodox
context, which seems to have made it possible for him to stress God’s omnipotence
and absolute sovereignty more fully. If we consider the underlying background of
this tendency of Charnock’s, it can be interpreted as his pursuit of a more solid
trinitarian system of theology by intensifying christological and covenantal concerns
along with a deep interest in piety. Therefore, for Charnock, in inherent continuity
with Perkins’ scholastic, Puritan, and orthodox trinitarian structure, the pactum
salutis was arguably the key to resolving the tension and harmony of the ad
110 We can even see this evidence beyond the level of individual work in The Westminster Confession
(1647), ch.5 (Of Providence); cf. Miller, The New England Mind, pp. 102-6.
111 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 451-2.
112 Cf. F. Oakley, “The Absolute and Ordained Power in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century
Theology,” pp. 454-5.
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intra/extra in relation to the revelation of God’s power, sovereignty, and His will.
This pursuit, of course, was in no way a blind reception of Aristotelian philosophy or
speculation based merely upon scholastic terminological devices.113
113 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 524-5.
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Chapter Seven
The Holiness, Goodness, and Patience of God
We need now, finally, to explore a further group of God’s attributes, i.e. those
outward manifestations of the divine will other than in power and in sovereignty in
Perkins’ and Charnock’s system. These doctrines of holiness, goodness, and patience,
in fact, are also founded upon scriptural exegesis as well as an Aristotelian faculty
psychology (especially in relation to the will and affections). Thus these kinds of
attributes are “analogical” (distinct with the dispositions of the human will) to God
Himself in terms of the doctrine of divine simplicity. Overall the Puritans and the
Reformed orthodox viewed holiness, goodness, and righteousness as moral and
essential virtues or as the dispositions of the divine intellect and will. At the same
time they also saw divine affections (e.g. mercy, grace, love, wrath, anger, patience,
and hatred etc.) as a kind of overlapped expression of those attributes towards the
creatures in terms of the ad extra. The doctrine of divine essence and simplicity
confirms the foundation and stability of the direction of these divine exercises —
from God Himself to the creatures. This is opposite to the way that human beings
engage in the operation of such affections.
When considering the Puritan Reformed scholastic pursuit of consolidating
the inseparability of the orthodox theological system and its piety, these final
categories of attributes were highly significant to Perkins and Charnock. This is
especially the case in relation to their emphasis upon both the doctrine of
sanctification and the theodicean defence against their opponents — allowing for the
minor differences between the two figures due to the change of historical context
between early and high orthodoxy. In this chapter, we will continue to explore
Charnock’s idea by following his threefold or fourfold structure in order to clarify the
development of the framework of discussion as well as its content. As Charnock
dealt with God’s holiness, goodness, and patience under each title in his Attributes
among the attributes of this category, we will also focus upon the investigation of
these attributes in Perkins and Charnock. Of course this is in order to examine
whether the charge of being “rigid Aristotelian scholastic orthodox works” (or a
merely voluntaristic Puritanism without an elaborate doctrinal basis) is reasonable or
not with regard to Charnock’s theological system.1
1 This point is again related to the problem of how to properly understand the combination of both the
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I. The Holiness of God
The theme of the purity of God has been clearly inherent in the Reformed
tradition since the Reformation era especially in relation to hamartiological or
pietistic interests.2 Even so, for the Puritans and the Reformed scholastics, the idea
of divine holiness became much more critical because of the development of the
doctrine of sanctification at an exhaustive level as their primary theological
emphasis.3 The development from the period of Perkins to that of Charnock (from
early orthodoxy to high orthodoxy), especially, is deeply related to the problem of
how to explain divine vindicatory justice as consistent or coexistent with His salvific
mercy (in opposition to the contention of the Arminians and Socinians).4 To be sure
the Reformed orthodox theologians endeavoured to provide the answers by
demonstrating both the harmony and balance between each attribute and the close
intertwinement of all the loci as a theological system. To put it another way, the key
solutions they invariably resorted to were the appropriate distinction between the ad
intra/extra dimensions and the arguments concerning christological, covenantal, and
trinitarian coherence as the foundation or causes of our sanctification. This also
shows that the Barthian suspicion of the Reformed scholastic view of divine holiness
as an ontological abstraction is groundless.5 We shall again see the necessity for the
exquisite combination of Thomism and Scotism in their treatment of the holiness of
God.
Thomistic and Scotistic elements in (Puritan) Reformed orthodox theology. In this chapter we shall
confirm again the necessity of a balanced view to avoid a misunderstanding of the identity of
Charnock’s thought. Though somewhat distinct in nuances, Gavin J. McGrath’s stress upon the
“voluntarism” of Puritan spirituality (based upon his own definition of it according to the relationship
between theology and piety) is notable to understand our point. He defines Puritan voluntarism as “the
prominence, but not dominance, of the will’s response to God’s sovereign initiatives in the
divine/human encounter”. See G. J. McGrath, “Puritans and the Human will: Voluntarism within Mid-
seventeenth Century English Puritanism as Seen in the Works of Richard Baxter and John Owen” (Ph.
D. Thesis, University of Durham, 1989), p. 3.
2 PRRD III, p. 497.
3 Perhaps Walter Marshall’s The Gospel Mystery of Sanctification (1692) would be the representative
Puritan work on this subject, especially against both Baxterian neonomianism and antinomianism. On
the more detailed explanation of its seventeenth century context, see Joel Beeke’s introductory chapter
titled “The Secret of Sanctification: Union with Christ,” in Walter Marshall, The Gospel Mystery of
Sanctification, repr. (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 1999), pp. v-xxv.
4 Cf. PRRD III, p. 492.
5 Colin Gunton, Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes (London: SCM Press,
2002), pp. 88-90. Cf. John Webster, Holiness (London: SCM Press, 2003), pp. 31-52; idem, “The
Holiness and Love of God,” in Confessing God: Essays in Christian Dogmatics II (London & New
York: T & T Clark, 2005), pp. 109-30.
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A. Perkins on the Holiness of God
In the first place, Perkins understands the concept of holiness in a two-fold
way: God’s own “uncreated” perfection and the “created” holiness of the creatures.6
Following the general tendency of the Reformed tradition to emphasise the ad extra
dimension in the attributes of God, Perkins also focuses on the explanation of this
created holiness in terms of the communicating of divine holiness to His elect.
Within the boundaries of an underlying Puritan and scholastic background, Perkins
defines the created or derived holiness in human beings as qualities or habits in the
soul’s faculties, especially in the will and affections. These lead one to perform all
the duties of piety related to the first table of the Decalogue concerning God.7 Thus
we see that the holiness in Perkins’ view remains consistently to be related to the
supernatural infusion of grace from the time of its being created to the glorification
in heaven. This holiness of heart as the image of God is restored only through the
new creation that rectifies the disproportion of the human soul’s faculties. At the
same time, a sanctifying operation as a “spiritualizing” or “illumination” takes place
within the mind, affections, memory, conscience, the will, and even the body (to
become a fit instrument for the holiness of the soul). 8 Thus the antithetical
characteristics of sin and holiness are necessarily emphasised in Perkins’ schema
since, as he insists, the nearness of God’s presence to our soul depends upon the
dialectics between these two natures within the believer.9
6 Perkins, An Exposition upon the Epistle of Jude, in Workes III (ii), p. 578: “Uncreated is the
holiness of God, which is nothing else but the perfection of his properties and attributes: this holiness
is incomprehensible, and infinite, yea the fountain of all other holiness. Created holiness is a certaine
gift of God, which by some proportion resembleth this uncreated holiness of God; the subject whereof
are Angels, man, & God’s ordinances, especially the written word.” For the importance of the Word
and prayer as the means of sanctification of human works, see Golden Chaine, in Workes I, pp. 45-6;
A Treatise of Callings, in Workes I, pp. 767-8; An Exposition of Christs Sermon in the Mount, in
Workes III (i), pp. 124-5, 138; An Exposition upon the Epistle of Jude, in Workes III (ii), pp. 509-10.
According to Herman Selderhuis’ analysis of Calvin’s view of divine holiness in his theology of the
Psalms, this linkage between uncreated and created holiness is obtained through one’s pursuit of
honouring God on the basis of humility. In fact this point is closely related to the two phases of
sanctification (e.g. mortification and vivification), which are continuous in Calvin and the later
Reformed tradition including Perkins and Charnock. See H. J. Selderhuis, Calvin’s Theology of the
Psalms (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), p. 169.
7 Perkins, A Commentarie upon Chap. 6 of the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, p. 421. Perkins
also sees the content of the second table in the Decalogue as the object of the exercise of our derived
“righteousness” to humans themselves.
8 Golden Chaine, in Workes I, pp. 83-4; The Estate of a Christian in This Life, in Workes I, pp. 370-2;
An Exposition upon the Epistle of Jude, in Workes III (ii), pp. 486-7.
9 Cf. Perkins, The Second Treatise of the Duties and Dignities of the Ministrie, in Workes III (ii), p.
451. At the same time the understanding of God’s justice is important for the way Perkins deals with
the problem of sin against His holiness. Perkins defines divine justice as “that by which he in all
things willeth that which is just” in His word or deed. There are two kinds of justice in deed: disposing
justice in relation to providential act and rewarding justice in relation to predestination. See Golden
192
As a way of cultivating holiness in the believer, Perkins depicts the effects of
sanctification in two respects: purifying one’s corrupted nature on the one hand and
receiving inward righteousness on the other.10 Thus, based upon a reading of 1 John
3: 9 and Rom 8:1, Perkins considers sanctification as a believer’s gradual growth in
holiness and righteousness through the efficacy of the Holy Spirit. According to
Perkins, the first part of sanctification is the mortification of sin “whereby the power
of sin is abated, and crucified” in the believer by virtue of Christ’s death, and the
imputation to Christ of the believer’s sin. The second part is vivification “whereby
inherent holiness being begun, is still augmented and enlarged” by the merit of
Christ’s resurrection which quickens and raises up the believer to “newness of life”.11
Within the context of this soteriologically focused interest in the holiness of the
believer, Perkins articulates an inseparable relationship between saving faith,
justification, sanctification, and assurance as follows:
Now this saving faith, laying hold on Christ’s righteousness, for man’s
justification, is never severed from sanctification by the Spirit, with the fruits
thereof, whereby the old man being mortified, and the new man in Christ’s
renewed, according to his image, in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness,
the whole person is turned into God, and made carefull to please him, both in
thought, word, and deed: and hereby doe we receive assurance of our
justification; for true sanctification is the earnest of the Spirit of adoption in our
hearts, whereby we are sealed into the day of our redemption.12
In effect, Perkins de facto integrates regeneration and sanctification by understanding
it as a divine operation both restraining and renewing the heart in the context of His
effectual calling in the larger perspective of the believer’s “life eternall”.13 To put it
Chaine, in Workes I, p. 13. For a detailed explanation of the various categories of divine justice in the
Reformed orthodox tradition, see also PRRD III, pp. 487-90.
10 Perkins, Sixe Principles of Christian Religion, in Workes I, p. 7; cf. Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p.
113. On the general background of the necessity of cultivating holiness in Puritan theology, see J.
Beeke, “Cultivating holiness”, Reformation and Revival 4/2 (1995), pp. 81-112.
11 Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 83; cf. An Exposition upon the Epistle of Jude, in Workes III (ii), pp.
485-6. This division basically evidences the continuity of the doctrine of sanctification between
Calvin and the Puritans as Randall Gleason argued in John Calvin and John Owen on Mortification
(New York: Peter Lang, 1995). For a concise explanation of Puritan piety in relation to sanctification,
see J. S. Yuille, Puritan Spirituality: The Fear of God in the Affective Theology of George Swinnock
(Carlisle: Paternoster, 2007), pp. 13-7.
12 Perkins, An Exposition of Christs Sermon in the Mount, in Workes III (i), p. 42; cf. A Commentiarie
upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, p. 247; Cases of Conscience, in Workes II, p. 19.
13 Perkins, An Exposition upon the Epistle of Jude, in Workes III (ii), p. 484. At the same time it is
notable that Perkins nevertheless clearly makes a distinction in the way of receiving each grace of
justification and sanctification between “applying” and “infusing”. For example, see Cases of
Conscience, in Workes II, p. 43: “Some gifts of God in Christs, bestowed on his servants, as remission
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another way, Perkins’ idea of holiness corresponds with the entire scope of his
theology of grace in which the believer lives a “wholehearted Christianity” by
conforming to God.
In summary, Perkins focused on the account of how God’s holiness is
restored in the elect through regeneration and sanctification through the work of the
Holy Spirit in view of both christological and anthropological dimensions. In
addition, we might say that the “supernatural” aspect of our trinitarian knowledge of
God is well explained in Perkins’ schema of divine holiness in the context of the
order of salvation.
B. Charnock’s Exegesis and Doctrine on the Holiness of God:
The Vindication of Holiness in Relation to His Righteousness
Based upon the exegesis of Ex. 15:11,14 Charnock initially looks upon God’s
holiness in His essence, nature, and operations as a glorious perfection of honour,
beauty, and life.15 The extensive nature of His holiness affects all the other attributes
that are glorified, and without holiness the others cannot be. Charnock also defines
holiness in a negative and positive direction: the former as freedom from evil and the
latter as the full integrity or conformity of affection and action to the divine will. The
former refers to the moral aspects; the latter refers to that comprehensive or
foundational influence of unchangeable or absolute holiness upon the acts of the
divine will and intellect.16
At the same time, for Charnock, the concept of holiness is similar to
righteousness but can nevertheless be distinguished according to the ad intra/extra
distinction in God. As he puts it, “Holiness is a perfection absolutely considered in
the nature of God; righteousness, a perfection as referred to others, in his actions
of sinnes by his death, and justification by his obedience, are not put into us, but are only applied and
made ours by imputation. Some other gifts there be, which are infused and put into us, as namely,
sanctification, regeneration, the love of God and man.” Paul Schaefer depicts well about the
relatedness between justification and sanctification in Perkins like this: “[We need to see] that fine
balance between justification and sanctification that refuses to separate the two when speaking of the
Christian life, but that also always distinguishes between them so that a true believer will not wallow
in despair.” P. Schaefer, “The Art of Prophesying,” in The Devoted Life: An Introduction to the
Puritan Classics (Downers Grove: IVP, 2004), pp. 49-50. As is known well, Calvin is also no
exception to this position in this both distinction and the integrative understanding of the two in his
soteriology. See Calvin, Institutes, III, esp. ch.14.
14 “Who is unto thee, O Lord, among the gods? Who is like thee, glorious in holiness, fearful in
praises, doing wonders?”
15 For general analysis of the tendency of Reformed orthodoxy on divine holiness, see PRRD III, pp.
498-503.
16 Works II, p. 194.
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towards them and upon them.”17 To be sure, as Muller points out, this distinct but
inseparable relatedness between the divine holiness and righteousness was important
for the Reformed orthodox critique of the Socinians who claimed that the holy God
cannot possibly exercise vindicative justice. 18 Accordingly, while the acts of
holiness ad intra are “necessary” according to the nature of God, yet those ad extra
are “conditional” depending upon the existence of creatures and their sins. In other
words, holiness refers to those acts of divine will that include the “moral and good”
aspects of it stemming from the “free necessity” of its characteristics.19 Charnock
thus continues to vindicate the reasonableness of this free necessity particularly in
the sense that God is unchangeably holy as well as extraneous to responsibility for
sin and evil. Both the voluntariness of the sinner and God’s abhorrence of sin in itself
(not the sinner) show the necessity of a proper understanding of the relationship
between the “goodness” of divine sovereignty and holiness.20 We can sense that
Charnock wanted to make it clear that God only permits sin as an ‘observer’ of the
spiritual combat between humanity and sin and evil. That is, Charnock’s intention to
defend divine simplicity is revealed in this account of the relatedness of divine
holiness, justice, and goodness centered in the single divine will.
Within this framework, Charnock examines specific proofs of the
manifestation of God’s holiness. Based upon Isa. 6:3,21 he understands this holiness
in a threefold way in terms of God as creator, lawgiver, and redeemer.22 With regard
to creation, Charnock identifies the divine holiness in human beings with the
voluntary part of the image of God implanted. As human reason reflects the divine
intellect, so one’s righteousness or “necessary uprightness” in the will reflects His
17 Works II, p. 194, citing F. Turretin, De Satisfact., p. 28. For a similar view of the relationship
between justice and holiness in other Reformed scholastics, see Thomas Ridgley, Body of Divinity
(London, 1731-1733), revised with notes by John Wilson (1855), repr. (Edmonton: Still Waters
Revival Books, 1993), I, p. 106; W. Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, 4 vols, trans. Bartel
Elshout & ed. Joel Beeke (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 1999), vol. I, pp. 127-30; cf.
PRRD III, p. 182.
18 PRRD III, pp. 480, 491-2, 501.
19 Works II, pp. 195, 198.
20 See Works II, pp. 201-2: “There is no sin but is in some sort voluntary; voluntary in root, or
voluntary in the branch; voluntary by an immediate act of the will, or voluntary by a general or natural
inclination of the will. … If a man mistakes the object, it is his own fault; for God hath endowed him
with reason to discern, and liberty of will to choose upon that judgment. … God would cease to be a
rightful sovereign if he ceased to be good, he would cease to be good if he did command, necessitate
or by any positive operation incline inwardly the heart of a creature directly to that which were
morally evil, and contrary to the eminency of his own nature.”
21 “And one cried unto another, and said, Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts: the whole earth is full
of his glory.”
22 Works II, p. 204.
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holiness. By this argument Charnock elicits the foundation of God’s moral
government of human beings through the law, rooted in this conformity of holiness
between God and humanity.23 Thus we see that the divine holiness and righteousness
are revealed in both the eternal law of nature and the ceremonial law. As mentioned
earlier, in this judicial context, God’s holiness and righteousness are intertwined with
each other because God vindicates His holiness by way of justice and penalty due to
His intrinsic abomination of sin. As Charnock declares, “Divine holiness is the root
of divine justice, and divine justice is the triumph of divine holiness.”24
For Charnock, the holiness of God is also revealed in His redemptive works,
which are both accomplished in a christological dimension and applied to each
individual in time. Holiness and righteousness are distinct from both the divine
intellect and power because the former two attributes can cause the human free will
to imitate them. Thus Charnock emphasises the role of holiness and righteousness for
our sanctification in that we can grow in these two aspects of the image of God.25 In
fact this point leads Charnock to investigate more deeply the christological
foundation of holiness in redemption that vindicates it in relation to sin and the
“death” of sin by way of the death of Christ.26 Only Christ’s death as the sole
possessor of perfect holiness can be the object of our justification by faith.27 For
Charnock, the christological benefits aiding us in our pursuit of the grace of
sanctification in the relation between the attributes of God and human nature are as
follows — he remarks:
None are partakers of the divine blessedness that are not partakers of the divine
nature; there must be a renewing of his image before there be a vision of his
face. … He will not have men brought only into a relative state of happiness by
justification, without a real state of grace by sanctification. … The whole design
of it is to reinstate us in a resemblance to this divine perfection, whereby he
shews what an affection he hath to this excellency of his nature, …28
23 See Works II, p. 205: “The law of love to God, with his whole soul, his whole mind, his whole heart
and strength, was originally writ upon his nature. All the parts of his nature were framed in a moral
conformity with God, to answer his law, and imitate God in his purity, which consists in a love of
himself, and his own goodness and excellency.”
24 Works II, p. 209.
25 Works II, p. 211.
26 For Charnock’s detailed argument, see Works II, pp. 212-3.
27 Works II, p. 214.
28 Works II, p. 214. In a similar Puritanistic and scholastic perspective, Owen also evidences a similar
view of sanctification by defining it as “the universal renovation of our natures by the Holy Spirit into
the image of God, through Jesus Christ,” in The Works of John Owen, vol. 3, p. 386; cf. ibid., p. 482.
Owen deals with the massive doctrinal and practical points of sanctification in books III and IV of this
volume titled Pneumatologia.
196
In one way, we might say that the relation of both communication and participation
between God’s holiness and the purity of the new creature confirms the continuity of
the series of creation, actual regeneration, sanctification, and perseverance. 29
Sanctification is considered in the same light as justification within the context of the
whole ordo salutis as both “union and communion” with God, despite the distinction
between the two.30 Furthermore, Charnock relates the trinitarian structure of this
supernatural operation of divine holiness to the recreated image of God in the
believer. The Holy Spirit, in particular, breaks the dominance of sin through the
individual application of divine holiness to the regenerate soul.31 Namely, the
holiness revealed in redeeming grace through redemptive work points to our struggle
for the perfection of the restored divine nature, which is beatitude.32 This is a
spiritual battle in which a choice is made for the way of holiness by conforming
oneself to God’s will revealed in the Scriptures. It is also a choice against unholiness
in so far as divine nature is continuously infused into the believer’s nature by His
grace.33
Based upon the examination of the threefold manifestation of divine holiness,
Charnock goes on to develop fully a series of defensive arguments concerning God’s
holiness in providential acts in relation to human sin. Citing Suarez, he makes it clear
that the fault does not lie with God’s first creation of the human being as a mutable
rational creature, in contrast to the immutable God per essentiam.34 According to
Charnock, the “natural” (not supernatural) faculties human beings received from God
were sufficient to allow Adam the ability to act freely in choosing his future between
the ‘stand’ and the ‘fall’. This balance in Adam’s faculties of the soul before the fall
is no other than “a harmony between his reason and affections” as an original
righteousness that makes it possible for him to love God as the chief good. Although
29 Here we also find a common characteristic Charnock shares with Perkins.
30 The quotation is from K. Kapic, Communion with God: The Divine and the Human in the Theology
of John Owen (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), p. 152. Of course Calvin deals with this point
extensively. See The Institutes, esp. vol. III.
31 See Works II, p. 215: “As [the Father] sent Jesus Christ to satisfy his justice for the expiation of the
guilt of sin, so he sends the Holy Ghost for the cleansing the filth of sin and overmastering the power
of it. Himself is the fountain, the Son is the pattern, and the Holy Ghost the immediate imprinter of
this stamp of holiness upon the creature.”
32 Cf. Leigh, Treatise of Divinity, I. xiii, p. 105, cited in PRRD III, p. 503.
33 The Reformed scholastics including Owen saw that both grace and holiness are infused into each
believer in this process of sanctification as habitus. To be sure they prefer the term “imputation” to
“infusion” in speaking of justification in terms of the distinction with Roman Catholics. See Kapic,
Communion with God, pp. 51-2
34 Works II, pp. 216-7, citing Suarez, vol. II, p. 548.
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God created humanity in a “righteous state”, yet Adam voluntarily gave himself to a
“forlorn state”.35 As was the case with the flexibility of the result in his free choice,
so God’s command to obey the law was not against His holiness because of an
original righteousness given to Adam. In addition, divine foreknowledge of the
human fall did not necessitate Adam’s will to commit sin. Human free will has
nothing to do with foreknowledge because the entirety of temporal events in the
created world is foreknown to God without encroaching upon the freedom of the
rational creature.36 To put it another way, in Charnock’s view, Adam’s original
righteousness given as the balance and harmony of his faculties of the soul reflects
the very holiness of God who is not responsible for his fall: our God is the creational,
providential, and redemptive trinitarian God who acts only according to a single
decretive will, which is based upon His infinite wisdom.
In these circumstances Charnock also argues that the eternal decree of
reprobation is not against the divine holiness but rather reasonable to His
righteousness. We need to be clear about this point of argument (by further
examination to follow) in order to grasp the relation of divine holiness and
righteousness. 37 In this argument Charnock particularly defends the traditional
doctrine of double predestination. As the divine operation towards the sin of the
reprobate is merely negative, it is, in fact, a denial or cessation of action that cannot
be the cause of sin in a positive way. Accordingly, Charnock endeavours to solve the
problem of the coexistence of both God’s secret will in permitting sin and His
perceived will in forbidding sin in man. Is the divine concurrence with sin possible or
not? For Charnock, to maintain the appropriate idea of the holiness of God, this kind
of divine willing in the permission of sin is to be grasped cautiously. It is only an
efficacious willing “not to hinder” sin as well as “not to give” the grace to prevent it
based upon a privative or deficient decree of God38 — the foundation of this decree
is in both the infinite wisdom and sovereignty. Citing Bradwardine, Charnock also
elaborates the principle in this way: “God doth not will sin simply, for that were to
approve it, but he wills it in order to that good his wisdom will bring forth from it.
35 Works II, pp. 217-8.
36 See Works II, p. 220: “If God’s prescience takes away the liberty of the creature, there is no such
thing as a free action in the world, … nor ever was, no, not by God himself ad extra.”
37 As a representative article dealing with this theme in the Puritan and Reformed scholastic view, see
C. Trueman, “John Owen’s Dissertation on Divine Justice: An Exercise in Christocentric
Scholasticism,” Calvin Theological Journal 33 (1998), pp. 87-103.
38 Works II, pp. 238-9.
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He wills not sin for itself, but for the event.”39 At the same time, we also find that
Charnock develops his rationale further from the Thomistic perspective by citing
Aquinas who prioritises the goodness of the infinitely wise God.40
Thus the object of God’s positive willing is not sin itself, but rather the
permission of sin despite “some sort of concurrence with sin” in God’s position, as
Charnock insists again: “Though the will of God about sin was permissive, yet the
will of God about that glory he would promote by the defect of the creature was
positive.”41 Such permission itself is also the object of the divine eternal decrees that
guarantee the certainty of temporal events. Consequently, at this juncture, we might
sense that the problem of the causality of original sin in relation to human free will is
a difficult question for Charnock. He describes the initial appearance of God’s
permissive will before the fall as follows:
The first object of this permissive will of God was to leave angels and men to
their own liberty and the use of their free will, which was natural to them, not
adding that supernatural grace which was necessary, not that they should not at
all sin, but that they should infallibly not sin; they had a strength sufficient to
avoid sin, but not sufficient infallibly to avoid sin, a grace sufficient to preserve
them, but not sufficient to confirm them.42
Thus it follows that the causal subject of original sin was Adam who had the free will
to choose his own status regardless of the orientation of God’s permissive will.
Permission is neither action nor the cause of the permitted result of Adam’s choice,
but rather the cause of not hindering sin. 43 As Charnock says, quoting from
Bradwardine again, this does not encroach upon His holiness but reflects both “His
own glory and a greater good (majus bonum)” in the wisdom of God.44
If so, then how can we defend God’s holiness in relation to His undeniable
concurrence with the creature in the “material part of a sinful act”?45 Charnock
continues to elaborate the answer to this troublesome issue in a very casuistic way.
39 Works II, p. 223, citing Bradwardine, lib. i. cap. xxxiv.
40 See Works II, p. 223: “Much more is this from God, who being infinitely good, cannot will evil as
evil, and being infinitely knowing, cannot will that for good which is evil. Infinite wisdom can be
under no error or mistake. To will sin as sin would be an unanswerable blemish on God, but to will to
suffer it in order to good is the glory of his wisdom.”
41 Works II, pp. 222, 224.
42 Works II, p. 225, citing Suarez, vol. iv. p. 414.
43 Thus Charnock presents this relation between sin and permission succinctly: “Sin may be said to be
committed not without God’s permission, rather than by his permission,” in Works II, p. 225.
44 Works II, pp. 227-8.
45 The quotation is from Works II, p. 229.
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The creature cannot operate without the help of divine “preserving and concurring”
power in acting, because God the first cause is co-working with every act of the
creature as the second cause. This means that no one can blame God on the basis of
concurring in the event, since God would then be the responsible subject (apart from
creatures) if one were to follow such a one-sided logic. To defend divine holiness,
Charnock points out the critical fact that action is the reflection or efficacy of the
soul’s faculties.46 As the faculties are corrupted after the fall, according to Charnock,
one cannot expect divine concurrence from God in the human act to be purely or
necessarily good in the light of the human predicament. For this reason, the judgment
of moral goodness or badness against His holiness depends not upon the material part
of the act, but rather upon the motive, circumstance, and mind of it.47
To sum up, the entire attribution of the responsibility for the result of sin to
human beings is consistent with God’s concurrent causation of the sinful act based
upon the infinite wisdom and goodness that conform to His eternal decree. What is to
be blamed is the misuse of Adam’s free will (not for frui but for uti) and the resultant
corrupted nature in his descendants: this unholiness of the human heart does not
come from the holiness of God!48 At the same time, in opposition to the Socinian
view, Charnock’s successful defence of God’s holiness frees Him from responsibility
as the author of the result of sins. This also guarantees the rightness of His exercise
of punitive justice upon sinners. All these defences are, in Charnock’s work,
theological devices which ultimately contribute to an argument for the necessity of
the incarnation and atonement as the basis of our sanctification in the orthodox
theological system (against the Socinians — and even the Arminians). That is, in
Charnock’s work, we again confirm that both the divine simplicity and unity of the
Triune God in all of His acts along with the participation of the creatures as the
secondary cause of events constitute the fundamental doctrinal foundations for the
defence of the orthodox doctrine of God.
C. Charnock’s Praxis concerning the Holiness of God:
The Trinitarian Basis of Sanctification towards “Union with Christ”
In the practical section, Charnock seeks to show that our practical holiness,
46 For example, Works II, p. 230: “Every faculty in its being, and every faculty in its motion, hath a
dependence upon the influence of God;” see also p. 231: “The action is the efficacy of the faculty,
extending itself to some outward object.”
47 See Works II, pp. 229-31; cf. ibid., pp. 240-1. Here Charnock depicts this predicament as “the want
of a righteous habit in those faculties, especially in the will”.
48 For details, see Works II, pp. 231-5, 239-40.
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especially in worshipping God, cannot exist without a right appropriation of His
essential and externally revealed holiness. This, of course, is on the basis of Scripture
as the cognitive foundation of our knowledge of God.49 Thus he accentuates the
significance of our holiness as the extension or reflection of the divine “eternal
fountain,” which is His essential holiness. Within the context of stressing the
necessity of our unremitting sanctification by this divine holiness, Charnock also
expounds the critical relationship between the divine holiness and glory in relation to
the restoration of the image of God in humanity from the angle of the history of
redemption. He comments:
By the glory of God is meant the holiness of God; as 2 Cor. iii. 18, ‘Beholding
as in a glass the glory of the Lord, we are changed into the same image from
glory to glory;’ that is, the glory of Lord in the text, into the image of which we
are changed; but the scripture speaks of no other image of God but that of
holiness. We are come short of the glory of God, of the holiness of God, which
is the glory of God; and the image of it, which was the glory of man. By sin,
which is particular in opposition to the purity of God, man was left many
leagues behind any resemblance to God; he stripped off that which was the
glory of his nature, and was the only means of glorifying God as his creator.50
Such a perception of the compatible or harmonious relationship between “our glory”
and “glorifying God” leads Charnock to address the doctrine of sanctification (as the
gradual restoration of the original purity in humanity before the fall) on a full scale
from christological, covenantal, soteriological, and trinitarian perspectives. As to the
christological dimension, he addresses the importance of sanctification as follows.
Charnock contends that the honour of the infinite purity of God had been impaired
by human sin but was compensated through the full atonement of a fit mediator who
possessed “efficacy and exact congruity” to the work of redemption. 51 Then,
according to Charnock’s rationale, a justified sinner by the sacrifice of the mediator
should grow in the knowledge of the holiness of Christ who is everlastingly righteous
because of his equality with the Father. Namely Charnock again pays attention to the
glory (of Christ) with His possession of holiness as a “glorious perfection of the
49 Charnock develops his argument by severely criticising the various sins of infringement upon
divine holiness, especially in the Roman Catholic ideas of merit, venial sins, supererogation etc. See
Works II, pp. 242-50.
50 Works II, p. 250.
51 Works II, p. 253.
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divine nature”.52 Clearly we have the sense that he is defending the deity of Christ
(as the orthodox foundation of the Christian religion) in this argument — the basis of
the struggle for conformity to Christ in terms of the restoration of our glory is
nothing less than the glorious holiness of the God-human.
In dealing with the covenantal background of sanctification, Charnock
discovers the holiness of God in the dispensations of both the covenant of works and
the covenant of grace — the latter covenant shows His will to communicate to “a
covenant soul”, who is a partaker of this new covenant.53 At another level, the
covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son is the perpetual foundation
of this holiness as well. In addition, the supernatural infusion of grace in time
through the work of the Holy Spirit on the basis of the eternal decree concerning the
federal relationship between God and the elect rooted in the pactum salutis reveals
the very image of God’s holiness. That is, God delights in this holiness in the
regenerate life of “every upright soul” because of “His own stamp on the godly” that
will renew, preserve, and perfect the image of Himself.54 For this reason, according
to Charnock, God’s will to communion with the elect in this holiness is more
prominent than any other attribute of God. In other words, as we have seen, the will
of the Triune God to sanctify the elect through a continuous, supernatural re-creation
has a firm christological and soteriological foundation.55
In touching upon this trinitarian background of sanctification, Charnock
particularly stresses the role of the Spirit in enabling us to be patient during various
divine dispensations. These are the trials of the believer, as he notes: “[God] melts us
down as gold, to fit us for the receiving a new impression, to mortify the affections
of the flesh, and clothe us with the graces of his Spirit.”56 At the same time, on our
part, only a deep sense of the glorious holiness of the relation between God and the
believer can yield true conviction and humbleness, a fear of God, vigilance over sin
52 Works II, p. 255. A good summarised example of Puritan thought about both the blessing of union
with Christ in terms of sanctification and the purity of Christ in a similar vein is J. Stephen Yuille, The
Inner Sanctum of Puritan Piety: John Flavel’s Doctrine of Mystical Union with Christ (Grand Rapids:
Reformation Heritage Books, 2007), pp. 48-50, 59; on Owen’s similar treatment of holiness and
righteousness within the larger Reformed scholastic context, see K. Kapic, Communion with God, pp.
137-45, 168-9.
53 Works II, p. 256.
54 Works II, pp. 258, 259.
55 See also Works II, p. 259: “As it is a part of the holiness of Christ to sanctify his church, Eph, v. 26,
till not a wrinkle or spot be left, so it is the part of God not to leave that work imperfect, which his
holiness hath attempted a second time to beautify his creature with. He will not cease exalting this
attribute, which is the believer’s by the new covenant, till he utters that applauding speech of his own
work, Cant. iv. 7, ‘Thou art all fair, my love, there is no spot in thee.’”
56 Works II, p. 263.
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and temptation and the desire for the imitation of Christ in us.57 Thus, according to
Charnock, we should consistently honour the holiness of God in the struggle for the
growth of holiness in a conformity to the law and a looking to Christ as the “ultimate
pattern” of holiness.58 In other words, the law and Christ are the two key axioms in
increasing our communion with God based upon His “covenant mercy” in the
process of sanctification. Accordingly, we find that Charnock emphasises the
necessity of human voluntary participation in this sanctification (through the work of
the Holy Spirit) in the means of grace as a “tool” for enhancing the federal
relationship between God and the elect.
Why, even so, is our pursuit of holiness critically important? Charnock goes
on to argue this point from anthropological, aesthetical, and teleological perspectives.
Above all, sanctification is the “prime way of honouring God” because God is
glorified only when “unstained spirits” endeavour to “live to Him in living like
Him”. 59 Charnock reiteratively stresses the inseparable relationship between
glorifying God and our sanctification based upon a background exegesis. He writes:
God seems to accept the glorifying this attribute, as if it were a real addiction to
that holiness which is infinite in his nature, and because infinite, cannot admit
of any increase; and therefore the word sanctified is used instead of glorified.
Isa. viii. 13, … This sanctification of God is by the fear of him, which signifies
in the language of the Old Testament, a reverence of him, and a righteousness
before him. He doth not say, when he would have his power or wisdom
glorified, ‘Empower me,’ or ‘Make me wise;’ but when he would have holiness
glorified by the creature, it is ‘Sanctify me;’ that is, manifest the purity of my
nature by the holiness of your lives.60
That is, our holiness is consequential in that only this attribute can demonstrate both
the glory and reliability of divine holiness to the world. At the same time, in
Charnock’s view, such holiness in the believer is “the excellency and beauty” of the
rational creature in terms of the image of God, reflecting faithfully the original
purpose (especially with regard to humanity) of God’s creation. The “beauty” of the
faculties of the soul in human life lies in nothing less than a supernatural elevation to
57 Works II, p. 261.
58 Works II, pp. 266-8. Note especially in p. 266: “When we honour him by acknowledging his purity,
he will honour us by communicating of it us. This is the way to derive a greater excellency to our
souls. … No creature can be essentially holy but by participation from the chief fountain of holiness,
but we must have the same kind of holiness, the same truth of holiness;”
59 Works II, p. 268.
60 Works II, p. 269.
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the original divine excellency intended by God.61 He addresses the concept of this
beauty in relation to sanctification in this way:
The beauty of every copied thing consists in its likeness to the original;
everything hath more of loveliness, as it hath greater impressions of its first
pattern; in this regard holiness hath more of beauty on it, than the whole
creation, because it partakes of a greater excellency of God than the sun, moon,
and the stars. No greater glory can be, than to be a conspicuous and visible
image of the invisible, and holy, and blessed God.62
Within this aesthetic context, Charnock again notes the role of the Holy Spirit, who
assists us to become more beautiful and fit to reach the original beauty of God. This
“beautification” is not only the “quintessence” of sanctification as the life of
communion with God, but also the “glory of the Holy Spirit” that operates in our
faculties of the soul in the light of a “moral and becoming” change rendering us fully
able to enjoy God.63 He thus emphasises, in the Augustinian sense, that the full
enjoyment of God (frui) cannot be given without an endeavour to resemble the image
of His holiness and righteousness that points to this “spiritual beauty”.64 Of course
Charnock does not forget to refer to the necessity of the purification of our soul also
in terms of the visio Dei (Heb. 12:14, 1 John 3:2-3).
Clearly this shows that sanctification necessarily correlates with or refers to
the soteriological element in Charnock’s schema. Therefore, at this point, he asserts
that there is no evidence we can find of divine election without a mark of
sanctification as the fruit of the believer’s struggle for “conformity to God in
purity”.65 Specifically, as holiness in us yields “acts of love to God”, the phase of
61 For a representative Puritan work on the nature and operation of the human faculties of the soul,
see Edward Reynolds, A Treatise on the Passions and Faculties of the Soul (London, 1656); also John
Flavel, Pneumatologia: A Treatise of the Soul of the Man, in The Works of John Flavel, 6 vols
(London: W. Baynes and Son, 1820; repr. Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth, 1968), Works II, p. 475- ,
Works III, pp. 238, 555-88. On the general idea of “beauty” in Puritan theology, especially in
American context, see Wilson N. Brissett, “Beauty among the Puritans: Aesthetics and Subjectivity in
Early New England” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 2007).
62 Works II, p. 269.
63 The quotations are from Works II, pp. 269, 270. Interestingly, in a similar aesthetical vein of Puritan
theology, Stephen Holmes describes the idea of Jonathan Edwards on the believer’s holiness as
follows: “True holiness is nothing but superlative love for God’s beauty, so the creature who loves
God is also participating in God’s holiness, and so is the recipient of the communication of God’s
holiness,” in God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan Edwards
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), pp. 56, 178-9.
64 See Works II, pp. 270-1: “Divine fruition is not so much by a union of presence as a union of nature.
…Unless we be of a like nature to God, we cannot have a pleasing fruition of him. … Were we
partakers of a divine nature, we might enjoy God with delight;”
65 Works II, p. 271.
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holiness progresses in these acts by changing our faculties of the soul into a better or
more beautiful image of God than previously. As Charnock states, “The will in
loving is rendered like the object beloved, is turned into its nature, and imbibes its
qualities. The soul by loving God will find itself more and more transformed into the
divine image.”66 Such an awareness of the relationship of nature and works in God
and the elect leads us to acknowledge more readily the necessity of a continuous
supernatural infusion of grace for the growth of holiness. For this purpose, the
supreme harmony of the work of each person of the trinitarian God in this whole
process of the restoration of His image is invariably fundamental, as Charnock
emphatically remarks:
There is no fear of our sanctification, if we come to him as a God of holiness,
since he is a God of peace, and the breach made by Adam is repaired by Christ:
… He restores the sanctifying Spirit which was withdrawn by the fall, as he is a
God pacified, and his holiness righted by the Redeemer. The beauty of it
appears in its smiles upon a man in Christ, and is as ready to impart itself to the
reconciled creature, as before justice was to punish the rebellious one. He loves
to send forth the streams of this perfection into created channels, more than any
else.67
In summary, in this practical section on divine holiness, Charnock has shown
us the aesthetical, redemptive (teleological), trinitarian, and Christ-centered aspects
of sanctification in terms of the relationship between God the creator and the elect.
The rational creature should point towards the perfection of the image of God and so
glorify Him (according to the end of God’s creation). That is, the original divine
holiness is to be reflected unremittingly in the soul’s faculties of the regenerate
through sanctification. This is God’s most wondrous work ad extra, beautifying
human being. “The dynamic aspect” of the divine “loving holiness” in His action is a
significant element in Charnock’s trinitarian account of holiness.
II. The Goodness and Patience of God
While the focus of the previous discussion of the holiness of God (especially
in the case of Charnock) was to demonstrate that God is not the efficient cause of sin
66 Works II, p. 272. Thus, in Charnock, we see that the love for God, the fear of God, piety, and
sanctification converge upon this pursuit of holiness in the believer; cf. S. Yuille, Puritan Spirituality,
pp. 93-4.
67 Works II, p. 274.
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and evil, and then to consider the doctrine of sanctification, here we shall deal with
the subject of His being the efficient cause of all the goodness in the created world.
In this sub-chapter, we will discover that the denotation of God’s goodness is broader
in Charnock’s work than in that of Perkins, especially in relation to the development
of federal theology in the high orthodox period. At the same time we will also see
that Charnock nevertheless still maintains the tension and harmony of nature and
grace as the axiom of Reformed soteriology, against the arguments of the Arminians
and the Socinians that sought to modify or transform the underlying structure of the
knowledge of God.68 To put it another way, it will be shown that all of Charnock’s
discussion can be traced back to his aim of developing a knowledge of the trinitarian
God which would embrace both theology and piety in terms of the whole works of
God’s creation, providence, and redemption ad extra.
A. Perkins on the Goodness and Patience of God
In contrast to his treatment of the other attributes of God, Perkins did not deal
much with God’s goodness in all his works. Yet, in Perkins, we can sense an
indication of the later development of the discussions in Charnock’s era. Let us
briefly examine Perkins’ statement of goodness in Golden Chaine and Cases of
Conscience. On the one hand, Perkins defines the goodness of God as “that by which
he being in himselfe absolutely good, doth freely exercise his liberalitie upon his
creatures”.69 In the same context with this definition, he also explains the concept of
goodness in a twofold way. While “uncreated” goodness is God Himself as the
“absolutely and perfectly” good being, “created” goodness is “that whereby the
creature is made good” as the mere ‘fruit’ of essential goodness in God.70 In a
Ramistic way, Perkins continues to divide this goodness in the creatures into a
“general or natural” and a “special or moral” goodness. The former is based upon
God’s goodness in His acts of creation, providence or in the ordination of it. The
68 Cf. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 1993), pp. 196-8.
69 Perkins, A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 12. Perkins bases this definition upon Mat. 5:45 (“He
maketh Sunne to shine upon the good and bad, and he raineth upon the just and unjust”) and 19:17
(“Why callest thou mee good? There is none good but one, even God”).
70 Being similar to, but distinct from the way of the Reformed orthodox, Arminius focused more upon
the communication of goodness between God and the creatures within the background of a Thomistic
position. It is also notable that the Thomistic perspective emphasised the role of divine “love” as the
basis of His will for communicating goodness. See Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 192.
However, Perkins seems to be both Scotistic and Thomistic when we see both his definition of God’s
goodness in a voluntaristic way and the emphasis upon the characteristic of creatures’ goodness as
derived from his essential goodness.
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latter is revealed in God’s moral law (given to the rational creature) that reflects His
“eternal and unchangeable wisdom”.71
On the other hand, in dealing with God’s patience with respect to His
providential goodness, Perkins emphasises the fact that this cannot be explained
without considering God’s demand for “true repentance” from all men (including
practical atheists) within the English context of those days.72 That is, His long-
suffering, especially seen in the remembrance of the life of the incarnate Son, should
not be abused by our sins.73 Perkins also succinctly presents the relationship
between His patience towards our sins and the moderation of anger in our deepening
piety as follows: “So often as he sinneth hee provoketh God to cast him away, and to
confound him eternally; yet the Lord is mercifull and long-suffering. … [Thus] we
must do as God doth: not be angry, but fight against our affections, …”74
In summary, we see that Perkins discussed God’s goodness and patience
mainly within the boundary of the doctrine of creation and providence (without
dealing with the supernatural dimension of God’s works ad extra). Nevertheless, he
did not lose the major focus on the ad extra dimension in the explanation of these
two attributes. In the following discussions, we will show the significance of this
characteristic in Perkins more clearly by investigating Charnock’s idea of goodness
and patience.
B. Charnock’s Exegesis: The Characteristics of the Summum Bonum
On the one hand, in approaching the scriptural basis of divine goodness,
Charnock draws out four characteristics of goodness — as original, infinite, perfect,
and immutable — by investigating the history of the exegesis of Mark 10:18.75 He
asserts the importance of this essential goodness of God in that neither the notion of
71 Perkins, Cases of Conscience, in Workes II, p. 2. Musculus similarly sees this division as to all
creatures and to His elect in Commonplaces of Christian Religion, p. 953, cited in PRRD III, p. 505.
However, despite this similarity with Musculus, Perkins seems not to view this goodness as literally
extending to salvific or redemptive grace.
72 Perkins, Of Gods Free Grace and Mans Free Will, in Workes I, pp. 744-5; cf. A Commentarie upon
the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, pp. 388-9; A Treatise of Christian Equity, in Workes II, pp.
448-52; An Exhortation to Repentance, in Workes III (ii), pp. 422-3. For a brief account of the
homiletical and historical context of Perkins’ theology, see J. Beeke, The Quest for Full Assurance:
The Legacy of Calvin and His Successors (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth, 1999), pp. 83-7.
73 Perkins, An Exposition upon the 2. Chap. of the Revelation, in Workes III (ii), pp. 303, 367-8.
74 Perkins, An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, p. 275. Cf. A Commentarie upon the Epistle to
the Galatians, in Workes II, pp. 338-9; An Exposition of Christs Sermon in the Mount, in Workes III (i),
p. 18.
75 “And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is, God.”
For details, see Works II, pp. 275-7.
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God nor His existence can be maintained without confessing it (Rom 1:20, Ps. 145:6-
7). It is at once “the end of the creation” and thus the efficient cause of goodness in
all creatures as the resemblance of God “the highest good” (summum bonum).76 That
is, according to Charnock, the value of the doctrine of divine goodness lies in the fact
that all of the loci — existence, nature, and works — of the doctrine of God should
be founded upon this “captain attribute” as primary among the other attributes.77 As
Muller points out, these “two corresponding systematic functions” of God’s goodness
as both an essential attribute and “the primary affection of the divine will” ad extra
are the important general bases of the Reformed idea of it since the Reformers.78
On the other hand, in dealing with God’s patience as part of His goodness,
Charnock bases his arguments upon the exegesis of Nahum 1:13.79 By way of
definition, he makes it clear that God’s patience is the power of controlling His anger
towards sin in relation to His justice — “a willingness to defer, and an unwillingness
to pour forth his wrath upon sinful creatures, he moderates his provoked justice, and
forbears to revenge the injuries he daily meets with in the world”.80 Thus we sense
that this patience in Charnock’s scheme is related to the whole providential work of
the righteous God prior to redemption and judgment, despite the distinction between
His mercy and patience.81
In brief, we have seen that the double function of divine goodness (and
patience) in its essential and extraneous directions de facto represents both the
Thomistic and Scotistic characteristics reflected in the Puritan and Reformed
scholastic understanding of God’s attributes with firm exegetical bases. We shall
frequently deal with the dialectics between the two ways in the ongoing doctrinal and
76 Works II, pp. 280-2.
77 Works II, p. 285; see p. 282: “His wisdom then steps in to dispose the methods of what he resolved,
and his power follows to execute what his wisdom hath disposed, and his goodness designed. His
power in making, and his wisdom in ordering, are subservient to his goodness;” see also p. 284: “All
are streams from this one fountain; he could be none of this were he not first good.”
78 PRRD III, p. 503. Nevertheless, according to Muller, although the definition of divine goodness
(mentioning both essential and external dimensions) is similar between Aquinas and the Reformed
orthodox, the clear tendency of emphasis upon the ad extra – “affective or volitional understanding of
divine goodness” – in the Reformed also reflects a Scotistic influence on their ideas. See also ibid., p.
506. Arminius’ idea of divine goodness is much closer to the Thomistic position than the Reformed
orthodox in that he stresses the “communication” of this divine goodness by our “participation”. See
God, Creation, and Providence, pp. 137-8.
79 “The Lord is slow to anger, and great in power, and will not at all acquit the wicked; the Lord hath
his way in the whirlwind and in the storm, and the clouds are the dust of his feet.” cf. PRRD III, p.
574; Leigh, A Systeme or Body of Divinity, II. xii, p. 299. Here Leigh also uses the same scriptural text
as Charnock in examining the divine patience.
80 Works II, p. 504.
81 For example, Works II, p. 506: “[God’s patience] differs from mercy in the formal consideration of
the object; mercy respects the creature as miserable, patience respects the creature as criminal.”
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practical discussions of the divine goodness and patience.
C. Charnock’s Doctrine of the Goodness and Patience of God:
The Integrative Understanding of the Ad Intra/Ad Extra in the Triune God and
His Works
In the initial paragraph of the doctrinal section, Charnock seeks to examine
the nature of this goodness on a full scale. He first notes that all creatures have a
“natural” goodness, despite the fall, as the reflection of God’s goodness due to the
works of creation itself. For Charnock, this shows that the motive of the divine acts
of creation and providence does not stem from His mercy (to all the miserable
creatures) or grace (to the rational creatures only), but rather from a goodness that is
wider in its scope.82 He defines this goodness as the “inclination to deal well and
bountifully with His creatures”.83 Charnock also notes that God is the only essential,
supreme, and necessary good in nature and essence because of the simplicity of God
Himself who diffuses it to the created world. That is, God does this as the ultimate
cause of their derivative goodness to enable them to participate in His primary
good.84
Starting from the goodness of God, Charnock elicits various propositions.
These develop his ideas concerning the doctrine of creation, citing abundant
scholastic resources. He holds that the communicated goodness seen in the ad extra
dimension shows particularly the “love” or affection of God emitted to all creatures,
without reaching the soteriological or redemptive level.85 At the same time, citing
the Catholic theologian Thomas Cajetan (1469-1534), Charnock insists that this
divine love to the goodness of creatures evidences the intratrinitarian love of God
Himself.86 At this point, in Charnock’s view, the relationship of goodness and love
82 Works II, pp. 277-8, citing Peter Lombard, lib. iv. distinct 46, p. 286.
83 Works II, pp. 283-4.
84 Works II, pp. 285-8, 293-4.
85 Puritan and Reformed orthodoxy frequently dealt with the love of God within the boundary of His
goodness, in a discussion more developed than that of the sixteenth century Reformers. This is shown
in their general definition of divine love as God’s movement towards goodness or union-oriented
inclination (in terms of the ad intra or extra). See PRRD III, pp. 561, 564-5. On the general tendency
of Reformed orthodox thought about God’s voluntary love to the creatures divided into three
dimensions (all creatures, rational creatures, the elect), see PRRD III, pp. 566-8.
86 Works II, p. 284, citing Cajetan, in Secund secundae, qu. 34. art. 3. Although it has been traditional
to distinguish three kinds of intratrinitarian love in God (the love between the Father and the Son, the
love of the Holy Spirit emanating both from the Father and the Son, and the love of the Father to the
Son as the basis of pactum salutis), Calvin and the later Reformed orthodox theologians focused more
upon the love of the trinitarian God ad extra, because of their reluctance to deal with the somewhat
speculative discussion (which was frequent in the medieval scholastic treatment of it) of the ad intra
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lies in the context of the relation between the divine intellect and will in His
essence.87 In other words, we see that Charnock unfolds his argument by being
clearly aware of the Thomistic position which gives priority to the intellect and
goodness over the will and love. We may sense that his understanding of the divine
wisdom and power in connection with the divine goodness displayed in the works of
creation and providence would be located within the same context. That is to say,
goodness should be grasped as the highest reason that leads divine wisdom and
power to operate upon His act towards its end.88
In addition Charnock stresses the fact that His necessary goodness does not
conflict with His freedom, based upon the division of essential or ad intra and
external or ad extra dimensions. Likewise, other attributes of God harmoniously
support the outward operation of the divine will:
God is necessarily good, affective, in regard of his nature; but freely good,
effective, in regard of the effluxes of it to this or that particular subject he
pitcheth on. … He is an understanding agent, and hath a sovereign right to
choose his own subjects. It would not be a supreme goodness, if it were not a
voluntary goodness. It is agreeable to the nature of the highest good to be
absolutely free, to dispense his goodness in what methods and measures he
pleaseth, according to the free determinations of his own will, guided by the
wisdom of his mind, and regulated by the holiness of his nature. … As it is the
perfection of his nature, it is necessary; as it is the communication of his bounty,
it is voluntary.89
In fact this could be also construed as a delicate combination of Thomism and
Scotistic voluntarism following in the general tendency of Puritan and Reformed
orthodox theology. In the same way, the reason for His communication of goodness
to creatures is founded upon His pleasurable will. To put it another way, God cannot
be the summum bonum unless He is voluntary love or lover.90
With these points in mind, Charnock defends the goodness of God (in a
similar style to the discussion of the holiness we dealt with in the previous section of
this chapter) at a somewhat polemical level, related both to the problems of sin and
dimension of trinitarian love. We see Charnock also shows this tendency to prioritise the ad extra
dimension in the love of God without missing out the importance of intratrinitarian love also.
87 See Works II, p. 289: “As God is necessarily mind, so he is necessarily will; as he is necessarily
knowing, so he is necessarily loving. He could not be blessed if he did not know himself, and his own
perfection; nor good if he did not delight in himself and his own perfections. ”
88 Works II, p. 292.
89 Works II, p. 290.
90 Cf. PRRD III, p. 565.
210
to the notion of God’s vindicative justice.91 In some way, this could be regarded as
another of Charnock’s exquisite formal combinations of Thomism and Scotism since
it addresses the divine wisdom and will in Christ’s atonement as a necessary way of
penal substitution for our sins in terms of the goodness of God. If we are to sum up
— on the one hand, original sin and unbelief cannot lessen the goodness of God in
creation because the voluntary state of Adam and the angels before the fall was due
to the very goodness itself that fully expected a “voluntary obedience” from them.92
God’s redeeming grace certainly reinforces the authenticity of this goodness. On the
other hand, God’s justice and judgment are part of His goodness since the necessity
of the law as the truth of God is confirmed and vindicated by demonstrating His will
to punish sin. Furthermore, we might say that all divine attributes are also part of His
goodness only on the condition of this penalty for sin.93 Therefore, we can say that
Charnock seeks to expound divine goodness, love, and justice together by integrating
all the loci of the doctrine of God in view of His trinitarian acts.
Following his own typical style of examining other attributes under the larger
category of the divine intellect and His will, we meet again Charnock’s exploration
of the divine exercises of this goodness according to the three dimension of His
works ad extra: creation, redemption, and providence. In dealing with the goodness
in creation, he first makes it clear that the end of the whole creation was not just the
existence of being itself, but the goodness of the created being. In particular, the
creation of humanity as spiritual beings who possess soul’s faculties is related to the
higher intention of communicating His goodness to the rational creature. For
Charnock, this integrity or excellency of human nature is nothing less than the image
of the holy and blessed God as creator. This is especially shown in the soul’s
91 For details, see Works II, pp. 294-306. On the error of the Arminians’ idea of the general atonement
against the Reformed doctrine of double predestination, based upon their own understanding of the
relationship between divine justice and goodness, see PRRD III, p. 510; Muller, God, Creation, and
Providence, p. 196.
92 The quotation is from Works II, p. 295; cf. ibid., p. 312.
93 See Works II, p. 302: “All of his attributes, which are parts of his goodness, engage him to punish
sin; without it, his authority would be vilified, his purity stained, his power derided, his truth
disgraced, his justice scorned, his wisdom slighted.” At the same time this could be inferred from
Charnock’s argument concerning divine love mentioned earlier, which should be considered
distinctively depending upon whether God is the creator of all creatures or the redeemer of the elect.
In addition, we can sense that Charnock’s argument shows that he emphasised the characteristic of
vindicatory justice as an essential attribute along with the ad extra dimension. When we consider the
fact that Arminians and Socinians were criticised by Owen because of their radical Scotistic view
(seeing it as the mere attribute of the ad extra) of vindicatory justice, Muller’s appraisal of Owen’s
criticism as an attempt at Thomistic “neutralization” also corresponds to Charnock’s case here. See
PRRD III, pp. 490-1; Owen, Dissertation on Divine Justice, in The Works of John Owen, vol. 10, pp.
481-624.
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faculties of clear understanding and free will. Human beings are the only dually
characterised creatures located between the creator and other creatures.94
Despite being mentioned earlier in a similar pattern in relation to other
attributes, the goodness of God is also seen in the fact that God has made human
nature “naturally righteous” enough for man to obey the law engraved in his/her
heart at the time of creation. This is in order to give the reasonable condition of
“eternal happiness” to humanity through the covenant of works.95 Nevertheless, at
this point, Charnock clearly asserts the limit of God’s “natural goodness” after the
fall since it cannot give a “supernatural happiness” but merely a “natural
happiness”.96 As has been usual with his basic attitude, this shows that Charnock
emphasises the radical gap between nature and grace in the level at which true
felicity is enjoyed. At the same time he does not devalue the work of creation in that
it is the foundation of the larger goodness of God based upon His eternal decree.97
In approaching the doctrine of divine goodness in redemption, Charnock sees
the need to underscore the fact that it stems from the goodness of the whole Trinity
— i.e., he observes that the office and the work of each person in the trinitarian God
are more clearly revealed in the work of redemption.98 Charnock also holds that the
goodness of the redemptive work is higher than that of creation because the whole
human being is restored by the sacrifice of the Son, through the operation of the
renewal of the soul’s faculties of intellect and will. With this in mind, Charnock
focuses on explaining the relation between the goodness of God and the merit of
94 Works II, pp. 308, 310.
95 See Works II, pp. 310-6.
96 Works II, p. 317.
97 E.g. Works II, p. 317: “God might have created man only for a natural happiness, according to the
perfection of his natural faculties, and dealt bountifully with him, if he had never intended him a
supernatural blessedness and an eternal recompence; but what a largeness of goodness is here, to
design man in his creation for so rich a blessedness as an eternal life, with the fruition of himself!” To
be sure the grace of God was also dealt with in the Puritan and the Reformed scholastics as one of the
branches of His goodness. Broadly speaking, the Protestant camp saw the concept of gratia not as
some kind of quality (despite the fact that grace changes the quality of the faculties of the soul in
relation to the concept of habitus), but as the supernatural favour of God irrespective of human merit,
against the view of medieval scholastics. At the same time seventeenth century orthodox theologians
also possessed the idea of the objects of the wider coverage of God’s grace (beyond the elect). See
PRRD III, p. 570. On the detailed treatment of this grace in relation to the law and the covenant of
works, see Won Taek Lim, The Covenant Theology of Francis Roberts (Chungnam: King & Kingdom,
2002); E. F. Kevan, The Grace of Law: A Study of Puritan Theology (London: Carey Kingsgate Press,
1963). Thus, although Charnock here contrasts nature and grace, yet it also reflects his underlying idea
of nature as a kind of “grace” in all of His works, which is the prerequisite of larger grace based upon
His infinite goodness and wisdom.
98 See Works II, p. 319: “In this [goodness of redemption] there are distinct functions: the grace of the
Father, the merit of the Son, and the efficacy of the Spirit. The Father makes the promise of
redemption, the Son seals it with his blood, and the Spirit applies it.”
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Christ as the means of redemption. He states:
Divine goodness only, without the association of any merit, not only of man, but
of the Redeemer himself, begat the first purpose of our recovery. He was
singled out and predestinated to be our redeemer, before he took our nature to
merit our redemption. … The love of God to the world was first in intention and
the order of nature, before the will of giving his Son to the world. His intention
of saving was before the mission of a Saviour, so that this affection rose not
from the merit of Christ, but the merit of Christ was directed by this affection.99
To put it another way, although Christ’s dying was voluntary, it was subordinate to
the eternal good will of the Father in the light of the order of the intratrinitarian
relationship among the divine persons. This also shows that Charnock thinks that the
Father’s will to predestinate Christ as our mediator and redeemer evidences the
priority of the goodness of God over the merit of Christ obtained by atonement.100
Therefore, for Charnock, God’s goodness is the foundational attribute for
understanding the work of redemption. Even so, in this goodness shown in
redemption, God reveals much more of His image than He does in creation by giving
Christ the Son to us, as Charnock writes: “[God] gave himself in creation to us, in the
image of his holiness, but in redemption he gave himself in the image of his
person.”101 In some way, there is a sense in which Charnock stresses the fact that the
incarnation has de facto implications for both the creation and the redemption of
human being — the sanctification of our nature in the imitation of the God-human.
Therefore, as was the case where he deals with the other attributes, we find that
Charnock firmly maintains his interest in the trinitarian and christological
backgrounds (of the goodness of God in redemption) in terms of both the ad intra in
its eternal dimension and the ad extra in its temporal dimension.
Above all, in considering the balance of his discussion, Charnock seems to
99 Works II, p. 323.
100 How one understands the meaning of the “necessity” of the incarnation and Christ’s atonement
differs within the Reformed camp, depending upon whether one accepts Anselmian theory or not. For
instance, according to Muller’s view, Scotus, Calvin, Twisse, and Rutherford opposed the “ultimate
necessity” of the Anselmian view by way of prioritising the sovereign will of the Father or the
absolute freedom of God. Yet Owen and Turretin regarded this necessity as ultimate, based upon its
significance as the soteriological assumption for the arguments. See PRRD III, pp. 494-5; cf. Owen,
Dissertation on Divine Justice, in Works 10, pp. 586-607; Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii, 19, pp. 234-41.
Charnock seems to take an eclectic position between the two views, but is at the same time closer to
the Scotistic position that emphasises the intratrinitarian order. See Charnock, The Knowledge of
Christ Crucified; idem, Christ Our Passover; idem, The Voluntariness of Christ’s Death; idem, The
Acceptableness of Christ’s Death, in Works IV, pp. 494-586.
101 Works II, pp. 326-7. Italics are mine.
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regard the covenant of grace as the most outstanding benefit for the elect as the
manifestation of divine goodness in its redemptive aspect. The goodness of God in
the new covenant, founded upon “the firmness of divine love” and the merit of Christ,
makes it possible for Him to imprint a “gracious heart” in the sinner in his/her
conversion.102 Even so, this evangelical covenant necessarily needs the conditions of
both faith and repentance. On the basis of this assumption, it is notable that Charnock
seeks especially to account for faith as the condition of entering the covenant, viewed
in terms of a relationship made between God and the elect through the goodness of
God. Only faith as a “full submission” can link us with the Son who is the object of
that faith, because divine goodness appointed Christ as the mediator between God
and the elect.103 As a matter of fact, this displays Charnock’s balanced understanding
of the divine goodness in the new covenant by considering its bilateral aspects.104 Of
course we find, once again, Charnock stressing that only the person who possesses
trinitarian knowledge of God in faith and repentance can receive the covenantal
benefit of His goodness.105
Similarly Charnock examines the significance of the sacraments, especially
the Lord’s Supper, as the visible element of divine goodness within the context of the
covenant of grace.106 Above all, Charnock relates the value of the Eucharist to the
sanctification or “beautification” of the soul’s faculties as well as to the strengthening
of our faith. He comments, “Neither of [Bread and the wine] lose their substance, but
both acquire a sanctification by the relation they have to that which they represent,
… In those God offers … a blood that can wash away our sins, and beautify our
souls.”107 Specifically, God shows His goodness by giving the Eucharist as a means
of sanctification, which is also a “dual sealing” of the new covenant. First, such
sealing is given to those who receive it “by the efficacy of the Spirit”, to their
consolation, assurance, and confidence in God on the condition of faith in the merit
102 Works II, p. 332.
103 Works II, p. 338.
104 E.g. Works II, p. 339: “The new covenant is a marriage covenant, Hosea ii. 16, 19, 20, which
implies a consent on our parts, as well as a consent on God’s part; that is no marriage that hath not the
consent of both parties.” For a representative analysis of this area in the Anglo-American Puritan
context especially related to the bilateral aspect of Reformed covenant thought, see John Von Rohr,
The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), esp. pp. 1-33, 53-85.
105 See Works II, p. 336: “He hath revealed a trinity of persons in their distinct offices in the business
of redemption, without which revelation of a trinity we could not have a right notion and scheme of
redeeming grace.”
106 For a general account of Puritan ideas of the Lord’s Supper, see E. Brooks Holifield, The Covenant
Sealed: The Development of Puritan Sacramental Theology in Old and New England, 1570-1720
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 109-38.
107 Works II, p. 342.
214
of Christ’s blood.108 Second, according to Charnock, we can consider this sealing in
the light of the pactum salutis along with a trinitarian background as well. He states:
The articles of the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son,
agreed on from eternity, were accomplished on Christ’s part by his death, on the
Father’s part by his resurrection; … The covenant of grace, founded upon this
covenant of redemption, is sealed in the sacrament. God owns his standing to
the terms of it, as sealed by the blood of the Mediator, by representing him to us
under those signs, and gives us a right upon faith to the enjoyment of the fruits
of it;109
Therefore, in Charnock’s view, God’s goodness in this covenantal or sacramental
sealing also leads us to a “union and communion with Christ” as the object of our
“justifying and sanctifying” faith through the work of the Holy Spirit.110 There then
follows the goodness of the believer, superior to that of Adam — and the believer is
now responsible for seeking to realise God’s original motive of creation by his own
pursuit of holiness.111 In other words, in Charnock’s schema, our holiness and
goodness coalesce in the doctrine of sanctification based upon redemptive works
accomplished and continuously applied to the life of faith and repentance. The
enactment of the sacrament based upon His covenantal relationship with us confirms
the divine goodness both hidden in the eternal decree and revealed in the extraneous
acts of the trinitarian God for the fulfillment of redemption.
Also in considering divine goodness in providence (somewhat repetitive of
previous discussions related to the government of God) Charnock concentrates on the
aspect of God’s being “the Saviour of all men (1 Tim. 4:10)” who maintains the
“beauty” of the creatures as the cosmos, “a comely world”.112 Within this context,
goodness is also seen in His permission of temptations, sin, and evils as the governor
of them. This ultimately guides us to victory in spiritual struggle, which yields a
better faith, a renewed heart through the means of grace, “the greatest communion
with God”, and “the service of God” as the very end of human creation and our own
goodness devoted to this end.113 At the same time, God’s long-suffering towards
108 Quotation from Works II, p. 343.
109 Works II, p. 343.
110 Works II, p. 344.
111 See Works II, p. 347: “Man hath not yet enjoyed the creature in the first intention of them; sin
made an interruption in that fruition. As redemption restores man to his true end, so it restores the
creatures to their true use.”
112 Works II, pp. 348, 352.
113 Works II, pp. 360-4. On the general tendency of the Reformed orthodox idea of this providential
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transgressors is also related to His providential goodness. Thus, in the doctrinal
section concerning God’s patience, Charnock focuses on His goodness in this
hamartiological aspect. While noting the nature of the divine patience revealed in the
christological manifestation as our mediator,114 Charnock defends God’s patience in
relation to its harmony with the other attributes. This harmony is founded upon the
soteriologically oriented providential wisdom of God, as Charnock says:
Since God hath glorified his justice on Christ as a surety for sinners, his
patience is so far from interfering with the rights of his justice, that it promotes
it. It is dispensed to this end, that God might pardon with honour, both upon the
score of purchased mercy and contented justice; that, by a penitent sinner’s
return, his mercy might be acknowledged free, and the satisfaction of his justice
by Christ be glorified in believing.115
That is, for Charnock, the idea of goodness in creation and redemption is
amalgamated in the wider discussion of the providential goodness of the Triune God
as both governor and the judge of the universe and history.
In summary, we have seen that Charnock’s doctrinal formulation of divine
goodness is basically oriented ad extra. Nevertheless, for Charnock, the goodness of
the Triune God from eternity to the end of history is immutable in every respect
because the christological foundation of both the decree and its execution penetrates
the centre of the federal relationship between God and the elect.
D. Charnock’s Praxis concerning the Goodness and Patience of God:
The Pursuit of the Knowledge of the “Prime Attribute”
In this section, Charnock again endeavours to expound both the harmony of
the divine attributes and the primacy of goodness as the ground of true religion. In
other words, he argues that only a clear knowledge of the importance of God’s
goodness can bridge doctrine or theology and practice or piety by way of drawing
each doctrinal locus into our true knowledge of God as a consistent system. He thus
initially notes the importance of the goodness of God. It is an interposed doctrine
between God’s existence (as the initial doctrine of the theological system) and
goodness within a similar context to that of Charnock, see PRRD III, p. 509.
114 Works II, p. 509: “God discovered not his grace but in Christ, and therefore discovered not his
patience but in Christ; it is in him he met with the satisfaction of his justice, that he might have ground
for the manifestation of his patience.”
115 Works II, p. 512. Also see ibid., p. 524: “He is solicited by his justice, directed by his omniscience,
and armed with judgments to vindicate himself, but his arm is restrained by patience.”
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Christ’s second coming (as final or eschatological), which saving faith rests upon.116
Charnock also elaborates the relation between the necessity of the Triune God’s self-
love in terms of the ad intra, which is founded upon His own goodness, and the
“powerful and free” emission of it to the created world ad extra.117 Therefore,
conversely, this divine love and goodness based upon both the intratrinitarian and the
external dimension demand our faith and obedience, that is, as fides caritates
formata within the covenantal union of goodness between God and the elect.118 To
be sure, in Charnock’s view, this covenantal obligation is not a speculative, but a
practical knowledge of divine goodness accompanied by the operations of the
understanding, affection, and will.119 In some way, the goodness of God is related to
the problem of assurance because goodness also provides the pre-cognitive (next to
His existence but prior to Scripture) foundation of our theology as the knowledge of
God. Charnock states:
The principle foundation of faith is not the word of God, but God himself, and
God as considered in this perfection. … If God be not first believed to be good,
he would not be believed at all in anything that he speaks or swears. … The
divine perfection gives credit to the divine promises; they of themselves would
not be a sufficient ground of trust, without an apprehension of his truth; nor
would his truth be very comfortable, without a belief of his good will, whereby
we are assured, that what he promises to give he gives liberally, free, and
without regret.120
That is, Charnock seeks to show the character of the goodness of God as the object of
our pursuit of the knowledge of God by the motion of both intellect and will — God
as the supreme good should be the “object of [our] desire” and we ought to use all
our faculties of the soul in order to know and to love Him.121 Thus, both the frequent
meditation on His goodness through the Word and the imitation of it through the
116 Works II, p. 378. For an excellent study of Puritans’ eschatology in recent scholarship, see
Crawford Gribben, The Puritan Millennium: Literature and Theology, 1550-1682, revised edition
(Carlisle: Paternoster, 2008).
117 See Works II, p. 379: “His goodness is his Godhead, Rom. i. 20. By his Godhead is meant his
goodness: if he loves his Godhead for itself, he loves his goodness for itself. He would not be good if
he did not love himself; … Self-love upon this account is the only prerogative of God;” also p. 387:
“God’s loving himself doth not make him good, but supposeth him good. He was good in the order of
nature, before he loved himself, and his being good was the ground of his loving himself, …”
118 Works II, p. 384.
119 Works II, p. 383.
120 Works II, pp. 383-4.
121 Works II, p. 392.
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example of Christ are indispensable to this quest of piety.122 In a similarly pietistic
context, Charnock also stresses the danger of humanity’s abuse of God’s goodness
and long-suffering patience regarding our sin, because the federal relationship
between God and the elect can only be maintained through repentance as the result of
His long-suffering.123
In brief, for Charnock, the pursuit of the knowledge of the divine goodness is
closely related to the growth of theological virtues that necessarily accompany the
act of all the faculties of the soul. The dual emphases of both the Thomistic aspect of
His goodness as the middle term of our theology (between the existence of God and
Scripture) and the Scotistic or voluntaristic aspect of human participation confirm
Charnock’s eclectic combination of theology and piety without losing both the
balance and tension of our trinitarian knowledge of God as a “system”.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the doctrine of God’s attributes as the exercise of His will
was consistently important to Perkins, in the period of early orthodoxy, and to
Charnock, in the period of high orthodoxy. This is especially true in terms of
providing a moral basis of coherence for Puritan piety and its theological system
within the boundary of the discussion of the true knowledge of God. The continuity
of the emphasis upon the doctrine of sanctification was maintained from Perkins to
Charnock, although Charnock developed the doctrinal or polemical discussions for
the defence of the orthodox theological system as unified loci, against the challenge
of the new intellectual milieu in the mid and later seventeenth century. Yet both
Perkins and Charnock pursued arguments resisting the dissolution and reorganisation
of each doctrinal locus. The critical reason for this pursuit in Perkins and Charnock is
that the orthodox theological framework, particularly in terms of its anthropological,
christological, covenantal, and trinitarian coherence, was important to them — it was,
indeed, for them the very foundation of the grace of our sanctification. Charnock did
not lose the Puritan characteristic of a “heart theology” pointing to the beautification
or purification of the psychological faculties or, for that matter, the scholastic or
traditional background of these discussions.
We also have discovered that the doctrine of God’s goodness and patience
122 See Works II, pp. 392-9, 538-44.
123 See Works II, esp. pp. 530-3.
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was extended to redemptive or supernatural considerations in Charnock, although
Perkins confined it to the area of creation and providence. This could be interpreted
as another developed or eclectic way of combining Thomism and Scotism in the
dispute with the Socinians related to the appropriate distinctions within the essential
and external dimensions of God’s goodness. Yet the traditional scheme of nature and
grace based upon the trinitarian foundation remains the same. According to the result
of our investigation, this phenomenon was arguably due to the development of
federal theology in later Puritan and Reformed orthodox thought that sought to
consolidate the relationship of the eternal or ad intra and the temporal or ad extra
dimensions as the foundation of our knowledge of the Triune God, which ought to be
the true worshipping of God. That is, we can conclude that this final chapter (directly
related to the doctrine of sanctification) confirms, in fact, the statement that
Charnock’s fourfold structure of high orthodoxy — irrespective of the aspect of
theological content — is not the result of scholastic speculation deeply influenced by
Aristotelian philosophy. The essential “ontological or metaphysical” basis of
trinitarian theology should not be regarded as “impersonal abstraction”. There is
much clearer evidence to suggest that it is representative of the inseparability of a
Trinitarian system of theology and piety (based upon the important relationship
between faith and obedience), along with the defence of divine simplicity so




We need, now, to return to the comments of Colin Gunton and Tudur R Jones
cited in the first chapter of this thesis, concerning Stephen Charnock’s thought, in
order to draw some conclusions. Using a “negative” understanding of the
relationship between the Trinity and the divine attributes in the “classical” doctrine
of God (as explained in our introductory investigation of the historical background)
Gunton has argued that Charnock’s account of the divine attributes does not reflect a
dynamic relationship with the “act and being” of the Trinitarian God: that is, the God
Who is the revealer of the gospel as the story of the history of salvation in Scripture.
This, in Gunton’s view, was because Charnock was unable to overcome the
limitations of a traditional “negative theology” influential since Pseudo-Dionysius.
Gunton even argued that Charnock’s work was based upon a structure of
“metaphysical causality” with “Neoplatonic and analogical rather than biblical”
tendencies which do not explain the positive or personal relationship between the
Triune God and creatures.1 Jones criticised Charnock’s work because it had moved
away from pure Puritan thought towards the realm of rationalism and scholasticism
by conceiving the covenant of redemption without an adequate Scriptural basis.2
However, according to the findings of our investigation into Perkins’ and
Charnock’s ideas of theological prolegomena, Scripture, and the doctrine of God’s
existence and attributes in the foregoing chapters, these criticisms turn out to be
seriously problematic. This has been clearly shown, in the basic unfolding structure
of our thesis, by a comparative examination of the doctrinal loci used by Charnock
and Perkins in terms of continuity, difference, and development. We have seen that
Perkins’ idea of these doctrinal areas de facto provides the form and content of
trinitarian theology and piety on the basis of the doctrine of divine simplicity. In
other words, we have affirmed how the scholastic background was amalgamated into
1 Colin Gunton, Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes (London: SCM Press,
2002), see esp. pp. 6-18.
2
Tudur Jones, “Union with Christ: The Existential Nerve of Puritan Piety,” Tyndale Bulletin 41/2
(1990), pp. 194-5. For an excellent biblical and systematic defence of the pactum salutis against
modern criticism, based upon the general historical background of Reformed theology, see David
VanDrunen and R. Scott Clark, “The Covenant before the Covenants,” in Covenant, Justification, and
Pastoral Ministry: Essays by the Faculty of Westminster Seminary California, ed. R. Scott Clark (New
Jersey: P & R, 2007), pp. 167-96.
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Charnock’s Reformed orthodox theological system of the trinitarian knowledge of
God as a tool or method, along with a “Puritan” piety that emphasised the
regeneration and sanctification of the elect. Clearly this trinitarian system has a
biblical foundation in terms of covenantal and christological foci in eternal or ad
intra and temporal or ad extra dimensions.
As was the case with Perkins, the role of both the Scripture and its
interpretation was consolidated in Charnock’s work through arguments involving a
tension and harmony between subjective revelation (knowledge of Christ as the
object of our saving faith) and the role of ancillary reason in eliciting doctrinal
conclusions from it. This is evidence that Charnock’s thought was neither
rationalistic nor unscriptural, but rather established a vital tension and harmony of
grace and nature as was the case in wider Puritan and later Reformed scholastic
theology. In addition, we have seen that the use of the scholastic term habitus based
upon the theory of faculty psychology and the dialectics of Thomism and Scotism
was remarkable in Charnock’s work. The relationship of intellect and will, essence
(being) and act, eternity and time, and theology and piety are complex but can be
understood against the background of their scholarly context. He also appropriated
the traditional faculty psychology as a necessary means of explaining aspects of the
whole of “eternal life,” while at the same time maintaining the tradition of Perkins
and the English Puritan “heart” theology. For Charnock, this was nothing less than
the believer’s incessant pursuit of the true knowledge of the Triune God Who wants
His creatures to desire to worship and communicate with Him.
In effect, the development of the fourfold structure (exegetical, doctrinal,
polemical, and practical) of Charnock’s writings, from Perkins’ Ramistic frame of
faith and obedience, was related to the pursuit of a more solid “trinitarian”
theological system. This, in turn, maintained the doctrine of divine simplicity and a
defence of the merit of pietistic efforts against the attempts of the Socinians to
dissolve the interconnectedness of each doctrinal locus related reciprocally as part of
the wider trinitarian “system” of the full doctrine of God. In other words, the formal
or structural developments in Charnock’s works are, rather, the evidence of a
fundamental continuity with Perkins’ thought. This, in turn, has already been verified
as being in continuity with Calvin’s thought as the prototype of Reformed theology.
Above all, Jones’ criticism of Charnock’s work on the covenant of redemption is
undoubtedly due to his failure to notice the mid or later seventeenth century orthodox
theologians’ dual efforts: Charnock and the Reformed scholastics sought to reinforce
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both the ontological and economic (creation, providence, and redemption) bases of
the orthodox theological system along with a characteristic of Puritans’ profound
interest in the doctrine of God’s attributes in terms of both piety and sanctification.
The development of federal theology beyond Perkins in Charnock’s work in terms of
a greater attention to the historical dimensions (i.e. focusing on the history of
redemption) is further evidence of the high orthodox Puritan effort to reinforce the
theological bases of the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions.
Furthermore, contra Gunton’s criticism of Charnock, Charnock’s discussions
of God’s attributes were not a mere speculation engrossed in the ad intra dimension
of negative theology, but rather reached the “theological zenith” of the English
Puritan elaborative genre in the later seventeenth century by concentrating all of the
doctrinal loci into the locus de Deo. This means that the Puritans’ doctrine of the
attributes of God focusing rather upon the ad extra dimension effectively dispels the
suspicion that Reformed scholasticism is a derivative of rigid Aristotelian rationalism.
The defence of God’s sovereignty, freedom, and the monergistic soteriological
framework in the trinitarian system of our knowledge of God was carried on in
Charnock’s thought. The role of human freedom and contingency along with the
appropriate recognition of divine causality was not neglected.
Therefore, we would conclude this thesis by saying that the key point to
notice in our research is the “historical or intellectual” context of Charnock (and
Perkins) in the Reformed orthodox period in terms of the development of the history
of theology. The Barthian or “postliberal” interpretation of the “classical” doctrine of
God, including that of the Reformed scholastics, is based upon the legacy of
Harnack’s view of the history of doctrine, and so seems to miss the point. Contrary to
the contentions of Gunton and Jones, in their theology Charnock and the later
Puritans in high orthodoxy resisted the intrusion of “rationalism”. Charnock’s
“scholasticism” should not, in fact, be a barrier to our understanding the essence and
content of his theological system as Scripture-based.3 At the same time, especially in
the case of Charnock, there is instead a consolidation of the “systematic” relatedness
3 J. I. Packer also rightly comments as follows: “Charnock displays God’s attributes as qualities
observable in the concrete actions of the living God of which the Bible speaks. The technical terms,
and sometimes, arguments of scholastic theology are employed, but always with a biblical orientation.
Charnock has no desire to speculate but only to declare the works and ways, the nature and character,
of the God of the Bible,” in Joel Beeke and Randall Gleason, Meet the Puritans: with a Guide to
Modern Reprints (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2006), p. 145, cited from The
Encyclopedia of Christianity, ed. Erwin Falbusch and Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1999), vol. 2, p. 411.
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of trinitarian theology as our knowledge of God and the doctrine of God’s attributes.
This was in order to expound more clearly the essence and act of the three persons of
the Trinity in the unity of the Divine nature within the context of the rational
creature’s communion with the creator. The theological struggle towards full
salvation through “wholehearted Christianity” was the “vision” of Charnock (and
Perkins) as Reformed “scholastic” Puritans. This should not be considered as mere
“Hellenized theism” simply because it rests on the basis of the inheritance of an
Augustinian “content” and a Christian Aristotelian “method”. Through our case study
of trinitarianism and the doctrine of the divine attributes we have uncovered a
sophisticated and comprehensive understanding of the relationship of historical
theology and Christian doctrine as a core “system” of faith based upon the original
gospel.4
4 Cf. Colin Gunton, “Historical and Systematic Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Christian Doctrine, ed. Colin Gunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 3-20; John
Henry Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (London: J. Toovey, 1846). For a
recent notable example reflecting this point, see Malcolm Yarnell III, The Formation of Christian
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